Compartmentalization
Dividing a facility's accelerators into isolated groups with restricted communication between them, so that no group can join a larger prohibited workload.
Compartmentalization divides a facility's accelerators into groups and restricts communication between the groups, so that no group can take part in a larger workload than it is allowed 1 2.
Scher and Thiergart describe pods with high-bandwidth interconnect inside and very little bandwidth between them: between pods, inference needs to pass only tokens, whereas training exchanges gradients or activations 1. Efficient inference fits within dozens to low hundreds of closely connected accelerators, while large-scale training links thousands 1. RAND's "fixed set" design likewise restricts networking so that small, fixed sets of GPUs cannot be combined into large clusters 2, and Sastry and colleagues list physical limits on chip-to-chip networking as a way to enforce compute caps 3; these ideas underlie bandwidth limits and compartmentalization.
Compartments can also separate trust domains: one low-trust design air-gaps its evaluation environments and uses optical splitters and data diodes, simple components that can be inspected for tampering, to enforce one-way data movement 4. The boundaries can be checked by observing traffic between accelerators with network taps 5, while physical channels that could bypass monitored links are the target of side-channel suppression 6.
Related
Used in
- R1Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization
- R2Bounding unexplained information in outputs
- R1Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities
- R1RAND secure inference data center (SIDC) design
- Communication between compute groups is bounded
- This compute runs inference, not training
Sources
- BA. Scher & L. Thiergart (2025). Mechanisms to Verify International Agreements About AI Development. arXiv. Source recordSupports: pods of well-connected chips; between pods, inference needs only tokens while other forms of parallelism transfer activations or gradients; efficient inference on dozens to low hundreds of chips versus thousands for large training · Interconnect bandwidth limits
- BG. Kulp et al. (2024). Hardware-Enabled Governance Mechanisms: Developing Technical Solutions to Exempt Items Otherwise Classified Under Export Control Classification Numbers 3A090 and 4A090. RAND Corporation. Source recordSupports: fixed-set HEM restricting networking of small, fixed sets of GPUs · p. viii
- BG. Sastry et al. (2024). Computing Power and the Governance of Artificial Intelligence. arXiv. Source recordSupports: compute caps enforced via physical limits on chip-to-chip networking · enforcement mechanisms
- BN. Cankaya (2026). A System Overview for Near-Term, Low-Trust AI Compute Verification. Machine Intelligence Research Institute. Source recordSupports: air-gapped evaluation environments; optical splitters and data diodes as inspectable components enforcing one-way data movement · system architecture
- BM. Baker et al. (2025). Verifying International Agreements on AI: Six Layers of Verification for Rules on Large-Scale AI Development and Deployment. RAND Corporation. Source recordSupports: network taps observing data exchanged between chips · §4.2
- CN. Cankaya (2026). Suppressing Side Channels in an Untrusted Data Center via Retrofitted Defenses. MIRI Technical Governance Team. Source recordSupports: physical channels could bypass network monitoring · side channels of concern