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A verification proposal from the AI Verification Tech Map, from its records of 2026-10-08. https://trustbutveri.fyi/explorer/?claims=C-0002&mechanisms=M-0007&goal=G-0006

Claims0 of 1 addressed

  1. Chips are where they are declared to be Unaddressed ×
×

Mechanisms1

Applied filters: none. Every filter is set to Any.

Analysis

Applied filters: none. Every filter is set to Any.

MechanismReadinessOpen flaws
Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting R13 significant
  • Open flaws: n critical n significant n minor
Claim coverage0 of 1 claim addressed

For the goal Enforce chip export controls. Each of its claims is marked direct or supporting.

1. Chips are where they are declared to be Direct
Unaddressed

No mechanism in the proposal addresses it.

Outside this map
  • End-user and end-use verification. Avellar and Grunewald also cover end-user verification, such as know-your-customer checks, and end-use verification, such as audits of compute provisioning. This map has no records for these compliance processes. B. Avellar & E. Grunewald 2026
Properties1 built for an adversarial prover
Attack testing1 mechanism with published testing

Published attempts to break a system, including those that found failures. Testing history does not show that open flaws are resolved.

Limits1 not yet demonstrated · 1 mechanism with open significant findings
Claims not fully addressed
Open significant flaws
3 flaws in 1 mechanism
  • Proves that work was done, not that no capacity remains in Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting

    Proof-of-work accounting bounds unmonitored compute only relative to an estimate of what the actor has. Attestable states that the verifier "needs a credible estimate of the compute available" to the actor, and that a proof "cannot discover a datacenter that was never declared". 1

    Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

    Related mechanism R1 Chip registries and manufacturing records: A registry of chips is one basis for the estimate of available compute that the flaw's source says the verifier needs. A pointer, not evidence that this flaw is mitigated. Add

    Related mechanism R1 Remote detection of data centres: Looks for data centres that were never declared, which a proof cannot discover. A pointer, not evidence that this flaw is mitigated. Add

  • Security rests on new hardness assumptions in Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting

    Komargodski and Weinstein base security on hardness assumptions about batches of low-rank random linear equations, and list PoUW "from more standard or well-studied assumptions" as an open problem. Pearl's floating-point variant introduces a further "quantized-subspace hardness" assumption. 3 4

    Open question · Significant · Open. On the record

  • Known shortcuts let a miner claim somewhat more work than it did in Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting

    Pearl's specification lists known mining speedups: crafted inputs, precision shortcuts, seed grinding, work reuse, and faster kernels or hardware. A policy check caps the summands a miner may skip at one-sixteenth of those in a tile. For capacity bounding, any gap between work proven and work possible leaves spare capacity. 4

    Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

Possible additions1 for claim gaps · 2 for open flaws

Mechanisms on the map that are not in the proposal. Pointers, not recommendations.

    • Aimed at claim 1, Chips are where they are declared to be, which is unaddressed.
    • Bears on the open significant flaw “Proves that work was done, not that no capacity remains” in Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting. A registry of chips is one basis for the estimate of available compute that the flaw's source says the verifier needs.
    • Bears on the open significant flaw “Proves that work was done, not that no capacity remains” in Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting. Looks for data centres that were never declared, which a proof cannot discover.
Dependencies3 blockers
Blockers
3 blockers recorded
  • Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting
    • Bounding spare capacity needs a credible estimate of the compute available to the actor, including third-party access. Capacity bounds 1
    • Proofs of work cannot find facilities that were never declared. Coverage & hidden compute 1
    • As of September 2026 no implementation, demonstration or independent evaluation of proofs of work for capacity bounding has been published. Adversarial validation
What the verifier sees1 depend on design

From the family or selected implementation's record.

Model weights

Depends on the design for Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting.

Inputs and outputs

Depends on the design for Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting.

Exposure notes
  • Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting: Checking a sampled tile of a matrix multiplication reveals that tile, which may hold model or input data; the authors suggest a zero-knowledge proof when the matrices must stay private.
Implementations1 system
Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting
Sources5 cited

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Filter mechanisms

Filters apply to mechanisms only. They describe the setting a proposal is for, and all are off by default. A mechanism that a filter rules out is flagged and does not count towards claim coverage. Selected implementations use their own record fields. A match means not excluded; conditional or unspecified exposure stays with a note. Passing a filter does not establish that the assumptions hold in a deployment.

All 25 mechanisms match.

Prover

How far can the party being checked be trusted?

The prover is the party being checked. Semi-trusted designs rely on part of its stack: usually the chip vendor's hardware root of trust, its firmware or counters, or its supply-chain records. Adversarial designs aim to hold even if it cheats wherever the checks allow, within their stated assumptions.

Keeps mechanisms whose threat model holds against at least this prover. Adversarial is the strongest assumption. Definitions

Verifier devices on site

May the verifier install its own hardware at the prover's sites?

Some mechanisms need a device the verifier owns or trusts at the prover's facility, such as a network tap, a bandwidth limiter or a sealed sensor. Choose Not allowed when the setting rules that out. Inspectors are not covered.

"Not allowed" removes mechanisms that need a retrofit device, such as a network tap or a sealed sensor. Definitions

Prover cooperation

How much must the prover take part?

Required: the prover takes part, for example by logging requests, producing proofs or opening records. Partial: some access, such as installing a device. Not required: works from outside, such as satellite imagery.

"Partial at most" removes mechanisms that need the prover's active participation. "Not required" keeps only those that work without it. Definitions

Chips

May the proposal depend on new chip designs?

New chip features take years to reach a deployed fleet and cover only chips made after they ship. Mechanisms that use shipping features, such as trusted execution environments or performance counters, stay.

"Existing chips only" removes mechanisms that need changes to future chip designs. Definitions

Minimum readiness

How mature must each mechanism be?

A level describes the public evidence for a mechanism's stated use, not its cost or feasibility. R3 can still have open critical flaws.

Keeps mechanisms whose readiness level is at least this one. Definitions

Attack testing

How hard has each mechanism been attacked in public?

The strongest published attempt to break the mechanism for its verification use: a security analysis, red-teaming by its developers or collaborators, or a red team independent of them.

Keeps mechanisms whose strongest published attack testing is at least this. Definitions

Keep hidden from the verifier

What must the verifier never see? Choose any.

Model weights: the checked model's parameters. Inputs and outputs: the requests a deployed model serves and its responses. Training data: what a model was trained on. Each mechanism's exposure is the editors' reading of its record: shown, depends on the design (kept, with a note), hidden, not involved, or unspecified for a selected implementation. Code and configuration are not covered yet.

Removes mechanisms that show the asset to the verifier. Conditional or unspecified exposure stays with a note and needs checking against the privacy requirement.

Claims

A claim is something one party wants to verify about another party's AI hardware or software. Each claim's number shows how the proposal addresses it.

  • Addressed. A mechanism in the proposal is aimed at this claim and is not excluded by the filters.
  • Partly addressed. Only supporting mechanisms, or mechanisms aimed at it that the filters exclude.
  • Unaddressed. No mechanism in the proposal addresses this claim.

Addressed means a mechanism in the proposal is aimed at the claim and is not excluded by your filters. It does not mean the claim is verified: check its assessed use, readiness, assumptions and open flaws.

All claims

Mechanisms

A mechanism is a general technique for verifying claims. Its badge is its readiness level for its stated use. An optional implementation choice narrows its assumptions, assessed use and claim links to that record. Lines join it to the claims it addresses. Click a line for details.Under its name it lists the claims it is aimed at or supports.

  • Aimed at the claim: verifying it is a direct purpose of the mechanism.
  • Supports the claim: helps verify it without being aimed at it.
  • Faint: excluded by your filters, so it does not count towards claim coverage.

All mechanisms

Overview

One row per mechanism in the proposal. Every mark comes from that mechanism's record, as listed in the panels below; what the verifier sees is the editors' reading of the record's text. Flaw counts are per mechanism. Summary counts name mechanisms with open findings, not a sum of attacks. Choosing an implementation narrows each row to that record's assessed use; family findings remain as context.

What the verifier sees

For model weights, inputs and outputs, and training data. This is the editors' reading of each mechanism's record (its threat model, how it works and its limitations), not a field of the record. Shown: the verifier sees it. Depends: on the design or variant, or the verifier sees only samples. Hidden: the verifier sees only commitments, hashes, proofs or results. Not involved: the record does not handle it. Unspecified: the selected implementation has no asset-specific assessment here.

Possible additions

Mechanisms on the map, not in the proposal, that the records connect to an unaddressed or partly addressed claim, an open flaw or a dependency. They are pointers, not recommendations: each brings its own readiness level and flaws, and none is claimed to close a flaw. Links from flaws are the editors' reading of the two records.

Start from a published design

Choosing a design loads the mechanisms its record realises or depends on. If the proposal has no claims yet, it also loads the claims that record says the design addresses.

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