{
  "schema_version": "1.2",
  "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/explorer/?mechanisms=M-0014,M-0012,M-0013&cols=prover,tested",
  "data_generated": "2026-10-08",
  "definitions": {
    "methodology": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/methodology/",
    "readiness": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/readiness/",
    "filters": [
      {
        "id": "prover",
        "label": "Prover",
        "question": "How far can the party being checked be trusted?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "cooperative",
            "label": "Cooperative"
          },
          {
            "value": "semi-trusted",
            "label": "Semi-trusted"
          },
          {
            "value": "adversarial",
            "label": "Adversarial"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose threat model holds against at least this prover. Adversarial is the strongest assumption.",
        "about": "The prover is the party being checked. Semi-trusted designs rely on part of its stack: usually the chip vendor's hardware root of trust, its firmware or counters, or its supply-chain records. Adversarial designs aim to hold even if it cheats wherever the checks allow, within their stated assumptions."
      },
      {
        "id": "onsite",
        "label": "Verifier devices on site",
        "question": "May the verifier install its own hardware at the prover's sites?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "no",
            "label": "Not allowed"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Not allowed\" removes mechanisms that need a retrofit device, such as a network tap or a sealed sensor.",
        "about": "Some mechanisms need a device the verifier owns or trusts at the prover's facility, such as a network tap, a bandwidth limiter or a sealed sensor. Choose Not allowed when the setting rules that out. Inspectors are not covered."
      },
      {
        "id": "coop",
        "label": "Prover cooperation",
        "question": "How much must the prover take part?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "partial",
            "label": "Partial at most"
          },
          {
            "value": "none",
            "label": "Not required"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Partial at most\" removes mechanisms that need the prover's active participation. \"Not required\" keeps only those that work without it.",
        "about": "Required: the prover takes part, for example by logging requests, producing proofs or opening records. Partial: some access, such as installing a device. Not required: works from outside, such as satellite imagery."
      },
      {
        "id": "chips",
        "label": "Chips",
        "question": "May the proposal depend on new chip designs?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "existing",
            "label": "Existing chips only"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Existing chips only\" removes mechanisms that need changes to future chip designs.",
        "about": "New chip features take years to reach a deployed fleet and cover only chips made after they ship. Mechanisms that use shipping features, such as trusted execution environments or performance counters, stay."
      },
      {
        "id": "ready",
        "label": "Minimum readiness",
        "question": "How mature must each mechanism be?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "R1",
            "label": "R1 Proposed"
          },
          {
            "value": "R2",
            "label": "R2 Demonstrated"
          },
          {
            "value": "R3",
            "label": "R3 In production"
          },
          {
            "value": "R4",
            "label": "R4 Deployment-ready"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose readiness level is at least this one.",
        "about": "A level describes the public evidence for a mechanism's stated use, not its cost or feasibility. R3 can still have open critical flaws."
      },
      {
        "id": "tested",
        "label": "Attack testing",
        "question": "How hard has each mechanism been attacked in public?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "analysis",
            "label": "Published analysis"
          },
          {
            "value": "red-teamed",
            "label": "Red-teamed"
          },
          {
            "value": "independent-red-team",
            "label": "Independent red-team"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose strongest published attack testing is at least this.",
        "about": "The strongest published attempt to break the mechanism for its verification use: a security analysis, red-teaming by its developers or collaborators, or a red team independent of them."
      },
      {
        "id": "hide",
        "label": "Keep hidden from the verifier",
        "question": "What must the verifier never see?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "weights",
            "label": "Model weights"
          },
          {
            "value": "io",
            "label": "Inputs and outputs"
          },
          {
            "value": "training",
            "label": "Training data"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Removes mechanisms that show the asset to the verifier. Conditional or unspecified exposure stays with a note and needs checking against the privacy requirement.",
        "about": "Model weights: the checked model's parameters. Inputs and outputs: the requests a deployed model serves and its responses. Training data: what a model was trained on. Each mechanism's exposure is the editors' reading of its record: shown, depends on the design (kept, with a note), hidden, not involved, or unspecified for a selected implementation. Code and configuration are not covered yet."
      }
    ],
    "exposure": "For model weights, inputs and outputs, and training data. This is the editors' reading of each mechanism's record (its threat model, how it works and its limitations), not a field of the record. Shown: the verifier sees it. Depends: on the design or variant, or the verifier sees only samples. Hidden: the verifier sees only commitments, hashes, proofs or results. Not involved: the record does not handle it. Unspecified: the selected implementation has no asset-specific assessment here.",
    "claim_status": {
      "addressed": "A mechanism in the proposal is aimed at this claim and is not excluded by the filters.",
      "partly-addressed": "Only supporting mechanisms, or mechanisms aimed at it that the filters exclude.",
      "unaddressed": "No mechanism in the proposal addresses this claim."
    },
    "finding_scope": "Evidence scope describes where a finding was demonstrated; it does not establish applicability to every implementation in the mechanism family.",
    "claim_finding_scope": "open_critical_findings names active findings on the assessed records; open_critical_context names conditional family findings whose implementation applicability is unassessed.",
    "legacy_status": "The status field retains covered/partial/none for compatibility. It names claim links, never successful verification. Use claim_status and status_label for presentation."
  },
  "filters": {
    "prover": "",
    "onsite": "",
    "coop": "",
    "chips": "",
    "ready": "",
    "tested": "",
    "hide": []
  },
  "mechanisms_passing_filters": 25,
  "claims": [],
  "mechanisms": [
    {
      "id": "M-0014",
      "title": "Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/bandwidth-limits-and-compartmentalization/",
      "assessment_record": {
        "id": "M-0014",
        "title": "Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/bandwidth-limits-and-compartmentalization/"
      },
      "selected_implementation": null,
      "readiness": {
        "level": "R2",
        "scope": "monitoring inter-node traffic with operator-run software on four GPUs",
        "confidence": "low",
        "evidence": [
          "S-0067",
          "S-1301",
          "S-0018",
          "S-3220",
          "S-1313"
        ]
      },
      "assessed_properties": {
        "threat_model": "adversarial",
        "hardware_requirement": "retrofit-device",
        "prover_cooperation": "required",
        "adversarial_evaluation": "analysis"
      },
      "claims": [],
      "exposure": {
        "weights": "none",
        "io": "none",
        "training": "none",
        "note": "Caps traffic between groups of chips; it does not read the traffic's content."
      },
      "family_finding_context": [],
      "filter_issues": []
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0012",
      "title": "Model identity attestation",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/model-identity-attestation/",
      "assessment_record": {
        "id": "M-0012",
        "title": "Model identity attestation",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/model-identity-attestation/"
      },
      "selected_implementation": null,
      "readiness": {
        "level": "R3",
        "scope": "showing users that a service runs the declared model weights",
        "confidence": "medium",
        "evidence": [
          "S-0013",
          "S-0012",
          "S-0015",
          "S-1206",
          "S-1207",
          "S-1208",
          "S-1209",
          "S-1202",
          "S-1507"
        ]
      },
      "assessed_properties": {
        "threat_model": "semi-trusted",
        "hardware_requirement": "existing-features",
        "prover_cooperation": "required",
        "adversarial_evaluation": "independent-red-team"
      },
      "claims": [],
      "exposure": {
        "weights": "partial",
        "io": "partial",
        "training": "none",
        "note": "The enclave route shows only hashes; the recomputation route gives the verifier the weights and the sampled requests and responses."
      },
      "family_finding_context": [],
      "filter_issues": []
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0013",
      "title": "Network taps and certifiers",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/network-taps-and-certifiers/",
      "assessment_record": {
        "id": "M-0013",
        "title": "Network taps and certifiers",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/network-taps-and-certifiers/"
      },
      "selected_implementation": null,
      "readiness": {
        "level": "R1",
        "scope": "committing a complete record of cluster traffic, so declared inference can be checked",
        "confidence": "medium",
        "evidence": [
          "S-1300",
          "S-0031",
          "S-0018",
          "S-0067",
          "S-1312",
          "S-1007",
          "S-1319",
          "S-1320"
        ]
      },
      "assessed_properties": {
        "threat_model": "adversarial",
        "hardware_requirement": "retrofit-device",
        "prover_cooperation": "required",
        "adversarial_evaluation": "analysis"
      },
      "claims": [],
      "exposure": {
        "weights": "partial",
        "io": "partial",
        "training": "partial",
        "note": "Only hashes leave the site; records picked for a challenge are opened for replay at a verification facility."
      },
      "family_finding_context": [],
      "filter_issues": []
    }
  ],
  "strengths": {
    "covered": [],
    "production": [
      "M-0012"
    ],
    "adversarial": [
      "M-0014",
      "M-0013"
    ],
    "noNewHardware": [
      "M-0012"
    ],
    "mitigated": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0012",
        "n": 2,
        "title": "Launch-state attestation does not by itself cover weights loaded later",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "mitigated",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Attestation measures launch state, and weights are read from disk after boot. A signature checked at load time does not stop a malicious hypervisor from altering the disk afterwards. Tinfoil reports mitigating this with dm-verity checks on every read. Unmeasured runtime configuration remains a general risk.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0013",
          "S-0014"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0013",
        "n": 6,
        "title": "Verifier dictionary attacks on hashes",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "minor",
        "status": "mitigated",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Hashes of very short outputs could be brute-forced by the verifier. The paper recommends hashing at least 5 tokens together, or at least 10 if the attacker filters for likely tokens.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1300"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "notCounted": []
  },
  "properties": {
    "covered": [],
    "production": [
      "M-0012"
    ],
    "adversarial": [
      "M-0014",
      "M-0013"
    ],
    "noNewHardware": [
      "M-0012"
    ],
    "mitigated": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0012",
        "n": 2,
        "title": "Launch-state attestation does not by itself cover weights loaded later",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "mitigated",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Attestation measures launch state, and weights are read from disk after boot. A signature checked at load time does not stop a malicious hypervisor from altering the disk afterwards. Tinfoil reports mitigating this with dm-verity checks on every read. Unmeasured runtime configuration remains a general risk.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0013",
          "S-0014"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0013",
        "n": 6,
        "title": "Verifier dictionary attacks on hashes",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "minor",
        "status": "mitigated",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Hashes of very short outputs could be brute-forced by the verifier. The paper recommends hashing at least 5 tokens together, or at least 10 if the attacker filters for likely tokens.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1300"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "notCounted": []
  },
  "attack_testing": [
    {
      "id": "M-0014",
      "record": "M-0014",
      "evaluation": "analysis",
      "in_setting": true
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0012",
      "record": "M-0012",
      "evaluation": "independent-red-team",
      "in_setting": true
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0013",
      "record": "M-0013",
      "evaluation": "analysis",
      "in_setting": true
    }
  ],
  "selected_implementations": {},
  "weaknesses": {
    "gaps": [],
    "excluded": [],
    "unlinked": [],
    "critical": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0012",
        "n": 1,
        "title": "Underlying attestation can be forged or relayed",
        "kind": "demonstrated-attack",
        "severity": "critical",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": "inherited",
        "scope_note": "Critical for the enclave route against an operator with physical access to affected hardware, or control of an unpatched SEV-SNP hypervisor. It does not apply to the recomputation route. PAL*M excludes physical attacks, and Tinfoil acknowledges this boundary.",
        "related_finding": {
          "record": "M-0008",
          "flaw": 1
        },
        "description": "The enclave route inherits the platform-specific TEE attestation failures. Intel TDX forgery and H100 relay were demonstrated with physical access and host control. Battering RAM defeated AMD SEV-SNP attestation on DDR4 servers; RMPocalypse did so from malicious host software on platforms without AMD's fixes. These demonstrate failures of the trust roots, not of each model-commitment protocol.",
        "response": "The TEE.fail authors report that physical interposer attacks are outside Intel's and AMD's threat models. AMD reports fixes for RMPocalypse.",
        "sources": [
          "S-1202",
          "S-1210",
          "S-1212",
          "S-1213",
          "S-1206",
          "S-0012"
        ],
        "helps": [
          {
            "by": "M-0009",
            "how": "A tamper-protected enclosure around the chip is the proposed answer when the party that holds the hardware may attack it physically."
          }
        ]
      }
    ],
    "significant": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0014",
        "n": 1,
        "title": "Low-communication training reduces the bandwidth training needs",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "DiLoCo matched fully synchronous training on 8 workers while communicating 500 times less. Rahman writes that this family of methods theoretically allows large-scale training with less than 100 Mbps. Lucid includes these methods in its bounds, but notes that extreme activation compression, architectures with unusually small inter-layer widths, or modular paradigms could erode the margin.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1314",
          "S-0060",
          "S-1301"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0014",
        "n": 2,
        "title": "Operator control of pod routing collapses the bound",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Lucid's analysis finds that if the operator can freely assign pods to routers, it could dedicate a whole cell of 100 or more pods to one pipeline stage. The bound then falls to about 90–220x uncompressed and as low as about 25x with compression. The proposed mitigation, auditor-controlled random assignment that is periodically re-randomized, has not been implemented.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1301"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0014",
        "n": 3,
        "title": "Undeclared local storage raises per-pod capacity",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "More memory or storage per pod helps an adversary. Lucid requires per-pod storage to be declared, capped and physically inspected.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1301"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0014",
        "n": 4,
        "title": "Training within one pod is not covered",
        "kind": "open-question",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Lucid's bounds concern pre-training models larger than the pods are sized for. Training models that fit in one pod, fine-tuning and reinforcement-learning post-training within one pod are outside the modelled threat.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1301"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0014",
        "n": 5,
        "title": "Parallel scale-up switches are hard enforcement points",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "In GB200 topologies, GPUs reach GPUs in other nodes through NVSwitches without a NIC on the path. Amodo notes that limits are hard to enforce there because many switches work in parallel, so compromising one or two would bypass the limit.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1313"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0012",
        "n": 3,
        "title": "For private models, a user can confirm consistency but not content",
        "kind": "open-question",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "When weights are not published, users can check that the same root hash is served each time, but not what the model is. Pairing the hash with an attested evaluation, as in Attestable Audits, is one proposed remedy.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0013",
          "S-0009"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0012",
        "n": 4,
        "title": "Recomputation depends on trusted logging and randomness, and its tolerance leaves a covert channel",
        "kind": "demonstrated-attack",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "The recomputation variant assumes that every input, output and seed is logged correctly, and that the attacker can neither predict nor manipulate which messages are sampled for verification. Legitimate nondeterminism concentrates at a few token positions, and slow leaks within the tolerated slack remain possible. An independent study showed that an adversary who controls the prompts roughly doubles the bits leaked per token, reducing the exfiltration slowdown from 146–254 times under benign prompts to 60–118 times. The attack targets the exfiltration bound, not the check that outputs match the declared model.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0015",
          "S-1507"
        ],
        "helps": [
          {
            "by": "M-0013",
            "how": "Taps are proposed to copy and hash traffic on the monitored links, reducing reliance on the prover's own log. This still depends on the monitored boundary and trusted capture."
          },
          {
            "by": "M-0002",
            "how": "Bit-exact inference would remove the numerical tolerance that leaves this channel."
          }
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0013",
        "n": 1,
        "title": "Output nondeterminism leaves covert capacity",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Hashing cannot remove information hidden in the outputs themselves. The Secure Gateway Device paper estimates that about 0.1 bit per token remains even with seed-synchronized replay checks. For a 200k-GPU inference cluster at full load (2,000 tokens per GPU per second), that is about 40 Mbit/s of covert egress, enough to move a 1 TB model in under three days. The paper names this the core remaining challenge and points to deterministic replay or active scrubbing of hardware-induced entropy. An independent study found that an adversary who chooses the prompts roughly doubles the bits leaked per token under Gumbel-based inference verification; see Bounding unexplained information in outputs.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1300",
          "S-1507"
        ],
        "helps": [
          {
            "by": "M-0002",
            "how": "Deterministic replay is one of the two remedies the flaw's source names."
          },
          {
            "by": "M-0024",
            "how": "Bounds the hidden information outputs can carry by measuring what the declared computation fails to predict."
          }
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0013",
        "n": 2,
        "title": "Some links cannot be passively tapped",
        "kind": "open-question",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Cankaya notes that copper-connected scale-up domains (for example NVL72 racks and TPU v7 cubes) are much harder to tap than fibre, and that optical budgets make passive taps impractical on 400GBASE-SR8 multimode links. Amodo found no taps advertised for 53 GBaud links as of May 2026.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0031",
          "S-1310"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0013",
        "n": 3,
        "title": "Encrypted fabrics hide plaintext from both parties",
        "kind": "open-question",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Cankaya notes that with TEE-protected sessions whose keys are ephemeral and managed inside the TEE, neither the operator nor the manufacturer can recover session keys after the session, so tapped traffic could not be opened for recomputation. For other encrypted fabrics, the operator can retain keys.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0031"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0013",
        "n": 4,
        "title": "Residual side channels in simple passive setups",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Amodo's analysis of its own tapped prototype lists unvalidated header fields, timing of permitted traffic and variation in response formatting as residual channels, and concludes that the passive tap must be replaced by an active one.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1312"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0013",
        "n": 5,
        "title": "Completeness rests on physical monitoring left out of scope",
        "kind": "open-question",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "The Secure Gateway Device paper assumes the facility is physically monitored, and states that the whole architecture depends on the device being the only communication channel. It names radio emanation, power-line signalling and thermal channels as covert channels beyond that scope.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1300"
        ],
        "helps": [
          {
            "by": "M-0022",
            "how": "Addresses the radio, power-line and thermal channels that network-level designs leave out."
          }
        ]
      }
    ],
    "criticalMechanisms": [
      "M-0012"
    ],
    "significantMechanisms": [
      "M-0014",
      "M-0012",
      "M-0013"
    ],
    "familyContext": [],
    "minor": 0,
    "minorFindings": [],
    "minorBy": [],
    "notDemonstrated": [
      "M-0013"
    ],
    "newChip": []
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "mech": "M-0014",
      "record": "M-0014",
      "n": 1,
      "title": "Low-communication training reduces the bandwidth training needs",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "DiLoCo matched fully synchronous training on 8 workers while communicating 500 times less. Rahman writes that this family of methods theoretically allows large-scale training with less than 100 Mbps. Lucid includes these methods in its bounds, but notes that extreme activation compression, architectures with unusually small inter-layer widths, or modular paradigms could erode the margin.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1314",
        "S-0060",
        "S-1301"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0014",
      "record": "M-0014",
      "n": 2,
      "title": "Operator control of pod routing collapses the bound",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Lucid's analysis finds that if the operator can freely assign pods to routers, it could dedicate a whole cell of 100 or more pods to one pipeline stage. The bound then falls to about 90–220x uncompressed and as low as about 25x with compression. The proposed mitigation, auditor-controlled random assignment that is periodically re-randomized, has not been implemented.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1301"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0014",
      "record": "M-0014",
      "n": 3,
      "title": "Undeclared local storage raises per-pod capacity",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "More memory or storage per pod helps an adversary. Lucid requires per-pod storage to be declared, capped and physically inspected.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1301"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0014",
      "record": "M-0014",
      "n": 4,
      "title": "Training within one pod is not covered",
      "kind": "open-question",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Lucid's bounds concern pre-training models larger than the pods are sized for. Training models that fit in one pod, fine-tuning and reinforcement-learning post-training within one pod are outside the modelled threat.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1301"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0014",
      "record": "M-0014",
      "n": 5,
      "title": "Parallel scale-up switches are hard enforcement points",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "In GB200 topologies, GPUs reach GPUs in other nodes through NVSwitches without a NIC on the path. Amodo notes that limits are hard to enforce there because many switches work in parallel, so compromising one or two would bypass the limit.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1313"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0012",
      "record": "M-0012",
      "n": 1,
      "title": "Underlying attestation can be forged or relayed",
      "kind": "demonstrated-attack",
      "severity": "critical",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": "inherited",
      "scope_note": "Critical for the enclave route against an operator with physical access to affected hardware, or control of an unpatched SEV-SNP hypervisor. It does not apply to the recomputation route. PAL*M excludes physical attacks, and Tinfoil acknowledges this boundary.",
      "related_finding": {
        "record": "M-0008",
        "flaw": 1
      },
      "description": "The enclave route inherits the platform-specific TEE attestation failures. Intel TDX forgery and H100 relay were demonstrated with physical access and host control. Battering RAM defeated AMD SEV-SNP attestation on DDR4 servers; RMPocalypse did so from malicious host software on platforms without AMD's fixes. These demonstrate failures of the trust roots, not of each model-commitment protocol.",
      "response": "The TEE.fail authors report that physical interposer attacks are outside Intel's and AMD's threat models. AMD reports fixes for RMPocalypse.",
      "sources": [
        "S-1202",
        "S-1210",
        "S-1212",
        "S-1213",
        "S-1206",
        "S-0012"
      ],
      "helps": [
        {
          "by": "M-0009",
          "how": "A tamper-protected enclosure around the chip is the proposed answer when the party that holds the hardware may attack it physically."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0012",
      "record": "M-0012",
      "n": 2,
      "title": "Launch-state attestation does not by itself cover weights loaded later",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "mitigated",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Attestation measures launch state, and weights are read from disk after boot. A signature checked at load time does not stop a malicious hypervisor from altering the disk afterwards. Tinfoil reports mitigating this with dm-verity checks on every read. Unmeasured runtime configuration remains a general risk.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-0013",
        "S-0014"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0012",
      "record": "M-0012",
      "n": 3,
      "title": "For private models, a user can confirm consistency but not content",
      "kind": "open-question",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "When weights are not published, users can check that the same root hash is served each time, but not what the model is. Pairing the hash with an attested evaluation, as in Attestable Audits, is one proposed remedy.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-0013",
        "S-0009"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0012",
      "record": "M-0012",
      "n": 4,
      "title": "Recomputation depends on trusted logging and randomness, and its tolerance leaves a covert channel",
      "kind": "demonstrated-attack",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "The recomputation variant assumes that every input, output and seed is logged correctly, and that the attacker can neither predict nor manipulate which messages are sampled for verification. Legitimate nondeterminism concentrates at a few token positions, and slow leaks within the tolerated slack remain possible. An independent study showed that an adversary who controls the prompts roughly doubles the bits leaked per token, reducing the exfiltration slowdown from 146–254 times under benign prompts to 60–118 times. The attack targets the exfiltration bound, not the check that outputs match the declared model.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-0015",
        "S-1507"
      ],
      "helps": [
        {
          "by": "M-0013",
          "how": "Taps are proposed to copy and hash traffic on the monitored links, reducing reliance on the prover's own log. This still depends on the monitored boundary and trusted capture."
        },
        {
          "by": "M-0002",
          "how": "Bit-exact inference would remove the numerical tolerance that leaves this channel."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0013",
      "record": "M-0013",
      "n": 1,
      "title": "Output nondeterminism leaves covert capacity",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Hashing cannot remove information hidden in the outputs themselves. The Secure Gateway Device paper estimates that about 0.1 bit per token remains even with seed-synchronized replay checks. For a 200k-GPU inference cluster at full load (2,000 tokens per GPU per second), that is about 40 Mbit/s of covert egress, enough to move a 1 TB model in under three days. The paper names this the core remaining challenge and points to deterministic replay or active scrubbing of hardware-induced entropy. An independent study found that an adversary who chooses the prompts roughly doubles the bits leaked per token under Gumbel-based inference verification; see Bounding unexplained information in outputs.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1300",
        "S-1507"
      ],
      "helps": [
        {
          "by": "M-0002",
          "how": "Deterministic replay is one of the two remedies the flaw's source names."
        },
        {
          "by": "M-0024",
          "how": "Bounds the hidden information outputs can carry by measuring what the declared computation fails to predict."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0013",
      "record": "M-0013",
      "n": 2,
      "title": "Some links cannot be passively tapped",
      "kind": "open-question",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Cankaya notes that copper-connected scale-up domains (for example NVL72 racks and TPU v7 cubes) are much harder to tap than fibre, and that optical budgets make passive taps impractical on 400GBASE-SR8 multimode links. Amodo found no taps advertised for 53 GBaud links as of May 2026.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-0031",
        "S-1310"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0013",
      "record": "M-0013",
      "n": 3,
      "title": "Encrypted fabrics hide plaintext from both parties",
      "kind": "open-question",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Cankaya notes that with TEE-protected sessions whose keys are ephemeral and managed inside the TEE, neither the operator nor the manufacturer can recover session keys after the session, so tapped traffic could not be opened for recomputation. For other encrypted fabrics, the operator can retain keys.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-0031"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0013",
      "record": "M-0013",
      "n": 4,
      "title": "Residual side channels in simple passive setups",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Amodo's analysis of its own tapped prototype lists unvalidated header fields, timing of permitted traffic and variation in response formatting as residual channels, and concludes that the passive tap must be replaced by an active one.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1312"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0013",
      "record": "M-0013",
      "n": 5,
      "title": "Completeness rests on physical monitoring left out of scope",
      "kind": "open-question",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "The Secure Gateway Device paper assumes the facility is physically monitored, and states that the whole architecture depends on the device being the only communication channel. It names radio emanation, power-line signalling and thermal channels as covert channels beyond that scope.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1300"
      ],
      "helps": [
        {
          "by": "M-0022",
          "how": "Addresses the radio, power-line and thermal channels that network-level designs leave out."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0013",
      "record": "M-0013",
      "n": 6,
      "title": "Verifier dictionary attacks on hashes",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "minor",
      "status": "mitigated",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Hashes of very short outputs could be brute-forced by the verifier. The paper recommends hashing at least 5 tokens together, or at least 10 if the attacker filters for likely tokens.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1300"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "possible_additions": [
    {
      "id": "M-0009",
      "title": "Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/",
      "readiness": "R1",
      "fits_filters": true,
      "filter_issues": [],
      "reasons": [
        {
          "kind": "flaw",
          "mech": "M-0012",
          "n": 1,
          "title": "Underlying attestation can be forged or relayed",
          "severity": "critical",
          "how": "A tamper-protected enclosure around the chip is the proposed answer when the party that holds the hardware may attack it physically."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0002",
      "title": "Deterministic and bit-exact inference",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/deterministic-inference/",
      "readiness": "R3",
      "fits_filters": true,
      "filter_issues": [],
      "reasons": [
        {
          "kind": "flaw",
          "mech": "M-0012",
          "n": 4,
          "title": "Recomputation depends on trusted logging and randomness, and its tolerance leaves a covert channel",
          "severity": "significant",
          "how": "Bit-exact inference would remove the numerical tolerance that leaves this channel."
        },
        {
          "kind": "flaw",
          "mech": "M-0013",
          "n": 1,
          "title": "Output nondeterminism leaves covert capacity",
          "severity": "significant",
          "how": "Deterministic replay is one of the two remedies the flaw's source names."
        },
        {
          "kind": "blocker",
          "mech": "M-0012",
          "text": "Numerical nondeterminism limits how tightly recomputation can pin down the model and sampling."
        },
        {
          "kind": "blocker",
          "mech": "M-0013",
          "text": "Nondeterministic inference leaves covert capacity in outputs that hashing cannot remove."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0024",
      "title": "Bounding unexplained information in outputs",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/bounding-unexplained-information/",
      "readiness": "R2",
      "fits_filters": true,
      "filter_issues": [],
      "reasons": [
        {
          "kind": "flaw",
          "mech": "M-0013",
          "n": 1,
          "title": "Output nondeterminism leaves covert capacity",
          "severity": "significant",
          "how": "Bounds the hidden information outputs can carry by measuring what the declared computation fails to predict."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0022",
      "title": "Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/side-channel-suppression/",
      "readiness": "R1",
      "fits_filters": true,
      "filter_issues": [],
      "reasons": [
        {
          "kind": "flaw",
          "mech": "M-0013",
          "n": 5,
          "title": "Completeness rests on physical monitoring left out of scope",
          "severity": "significant",
          "how": "Addresses the radio, power-line and thermal channels that network-level designs leave out."
        },
        {
          "kind": "blocker",
          "mech": "M-0013",
          "text": "Radio, power-line and thermal channels are not addressed by network-level designs."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0008",
      "title": "TEE remote attestation for AI workloads",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/tee-remote-attestation/",
      "readiness": "R3",
      "fits_filters": true,
      "filter_issues": [],
      "reasons": [
        {
          "kind": "blocker",
          "mech": "M-0012",
          "text": "Attestation that resists physical attackers, for the enclave variant."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0017",
      "title": "Tamper evidence for verifier devices",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/tamper-evidence-for-verifier-devices/",
      "readiness": "R2",
      "fits_filters": true,
      "filter_issues": [],
      "reasons": [
        {
          "kind": "blocker",
          "mech": "M-0014",
          "text": "Shaping devices and routing assignments must be trusted by both parties; Amodo has not yet fully analysed resilience to a compromised DPU."
        },
        {
          "kind": "blocker",
          "mech": "M-0013",
          "text": "Taps and gateway devices need tamper-evident housing and physical monitoring so that traffic cannot bypass them."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0001",
      "title": "Sampled inference recomputation",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/sampled-inference-recomputation/",
      "readiness": "R3",
      "fits_filters": true,
      "filter_issues": [],
      "reasons": [
        {
          "kind": "prerequisite",
          "mech": "M-0013"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "goal": null,
  "design": null,
  "dependencies": {
    "prerequisites": [
      {
        "id": "M-0017",
        "neededBy": [
          "M-0014",
          "M-0013"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "M-0001",
        "neededBy": [
          "M-0013"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "M-0002",
        "neededBy": [
          "M-0013"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "M-0022",
        "neededBy": [
          "M-0013"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "shared": [
      {
        "id": "M-0017",
        "by": [
          "M-0014",
          "M-0013"
        ],
        "inProposal": false
      },
      {
        "id": "M-0002",
        "by": [
          "M-0012",
          "M-0013"
        ],
        "inProposal": false
      }
    ],
    "blockers": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0014",
        "n": 1,
        "text": "No cap that a verifier can check has been implemented or red-teamed.",
        "theme": "adversarial-validation",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1301"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0014",
        "n": 2,
        "text": "The verifier must know that all traffic leaving a pod crosses the capped, monitored links.",
        "theme": "coverage-hidden-compute",
        "blocked_by": "M-0013",
        "sources": [
          "S-0018"
        ],
        "inProposal": true
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0014",
        "n": 3,
        "text": "Shaping devices and routing assignments must be trusted by both parties; Amodo has not yet fully analysed resilience to a compromised DPU.",
        "theme": "hardware-trust",
        "blocked_by": "M-0017",
        "sources": [
          "S-1301",
          "S-1313"
        ],
        "inProposal": false
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0014",
        "n": 4,
        "text": "Advances in low-communication training could shrink the margin that the cap enforces.",
        "theme": "capacity-bounds",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1314",
          "S-0060",
          "S-1301"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0012",
        "n": 1,
        "text": "Attestation that resists physical attackers, for the enclave variant.",
        "theme": "hardware-trust",
        "blocked_by": "M-0008",
        "sources": [
          "S-1202"
        ],
        "inProposal": false
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0012",
        "n": 2,
        "text": "Numerical nondeterminism limits how tightly recomputation can pin down the model and sampling.",
        "theme": "protocol-soundness",
        "blocked_by": "M-0002",
        "sources": [
          "S-0015"
        ],
        "inProposal": false
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0012",
        "n": 3,
        "text": "The recomputation variant needs the verifier to hold the declared weights.",
        "theme": "access-governance",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0015"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0013",
        "n": 1,
        "text": "No complete verification tap has been demonstrated at production frontend link rates, and on the tested CPU no hash algorithm reached line rate with minimum-size frames.",
        "theme": "performance-compatibility",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1311",
          "S-1310"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0013",
        "n": 2,
        "text": "Nondeterministic inference leaves covert capacity in outputs that hashing cannot remove.",
        "theme": "evidence-binding",
        "blocked_by": "M-0002",
        "sources": [
          "S-1300"
        ],
        "inProposal": false
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0013",
        "n": 3,
        "text": "Taps and gateway devices need tamper-evident housing and physical monitoring so that traffic cannot bypass them.",
        "theme": "hardware-trust",
        "blocked_by": "M-0017",
        "sources": [
          "S-1300",
          "S-0018"
        ],
        "inProposal": false
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0013",
        "n": 4,
        "text": "Radio, power-line and thermal channels are not addressed by network-level designs.",
        "theme": "coverage-hidden-compute",
        "blocked_by": "M-0022",
        "sources": [
          "S-1300"
        ],
        "inProposal": false
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0013",
        "n": 5,
        "text": "Red-teaming by specialists is called for but has not been reported.",
        "theme": "adversarial-validation",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1300"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      }
    ]
  },
  "exposure": {
    "weights": {
      "shown": [],
      "partial": [
        "M-0012",
        "M-0013"
      ],
      "hidden": [],
      "none": [
        "M-0014"
      ],
      "unknown": []
    },
    "io": {
      "shown": [],
      "partial": [
        "M-0012",
        "M-0013"
      ],
      "hidden": [],
      "none": [
        "M-0014"
      ],
      "unknown": []
    },
    "training": {
      "shown": [],
      "partial": [
        "M-0013"
      ],
      "hidden": [],
      "none": [
        "M-0014",
        "M-0012"
      ],
      "unknown": []
    }
  },
  "implementations": [
    {
      "mechanism": "M-0014",
      "selected": null,
      "implementations": [
        {
          "id": "I-0011",
          "title": "AI 2040 inference-only verification stack",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/ai-2040-inference-only-verification-plan/"
        },
        {
          "id": "I-0010",
          "title": "RAND secure inference data center (SIDC) design",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/rand-secure-inference-data-centers/"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "mechanism": "M-0012",
      "selected": null,
      "implementations": [
        {
          "id": "I-0007",
          "title": "Attestable Audits",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/attestable-audits/"
        },
        {
          "id": "I-0022",
          "title": "PAL*M",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/palm/"
        },
        {
          "id": "I-0006",
          "title": "Tinfoil model identity (Modelwrap)",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/tinfoil-model-identity/"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "mechanism": "M-0013",
      "selected": null,
      "implementations": [
        {
          "id": "I-0011",
          "title": "AI 2040 inference-only verification stack",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/ai-2040-inference-only-verification-plan/"
        },
        {
          "id": "I-0012",
          "title": "Low-trust AI compute verification system overview",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/low-trust-compute-verification-system-overview/"
        },
        {
          "id": "I-0008",
          "title": "SASH confidential network logger",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/sash-confidential-network-logger/"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "sources": [
    {
      "id": "S-0067",
      "title": "Verification Plan",
      "authors": "R. Dean",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://ai-2040.com/supplements/verification-plan",
      "path": "/sources/dean-verification-plan/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1301",
      "title": "Traffic Shaping for Workload Classification",
      "authors": "Lucid Computing",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://lucidcomputing.substack.com/p/traffic-shaping-for-workload-classification",
      "path": "/sources/lucid-traffic-shaping-workload-classification/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0018",
      "title": "A System Overview for Near-Term, Low-Trust AI Compute Verification",
      "authors": "N. Cankaya",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://intelligence.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/A-system-overview-for-near-term-low-trust-AI-compute-verification.pdf",
      "path": "/sources/cankaya-system-overview-low-trust-compute-verification/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-3220",
      "title": "De-risking Interconnect Limits for AI Verification",
      "authors": "A. Scher et al.",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://techgov.intelligence.org/blog/de-risking-interconnect-limits-for-ai-verification",
      "path": "/sources/scher-derisking-interconnect-limits/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1313",
      "title": "The Tray as a Bandwidth Boundary",
      "authors": "Amodo Design",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://amododesign.com/notes/2026-03-16-dpu-bandwidth-limiter/",
      "path": "/sources/amodo-tray-bandwidth-boundary/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1314",
      "title": "DiLoCo: Distributed Low-Communication Training of Language Models",
      "authors": "A. Douillard et al.",
      "year": 2024,
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.08105",
      "path": "/sources/douillard-diloco/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0060",
      "title": "Does Distributed Training Undermine Compute Governance?",
      "authors": "R. Rahman",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.29359",
      "path": "/sources/rahman-distributed-training-compute-governance/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0013",
      "title": "How Tinfoil Proves Exactly What Model Is Running",
      "authors": "Tinfoil Team",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://tinfoil.sh/blog/2026-02-03-proving-model-identity",
      "path": "/sources/tinfoil-proving-model-identity/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0012",
      "title": "PAL*M: Property Attestation for Large Generative Models",
      "authors": "P. Chantasantitam et al.",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.16199",
      "path": "/sources/chantasantitam-palm/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0015",
      "title": "Verifying LLM Inference to Detect Model Weight Exfiltration",
      "authors": "R. Rinberg et al.",
      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.02620",
      "path": "/sources/rinberg-verifying-llm-inference-weight-exfiltration/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1206",
      "title": "A primer on secure enclaves",
      "authors": "Tinfoil",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://docs.tinfoil.sh/verification/secure-enclave-primer",
      "path": "/sources/tinfoil-docs-secure-enclave-primer/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1207",
      "title": "Backend infrastructure",
      "authors": "Tinfoil",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://docs.tinfoil.sh/verification/attestation-architecture",
      "path": "/sources/tinfoil-docs-attestation-architecture/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1208",
      "title": "How verification works in Tinfoil",
      "authors": "Tinfoil",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://docs.tinfoil.sh/verification/verification-in-tinfoil",
      "path": "/sources/tinfoil-docs-verification-in-tinfoil/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1209",
      "title": "modelwrap: Reproducible dm-verity read-only image of Huggingface models",
      "authors": "Tinfoil",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://github.com/tinfoilsh/modelwrap",
      "path": "/sources/tinfoil-modelwrap-code/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1202",
      "title": "TEE.fail: Breaking Trusted Execution Environments via DDR5 Memory Bus Interposition",
      "authors": "J. Chuang et al.",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://tee.fail/",
      "path": "/sources/chuang-tee-fail/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1507",
      "title": "Adversarial Entropy Inflation Against Gumbel-Based Inference Verification",
      "authors": "N. Kezins",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.23375",
      "path": "/sources/kezins-adversarial-entropy-inflation/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1210",
      "title": "Battering RAM: Low-Cost Interposer Attacks on Confidential Computing via Dynamic Memory Aliasing",
      "authors": "J. De Meulemeester et al.",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://batteringram.eu/",
      "path": "/sources/de-meulemeester-battering-ram/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1212",
      "title": "RMPocalypse: How a Catch-22 Breaks AMD SEV-SNP",
      "authors": "B. Schlüter & S. Shinde",
      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://rmpocalypse.github.io/",
      "path": "/sources/schluter-rmpocalypse/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1213",
      "title": "SEV-SNP RMP Initialization Vulnerability (AMD-SB-3020)",
      "authors": "AMD",
      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-3020.html",
      "path": "/sources/amd-sb-3020-rmp-initialization/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0014",
      "title": "On TEEs for Privacy-Preserving Monitoring in AI Governance",
      "authors": "Gloria Z",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://techgov.intelligence.org/blog/on-tees-for-privacy-preserving-monitoring-in-ai-governance",
      "path": "/sources/zhao-tees-privacy-preserving-monitoring/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0009",
      "title": "Attestable Audits: Verifiable AI Safety Benchmarks Using Trusted Execution Environments",
      "authors": "C. Schnabl et al.",
      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.23706",
      "path": "/sources/schnabl-attestable-audits/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1300",
      "title": "Fingerprinting All AI Cluster I/O Without Mutually Trusted Processors",
      "authors": "N. Cankaya et al.",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.10724",
      "path": "/sources/cankaya-fingerprinting-ai-cluster-io/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0031",
      "title": "The Fundamentals and Feasibility of Secure Network Taps for Verifying AI Datacenter Use",
      "authors": "N. Cankaya",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://nacicankaya.substack.com/p/research-note-the-fundamentals-and",
      "path": "/sources/cankaya-secure-network-taps/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1312",
      "title": "Fitting a Network TAP to our Inference Verification Prototype",
      "authors": "Amodo Design",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://amododesign.com/notes/2026-09-15-network-tap-inference-verification/",
      "path": "/sources/amodo-network-tap-inference-verification-prototype/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1007",
      "title": "Amodo-Design/Inference-Recomputation-Prototype (GitHub repository)",
      "authors": "Amodo Design",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://github.com/Amodo-Design/Inference-Recomputation-Prototype",
      "path": "/sources/amodo-inference-recomputation-prototype-code/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1319",
      "title": "inference-verification: Inference Verification Prototype",
      "authors": "Singapore AI Safety Hub (SASH)",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://github.com/sg-ai-safety-hub/inference-verification",
      "path": "/sources/sash-inference-verification-repo/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1320",
      "title": "Internationalising AI Verification",
      "authors": "Singapore AI Safety Hub (SASH)",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://www.aisafety.sg/research/internationalising-ai-verification",
      "path": "/sources/sash-internationalising-ai-verification/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1310",
      "title": "Network Tapping for AI Verification: A Technical Assessment",
      "authors": "Amodo Design",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://amododesign.com/notes/2026-05-03-network-tapping/",
      "path": "/sources/amodo-network-tapping-technical-assessment/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1311",
      "title": "Network Traffic Hashing",
      "authors": "Amodo Design",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://amododesign.com/notes/2026-07-03-network-traffic-hashing/",
      "path": "/sources/amodo-network-traffic-hashing/"
    }
  ]
}