Proposal Explorer
ResetA verification proposal from the AI Verification Tech Map, from its records of 2026-10-08. https://trustbutveri.fyi/explorer/?mechanisms=M-0016&implementations=M-0016:I-0018&cols=tested,sees
Analysis
Applied filters: none. Every filter is set to Any.
Overview
| Mechanism | Readiness | Open flaws | Attack testing | Verifier sees |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challengesGPU contention probes | R2 | 2 significantFamily context below | Analysis | W unspecifiedI unspecifiedT unspecified |
- Open flaws: n critical n significant n minor
- Verifier sees model weights (W), inputs and outputs (I), training data (T): W shown W depends W hidden W not involved W unspecified
Claim coverageNo claims yet
Add claims to see which ones the mechanisms address.
Properties1 built for an adversarial prover
- Built for an adversarial prover
- Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges
- No new hardware needed
- Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges
Attack testing1 mechanism with published testing
Published attempts to break a system, including those that found failures. Testing history does not show that open flaws are resolved.
Limits1 family with findings to check · 1 mechanism with open significant findings
- Family findings
- Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges
Context for GPU contention probes. These findings concern the family or other implementations; applicability must be checked against their stated scope.
Timing-based software attestation has been broken in practice in Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges
Castelluccia et al. implemented two generic attacks, one based on a return-oriented rootkit and one on code compression, together with specific attacks on SWATT and ICE-based schemes, on commodity sensor nodes. They conclude that secure time-based attestation is "very difficult, if not impossible, to design correctly". The attacks target embedded schemes, not AI accelerators. 2 3
Response: Perrig and van Doorn, two of the designers of SWATT and ICE, replied in August 2010. They argue that the rootkit attack defeats a naive implementation, not a property the schemes claim, and that the SWATT attack was run on a re-implementation on a chip with eight times the program memory, where SWATT's own chip is almost always full of code. They accept that the attack on ICE works.
Demonstrated attack · Significant · Disputed. On the record
Remote memory narrows the timing margin in Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges
Data-centre remote memory access returns in about 1–2 µs, against about 70–200 ns for local DRAM. The MIRI overview says verification of memory saturation depends on ruling out remote access by latency or physical disconnection. It adds that pre-staging data is ruled out only by unpredictable, capacity-filling challenges. 4
Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record
Related mechanism R2 Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization: Physical disconnection is proposed to exclude remote memory between the separated groups during a challenge. It depends on the isolation boundary being enforced. A pointer, not evidence that this flaw is mitigated. Add
Error rates not quantified in Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges
Monfared et al. show separable timing distributions but do not define thresholds or statistical tests, so false-positive and false-negative rates are not quantified. 1
Open question · Minor · Open. On the record
- Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges
- Open significant flaws
2 flaws in 1 mechanism
Error rates not quantified in GPU contention probes
Monfared et al. show timing distributions that shift under contention, but leave hardware-specific thresholds to future work and state that false-positive and false-negative rates are not quantified. 1
Open question · Significant · Open. On the record
Answers are not tied to one GPU in GPU contention probes
The paper's floating-point fingerprint characterises a GPU model. The authors state that it does not distinguish individual GPUs, so a probe answer does not show which device of that model produced it. 1
Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record
Possible additionsNone found on the map
Mechanisms on the map that are not in the proposal. Pointers, not recommendations.
The records connect no other mechanism to this proposal's gaps, open flaws or dependencies.
Dependencies2 blockers
- Blockers
2 blockers recorded
What the verifier sees1 unspecified
From the family or selected implementation's record.
- Model weights
Unspecified for Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges. Check the implementation record.
- Inputs and outputs
Unspecified for Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges. Check the implementation record.
- Training data
Unspecified for Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges. Check the implementation record.
Exposure notes
- Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges, GPU contention probes: This Explorer has no asset-specific exposure assessment for this implementation. Check its source and deployment assumptions.
Implementations5 systems
- Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges
- R1 Data-centre memory challenging Proposed architecture, Machine Intelligence Research Institute
- R2 GPU contention probes Research prototype
- R1 Low-trust AI compute verification system overview Proposed architecture, Machine Intelligence Research Institute
- R2 SAGE Research prototype
- R2 VRAM-residency challenge Research prototype
Sources4 cited
- Timing and Memory Telemetry on GPUs for AI Governance, S. K. Monfared et al. (2026). Original
- On the Difficulty of Software-Based Attestation of Embedded Devices, C. Castelluccia et al. (2009). Original
- Refutation of "On the Difficulty of Software-Based Attestation of Embedded Devices", A. Perrig & L. van Doorn (2010). Original
- A System Overview for Near-Term, Low-Trust AI Compute Verification, N. Cankaya (2026). Original
Share the link to this proposal. This proposal is also available as plain text and JSON.
Filter mechanisms
Filters apply to mechanisms only. They describe the setting a proposal is for, and all are off by default. A mechanism that a filter rules out is flagged and does not count towards claim coverage. Selected implementations use their own record fields. A match means not excluded; conditional or unspecified exposure stays with a note. Passing a filter does not establish that the assumptions hold in a deployment.
All 25 mechanisms match.
Prover
How far can the party being checked be trusted?
The prover is the party being checked. Semi-trusted designs rely on part of its stack: usually the chip vendor's hardware root of trust, its firmware or counters, or its supply-chain records. Adversarial designs aim to hold even if it cheats wherever the checks allow, within their stated assumptions.
Keeps mechanisms whose threat model holds against at least this prover. Adversarial is the strongest assumption. Definitions
Verifier devices on site
May the verifier install its own hardware at the prover's sites?
Some mechanisms need a device the verifier owns or trusts at the prover's facility, such as a network tap, a bandwidth limiter or a sealed sensor. Choose Not allowed when the setting rules that out. Inspectors are not covered.
"Not allowed" removes mechanisms that need a retrofit device, such as a network tap or a sealed sensor. Definitions
Prover cooperation
How much must the prover take part?
Required: the prover takes part, for example by logging requests, producing proofs or opening records. Partial: some access, such as installing a device. Not required: works from outside, such as satellite imagery.
"Partial at most" removes mechanisms that need the prover's active participation. "Not required" keeps only those that work without it. Definitions
Chips
May the proposal depend on new chip designs?
New chip features take years to reach a deployed fleet and cover only chips made after they ship. Mechanisms that use shipping features, such as trusted execution environments or performance counters, stay.
"Existing chips only" removes mechanisms that need changes to future chip designs. Definitions
Minimum readiness
How mature must each mechanism be?
- Any (selected)25 match
- R1 Proposed25 match
- R2 Demonstrated15 match
- R3 In production4 match
- R4 Deployment-ready0 match
A level describes the public evidence for a mechanism's stated use, not its cost or feasibility. R3 can still have open critical flaws.
Keeps mechanisms whose readiness level is at least this one. Definitions
Attack testing
How hard has each mechanism been attacked in public?
The strongest published attempt to break the mechanism for its verification use: a security analysis, red-teaming by its developers or collaborators, or a red team independent of them.
Keeps mechanisms whose strongest published attack testing is at least this. Definitions
Keep hidden from the verifier
What must the verifier never see? Choose any.
Model weights: the checked model's parameters. Inputs and outputs: the requests a deployed model serves and its responses. Training data: what a model was trained on. Each mechanism's exposure is the editors' reading of its record: shown, depends on the design (kept, with a note), hidden, not involved, or unspecified for a selected implementation. Code and configuration are not covered yet.
Removes mechanisms that show the asset to the verifier. Conditional or unspecified exposure stays with a note and needs checking against the privacy requirement.
Claims
A claim is something one party wants to verify about another party's AI hardware or software. Each claim's number shows how the proposal addresses it.
- Addressed. A mechanism in the proposal is aimed at this claim and is not excluded by the filters.
- Partly addressed. Only supporting mechanisms, or mechanisms aimed at it that the filters exclude.
- Unaddressed. No mechanism in the proposal addresses this claim.
Addressed means a mechanism in the proposal is aimed at the claim and is not excluded by your filters. It does not mean the claim is verified: check its assessed use, readiness, assumptions and open flaws.
Mechanisms
A mechanism is a general technique for verifying claims. Its badge is its readiness level for its stated use. An optional implementation choice narrows its assumptions, assessed use and claim links to that record. Lines join it to the claims it addresses. Click a line for details.Under its name it lists the claims it is aimed at or supports.
- Aimed at the claim: verifying it is a direct purpose of the mechanism.
- Supports the claim: helps verify it without being aimed at it.
- Faint: excluded by your filters, so it does not count towards claim coverage.
Overview
One row per mechanism in the proposal. Every mark comes from that mechanism's record, as listed in the panels below; what the verifier sees is the editors' reading of the record's text. Flaw counts are per mechanism. Summary counts name mechanisms with open findings, not a sum of attacks. Choosing an implementation narrows each row to that record's assessed use; family findings remain as context.
What the verifier sees
For model weights, inputs and outputs, and training data. This is the editors' reading of each mechanism's record (its threat model, how it works and its limitations), not a field of the record. Shown: the verifier sees it. Depends: on the design or variant, or the verifier sees only samples. Hidden: the verifier sees only commitments, hashes, proofs or results. Not involved: the record does not handle it. Unspecified: the selected implementation has no asset-specific assessment here.
Possible additions
Mechanisms on the map, not in the proposal, that the records connect to an unaddressed or partly addressed claim, an open flaw or a dependency. They are pointers, not recommendations: each brings its own readiness level and flaws, and none is claimed to close a flaw. Links from flaws are the editors' reading of the two records.
Start from a goal
A goal is something a rule or agreement about AI sets out to achieve. Choosing one loads the claims it needs verified. Your mechanisms and filters stay as they are.
- Cap frontier training2 direct, 3 supportingKeep every AI training run below an agreed amount of compute.
- Pause frontier AI development2 direct, 3 supportingStop new AI training runs and experiments for an agreed period, while existing models stay in service.
- Deploy only evaluated models2 direct, 3 supportingDeploy powerful AI models widely only after their risks have been evaluated and judged manageable.
- Prevent catastrophic misuse2 direct, 2 supportingKeep capable AI models from helping anyone carry out catastrophic attacks, such as biological or chemical ones.
- Prevent weight theft1 direct, 1 supportingKeep the weights of capable AI models from being copied out of the facilities that hold them.
- Enforce chip export controls1 directKeep export-controlled AI chips at the destinations they were authorised for.
Start from a published design
Choosing a design loads the mechanisms its record realises or depends on. If the proposal has no claims yet, it also loads the claims that record says the design addresses.
- AI 2040 inference-only verification stack7 mechanismsProposed architecture, AI Futures Project
- Low-trust AI compute verification system overview7 mechanismsProposed architecture, Machine Intelligence Research Institute
- RAND secure inference data center (SIDC) design3 mechanismsProposed architecture, RAND