{
  "schema_version": "1.3",
  "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/explorer/?mechanisms=M-0019,M-0007&hide=weights",
  "data_generated": "2026-10-09",
  "definitions": {
    "methodology": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/methodology/",
    "readiness": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/readiness/",
    "filters": [
      {
        "id": "prover",
        "label": "Prover",
        "question": "How far can the party being checked be trusted?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "cooperative",
            "label": "Cooperative"
          },
          {
            "value": "semi-trusted",
            "label": "Semi-trusted"
          },
          {
            "value": "adversarial",
            "label": "Adversarial"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose threat model holds against at least this prover. Adversarial is the strongest assumption.",
        "about": "The prover is the party being checked. Semi-trusted designs rely on part of its stack: usually the chip vendor's hardware root of trust, its firmware or counters, or its supply-chain records. Adversarial designs aim to hold even if it cheats wherever the checks allow, within their stated assumptions."
      },
      {
        "id": "onsite",
        "label": "Verifier devices on site",
        "question": "May the verifier install its own hardware at the prover's sites?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "no",
            "label": "Not allowed"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Not allowed\" removes mechanisms that need a retrofit device, such as a network tap or a sealed sensor.",
        "about": "Some mechanisms need a device the verifier owns or trusts at the prover's facility, such as a network tap, a bandwidth limiter or a sealed sensor. Choose Not allowed when the setting rules that out. Inspectors are not covered."
      },
      {
        "id": "coop",
        "label": "Prover cooperation",
        "question": "How much must the prover take part?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "partial",
            "label": "Partial at most"
          },
          {
            "value": "none",
            "label": "Not required"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Partial at most\" removes mechanisms that need the prover's active participation. \"Not required\" keeps only those that work without it.",
        "about": "Required: the prover takes part, for example by logging requests, producing proofs or opening records. Partial: some access, such as installing a device. Not required: works from outside, such as satellite imagery."
      },
      {
        "id": "chips",
        "label": "Chips",
        "question": "May the proposal depend on new chip designs?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "existing",
            "label": "Existing chips only"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Existing chips only\" removes mechanisms that need changes to future chip designs.",
        "about": "New chip features take years to reach a deployed fleet and cover only chips made after they ship. Mechanisms that use shipping features, such as trusted execution environments or performance counters, stay."
      },
      {
        "id": "ready",
        "label": "Minimum development status",
        "question": "Development status",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "R1",
            "label": "Proposed"
          },
          {
            "value": "R2",
            "label": "Research demonstration"
          },
          {
            "value": "R3",
            "label": "Operational use"
          },
          {
            "value": "R4",
            "label": "Legacy independent-evaluation filter",
            "legacy": true
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose readiness level is at least this one.",
        "about": "A level describes the public evidence for a mechanism's stated use, not its cost or feasibility. R3 can still have open critical flaws."
      },
      {
        "id": "tested",
        "label": "Attack testing",
        "question": "How hard has each mechanism been attacked in public?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "analysis",
            "label": "Published analysis"
          },
          {
            "value": "red-teamed",
            "label": "Red-teamed"
          },
          {
            "value": "independent-red-team",
            "label": "Independent red-team"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose strongest published attack testing is at least this.",
        "about": "The strongest published attempt to break the mechanism for its verification use: a security analysis, red-teaming by its developers or collaborators, or a red team independent of them."
      },
      {
        "id": "hide",
        "label": "Keep hidden from the verifier",
        "question": "What must the verifier never see?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "weights",
            "label": "Model weights"
          },
          {
            "value": "io",
            "label": "Inputs and outputs"
          },
          {
            "value": "training",
            "label": "Training data"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Removes mechanisms that show the asset to the verifier. Conditional or unspecified exposure stays with a note and needs checking against the privacy requirement.",
        "about": "Model weights: the checked model's parameters. Inputs and outputs: the requests a deployed model serves and its responses. Training data: what a model was trained on. Each mechanism's exposure is the editors' reading of its record: shown, depends on the design (kept, with a note), hidden, not involved, or unspecified for a selected implementation. Code and configuration are not covered yet."
      }
    ],
    "exposure": "For model weights, inputs and outputs, and training data. This is the editors' reading of each mechanism's record (its threat model, how it works and its limitations), not a field of the record. Shown: the verifier sees it. Depends: on the design or variant, or the verifier sees only samples. Hidden: the verifier sees only commitments, hashes, proofs or results. Not involved: the record does not handle it. Unspecified: the selected implementation has no asset-specific assessment here.",
    "claim_status": {
      "addressed": "A mechanism in the proposal is aimed at this claim and is not excluded by the filters.",
      "partly-addressed": "Only supporting mechanisms, or mechanisms aimed at it that the filters exclude.",
      "unaddressed": "No mechanism in the proposal addresses this claim."
    },
    "finding_classification": {
      "failure": {
        "label": "Known failures",
        "singular": "Known failure",
        "anchor": "known-flaws"
      },
      "scope-limitation": {
        "label": "Scope limitations",
        "singular": "Scope limitation",
        "anchor": "scope-limitations"
      },
      "open-question": {
        "label": "Open questions",
        "singular": "Open question",
        "anchor": "open-questions"
      }
    },
    "finding_scope": "Evidence scope describes where a finding was demonstrated; it does not establish applicability to every implementation in the mechanism family.",
    "claim_finding_scope": "open_critical_findings names active failures on the assessed records; open_critical_context names conditional family failures whose implementation applicability is unassessed.",
    "legacy_status": "The status field retains covered/partial/none for compatibility. It names claim links, never successful verification. Use claim_status and status_label for presentation."
  },
  "filters": {
    "prover": "",
    "onsite": "",
    "coop": "",
    "chips": "",
    "ready": "",
    "tested": "",
    "hide": [
      "weights"
    ]
  },
  "mechanisms_passing_filters": 24,
  "claims": [],
  "mechanisms": [
    {
      "id": "M-0019",
      "title": "Chip registries and manufacturing records",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-registries-and-manufacturing-records/",
      "assessment_record": {
        "id": "M-0019",
        "title": "Chip registries and manufacturing records",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-registries-and-manufacturing-records/"
      },
      "finding_counts": {
        "failure": 1,
        "scope_limitation": 2,
        "open_question": 0,
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 1,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "selected_implementation": null,
      "readiness": {
        "level": "R1",
        "scope": "a checkable record of which chips were made and who declared owning them",
        "confidence": "medium",
        "evidence": [
          "S-0002",
          "S-1402",
          "S-1408",
          "S-0007"
        ]
      },
      "development_status": {
        "code": "R1",
        "label": "Proposed",
        "short": "Proposed",
        "rank": 1,
        "legacy_code": "R1"
      },
      "security_evidence": {
        "attack_testing": {
          "status": "analysis",
          "label": "Published security analysis",
          "kind": "analysis"
        },
        "independent_evaluation": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "formal_proof": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "deployment_assurance": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "legacy_evaluation_code": null,
        "scoped_findings": [
          {
            "n": 2,
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "unassessed",
            "sources": [
              "S-1402"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 1,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "assessed_properties": {
        "threat_model": "semi-trusted",
        "hardware_requirement": "existing-features",
        "prover_cooperation": "required",
        "adversarial_evaluation": "analysis"
      },
      "claims": [],
      "exposure": {
        "weights": "none",
        "io": "none",
        "training": "none",
        "note": "Records chip identities and owners; it does not handle model data."
      },
      "family_finding_context": [],
      "filter_issues": []
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0007",
      "title": "Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/proofs-of-useful-work/",
      "assessment_record": {
        "id": "M-0007",
        "title": "Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/proofs-of-useful-work/"
      },
      "finding_counts": {
        "failure": 1,
        "scope_limitation": 1,
        "open_question": 1,
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 1,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "selected_implementation": null,
      "readiness": {
        "level": "R1",
        "scope": "bounding the spare capacity of declared hardware that could run training",
        "confidence": "low",
        "evidence": [
          "S-1102",
          "S-0005",
          "S-1609",
          "S-1105",
          "S-1107"
        ]
      },
      "development_status": {
        "code": "R1",
        "label": "Proposed",
        "short": "Proposed",
        "rank": 1,
        "legacy_code": "R1"
      },
      "security_evidence": {
        "attack_testing": {
          "status": "analysis",
          "label": "Published security analysis",
          "kind": "analysis"
        },
        "independent_evaluation": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "formal_proof": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "deployment_assurance": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "legacy_evaluation_code": null,
        "scoped_findings": [
          {
            "n": 3,
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "unassessed",
            "sources": [
              "S-1105"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 1,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "assessed_properties": {
        "threat_model": "adversarial",
        "hardware_requirement": "none",
        "prover_cooperation": "required",
        "adversarial_evaluation": "analysis"
      },
      "claims": [],
      "exposure": {
        "weights": "partial",
        "io": "partial",
        "training": "none",
        "note": "Checking a sampled tile of a matrix multiplication reveals that tile, which may hold model or input data; the authors suggest a zero-knowledge proof when the matrices must stay private."
      },
      "family_finding_context": [],
      "filter_issues": [
        {
          "filter": "hide",
          "level": "note",
          "short": "may show model weights",
          "text": "May show model weights, depending on the design. Checking a sampled tile of a matrix multiplication reveals that tile, which may hold model or input data; the authors suggest a zero-knowledge proof when the matrices must stay private."
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "strengths": {
    "covered": [],
    "production": [],
    "operationalUse": [],
    "adversarial": [
      "M-0007"
    ],
    "noNewHardware": [
      "M-0019",
      "M-0007"
    ],
    "mitigated": [],
    "notCounted": []
  },
  "properties": {
    "covered": [],
    "production": [],
    "operationalUse": [],
    "adversarial": [
      "M-0007"
    ],
    "noNewHardware": [
      "M-0019",
      "M-0007"
    ],
    "mitigated": [],
    "notCounted": []
  },
  "attack_testing": [
    {
      "id": "M-0019",
      "record": "M-0019",
      "evaluation": "analysis",
      "in_setting": true
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0007",
      "record": "M-0007",
      "evaluation": "analysis",
      "in_setting": true
    }
  ],
  "selected_implementations": {},
  "weaknesses": {
    "gaps": [],
    "excluded": [],
    "unlinked": [],
    "critical": [],
    "significant": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0019",
        "n": 2,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Documents and serial numbers can be forged",
        "classification": "failure",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Avellar and Grunewald note that export documents can be forged, that companies can hide information behind obscure corporate structures, and that it may be possible to forge serial numbers on chips and racks. They recommend cryptographic attestation of a powered-on chip as an extra check.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1402"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0007",
        "n": 3,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Known shortcuts let a miner claim somewhat more work than it did",
        "classification": "failure",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Pearl's specification lists known mining speedups: crafted inputs, precision shortcuts, seed grinding, work reuse, and faster kernels or hardware. A policy check caps the summands a miner may skip at one-sixteenth of those in a tile. For capacity bounding, any gap between work proven and work possible leaves spare capacity.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1105"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "criticalMechanisms": [],
    "significantMechanisms": [
      "M-0019",
      "M-0007"
    ],
    "familyContext": [],
    "scopeLimitations": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0019",
        "n": 1,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Records cover only chips that were recorded",
        "classification": "scope-limitation",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "A registry or commitment accounts only for chips entered into it. Cankaya asks how a verifier would know it had found all chips, or how much \"dark compute\" remains, and notes that a fraudulent original record would mean unregistered chips had been made in advance. Halstead and Larsen propose reconstructing earlier production by auditing upstream suppliers.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1408",
          "S-1410"
        ],
        "helps": [
          {
            "by": "M-0020",
            "how": "Looks for large data centres that were never declared, which a registry cannot show."
          }
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0019",
        "n": 3,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Insiders could alter records before they are fixed",
        "classification": "scope-limitation",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Cankaya argues that insiders who can photograph process secrets could also tamper with production records. A commitment makes changes after publication detectable, but it cannot show that the records were accurate when committed.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1408"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0007",
        "n": 1,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Proves that work was done, not that no capacity remains",
        "classification": "scope-limitation",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Proof-of-work accounting bounds unmonitored compute only relative to an estimate of what the actor has. Attestable states that the verifier \"needs a credible estimate of the compute available\" to the actor, and that a proof \"cannot discover a datacenter that was never declared\".",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1102"
        ],
        "helps": [
          {
            "by": "M-0019",
            "how": "A registry of chips is one basis for the estimate of available compute that the flaw's source says the verifier needs."
          },
          {
            "by": "M-0020",
            "how": "Looks for data centres that were never declared, which a proof cannot discover."
          }
        ]
      }
    ],
    "openQuestions": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0007",
        "n": 2,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Security rests on new hardness assumptions",
        "classification": "open-question",
        "kind": "open-question",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Komargodski and Weinstein base security on hardness assumptions about batches of low-rank random linear equations, and list PoUW \"from more standard or well-studied assumptions\" as an open problem. Pearl's floating-point variant introduces a further \"quantized-subspace hardness\" assumption.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1609",
          "S-1105"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "minor": 0,
    "minorFindings": [],
    "minorBy": [],
    "notDemonstrated": [
      "M-0019",
      "M-0007"
    ],
    "newChip": []
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "mech": "M-0019",
      "record": "M-0019",
      "n": 1,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Records cover only chips that were recorded",
      "classification": "scope-limitation",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "A registry or commitment accounts only for chips entered into it. Cankaya asks how a verifier would know it had found all chips, or how much \"dark compute\" remains, and notes that a fraudulent original record would mean unregistered chips had been made in advance. Halstead and Larsen propose reconstructing earlier production by auditing upstream suppliers.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1408",
        "S-1410"
      ],
      "helps": [
        {
          "by": "M-0020",
          "how": "Looks for large data centres that were never declared, which a registry cannot show."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0019",
      "record": "M-0019",
      "n": 2,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Documents and serial numbers can be forged",
      "classification": "failure",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Avellar and Grunewald note that export documents can be forged, that companies can hide information behind obscure corporate structures, and that it may be possible to forge serial numbers on chips and racks. They recommend cryptographic attestation of a powered-on chip as an extra check.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1402"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0019",
      "record": "M-0019",
      "n": 3,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Insiders could alter records before they are fixed",
      "classification": "scope-limitation",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Cankaya argues that insiders who can photograph process secrets could also tamper with production records. A commitment makes changes after publication detectable, but it cannot show that the records were accurate when committed.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1408"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0007",
      "record": "M-0007",
      "n": 1,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Proves that work was done, not that no capacity remains",
      "classification": "scope-limitation",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Proof-of-work accounting bounds unmonitored compute only relative to an estimate of what the actor has. Attestable states that the verifier \"needs a credible estimate of the compute available\" to the actor, and that a proof \"cannot discover a datacenter that was never declared\".",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1102"
      ],
      "helps": [
        {
          "by": "M-0019",
          "how": "A registry of chips is one basis for the estimate of available compute that the flaw's source says the verifier needs."
        },
        {
          "by": "M-0020",
          "how": "Looks for data centres that were never declared, which a proof cannot discover."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0007",
      "record": "M-0007",
      "n": 2,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Security rests on new hardness assumptions",
      "classification": "open-question",
      "kind": "open-question",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Komargodski and Weinstein base security on hardness assumptions about batches of low-rank random linear equations, and list PoUW \"from more standard or well-studied assumptions\" as an open problem. Pearl's floating-point variant introduces a further \"quantized-subspace hardness\" assumption.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1609",
        "S-1105"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0007",
      "record": "M-0007",
      "n": 3,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Known shortcuts let a miner claim somewhat more work than it did",
      "classification": "failure",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Pearl's specification lists known mining speedups: crafted inputs, precision shortcuts, seed grinding, work reuse, and faster kernels or hardware. A policy check caps the summands a miner may skip at one-sixteenth of those in a tile. For capacity bounding, any gap between work proven and work possible leaves spare capacity.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1105"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "possible_additions": [],
  "goal": null,
  "design": null,
  "dependencies": {
    "prerequisites": [],
    "shared": [],
    "blockers": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0019",
        "n": 1,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "No implementation of an AI chip registry has been publicly reported, and covering re-exports would need cooperation from re-exporters and foreign governments that may not be feasible everywhere.",
        "theme": "access-governance",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1402",
          "S-0002"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0019",
        "n": 2,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "Linking records to physical chips needs hard-to-spoof unique IDs and inspections.",
        "theme": "hardware-trust",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0002",
          "S-1402",
          "S-1408"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0019",
        "n": 3,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "Chips produced before a registry starts must be reconstructed from supplier records.",
        "theme": "coverage-hidden-compute",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1408",
          "S-1410"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0007",
        "n": 1,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "Bounding spare capacity needs a credible estimate of the compute available to the actor, including third-party access.",
        "theme": "capacity-bounds",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1102"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0007",
        "n": 2,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "Proofs of work cannot find facilities that were never declared.",
        "theme": "coverage-hidden-compute",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1102"
        ],
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      "authors": "M. Baker et al.",
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      "path": "/sources/halstead-covert-ai-projects/"
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      "path": "/sources/attestable-pacing-ai-requires-proof/"
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      "title": "Mechanisms to Verify International Agreements About AI Development",
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      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.15867",
      "path": "/sources/scher-mechanisms-verify-ai-agreements/"
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      "path": "/sources/komargodski-proofs-useful-work-matrix-multiplication/"
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}