Recomputation
Checking a claimed computation by re-running all of it, or a random sample, on hardware the verifier trusts and comparing the results.
Recomputation checks a claimed computation by re-running it, or a random sample of it, from the same inputs on hardware the verifier trusts, and comparing the results with those reported 1 2.
Re-running a large training run in full would be very costly, so in Shavit's framework the verifier re-runs selected segments, starting from a reported checkpoint and applying the reported data batches, and accepts if the result is close to the next reported checkpoint; this is the basis of proof-of-learning and training-transcript verification 1. For inference, a trusted reference implementation recomputes what the model should have predicted at each generated token 2, as in sampled inference recomputation; the same check can limit how much of a model's weights can be hidden in its responses (Bounding unexplained information in outputs) 3. Amodo Design distinguishes correctness, meaning that the workloads run match those declared, from completeness, meaning that every workload is reported, and notes that its recomputation schemes address only correctness 4. Recomputation also needs:
- Access to inputs and weights. This raises confidentiality problems, which Shavit addresses with a jointly trusted, air-gapped cluster 1; one low-trust design uses air-gapped auditing environments with committed weights 5.
- Commitment before sampling. The prover must fix its records, for example by committing to a hash of sampled weights, before it learns which step will be audited 4.
- A way to handle numerical nondeterminism. Benign noise otherwise makes legitimate variation hard to tell from real problems 2.
Related
Used in
- R2Bounding unexplained information in outputs
- R2Deterministic and bit-exact inference
- R2Model identity attestation⚠
- R1Network taps and certifiers
- R2Proof-of-learning and training-transcript verification⚠
- R1Reproducible computation packets
- R2Safeguard attestation
- R2Sampled inference recomputation
- R1AI 2040 inference-only verification stack
- R2DiFR (Divergence From Reference)
- R1Low-trust AI compute verification system overview
- R1SASH confidential network logger
- R2TOPLOC
- The declared model is the one being served
- This compute runs inference, not training
- A training run stayed within declared limits
Sources
- BY. Shavit (2023). What does it take to catch a Chinchilla? Verifying Rules on Large-Scale Neural Network Training via Compute Monitoring. arXiv. Source recordSupports: full re-running of large training is infeasible; verifier re-runs segments from a reported checkpoint with the reported data batches and accepts if close to the next checkpoint; jointly trusted air-gapped cluster for confidentiality · §5.1; §5.2
- BA. Karvonen et al. (2025). DiFR: Inference Verification Despite Nondeterminism. arXiv. Source recordSupports: trusted reference implementation recomputes predictions for generated tokens; nondeterminism makes legitimate variation hard to tell from real problems · abstract
- BR. Rinberg et al. (2025). Verifying LLM Inference to Detect Model Weight Exfiltration. arXiv. Source recordSupports: inference verification against a reference to limit steganographic weight exfiltration · abstract
- CAmodo Design (2026). Example Schemes for Verifying High-Stakes AI Agreements. Amodo Design. Source recordSupports: prover commits to sampled weights before learning whether a step will be audited; correctness vs completeness; schemes address correctness only · pre-training scheme; introduction
- BN. Cankaya (2026). A System Overview for Near-Term, Low-Trust AI Compute Verification. Machine Intelligence Research Institute. Source recordSupports: recomputation in air-gapped auditing environments with committed weights · system architecture