Mechanisms · category

Compute accounting & provenance

Establishing what compute exists, where it is and what it can do: chip registries, manufacturing records, location verification, capacity bounds.

Name	Type	Development	Security evidence	Verifies	Threat model
Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges A verifier times answers to unpredictable questions designed so that answering correctly and in time requires holding specified data locally or dedicating specified resources.	Mechanism	Research demonstration Research demonstration for detecting whether a GPU is doing other work. Medium confidence. Mechanism · Adversarial prover	Published analysis or argument	Declared hardware is idle or shut down This compute runs inference, not training Chips are where they are declared to be The declared model is the one being served	Adversarial prover
Chip location verification Timing a chip's signed replies to trusted servers at known places, so that the speed of light bounds how far away the chip can be.	Mechanism	Proposed Proposed for bounding how far a chip is from trusted landmark servers when checked. Medium confidence. Mechanism · Adversarial prover	Published analysis or argument	Chips are where they are declared to be There is no undeclared relevant compute	Adversarial prover
Chip registries and manufacturing records Recording each AI chip's identity and owner from manufacture onwards, and publishing a cryptographic fingerprint of manufacturing records, so chips can be accounted for later.	Mechanism	Proposed Proposed for a checkable record of which chips were made and who declared owning them. Medium confidence. Mechanism · Semi-trusted prover	Published analysis or argument	Compute stock is at most a declared amount There is no undeclared relevant compute Chips are where they are declared to be	Semi-trusted prover
Hardware performance throttling and licensing Proposed on-chip mechanisms that cut an AI accelerator's performance when a license expires or a trusted trigger fires, bounding what the hardware can do.	Mechanism	Proposed Proposed for performance limits a verifier can rely on, against an operator trying to bypass them. Medium confidence. Mechanism · Adversarial prover	Published analysis or argument	Compute stock is at most a declared amount A training run stayed within declared limits Declared hardware is idle or shut down	Adversarial prover
Lucid sovereignty (location) certificates A draft specification, hosted by Lucid Computing, for short-lived certificates that bound where a workload runs by timing signed messages to servers at known locations. Standard · Realises Chip location verification Provider-reported	Implementation	Proposed Proposed for certifying the region where an attested workload ran at a given time. Medium confidence. Implementation · Semi-trusted prover	Published analysis or argument	Chips are where they are declared to be	Semi-trusted prover

Includes records that list this as a secondary category. Claims in grey italics are supported rather than aimed at.