{
  "schema_version": "1.2",
  "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/explorer/?hide=io&goal=G-0005",
  "data_generated": "2026-10-08",
  "definitions": {
    "methodology": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/methodology/",
    "readiness": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/readiness/",
    "filters": [
      {
        "id": "prover",
        "label": "Prover",
        "question": "How far can the party being checked be trusted?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "cooperative",
            "label": "Cooperative"
          },
          {
            "value": "semi-trusted",
            "label": "Semi-trusted"
          },
          {
            "value": "adversarial",
            "label": "Adversarial"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose threat model holds against at least this prover. Adversarial is the strongest assumption.",
        "about": "The prover is the party being checked. Semi-trusted designs rely on part of its stack: usually the chip vendor's hardware root of trust, its firmware or counters, or its supply-chain records. Adversarial designs aim to hold even if it cheats wherever the checks allow, within their stated assumptions."
      },
      {
        "id": "onsite",
        "label": "Verifier devices on site",
        "question": "May the verifier install its own hardware at the prover's sites?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "no",
            "label": "Not allowed"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Not allowed\" removes mechanisms that need a retrofit device, such as a network tap or a sealed sensor.",
        "about": "Some mechanisms need a device the verifier owns or trusts at the prover's facility, such as a network tap, a bandwidth limiter or a sealed sensor. Choose Not allowed when the setting rules that out. Inspectors are not covered."
      },
      {
        "id": "coop",
        "label": "Prover cooperation",
        "question": "How much must the prover take part?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "partial",
            "label": "Partial at most"
          },
          {
            "value": "none",
            "label": "Not required"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Partial at most\" removes mechanisms that need the prover's active participation. \"Not required\" keeps only those that work without it.",
        "about": "Required: the prover takes part, for example by logging requests, producing proofs or opening records. Partial: some access, such as installing a device. Not required: works from outside, such as satellite imagery."
      },
      {
        "id": "chips",
        "label": "Chips",
        "question": "May the proposal depend on new chip designs?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "existing",
            "label": "Existing chips only"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Existing chips only\" removes mechanisms that need changes to future chip designs.",
        "about": "New chip features take years to reach a deployed fleet and cover only chips made after they ship. Mechanisms that use shipping features, such as trusted execution environments or performance counters, stay."
      },
      {
        "id": "ready",
        "label": "Minimum readiness",
        "question": "How mature must each mechanism be?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "R1",
            "label": "R1 Proposed"
          },
          {
            "value": "R2",
            "label": "R2 Demonstrated"
          },
          {
            "value": "R3",
            "label": "R3 In production"
          },
          {
            "value": "R4",
            "label": "R4 Deployment-ready"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose readiness level is at least this one.",
        "about": "A level describes the public evidence for a mechanism's stated use, not its cost or feasibility. R3 can still have open critical flaws."
      },
      {
        "id": "tested",
        "label": "Attack testing",
        "question": "How hard has each mechanism been attacked in public?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "analysis",
            "label": "Published analysis"
          },
          {
            "value": "red-teamed",
            "label": "Red-teamed"
          },
          {
            "value": "independent-red-team",
            "label": "Independent red-team"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose strongest published attack testing is at least this.",
        "about": "The strongest published attempt to break the mechanism for its verification use: a security analysis, red-teaming by its developers or collaborators, or a red team independent of them."
      },
      {
        "id": "hide",
        "label": "Keep hidden from the verifier",
        "question": "What must the verifier never see?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "weights",
            "label": "Model weights"
          },
          {
            "value": "io",
            "label": "Inputs and outputs"
          },
          {
            "value": "training",
            "label": "Training data"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Removes mechanisms that show the asset to the verifier. Conditional or unspecified exposure stays with a note and needs checking against the privacy requirement.",
        "about": "Model weights: the checked model's parameters. Inputs and outputs: the requests a deployed model serves and its responses. Training data: what a model was trained on. Each mechanism's exposure is the editors' reading of its record: shown, depends on the design (kept, with a note), hidden, not involved, or unspecified for a selected implementation. Code and configuration are not covered yet."
      }
    ],
    "exposure": "For model weights, inputs and outputs, and training data. This is the editors' reading of each mechanism's record (its threat model, how it works and its limitations), not a field of the record. Shown: the verifier sees it. Depends: on the design or variant, or the verifier sees only samples. Hidden: the verifier sees only commitments, hashes, proofs or results. Not involved: the record does not handle it. Unspecified: the selected implementation has no asset-specific assessment here.",
    "claim_status": {
      "addressed": "A mechanism in the proposal is aimed at this claim and is not excluded by the filters.",
      "partly-addressed": "Only supporting mechanisms, or mechanisms aimed at it that the filters exclude.",
      "unaddressed": "No mechanism in the proposal addresses this claim."
    },
    "finding_scope": "Evidence scope describes where a finding was demonstrated; it does not establish applicability to every implementation in the mechanism family.",
    "claim_finding_scope": "open_critical_findings names active findings on the assessed records; open_critical_context names conditional family findings whose implementation applicability is unassessed.",
    "legacy_status": "The status field retains covered/partial/none for compatibility. It names claim links, never successful verification. Use claim_status and status_label for presentation."
  },
  "filters": {
    "prover": "",
    "onsite": "",
    "coop": "",
    "chips": "",
    "ready": "",
    "tested": "",
    "hide": [
      "io"
    ]
  },
  "mechanisms_passing_filters": 24,
  "claims": [],
  "mechanisms": [],
  "strengths": {
    "covered": [],
    "production": [],
    "adversarial": [],
    "noNewHardware": [],
    "mitigated": [],
    "notCounted": []
  },
  "properties": {
    "covered": [],
    "production": [],
    "adversarial": [],
    "noNewHardware": [],
    "mitigated": [],
    "notCounted": []
  },
  "attack_testing": [],
  "selected_implementations": {},
  "weaknesses": {
    "gaps": [],
    "excluded": [],
    "unlinked": [],
    "critical": [],
    "significant": [],
    "criticalMechanisms": [],
    "significantMechanisms": [],
    "familyContext": [],
    "minor": 0,
    "minorFindings": [],
    "minorBy": [],
    "notDemonstrated": [],
    "newChip": []
  },
  "findings": [],
  "possible_additions": [],
  "goal": {
    "id": "G-0005",
    "title": "Prevent weight theft",
    "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/goals/prevent-weight-theft/",
    "one_liner": "Keep the weights of capable AI models from being copied out of the facilities that hold them.",
    "claims": [
      {
        "id": "C-0009",
        "title": "Model weights have not left the facility",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/claims/weights-have-not-left/",
        "relevance": "direct",
        "note": "This claim is the goal in a form a verifier can check: no copy of the specified weights has left the facility.",
        "sources": [
          "S-1610",
          "S-0005"
        ],
        "editorial": false,
        "in_proposal": false
      },
      {
        "id": "C-0008",
        "title": "Communication between compute groups is bounded",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/claims/bandwidth-is-bounded/",
        "relevance": "supporting",
        "note": "If only a set amount of data can leave a data centre, an adversary cannot steal more than that amount.",
        "sources": [
          "S-1508"
        ],
        "editorial": false,
        "in_proposal": false
      }
    ],
    "outside": [
      {
        "label": "insider and physical security",
        "text": "Nevo and colleagues group their 38 attack vectors into nine categories, which include unauthorised physical access, supply chain attacks and human intelligence. Access controls, insider threat programmes and physical security are outside this map's records.",
        "sources": [
          "S-1610"
        ],
        "editorial": false
      }
    ]
  },
  "design": null,
  "dependencies": {
    "prerequisites": [],
    "shared": [],
    "blockers": []
  },
  "exposure": {
    "weights": {
      "shown": [],
      "partial": [],
      "hidden": [],
      "none": [],
      "unknown": []
    },
    "io": {
      "shown": [],
      "partial": [],
      "hidden": [],
      "none": [],
      "unknown": []
    },
    "training": {
      "shown": [],
      "partial": [],
      "hidden": [],
      "none": [],
      "unknown": []
    }
  },
  "implementations": [],
  "sources": []
}