{
  "schema_version": "1.3",
  "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/explorer/?mechanisms=M-0017,M-0003&cols=claims,hardware",
  "data_generated": "2026-10-09",
  "definitions": {
    "methodology": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/methodology/",
    "readiness": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/readiness/",
    "filters": [
      {
        "id": "prover",
        "label": "Prover",
        "question": "How far can the party being checked be trusted?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "cooperative",
            "label": "Cooperative"
          },
          {
            "value": "semi-trusted",
            "label": "Semi-trusted"
          },
          {
            "value": "adversarial",
            "label": "Adversarial"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose threat model holds against at least this prover. Adversarial is the strongest assumption.",
        "about": "The prover is the party being checked. Semi-trusted designs rely on part of its stack: usually the chip vendor's hardware root of trust, its firmware or counters, or its supply-chain records. Adversarial designs aim to hold even if it cheats wherever the checks allow, within their stated assumptions."
      },
      {
        "id": "onsite",
        "label": "Verifier devices on site",
        "question": "May the verifier install its own hardware at the prover's sites?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "no",
            "label": "Not allowed"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Not allowed\" removes mechanisms that need a retrofit device, such as a network tap or a sealed sensor.",
        "about": "Some mechanisms need a device the verifier owns or trusts at the prover's facility, such as a network tap, a bandwidth limiter or a sealed sensor. Choose Not allowed when the setting rules that out. Inspectors are not covered."
      },
      {
        "id": "coop",
        "label": "Prover cooperation",
        "question": "How much must the prover take part?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "partial",
            "label": "Partial at most"
          },
          {
            "value": "none",
            "label": "Not required"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Partial at most\" removes mechanisms that need the prover's active participation. \"Not required\" keeps only those that work without it.",
        "about": "Required: the prover takes part, for example by logging requests, producing proofs or opening records. Partial: some access, such as installing a device. Not required: works from outside, such as satellite imagery."
      },
      {
        "id": "chips",
        "label": "Chips",
        "question": "May the proposal depend on new chip designs?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "existing",
            "label": "Existing chips only"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Existing chips only\" removes mechanisms that need changes to future chip designs.",
        "about": "New chip features take years to reach a deployed fleet and cover only chips made after they ship. Mechanisms that use shipping features, such as trusted execution environments or performance counters, stay."
      },
      {
        "id": "ready",
        "label": "Minimum development status",
        "question": "Development status",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "R1",
            "label": "Proposed"
          },
          {
            "value": "R2",
            "label": "Research demonstration"
          },
          {
            "value": "R3",
            "label": "Operational use"
          },
          {
            "value": "R4",
            "label": "Legacy independent-evaluation filter",
            "legacy": true
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose readiness level is at least this one.",
        "about": "A level describes the public evidence for a mechanism's stated use, not its cost or feasibility. R3 can still have open critical flaws."
      },
      {
        "id": "tested",
        "label": "Attack testing",
        "question": "How hard has each mechanism been attacked in public?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "analysis",
            "label": "Published analysis"
          },
          {
            "value": "red-teamed",
            "label": "Red-teamed"
          },
          {
            "value": "independent-red-team",
            "label": "Independent red-team"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose strongest published attack testing is at least this.",
        "about": "The strongest published attempt to break the mechanism for its verification use: a security analysis, red-teaming by its developers or collaborators, or a red team independent of them."
      },
      {
        "id": "hide",
        "label": "Keep hidden from the verifier",
        "question": "What must the verifier never see?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "weights",
            "label": "Model weights"
          },
          {
            "value": "io",
            "label": "Inputs and outputs"
          },
          {
            "value": "training",
            "label": "Training data"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Removes mechanisms that show the asset to the verifier. Conditional or unspecified exposure stays with a note and needs checking against the privacy requirement.",
        "about": "Model weights: the checked model's parameters. Inputs and outputs: the requests a deployed model serves and its responses. Training data: what a model was trained on. Each mechanism's exposure is the editors' reading of its record: shown, depends on the design (kept, with a note), hidden, not involved, or unspecified for a selected implementation. Code and configuration are not covered yet."
      }
    ],
    "exposure": "For model weights, inputs and outputs, and training data. This is the editors' reading of each mechanism's record (its threat model, how it works and its limitations), not a field of the record. Shown: the verifier sees it. Depends: on the design or variant, or the verifier sees only samples. Hidden: the verifier sees only commitments, hashes, proofs or results. Not involved: the record does not handle it. Unspecified: the selected implementation has no asset-specific assessment here.",
    "claim_status": {
      "addressed": "A mechanism in the proposal is aimed at this claim and is not excluded by the filters.",
      "partly-addressed": "Only supporting mechanisms, or mechanisms aimed at it that the filters exclude.",
      "unaddressed": "No mechanism in the proposal addresses this claim."
    },
    "finding_classification": {
      "failure": {
        "label": "Known failures",
        "singular": "Known failure",
        "anchor": "known-flaws"
      },
      "scope-limitation": {
        "label": "Scope limitations",
        "singular": "Scope limitation",
        "anchor": "scope-limitations"
      },
      "open-question": {
        "label": "Open questions",
        "singular": "Open question",
        "anchor": "open-questions"
      }
    },
    "finding_scope": "Evidence scope describes where a finding was demonstrated; it does not establish applicability to every implementation in the mechanism family.",
    "claim_finding_scope": "open_critical_findings names active failures on the assessed records; open_critical_context names conditional family failures whose implementation applicability is unassessed.",
    "legacy_status": "The status field retains covered/partial/none for compatibility. It names claim links, never successful verification. Use claim_status and status_label for presentation."
  },
  "filters": {
    "prover": "",
    "onsite": "",
    "coop": "",
    "chips": "",
    "ready": "",
    "tested": "",
    "hide": []
  },
  "mechanisms_passing_filters": 25,
  "claims": [],
  "mechanisms": [
    {
      "id": "M-0017",
      "title": "Tamper evidence for verifier devices",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/tamper-evidence-for-verifier-devices/",
      "assessment_record": {
        "id": "M-0017",
        "title": "Tamper evidence for verifier devices",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/tamper-evidence-for-verifier-devices/"
      },
      "finding_counts": {
        "failure": 2,
        "scope_limitation": 1,
        "open_question": 0,
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 2,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "selected_implementation": null,
      "readiness": {
        "level": "R2",
        "scope": "detecting probing of proposed verifier hardware, using server and electronics prototypes as evidence",
        "confidence": "medium",
        "evidence": [
          "S-0052",
          "S-1315",
          "S-0051",
          "S-0050",
          "S-3262",
          "S-1316",
          "S-0018"
        ]
      },
      "development_status": {
        "code": "R2",
        "label": "Research demonstration",
        "short": "Research demo",
        "rank": 2,
        "legacy_code": "R2"
      },
      "security_evidence": {
        "attack_testing": {
          "status": "analysis",
          "label": "Published security analysis",
          "kind": "analysis"
        },
        "independent_evaluation": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "formal_proof": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "deployment_assurance": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "legacy_evaluation_code": null,
        "scoped_findings": [
          {
            "n": 1,
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "mechanism",
            "sources": [
              "S-1317",
              "S-1318"
            ]
          },
          {
            "n": 3,
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "mechanism",
            "sources": [
              "S-1315",
              "S-0052",
              "S-3261"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 2,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "assessed_properties": {
        "threat_model": "adversarial",
        "hardware_requirement": "retrofit-device",
        "prover_cooperation": "partial",
        "adversarial_evaluation": "analysis"
      },
      "claims": [],
      "exposure": {
        "weights": "none",
        "io": "none",
        "training": "none",
        "note": "Protects verifier devices; it does not handle model data."
      },
      "family_finding_context": [],
      "filter_issues": []
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0003",
      "title": "Whole-workload recomputation (reproducible packets)",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/reproducible-computation-packets/",
      "assessment_record": {
        "id": "M-0003",
        "title": "Whole-workload recomputation (reproducible packets)",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/reproducible-computation-packets/"
      },
      "finding_counts": {
        "failure": 0,
        "scope_limitation": 1,
        "open_question": 1,
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 0,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "selected_implementation": null,
      "readiness": {
        "level": "R1",
        "scope": "recomputing whole workloads to show a cluster runs only declared inference",
        "confidence": "medium",
        "evidence": [
          "S-0067",
          "S-0017",
          "S-1006",
          "S-1008",
          "S-1511",
          "S-0027"
        ]
      },
      "development_status": {
        "code": "R1",
        "label": "Proposed",
        "short": "Proposed",
        "rank": 1,
        "legacy_code": "R1"
      },
      "security_evidence": {
        "attack_testing": {
          "status": "none",
          "label": "No published adversarial analysis recorded",
          "kind": "none"
        },
        "independent_evaluation": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "formal_proof": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "deployment_assurance": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "legacy_evaluation_code": null,
        "scoped_findings": [],
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 0,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "assessed_properties": {
        "threat_model": "adversarial",
        "hardware_requirement": "retrofit-device",
        "prover_cooperation": "required",
        "adversarial_evaluation": "none"
      },
      "claims": [],
      "exposure": {
        "weights": "partial",
        "io": "partial",
        "training": "partial",
        "note": "Recomputing sampled units needs weights and sampled inputs or training data inside the checking environment. The design depends on securing that environment; disclosure depends on its confidentiality boundary.",
        "sources": [
          "S-0017",
          "S-0067"
        ]
      },
      "family_finding_context": [],
      "filter_issues": []
    }
  ],
  "strengths": {
    "covered": [],
    "production": [],
    "operationalUse": [],
    "adversarial": [
      "M-0017",
      "M-0003"
    ],
    "noNewHardware": [],
    "mitigated": [],
    "notCounted": []
  },
  "properties": {
    "covered": [],
    "production": [],
    "operationalUse": [],
    "adversarial": [
      "M-0017",
      "M-0003"
    ],
    "noNewHardware": [],
    "mitigated": [],
    "notCounted": []
  },
  "attack_testing": [
    {
      "id": "M-0017",
      "record": "M-0017",
      "evaluation": "analysis",
      "in_setting": true
    }
  ],
  "selected_implementations": {},
  "weaknesses": {
    "gaps": [],
    "excluded": [],
    "unlinked": [],
    "critical": [],
    "significant": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0017",
        "n": 1,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Seals are often defeated with simple methods",
        "classification": "failure",
        "kind": "demonstrated-attack",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": "mechanism",
        "scope_note": "Published defeats of general security seals. They warn about proposed verifier-device seals, but do not demonstrate defeat of an AI verification enclosure or sensor.",
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "In 1996 a Los Alamos vulnerability assessment defeated all 94 security seals it examined, with 132 defeats in total, using rapid, inexpensive, low-tech methods. It found that seal cost did not predict security. In 2001 Johnston reported that high-tech seals are often easier to defeat than low-tech ones.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1317",
          "S-1318"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0017",
        "n": 3,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Attack classes outside published models",
        "classification": "failure",
        "kind": "open-question",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": "mechanism",
        "scope_note": "The radio compensation result is emulated using measured channel data under a known-reference attacker model. It is not a physical bypass demonstration against an AI verifier enclosure.",
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "The authors of the batteryless cover say they cannot assess chemical-solvent attacks, which exceed their expertise, and deem cover removal impractical. Anti-Tamper Radio's reference can drift as the environment or measurement system ages; the authors suggest gradually renewing the reference. A 2025 follow-up by some of the same authors shows, by emulation on measured channel data, that an attacker who knows the reference channel and the needle's effect on it could inject a signal that cancels the change caused by a needle insertion. It proposes a reconfigurable intelligent surface that randomizes the channel as a countermeasure.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1315",
          "S-0052",
          "S-3261"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "criticalMechanisms": [],
    "significantMechanisms": [
      "M-0017"
    ],
    "familyContext": [],
    "scopeLimitations": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0017",
        "n": 2,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Security depends on inspection protocols",
        "classification": "scope-limitation",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": "mechanism",
        "scope_note": "An inspection and protocol requirement drawn from safeguards and enclosure studies, not a reported break of a deployed AI verifier.",
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Johnston argues that a seal is no better than the protocols for using it, and that inspectors are usually given little useful information on how to detect tampering. The Sandia survey notes that larger enclosures are hard to inspect fully and that sensor data must be authenticated.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1318",
          "S-1316"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0003",
        "n": 1,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Spare compute is outside the scheme",
        "classification": "scope-limitation",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "The plan states that it does not verify that spare compute is not used for unapproved workloads, because this seems very challenging. Recomputation checks the correctness of declared work, not its completeness.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0067",
          "S-0017"
        ],
        "helps": [
          {
            "by": "M-0007",
            "how": "Proposed as one input to accounting for spare capacity on declared hardware."
          }
        ]
      }
    ],
    "openQuestions": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0003",
        "n": 2,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Non-compliant work could be encoded inside compliant-looking packets",
        "classification": "open-question",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "The plan notes that an AI company might try to encode a non-compliant workload inside a workload that looks compliant on the surface.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0067"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "minor": 0,
    "minorFindings": [],
    "minorBy": [],
    "notDemonstrated": [
      "M-0003"
    ],
    "newChip": []
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "mech": "M-0017",
      "record": "M-0017",
      "n": 1,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Seals are often defeated with simple methods",
      "classification": "failure",
      "kind": "demonstrated-attack",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": "mechanism",
      "scope_note": "Published defeats of general security seals. They warn about proposed verifier-device seals, but do not demonstrate defeat of an AI verification enclosure or sensor.",
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "In 1996 a Los Alamos vulnerability assessment defeated all 94 security seals it examined, with 132 defeats in total, using rapid, inexpensive, low-tech methods. It found that seal cost did not predict security. In 2001 Johnston reported that high-tech seals are often easier to defeat than low-tech ones.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1317",
        "S-1318"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0017",
      "record": "M-0017",
      "n": 2,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Security depends on inspection protocols",
      "classification": "scope-limitation",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": "mechanism",
      "scope_note": "An inspection and protocol requirement drawn from safeguards and enclosure studies, not a reported break of a deployed AI verifier.",
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Johnston argues that a seal is no better than the protocols for using it, and that inspectors are usually given little useful information on how to detect tampering. The Sandia survey notes that larger enclosures are hard to inspect fully and that sensor data must be authenticated.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1318",
        "S-1316"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0017",
      "record": "M-0017",
      "n": 3,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Attack classes outside published models",
      "classification": "failure",
      "kind": "open-question",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": "mechanism",
      "scope_note": "The radio compensation result is emulated using measured channel data under a known-reference attacker model. It is not a physical bypass demonstration against an AI verifier enclosure.",
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "The authors of the batteryless cover say they cannot assess chemical-solvent attacks, which exceed their expertise, and deem cover removal impractical. Anti-Tamper Radio's reference can drift as the environment or measurement system ages; the authors suggest gradually renewing the reference. A 2025 follow-up by some of the same authors shows, by emulation on measured channel data, that an attacker who knows the reference channel and the needle's effect on it could inject a signal that cancels the change caused by a needle insertion. It proposes a reconfigurable intelligent surface that randomizes the channel as a countermeasure.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1315",
        "S-0052",
        "S-3261"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0003",
      "record": "M-0003",
      "n": 1,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Spare compute is outside the scheme",
      "classification": "scope-limitation",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "The plan states that it does not verify that spare compute is not used for unapproved workloads, because this seems very challenging. Recomputation checks the correctness of declared work, not its completeness.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-0067",
        "S-0017"
      ],
      "helps": [
        {
          "by": "M-0007",
          "how": "Proposed as one input to accounting for spare capacity on declared hardware."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0003",
      "record": "M-0003",
      "n": 2,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Non-compliant work could be encoded inside compliant-looking packets",
      "classification": "open-question",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "The plan notes that an AI company might try to encode a non-compliant workload inside a workload that looks compliant on the surface.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-0067"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "possible_additions": [
    {
      "id": "M-0002",
      "title": "Deterministic and bit-exact inference",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/deterministic-inference/",
      "readiness": "R3",
      "development_status": {
        "code": "R3",
        "label": "Operational use",
        "short": "Operational use",
        "rank": 3,
        "legacy_code": "R3"
      },
      "security_evidence": {
        "attack_testing": {
          "status": "analysis",
          "label": "Published security analysis",
          "kind": "analysis"
        },
        "independent_evaluation": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "formal_proof": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "deployment_assurance": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "legacy_evaluation_code": null,
        "scoped_findings": [],
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 0,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "fits_filters": true,
      "filter_issues": [],
      "reasons": [
        {
          "kind": "blocker",
          "mech": "M-0003",
          "text": "Workloads are not reproducible by default, and achieving reproducibility may cost performance."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0013",
      "title": "Network taps and certifiers",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/network-taps-and-certifiers/",
      "readiness": "R1",
      "development_status": {
        "code": "R1",
        "label": "Proposed",
        "short": "Proposed",
        "rank": 1,
        "legacy_code": "R1"
      },
      "security_evidence": {
        "attack_testing": {
          "status": "analysis",
          "label": "Published security analysis",
          "kind": "analysis"
        },
        "independent_evaluation": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "formal_proof": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "deployment_assurance": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "legacy_evaluation_code": null,
        "scoped_findings": [
          {
            "n": 1,
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "unassessed",
            "sources": [
              "S-1300",
              "S-1507"
            ]
          },
          {
            "n": 4,
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "unassessed",
            "sources": [
              "S-1312"
            ]
          },
          {
            "n": 6,
            "severity": "minor",
            "status": "mitigated",
            "evidence_scope": "unassessed",
            "sources": [
              "S-1300"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 2,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "fits_filters": true,
      "filter_issues": [],
      "reasons": [
        {
          "kind": "blocker",
          "mech": "M-0003",
          "text": "All traffic must reach the recomputation server via network taps, and the server's integrity is critical."
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "goal": null,
  "design": null,
  "dependencies": {
    "prerequisites": [
      {
        "id": "M-0002",
        "neededBy": [
          "M-0003"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "M-0013",
        "neededBy": [
          "M-0003"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "shared": [],
    "blockers": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0017",
        "n": 1,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "No tamper-evident enclosure has been designed for AI verifier hardware at retrofit scale.",
        "theme": "hardware-trust",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0018"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0017",
        "n": 2,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "Battery-backed designs add bulk, limit operating temperature (+10 °C to +35 °C for the IBM 4765) and complicate transport.",
        "theme": "performance-compatibility",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1315"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0017",
        "n": 3,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "Active monitoring needs power, and visual inspection of large enclosures faces access limits.",
        "theme": "access-governance",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1316"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0017",
        "n": 4,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "No evaluation has been published in the AI verification setting.",
        "theme": "adversarial-validation",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0018"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0003",
        "n": 1,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "Workloads are not reproducible by default, and achieving reproducibility may cost performance.",
        "theme": "performance-compatibility",
        "blocked_by": "M-0002",
        "sources": [
          "S-0067"
        ],
        "inProposal": false
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0003",
        "n": 2,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "Network packets are not individually reproducible by default; making them so may need considerable software, firmware and hardware work. Amodo rates this 'not on track'.",
        "theme": "performance-compatibility",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1008"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0003",
        "n": 3,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "All traffic must reach the recomputation server via network taps, and the server's integrity is critical.",
        "theme": "hardware-trust",
        "blocked_by": "M-0013",
        "sources": [
          "S-0067",
          "S-1008"
        ],
        "inProposal": false
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0003",
        "n": 4,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "Recomputing training steps needs checkpoints: writing one at every step would cost more than 100% overhead, so Amodo's design needs a spare data-parallel replica that tracks the weights instead.",
        "theme": "performance-compatibility",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0017"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      }
    ]
  },
  "exposure": {
    "weights": {
      "shown": [],
      "partial": [
        "M-0003"
      ],
      "hidden": [],
      "none": [
        "M-0017"
      ],
      "unknown": []
    },
    "io": {
      "shown": [],
      "partial": [
        "M-0003"
      ],
      "hidden": [],
      "none": [
        "M-0017"
      ],
      "unknown": []
    },
    "training": {
      "shown": [],
      "partial": [
        "M-0003"
      ],
      "hidden": [],
      "none": [
        "M-0017"
      ],
      "unknown": []
    }
  },
  "implementations": [
    {
      "mechanism": "M-0017",
      "selected": null,
      "implementations": [
        {
          "id": "I-0011",
          "title": "AI 2040 inference-only verification stack",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/ai-2040-inference-only-verification-plan/"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "mechanism": "M-0003",
      "selected": null,
      "implementations": [
        {
          "id": "I-0011",
          "title": "AI 2040 inference-only verification stack",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/ai-2040-inference-only-verification-plan/"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "sources": [
    {
      "id": "S-0052",
      "title": "Anti-Tamper Radio: System-Level Tamper Detection for Computing Systems",
      "authors": "P. Staat et al.",
      "year": 2022,
      "url": "https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9833631/",
      "path": "/sources/staat-anti-tamper-radio/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1315",
      "title": "Secure Physical Enclosures from Covers with Tamper-Resistance",
      "authors": "V. Immler et al.",
      "year": 2019,
      "url": "https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/7334",
      "path": "/sources/immler-secure-physical-enclosures-covers/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0051",
      "title": "ImpedanceVerif: On-Chip Impedance Sensing for System-Level Tampering Detection",
      "authors": "T. Mosavirik et al.",
      "year": 2023,
      "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/946",
      "path": "/sources/mosavirik-impedanceverif/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0050",
      "title": "IBM 4765 Cryptographic Coprocessor Security Module: Security Policy",
      "authors": "IBM Corporation",
      "year": 2012,
      "url": "https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/security-policies/140sp1505.pdf",
      "path": "/sources/ibm-4765-security-policy/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-3262",
      "title": "PHYSEC SEAL: Change detection for maximum safety",
      "authors": "PHYSEC GmbH",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://www.physec.de/en/solutions/physec-seal/",
      "path": "/sources/physec-seal/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1316",
      "title": "Tamper-Indicating Enclosures, A Current Survey",
      "authors": "H. A. Smartt & Z. N. Gastelum",
      "year": 2015,
      "url": "https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1256541",
      "path": "/sources/smartt-tamper-indicating-enclosures-survey/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0018",
      "title": "A System Overview for Near-Term, Low-Trust AI Compute Verification",
      "authors": "N. Cankaya",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://intelligence.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/A-system-overview-for-near-term-low-trust-AI-compute-verification.pdf",
      "path": "/sources/cankaya-system-overview-low-trust-compute-verification/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1317",
      "title": "Physical Security and Tamper-Indicating Devices",
      "authors": "R. G. Johnston & A. R. E. Garcia",
      "year": 1996,
      "url": "https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/459707",
      "path": "/sources/johnston-physical-security-tamper-indicating-devices/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1318",
      "title": "Tamper Detection for Safeguards and Treaty Monitoring: Fantasies, Realities, and Potentials",
      "authors": "R. G. Johnston",
      "year": 2001,
      "url": "https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/81john.pdf",
      "path": "/sources/johnston-tamper-detection-safeguards-treaty-monitoring/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-3261",
      "title": "Anti-Tamper Radio Meets Reconfigurable Intelligent Surface for System-Level Tamper Detection",
      "authors": "M. S. Tabar et al.",
      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.14279",
      "path": "/sources/tabar-anti-tamper-radio-ris/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0067",
      "title": "Verification Plan",
      "authors": "R. Dean",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://ai-2040.com/supplements/verification-plan",
      "path": "/sources/dean-verification-plan/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0017",
      "title": "Example Schemes for Verifying High-Stakes AI Agreements",
      "authors": "Amodo Design",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://amododesign.com/notes/2026-06-23-verification-algorithms/",
      "path": "/sources/amodo-example-schemes-high-stakes-ai-agreements/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1006",
      "title": "Scaling Recomputation Inference Verification",
      "authors": "Amodo Design",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://amododesign.com/notes/2026-09-02-scaling-recomputation-inference-verification/",
      "path": "/sources/amodo-scaling-recomputation-inference-verification/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1008",
      "title": "AI 2040 Plan A — Verification SITREP",
      "authors": "Amodo Design",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://amododesign.com/ai-verification/plan-a-sitrep/",
      "path": "/sources/amodo-plan-a-verification-sitrep/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1511",
      "title": "Get Involved in Verification",
      "authors": "AI Futures Project",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://ai-2040.com/supplements/verification-plan/get-involved",
      "path": "/sources/ai-futures-get-involved-verification/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0027",
      "title": "Proof-of-Learning is Currently More Broken Than You Think",
      "authors": "C. Fang et al.",
      "year": 2023,
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2208.03567",
      "path": "/sources/fang-proof-of-learning-broken/"
    }
  ]
}