{
  "schema_version": "1.3",
  "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/explorer/?mechanisms=M-0009,M-0017,M-0024&hide=io",
  "data_generated": "2026-10-09",
  "definitions": {
    "methodology": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/methodology/",
    "readiness": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/readiness/",
    "filters": [
      {
        "id": "prover",
        "label": "Prover",
        "question": "How far can the party being checked be trusted?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "cooperative",
            "label": "Cooperative"
          },
          {
            "value": "semi-trusted",
            "label": "Semi-trusted"
          },
          {
            "value": "adversarial",
            "label": "Adversarial"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose threat model holds against at least this prover. Adversarial is the strongest assumption.",
        "about": "The prover is the party being checked. Semi-trusted designs rely on part of its stack: usually the chip vendor's hardware root of trust, its firmware or counters, or its supply-chain records. Adversarial designs aim to hold even if it cheats wherever the checks allow, within their stated assumptions."
      },
      {
        "id": "onsite",
        "label": "Verifier devices on site",
        "question": "May the verifier install its own hardware at the prover's sites?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "no",
            "label": "Not allowed"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Not allowed\" removes mechanisms that need a retrofit device, such as a network tap or a sealed sensor.",
        "about": "Some mechanisms need a device the verifier owns or trusts at the prover's facility, such as a network tap, a bandwidth limiter or a sealed sensor. Choose Not allowed when the setting rules that out. Inspectors are not covered."
      },
      {
        "id": "coop",
        "label": "Prover cooperation",
        "question": "How much must the prover take part?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "partial",
            "label": "Partial at most"
          },
          {
            "value": "none",
            "label": "Not required"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Partial at most\" removes mechanisms that need the prover's active participation. \"Not required\" keeps only those that work without it.",
        "about": "Required: the prover takes part, for example by logging requests, producing proofs or opening records. Partial: some access, such as installing a device. Not required: works from outside, such as satellite imagery."
      },
      {
        "id": "chips",
        "label": "Chips",
        "question": "May the proposal depend on new chip designs?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "existing",
            "label": "Existing chips only"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Existing chips only\" removes mechanisms that need changes to future chip designs.",
        "about": "New chip features take years to reach a deployed fleet and cover only chips made after they ship. Mechanisms that use shipping features, such as trusted execution environments or performance counters, stay."
      },
      {
        "id": "ready",
        "label": "Minimum development status",
        "question": "Development status",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "R1",
            "label": "Proposed"
          },
          {
            "value": "R2",
            "label": "Research demonstration"
          },
          {
            "value": "R3",
            "label": "Operational use"
          },
          {
            "value": "R4",
            "label": "Legacy independent-evaluation filter",
            "legacy": true
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose readiness level is at least this one.",
        "about": "A level describes the public evidence for a mechanism's stated use, not its cost or feasibility. R3 can still have open critical flaws."
      },
      {
        "id": "tested",
        "label": "Attack testing",
        "question": "How hard has each mechanism been attacked in public?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "analysis",
            "label": "Published analysis"
          },
          {
            "value": "red-teamed",
            "label": "Red-teamed"
          },
          {
            "value": "independent-red-team",
            "label": "Independent red-team"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose strongest published attack testing is at least this.",
        "about": "The strongest published attempt to break the mechanism for its verification use: a security analysis, red-teaming by its developers or collaborators, or a red team independent of them."
      },
      {
        "id": "hide",
        "label": "Keep hidden from the verifier",
        "question": "What must the verifier never see?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "weights",
            "label": "Model weights"
          },
          {
            "value": "io",
            "label": "Inputs and outputs"
          },
          {
            "value": "training",
            "label": "Training data"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Removes mechanisms that show the asset to the verifier. Conditional or unspecified exposure stays with a note and needs checking against the privacy requirement.",
        "about": "Model weights: the checked model's parameters. Inputs and outputs: the requests a deployed model serves and its responses. Training data: what a model was trained on. Each mechanism's exposure is the editors' reading of its record: shown, depends on the design (kept, with a note), hidden, not involved, or unspecified for a selected implementation. Code and configuration are not covered yet."
      }
    ],
    "exposure": "For model weights, inputs and outputs, and training data. This is the editors' reading of each mechanism's record (its threat model, how it works and its limitations), not a field of the record. Shown: the verifier sees it. Depends: on the design or variant, or the verifier sees only samples. Hidden: the verifier sees only commitments, hashes, proofs or results. Not involved: the record does not handle it. Unspecified: the selected implementation has no asset-specific assessment here.",
    "claim_status": {
      "addressed": "A mechanism in the proposal is aimed at this claim and is not excluded by the filters.",
      "partly-addressed": "Only supporting mechanisms, or mechanisms aimed at it that the filters exclude.",
      "unaddressed": "No mechanism in the proposal addresses this claim."
    },
    "finding_classification": {
      "failure": {
        "label": "Known failures",
        "singular": "Known failure",
        "anchor": "known-flaws"
      },
      "scope-limitation": {
        "label": "Scope limitations",
        "singular": "Scope limitation",
        "anchor": "scope-limitations"
      },
      "open-question": {
        "label": "Open questions",
        "singular": "Open question",
        "anchor": "open-questions"
      }
    },
    "finding_scope": "Evidence scope describes where a finding was demonstrated; it does not establish applicability to every implementation in the mechanism family.",
    "claim_finding_scope": "open_critical_findings names active failures on the assessed records; open_critical_context names conditional family failures whose implementation applicability is unassessed.",
    "legacy_status": "The status field retains covered/partial/none for compatibility. It names claim links, never successful verification. Use claim_status and status_label for presentation."
  },
  "filters": {
    "prover": "",
    "onsite": "",
    "coop": "",
    "chips": "",
    "ready": "",
    "tested": "",
    "hide": [
      "io"
    ]
  },
  "mechanisms_passing_filters": 24,
  "claims": [],
  "mechanisms": [
    {
      "id": "M-0009",
      "title": "Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/",
      "assessment_record": {
        "id": "M-0009",
        "title": "Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/"
      },
      "finding_counts": {
        "failure": 3,
        "scope_limitation": 2,
        "open_question": 1,
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 3,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "selected_implementation": null,
      "readiness": {
        "level": "R1",
        "scope": "checking and enforcing training-compute limits on chips, against adversaries up to states",
        "confidence": "medium",
        "evidence": [
          "S-0035",
          "S-1204",
          "S-1205",
          "S-0057",
          "S-0056",
          "S-0006"
        ]
      },
      "development_status": {
        "code": "R1",
        "label": "Proposed",
        "short": "Proposed",
        "rank": 1,
        "legacy_code": "R1"
      },
      "security_evidence": {
        "attack_testing": {
          "status": "analysis",
          "label": "Published security analysis",
          "kind": "analysis"
        },
        "independent_evaluation": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "formal_proof": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "deployment_assurance": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "legacy_evaluation_code": null,
        "scoped_findings": [
          {
            "n": 1,
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "unassessed",
            "sources": [
              "S-1204",
              "S-0057"
            ]
          },
          {
            "n": 2,
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "unassessed",
            "sources": [
              "S-1204"
            ]
          },
          {
            "n": 4,
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "unassessed",
            "sources": [
              "S-1204"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 3,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "assessed_properties": {
        "threat_model": "adversarial",
        "hardware_requirement": "new-chip",
        "prover_cooperation": "required",
        "adversarial_evaluation": "analysis"
      },
      "claims": [],
      "exposure": {
        "weights": "hidden",
        "io": "hidden",
        "training": "hidden",
        "note": "The guarantee processor sees the chip's traffic inside a sealed enclosure and reports only whether rules were kept."
      },
      "family_finding_context": [],
      "filter_issues": []
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0017",
      "title": "Tamper evidence for verifier devices",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/tamper-evidence-for-verifier-devices/",
      "assessment_record": {
        "id": "M-0017",
        "title": "Tamper evidence for verifier devices",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/tamper-evidence-for-verifier-devices/"
      },
      "finding_counts": {
        "failure": 2,
        "scope_limitation": 1,
        "open_question": 0,
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 2,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "selected_implementation": null,
      "readiness": {
        "level": "R2",
        "scope": "detecting probing of proposed verifier hardware, using server and electronics prototypes as evidence",
        "confidence": "medium",
        "evidence": [
          "S-0052",
          "S-1315",
          "S-0051",
          "S-0050",
          "S-3262",
          "S-1316",
          "S-0018"
        ]
      },
      "development_status": {
        "code": "R2",
        "label": "Research demonstration",
        "short": "Research demo",
        "rank": 2,
        "legacy_code": "R2"
      },
      "security_evidence": {
        "attack_testing": {
          "status": "analysis",
          "label": "Published security analysis",
          "kind": "analysis"
        },
        "independent_evaluation": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "formal_proof": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "deployment_assurance": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "legacy_evaluation_code": null,
        "scoped_findings": [
          {
            "n": 1,
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "mechanism",
            "sources": [
              "S-1317",
              "S-1318"
            ]
          },
          {
            "n": 3,
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "mechanism",
            "sources": [
              "S-1315",
              "S-0052",
              "S-3261"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 2,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "assessed_properties": {
        "threat_model": "adversarial",
        "hardware_requirement": "retrofit-device",
        "prover_cooperation": "partial",
        "adversarial_evaluation": "analysis"
      },
      "claims": [],
      "exposure": {
        "weights": "none",
        "io": "none",
        "training": "none",
        "note": "Protects verifier devices; it does not handle model data."
      },
      "family_finding_context": [],
      "filter_issues": []
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0024",
      "title": "Bounding unexplained information in outputs",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/bounding-unexplained-information/",
      "assessment_record": {
        "id": "M-0024",
        "title": "Bounding unexplained information in outputs",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/bounding-unexplained-information/"
      },
      "finding_counts": {
        "failure": 1,
        "scope_limitation": 2,
        "open_question": 1,
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 1,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "selected_implementation": null,
      "readiness": {
        "level": "R2",
        "scope": "bounding how much hidden information can leave in checked inference outputs",
        "confidence": "low",
        "evidence": [
          "S-0019",
          "S-0015",
          "S-1507"
        ]
      },
      "development_status": {
        "code": "R2",
        "label": "Research demonstration",
        "short": "Research demo",
        "rank": 2,
        "legacy_code": "R2"
      },
      "security_evidence": {
        "attack_testing": {
          "status": "independent-red-team",
          "label": "Published attack testing",
          "kind": "practical",
          "attribution": "Independent team"
        },
        "independent_evaluation": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "formal_proof": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "deployment_assurance": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "legacy_evaluation_code": null,
        "scoped_findings": [
          {
            "n": 1,
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "unassessed",
            "sources": [
              "S-1507",
              "S-0015"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 1,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "assessed_properties": {
        "threat_model": "adversarial",
        "hardware_requirement": "retrofit-device",
        "prover_cooperation": "required",
        "adversarial_evaluation": "independent-red-team"
      },
      "claims": [],
      "exposure": {
        "weights": "partial",
        "io": "partial",
        "training": "none",
        "note": "Depends on where recomputation runs: in a sealed enclosure, or with zero-knowledge proofs, the verifier need not see the weights or the traffic."
      },
      "family_finding_context": [],
      "filter_issues": [
        {
          "filter": "hide",
          "level": "note",
          "short": "may show inputs and outputs",
          "text": "May show inputs and outputs, depending on the design. Depends on where recomputation runs: in a sealed enclosure, or with zero-knowledge proofs, the verifier need not see the weights or the traffic."
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "strengths": {
    "covered": [],
    "production": [],
    "operationalUse": [],
    "adversarial": [
      "M-0009",
      "M-0017",
      "M-0024"
    ],
    "noNewHardware": [],
    "mitigated": [],
    "notCounted": []
  },
  "properties": {
    "covered": [],
    "production": [],
    "operationalUse": [],
    "adversarial": [
      "M-0009",
      "M-0017",
      "M-0024"
    ],
    "noNewHardware": [],
    "mitigated": [],
    "notCounted": []
  },
  "attack_testing": [
    {
      "id": "M-0009",
      "record": "M-0009",
      "evaluation": "analysis",
      "in_setting": true
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0017",
      "record": "M-0017",
      "evaluation": "analysis",
      "in_setting": true
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0024",
      "record": "M-0024",
      "evaluation": "independent-red-team",
      "in_setting": true
    }
  ],
  "selected_implementations": {},
  "weaknesses": {
    "gaps": [],
    "excluded": [],
    "unlinked": [],
    "critical": [],
    "significant": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0009",
        "n": 1,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "State attackers can likely defeat current secure enclosures",
        "classification": "failure",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "The flexHEG authors write that \"nation-state attackers can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures\", and that the marginal cost of circumvention per device is hard to estimate. RAND similarly judges that anti-tamper measures \"would not be insurmountable for a determined and well-resourced adversary\", although they raise costs and can reveal tampering.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1204",
          "S-0057"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0009",
        "n": 2,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Firmware-only retrofits rely on Secure Boot, which fault injection can bypass",
        "classification": "failure",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Part II notes that the most common attack on Secure Boot replaces the firmware and applies a voltage glitch while the signature is being checked. It also notes that sophisticated actors may use microprobing or laser voltage probing to read key registers.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1204"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0009",
        "n": 4,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "FLOP accounting can be laundered through external data",
        "classification": "failure",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Results of earlier or parallel workloads could be hidden in the \"external data\" fed to a device, which would falsify the total FLOP count unless the inputs are explained or time delays are imposed.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1204"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0017",
        "n": 1,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Seals are often defeated with simple methods",
        "classification": "failure",
        "kind": "demonstrated-attack",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": "mechanism",
        "scope_note": "Published defeats of general security seals. They warn about proposed verifier-device seals, but do not demonstrate defeat of an AI verification enclosure or sensor.",
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "In 1996 a Los Alamos vulnerability assessment defeated all 94 security seals it examined, with 132 defeats in total, using rapid, inexpensive, low-tech methods. It found that seal cost did not predict security. In 2001 Johnston reported that high-tech seals are often easier to defeat than low-tech ones.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1317",
          "S-1318"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0017",
        "n": 3,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Attack classes outside published models",
        "classification": "failure",
        "kind": "open-question",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": "mechanism",
        "scope_note": "The radio compensation result is emulated using measured channel data under a known-reference attacker model. It is not a physical bypass demonstration against an AI verifier enclosure.",
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "The authors of the batteryless cover say they cannot assess chemical-solvent attacks, which exceed their expertise, and deem cover removal impractical. Anti-Tamper Radio's reference can drift as the environment or measurement system ages; the authors suggest gradually renewing the reference. A 2025 follow-up by some of the same authors shows, by emulation on measured channel data, that an attacker who knows the reference channel and the needle's effect on it could inject a signal that cancels the change caused by a needle insertion. It proposes a reconfigurable intelligent surface that randomizes the channel as a countermeasure.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1315",
          "S-0052",
          "S-3261"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0024",
        "n": 1,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Prompt-controlled entropy inflation widens the covert channel",
        "classification": "failure",
        "kind": "demonstrated-attack",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Gumbel-based inference verification tolerates token choices that honest GPU nondeterminism could produce, and the size of that tolerated set grows with the model's output entropy. Kezins, an independent researcher, showed that an adversary who controls the prompt distribution can raise output entropy and roughly double the bits leaked per token. Across six models of 1 to 32 billion parameters, this cut the slowdown from 146–254 times under benign prompts to 60–118 times. Kezins argues that architectures built on the same unexplained-information bound inherit this attack surface, and recommends calibrating tolerances against local token entropy rather than benign traffic.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1507",
          "S-0015"
        ],
        "helps": [
          {
            "by": "M-0002",
            "how": "Bit-exact replay would remove the tolerance for numerical noise that sets the size of this channel. The record notes that it needs full hardware and software metadata."
          }
        ]
      }
    ],
    "criticalMechanisms": [],
    "significantMechanisms": [
      "M-0009",
      "M-0017",
      "M-0024"
    ],
    "familyContext": [],
    "scopeLimitations": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0009",
        "n": 3,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Many important rules cannot be checked on-chip",
        "classification": "scope-limitation",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Malicious intent \"is not a technical property observable on-chip\", and misuse depends on what is done with a computation's results. A guarantee processor cannot easily tell whether a network is the whole system or one expert in a mixture-of-experts system. Part III judges that a fully local ruleset \"may not be entirely feasible\" for the same reason.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0035",
          "S-1205"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0009",
        "n": 6,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Coverage stops at flexHEG-equipped chips",
        "classification": "scope-limitation",
        "kind": "open-question",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Motivated actors will always be able to use some compute that is not flexHEG-equipped. Recalling existing consumer GPUs would likely be impractical, and reaching perfect coverage, or conclusively proving that no secret government data centres exist, would be \"practically quite difficult\".",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0035",
          "S-1205"
        ],
        "helps": [
          {
            "by": "M-0019",
            "how": "Accounts for which chips exist and who holds them."
          },
          {
            "by": "M-0020",
            "how": "Looks for undeclared facilities that hold other chips."
          }
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0017",
        "n": 2,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Security depends on inspection protocols",
        "classification": "scope-limitation",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": "mechanism",
        "scope_note": "An inspection and protocol requirement drawn from safeguards and enclosure studies, not a reported break of a deployed AI verifier.",
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Johnston argues that a seal is no better than the protocols for using it, and that inspectors are usually given little useful information on how to detect tampering. The Sandia survey notes that larger enclosures are hard to inspect fully and that sensor data must be authenticated.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1318",
          "S-1316"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0024",
        "n": 2,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Information the declared computation explains is not bounded",
        "classification": "scope-limitation",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "The bound limits unexplained bits only. Outputs that the declared computation fully explains can still carry valuable information: a compression study notes that an adversary with inference access can extract more proprietary information per bit than naive transmission allows.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1508",
          "S-0019"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0024",
        "n": 3,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Channels other than checked outputs are outside the bound",
        "classification": "scope-limitation",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "The inference-verification scheme treats side channels as out of scope. A low-trust system design argues that suppressing physical covert bandwidth below kilobits per second is much more achievable than aiming for zero, and that a malicious device can leak one bit of information by deliberately outputting a wrong result.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0015",
          "S-0018"
        ],
        "helps": [
          {
            "by": "M-0022",
            "how": "Physical side channels need separate suppression, which is this mechanism's purpose."
          }
        ]
      }
    ],
    "openQuestions": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0009",
        "n": 5,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Supply-chain diversion and hidden backdoors",
        "classification": "open-question",
        "kind": "open-question",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Components could be diverted before a guarantee processor is added, and backdoors could be introduced during design or manufacturing. Open-source designs and physical scans of randomly selected chips are proposed as countermeasures. Part III proposes international oversight of production and extensive testing of a random sample of finished devices.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1204",
          "S-1205"
        ],
        "helps": [
          {
            "by": "M-0019",
            "how": "Records each chip's identity and owner from the fab onwards, which bears on diversion before a guarantee processor is fitted. It does not address hidden backdoors."
          }
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0024",
        "n": 4,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "The facility-level design is untested",
        "classification": "open-question",
        "kind": "open-question",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "The compute-verification architecture is described with protocol details, potential attacks and prototyping plans, but no prototype results have been published.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0019"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "minor": 0,
    "minorFindings": [],
    "minorBy": [],
    "notDemonstrated": [
      "M-0009"
    ],
    "newChip": [
      "M-0009"
    ]
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "mech": "M-0009",
      "record": "M-0009",
      "n": 1,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "State attackers can likely defeat current secure enclosures",
      "classification": "failure",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "The flexHEG authors write that \"nation-state attackers can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures\", and that the marginal cost of circumvention per device is hard to estimate. RAND similarly judges that anti-tamper measures \"would not be insurmountable for a determined and well-resourced adversary\", although they raise costs and can reveal tampering.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1204",
        "S-0057"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0009",
      "record": "M-0009",
      "n": 2,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Firmware-only retrofits rely on Secure Boot, which fault injection can bypass",
      "classification": "failure",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Part II notes that the most common attack on Secure Boot replaces the firmware and applies a voltage glitch while the signature is being checked. It also notes that sophisticated actors may use microprobing or laser voltage probing to read key registers.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1204"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0009",
      "record": "M-0009",
      "n": 3,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Many important rules cannot be checked on-chip",
      "classification": "scope-limitation",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Malicious intent \"is not a technical property observable on-chip\", and misuse depends on what is done with a computation's results. A guarantee processor cannot easily tell whether a network is the whole system or one expert in a mixture-of-experts system. Part III judges that a fully local ruleset \"may not be entirely feasible\" for the same reason.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-0035",
        "S-1205"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0009",
      "record": "M-0009",
      "n": 4,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "FLOP accounting can be laundered through external data",
      "classification": "failure",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Results of earlier or parallel workloads could be hidden in the \"external data\" fed to a device, which would falsify the total FLOP count unless the inputs are explained or time delays are imposed.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1204"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0009",
      "record": "M-0009",
      "n": 5,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Supply-chain diversion and hidden backdoors",
      "classification": "open-question",
      "kind": "open-question",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Components could be diverted before a guarantee processor is added, and backdoors could be introduced during design or manufacturing. Open-source designs and physical scans of randomly selected chips are proposed as countermeasures. Part III proposes international oversight of production and extensive testing of a random sample of finished devices.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1204",
        "S-1205"
      ],
      "helps": [
        {
          "by": "M-0019",
          "how": "Records each chip's identity and owner from the fab onwards, which bears on diversion before a guarantee processor is fitted. It does not address hidden backdoors."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0009",
      "record": "M-0009",
      "n": 6,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Coverage stops at flexHEG-equipped chips",
      "classification": "scope-limitation",
      "kind": "open-question",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Motivated actors will always be able to use some compute that is not flexHEG-equipped. Recalling existing consumer GPUs would likely be impractical, and reaching perfect coverage, or conclusively proving that no secret government data centres exist, would be \"practically quite difficult\".",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-0035",
        "S-1205"
      ],
      "helps": [
        {
          "by": "M-0019",
          "how": "Accounts for which chips exist and who holds them."
        },
        {
          "by": "M-0020",
          "how": "Looks for undeclared facilities that hold other chips."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0017",
      "record": "M-0017",
      "n": 1,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Seals are often defeated with simple methods",
      "classification": "failure",
      "kind": "demonstrated-attack",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": "mechanism",
      "scope_note": "Published defeats of general security seals. They warn about proposed verifier-device seals, but do not demonstrate defeat of an AI verification enclosure or sensor.",
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "In 1996 a Los Alamos vulnerability assessment defeated all 94 security seals it examined, with 132 defeats in total, using rapid, inexpensive, low-tech methods. It found that seal cost did not predict security. In 2001 Johnston reported that high-tech seals are often easier to defeat than low-tech ones.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1317",
        "S-1318"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0017",
      "record": "M-0017",
      "n": 2,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Security depends on inspection protocols",
      "classification": "scope-limitation",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": "mechanism",
      "scope_note": "An inspection and protocol requirement drawn from safeguards and enclosure studies, not a reported break of a deployed AI verifier.",
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Johnston argues that a seal is no better than the protocols for using it, and that inspectors are usually given little useful information on how to detect tampering. The Sandia survey notes that larger enclosures are hard to inspect fully and that sensor data must be authenticated.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1318",
        "S-1316"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0017",
      "record": "M-0017",
      "n": 3,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Attack classes outside published models",
      "classification": "failure",
      "kind": "open-question",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": "mechanism",
      "scope_note": "The radio compensation result is emulated using measured channel data under a known-reference attacker model. It is not a physical bypass demonstration against an AI verifier enclosure.",
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "The authors of the batteryless cover say they cannot assess chemical-solvent attacks, which exceed their expertise, and deem cover removal impractical. Anti-Tamper Radio's reference can drift as the environment or measurement system ages; the authors suggest gradually renewing the reference. A 2025 follow-up by some of the same authors shows, by emulation on measured channel data, that an attacker who knows the reference channel and the needle's effect on it could inject a signal that cancels the change caused by a needle insertion. It proposes a reconfigurable intelligent surface that randomizes the channel as a countermeasure.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1315",
        "S-0052",
        "S-3261"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0024",
      "record": "M-0024",
      "n": 1,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Prompt-controlled entropy inflation widens the covert channel",
      "classification": "failure",
      "kind": "demonstrated-attack",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Gumbel-based inference verification tolerates token choices that honest GPU nondeterminism could produce, and the size of that tolerated set grows with the model's output entropy. Kezins, an independent researcher, showed that an adversary who controls the prompt distribution can raise output entropy and roughly double the bits leaked per token. Across six models of 1 to 32 billion parameters, this cut the slowdown from 146–254 times under benign prompts to 60–118 times. Kezins argues that architectures built on the same unexplained-information bound inherit this attack surface, and recommends calibrating tolerances against local token entropy rather than benign traffic.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1507",
        "S-0015"
      ],
      "helps": [
        {
          "by": "M-0002",
          "how": "Bit-exact replay would remove the tolerance for numerical noise that sets the size of this channel. The record notes that it needs full hardware and software metadata."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0024",
      "record": "M-0024",
      "n": 2,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Information the declared computation explains is not bounded",
      "classification": "scope-limitation",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "The bound limits unexplained bits only. Outputs that the declared computation fully explains can still carry valuable information: a compression study notes that an adversary with inference access can extract more proprietary information per bit than naive transmission allows.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1508",
        "S-0019"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0024",
      "record": "M-0024",
      "n": 3,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Channels other than checked outputs are outside the bound",
      "classification": "scope-limitation",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "The inference-verification scheme treats side channels as out of scope. A low-trust system design argues that suppressing physical covert bandwidth below kilobits per second is much more achievable than aiming for zero, and that a malicious device can leak one bit of information by deliberately outputting a wrong result.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-0015",
        "S-0018"
      ],
      "helps": [
        {
          "by": "M-0022",
          "how": "Physical side channels need separate suppression, which is this mechanism's purpose."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0024",
      "record": "M-0024",
      "n": 4,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "The facility-level design is untested",
      "classification": "open-question",
      "kind": "open-question",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "The compute-verification architecture is described with protocol details, potential attacks and prototyping plans, but no prototype results have been published.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-0019"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "possible_additions": [
    {
      "id": "M-0002",
      "title": "Deterministic and bit-exact inference",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/deterministic-inference/",
      "readiness": "R3",
      "development_status": {
        "code": "R3",
        "label": "Operational use",
        "short": "Operational use",
        "rank": 3,
        "legacy_code": "R3"
      },
      "security_evidence": {
        "attack_testing": {
          "status": "analysis",
          "label": "Published security analysis",
          "kind": "analysis"
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        "independent_evaluation": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "formal_proof": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "deployment_assurance": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "legacy_evaluation_code": null,
        "scoped_findings": [],
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 0,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "fits_filters": true,
      "filter_issues": [],
      "reasons": [
        {
          "kind": "flaw",
          "mech": "M-0024",
          "n": 1,
          "title": "Prompt-controlled entropy inflation widens the covert channel",
          "severity": "significant",
          "how": "Bit-exact replay would remove the tolerance for numerical noise that sets the size of this channel. The record notes that it needs full hardware and software metadata."
        },
        {
          "kind": "blocker",
          "mech": "M-0024",
          "text": "Tolerance for numerical nondeterminism sets the size of the residual channel; bit-exact replay would remove it but needs full hardware and software metadata."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0014",
      "title": "Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/bandwidth-limits-and-compartmentalization/",
      "readiness": "R2",
      "development_status": {
        "code": "R2",
        "label": "Research demonstration",
        "short": "Research demo",
        "rank": 2,
        "legacy_code": "R2"
      },
      "security_evidence": {
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          "status": "analysis",
          "label": "Published security analysis",
          "kind": "analysis"
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        "independent_evaluation": {
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        },
        "formal_proof": {
          "status": "unassessed"
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        "deployment_assurance": {
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        },
        "legacy_evaluation_code": null,
        "scoped_findings": [
          {
            "n": 2,
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "unassessed",
            "sources": [
              "S-1301"
            ]
          },
          {
            "n": 5,
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "unassessed",
            "sources": [
              "S-1313"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 2,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "fits_filters": true,
      "filter_issues": [],
      "reasons": [
        {
          "kind": "blocker",
          "mech": "M-0024",
          "text": "The prover's compute must be isolated so that all traffic passes through the verifier's interlock; any unmonitored path voids the bound."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0019",
      "title": "Chip registries and manufacturing records",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-registries-and-manufacturing-records/",
      "readiness": "R1",
      "development_status": {
        "code": "R1",
        "label": "Proposed",
        "short": "Proposed",
        "rank": 1,
        "legacy_code": "R1"
      },
      "security_evidence": {
        "attack_testing": {
          "status": "analysis",
          "label": "Published security analysis",
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        "independent_evaluation": {
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        "formal_proof": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "deployment_assurance": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "legacy_evaluation_code": null,
        "scoped_findings": [
          {
            "n": 2,
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "unassessed",
            "sources": [
              "S-1402"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 1,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "fits_filters": true,
      "filter_issues": [],
      "reasons": [
        {
          "kind": "blocker",
          "mech": "M-0009",
          "text": "Governing all relevant chips depends on knowing where they are, through chip registries and detection of undeclared facilities."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0022",
      "title": "Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/side-channel-suppression/",
      "readiness": "R1",
      "development_status": {
        "code": "R1",
        "label": "Proposed",
        "short": "Proposed",
        "rank": 1,
        "legacy_code": "R1"
      },
      "security_evidence": {
        "attack_testing": {
          "status": "analysis",
          "label": "Published security analysis",
          "kind": "analysis"
        },
        "independent_evaluation": {
          "status": "unassessed"
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        "formal_proof": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "deployment_assurance": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "legacy_evaluation_code": null,
        "scoped_findings": [],
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 0,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "fits_filters": true,
      "filter_issues": [],
      "reasons": [
        {
          "kind": "blocker",
          "mech": "M-0024",
          "text": "Physical side channels need separate suppression, and one design treats a low residual bandwidth, rather than zero, as the realistic target."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0001",
      "title": "Sampled inference recomputation",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/sampled-inference-recomputation/",
      "readiness": "R3",
      "development_status": {
        "code": "R3",
        "label": "Operational use",
        "short": "Operational use",
        "rank": 3,
        "legacy_code": "R3"
      },
      "security_evidence": {
        "attack_testing": {
          "status": "analysis",
          "label": "Published security analysis",
          "kind": "analysis"
        },
        "independent_evaluation": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "formal_proof": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "deployment_assurance": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "legacy_evaluation_code": null,
        "scoped_findings": [
          {
            "n": 1,
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "unassessed",
            "sources": [
              "S-0020",
              "S-0015",
              "S-1507"
            ]
          },
          {
            "n": 3,
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "unassessed",
            "sources": [
              "S-1000",
              "S-0016"
            ]
          },
          {
            "n": 4,
            "severity": "minor",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "unassessed",
            "sources": [
              "S-0016"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 2,
          "minor": 1
        }
      },
      "fits_filters": true,
      "filter_issues": [],
      "reasons": [
        {
          "kind": "prerequisite",
          "mech": "M-0024"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0008",
      "title": "TEE remote attestation for AI workloads",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/tee-remote-attestation/",
      "readiness": "R3",
      "development_status": {
        "code": "R3",
        "label": "Operational use",
        "short": "Operational use",
        "rank": 3,
        "legacy_code": "R3"
      },
      "security_evidence": {
        "attack_testing": {
          "status": "independent-red-team",
          "label": "Published attack testing",
          "kind": "practical",
          "attribution": "Independent team"
        },
        "independent_evaluation": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "formal_proof": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "deployment_assurance": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "legacy_evaluation_code": null,
        "scoped_findings": [
          {
            "n": 1,
            "severity": "critical",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "mechanism",
            "sources": [
              "S-1202",
              "S-3126",
              "S-0012",
              "S-1206",
              "S-0014",
              "S-1210",
              "S-1212",
              "S-3127"
            ]
          },
          {
            "n": 2,
            "severity": "critical",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "mechanism",
            "sources": [
              "S-1210",
              "S-1211"
            ]
          },
          {
            "n": 3,
            "severity": "critical",
            "status": "mitigated",
            "evidence_scope": "mechanism",
            "sources": [
              "S-1212",
              "S-1213",
              "S-3127",
              "S-3128"
            ]
          },
          {
            "n": 4,
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "mechanism",
            "sources": [
              "S-1202"
            ]
          },
          {
            "n": 5,
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "mechanism",
            "sources": [
              "S-0012",
              "S-0009",
              "S-0014",
              "S-3123",
              "S-3129"
            ]
          },
          {
            "n": 8,
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "mechanism",
            "sources": [
              "S-0014",
              "S-0009",
              "S-3130",
              "S-3131"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 2,
          "significant": 3,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "fits_filters": true,
      "filter_issues": [],
      "reasons": [
        {
          "kind": "prerequisite",
          "mech": "M-0009"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0013",
      "title": "Network taps and certifiers",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/network-taps-and-certifiers/",
      "readiness": "R1",
      "development_status": {
        "code": "R1",
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      "title": "Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees for AI Compute",
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      "authors": "G. Kulp et al.",
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      "url": "https://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WRA3056-1.html",
      "path": "/sources/kulp-hardware-enabled-governance-mechanisms/"
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      "title": "Secure, Governable Chips: Using On-Chip Mechanisms to Manage National Security Risks from AI & Advanced Computing",
      "authors": "O. Aarne et al.",
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      "url": "https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/secure-governable-chips",
      "path": "/sources/aarne-secure-governable-chips/"
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      "id": "S-0006",
      "title": "Hardware-Enabled Mechanisms for Verifying Responsible AI Development",
      "authors": "A. O'Gara et al.",
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      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.03742",
      "path": "/sources/ogara-hardware-enabled-verifying-responsible-ai/"
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    {
      "id": "S-0052",
      "title": "Anti-Tamper Radio: System-Level Tamper Detection for Computing Systems",
      "authors": "P. Staat et al.",
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      "url": "https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9833631/",
      "path": "/sources/staat-anti-tamper-radio/"
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      "path": "/sources/immler-secure-physical-enclosures-covers/"
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      "id": "S-0051",
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      "year": 2023,
      "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/946",
      "path": "/sources/mosavirik-impedanceverif/"
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      "url": "https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/security-policies/140sp1505.pdf",
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      "url": "https://www.physec.de/en/solutions/physec-seal/",
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      "url": "https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1256541",
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      "path": "/sources/tabar-anti-tamper-radio-ris/"
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      "title": "Verifying LLM Inference to Detect Model Weight Exfiltration",
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      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.02620",
      "path": "/sources/rinberg-verifying-llm-inference-weight-exfiltration/"
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      "authors": "N. Kezins",
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      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.23375",
      "path": "/sources/kezins-adversarial-entropy-inflation/"
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      "authors": "R. Rinberg et al.",
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      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.02343",
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}