{
  "schema_version": "1.3",
  "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/explorer/?mechanisms=M-0018,M-0012&implementations=M-0012:I-0006",
  "data_generated": "2026-10-09",
  "definitions": {
    "methodology": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/methodology/",
    "readiness": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/readiness/",
    "filters": [
      {
        "id": "prover",
        "label": "Prover",
        "question": "How far can the party being checked be trusted?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "cooperative",
            "label": "Cooperative"
          },
          {
            "value": "semi-trusted",
            "label": "Semi-trusted"
          },
          {
            "value": "adversarial",
            "label": "Adversarial"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose threat model holds against at least this prover. Adversarial is the strongest assumption.",
        "about": "The prover is the party being checked. Semi-trusted designs rely on part of its stack: usually the chip vendor's hardware root of trust, its firmware or counters, or its supply-chain records. Adversarial designs aim to hold even if it cheats wherever the checks allow, within their stated assumptions."
      },
      {
        "id": "onsite",
        "label": "Verifier devices on site",
        "question": "May the verifier install its own hardware at the prover's sites?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "no",
            "label": "Not allowed"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Not allowed\" removes mechanisms that need a retrofit device, such as a network tap or a sealed sensor.",
        "about": "Some mechanisms need a device the verifier owns or trusts at the prover's facility, such as a network tap, a bandwidth limiter or a sealed sensor. Choose Not allowed when the setting rules that out. Inspectors are not covered."
      },
      {
        "id": "coop",
        "label": "Prover cooperation",
        "question": "How much must the prover take part?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "partial",
            "label": "Partial at most"
          },
          {
            "value": "none",
            "label": "Not required"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Partial at most\" removes mechanisms that need the prover's active participation. \"Not required\" keeps only those that work without it.",
        "about": "Required: the prover takes part, for example by logging requests, producing proofs or opening records. Partial: some access, such as installing a device. Not required: works from outside, such as satellite imagery."
      },
      {
        "id": "chips",
        "label": "Chips",
        "question": "May the proposal depend on new chip designs?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "existing",
            "label": "Existing chips only"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Existing chips only\" removes mechanisms that need changes to future chip designs.",
        "about": "New chip features take years to reach a deployed fleet and cover only chips made after they ship. Mechanisms that use shipping features, such as trusted execution environments or performance counters, stay."
      },
      {
        "id": "ready",
        "label": "Minimum development status",
        "question": "Development status",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "R1",
            "label": "Proposed"
          },
          {
            "value": "R2",
            "label": "Research demonstration"
          },
          {
            "value": "R3",
            "label": "Operational use"
          },
          {
            "value": "R4",
            "label": "Legacy independent-evaluation filter",
            "legacy": true
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose readiness level is at least this one.",
        "about": "A level describes the public evidence for a mechanism's stated use, not its cost or feasibility. R3 can still have open critical flaws."
      },
      {
        "id": "tested",
        "label": "Attack testing",
        "question": "How hard has each mechanism been attacked in public?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "analysis",
            "label": "Published analysis"
          },
          {
            "value": "red-teamed",
            "label": "Red-teamed"
          },
          {
            "value": "independent-red-team",
            "label": "Independent red-team"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose strongest published attack testing is at least this.",
        "about": "The strongest published attempt to break the mechanism for its verification use: a security analysis, red-teaming by its developers or collaborators, or a red team independent of them."
      },
      {
        "id": "hide",
        "label": "Keep hidden from the verifier",
        "question": "What must the verifier never see?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "weights",
            "label": "Model weights"
          },
          {
            "value": "io",
            "label": "Inputs and outputs"
          },
          {
            "value": "training",
            "label": "Training data"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Removes mechanisms that show the asset to the verifier. Conditional or unspecified exposure stays with a note and needs checking against the privacy requirement.",
        "about": "Model weights: the checked model's parameters. Inputs and outputs: the requests a deployed model serves and its responses. Training data: what a model was trained on. Each mechanism's exposure is the editors' reading of its record: shown, depends on the design (kept, with a note), hidden, not involved, or unspecified for a selected implementation. Code and configuration are not covered yet."
      }
    ],
    "exposure": "For model weights, inputs and outputs, and training data. This is the editors' reading of each mechanism's record (its threat model, how it works and its limitations), not a field of the record. Shown: the verifier sees it. Depends: on the design or variant, or the verifier sees only samples. Hidden: the verifier sees only commitments, hashes, proofs or results. Not involved: the record does not handle it. Unspecified: the selected implementation has no asset-specific assessment here.",
    "claim_status": {
      "addressed": "A mechanism in the proposal is aimed at this claim and is not excluded by the filters.",
      "partly-addressed": "Only supporting mechanisms, or mechanisms aimed at it that the filters exclude.",
      "unaddressed": "No mechanism in the proposal addresses this claim."
    },
    "finding_classification": {
      "failure": {
        "label": "Known failures",
        "singular": "Known failure",
        "anchor": "known-flaws"
      },
      "scope-limitation": {
        "label": "Scope limitations",
        "singular": "Scope limitation",
        "anchor": "scope-limitations"
      },
      "open-question": {
        "label": "Open questions",
        "singular": "Open question",
        "anchor": "open-questions"
      }
    },
    "finding_scope": "Evidence scope describes where a finding was demonstrated; it does not establish applicability to every implementation in the mechanism family.",
    "claim_finding_scope": "open_critical_findings names active failures on the assessed records; open_critical_context names conditional family failures whose implementation applicability is unassessed.",
    "legacy_status": "The status field retains covered/partial/none for compatibility. It names claim links, never successful verification. Use claim_status and status_label for presentation."
  },
  "filters": {
    "prover": "",
    "onsite": "",
    "coop": "",
    "chips": "",
    "ready": "",
    "tested": "",
    "hide": []
  },
  "mechanisms_passing_filters": 25,
  "claims": [],
  "mechanisms": [
    {
      "id": "M-0018",
      "title": "Chip location verification",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-location-verification/",
      "assessment_record": {
        "id": "M-0018",
        "title": "Chip location verification",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-location-verification/"
      },
      "finding_counts": {
        "failure": 4,
        "scope_limitation": 0,
        "open_question": 0,
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 4,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "selected_implementation": null,
      "readiness": {
        "level": "R1",
        "scope": "bounding how far a chip is from trusted landmark servers when checked",
        "confidence": "medium",
        "evidence": [
          "S-1400",
          "S-1401",
          "S-3570",
          "S-1402",
          "S-1404",
          "S-1403",
          "S-0056"
        ]
      },
      "development_status": {
        "code": "R1",
        "label": "Proposed",
        "short": "Proposed",
        "rank": 1,
        "legacy_code": "R1"
      },
      "security_evidence": {
        "attack_testing": {
          "status": "analysis",
          "label": "Published security analysis",
          "kind": "analysis"
        },
        "independent_evaluation": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "formal_proof": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "deployment_assurance": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "legacy_evaluation_code": null,
        "scoped_findings": [
          {
            "n": 1,
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "unassessed",
            "sources": [
              "S-1403",
              "S-1400"
            ]
          },
          {
            "n": 2,
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "unassessed",
            "sources": [
              "S-1400",
              "S-1402"
            ]
          },
          {
            "n": 3,
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "unassessed",
            "sources": [
              "S-1400",
              "S-1402"
            ]
          },
          {
            "n": 4,
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "unassessed",
            "sources": [
              "S-1400",
              "S-1402",
              "S-1404"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 4,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "assessed_properties": {
        "threat_model": "adversarial",
        "hardware_requirement": "existing-features",
        "prover_cooperation": "required",
        "adversarial_evaluation": "analysis"
      },
      "claims": [],
      "exposure": {
        "weights": "none",
        "io": "none",
        "training": "none",
        "note": "Times signed replies from chips; it does not handle model data."
      },
      "family_finding_context": [],
      "filter_issues": []
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0012",
      "title": "Hardware-attested weight binding",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/model-identity-attestation/",
      "assessment_record": {
        "id": "I-0006",
        "title": "Tinfoil model identity (Modelwrap)",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/tinfoil-model-identity/"
      },
      "finding_counts": {
        "failure": 1,
        "scope_limitation": 2,
        "open_question": 0,
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 1,
          "significant": 0,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "selected_implementation": {
        "id": "I-0006",
        "title": "Tinfoil model identity (Modelwrap)",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/tinfoil-model-identity/"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "level": "R3",
        "scope": "showing clients that the served weights match a committed hash",
        "confidence": "medium",
        "evidence": [
          "S-0013",
          "S-1206",
          "S-1207",
          "S-1208",
          "S-1209",
          "S-1202",
          "S-1210",
          "S-1212"
        ]
      },
      "development_status": {
        "code": "R3",
        "label": "Operational use",
        "short": "Operational use",
        "rank": 3,
        "legacy_code": "R3"
      },
      "security_evidence": {
        "attack_testing": {
          "status": "analysis",
          "label": "Published security analysis",
          "kind": "analysis"
        },
        "independent_evaluation": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "formal_proof": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "deployment_assurance": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "legacy_evaluation_code": null,
        "scoped_findings": [
          {
            "n": 1,
            "severity": "critical",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "inherited",
            "sources": [
              "S-1206",
              "S-1202",
              "S-1210",
              "S-1212",
              "S-1213",
              "S-1207"
            ],
            "related_finding": {
              "record": "M-0008",
              "flaw": 1
            }
          }
        ],
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 1,
          "significant": 0,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "assessed_properties": {
        "threat_model": "semi-trusted",
        "hardware_requirement": "existing-features",
        "prover_cooperation": "required",
        "adversarial_evaluation": "analysis"
      },
      "claims": [],
      "exposure": {
        "weights": "partial",
        "io": "unknown",
        "training": "none",
        "note": "Tinfoil describes downloaded weights for public-model verification and hash consistency for private models. This model-identity description does not specify input/output exposure.",
        "sources": [
          "S-0013"
        ]
      },
      "family_finding_context": [
        {
          "n": 1,
          "historical": false,
          "title": "Underlying attestation can be forged or relayed",
          "classification": "failure",
          "kind": "demonstrated-attack",
          "severity": "critical",
          "status": "open",
          "evidence_scope": "inherited",
          "scope_note": "Critical for weight binding against an operator with physical access to affected hardware, or with control of the hypervisor on an AMD SEV-SNP platform without AMD's fixes. PAL*M excludes physical attacks, and Tinfoil acknowledges this boundary.",
          "related_finding": {
            "record": "M-0008",
            "flaw": 1
          },
          "description": "The enclave route inherits the platform-specific TEE attestation failures. Intel TDX forgery and H100 relay were demonstrated with physical access and host control. Battering RAM defeated AMD SEV-SNP attestation on DDR4 servers; RMPocalypse did so from malicious host software on platforms without AMD's fixes. These demonstrate failures of the trust roots, not of each model-commitment protocol.",
          "response": "The TEE.fail authors report that physical interposer attacks are outside Intel's and AMD's threat models. AMD reports fixes for RMPocalypse.",
          "sources": [
            "S-1202",
            "S-1210",
            "S-1212",
            "S-1213",
            "S-1206",
            "S-0012"
          ],
          "helps": [
            {
              "by": "M-0009",
              "how": "A tamper-protected enclosure around the chip is the proposed answer when the party that holds the hardware may attack it physically."
            }
          ],
          "record": "M-0012",
          "represented_by": []
        },
        {
          "n": 2,
          "historical": false,
          "title": "Launch-state attestation does not by itself cover weights loaded later",
          "classification": "failure",
          "kind": "theoretical-argument",
          "severity": "significant",
          "status": "mitigated",
          "evidence_scope": null,
          "scope_note": null,
          "related_finding": null,
          "description": "Attestation measures launch state, and weights are read from disk after boot. A signature checked at load time does not stop a malicious hypervisor from altering the disk afterwards. Tinfoil reports mitigating this with dm-verity checks on every read. Unmeasured runtime configuration remains a general risk.",
          "response": null,
          "sources": [
            "S-0013",
            "S-0014"
          ],
          "record": "M-0012",
          "represented_by": []
        },
        {
          "n": 3,
          "historical": false,
          "title": "For private models, a user can confirm consistency but not content",
          "classification": "scope-limitation",
          "kind": "open-question",
          "severity": "significant",
          "status": "open",
          "evidence_scope": null,
          "scope_note": null,
          "related_finding": null,
          "description": "When weights are not published, users can check that the same root hash is served each time, but not what the model is. Pairing the hash with an attested evaluation, as in Attestable Audits, is one proposed remedy.",
          "response": null,
          "sources": [
            "S-0013",
            "S-0009"
          ],
          "record": "M-0012",
          "represented_by": []
        }
      ],
      "filter_issues": []
    }
  ],
  "strengths": {
    "covered": [],
    "production": [
      "M-0012"
    ],
    "operationalUse": [
      "M-0012"
    ],
    "adversarial": [
      "M-0018"
    ],
    "noNewHardware": [
      "M-0018",
      "M-0012"
    ],
    "mitigated": [],
    "notCounted": []
  },
  "properties": {
    "covered": [],
    "production": [
      "M-0012"
    ],
    "operationalUse": [
      "M-0012"
    ],
    "adversarial": [
      "M-0018"
    ],
    "noNewHardware": [
      "M-0018",
      "M-0012"
    ],
    "mitigated": [],
    "notCounted": []
  },
  "attack_testing": [
    {
      "id": "M-0018",
      "record": "M-0018",
      "evaluation": "analysis",
      "in_setting": true
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0012",
      "record": "I-0006",
      "evaluation": "analysis",
      "in_setting": true
    }
  ],
  "selected_implementations": {
    "M-0012": "I-0006"
  },
  "weaknesses": {
    "gaps": [],
    "excluded": [],
    "unlinked": [],
    "critical": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0012",
        "n": 1,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Inherits attacks on the underlying TEEs",
        "classification": "failure",
        "kind": "demonstrated-attack",
        "severity": "critical",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": "inherited",
        "scope_note": "Critical when model identity must hold against an operator with physical access to an affected host. Tinfoil documents physical attacks as an enclave limitation. These are hardware-class demonstrations, not a published break of Modelwrap or Tinfoil's deployed verification chain.",
        "related_finding": {
          "record": "M-0008",
          "flaw": 1
        },
        "description": "Tinfoil's model commitment and boot-time GPU check depend on the CPU attestation. The TEE findings distinguish Intel TDX forgery on DDR5, AMD SEV-SNP forgery on DDR4 in Battering RAM, and software-only RMPocalypse on platforms lacking AMD's fixes. TEE.fail recovered a guest OpenSSL key on AMD, not an AMD attestation key. Its GPU relay demonstration used an H100 with forged TDX evidence; it does not establish the same result for Tinfoil's H200 or B200 configurations.",
        "response": "Tinfoil acknowledges the physical-access boundary. The TEE.fail authors report that Intel and AMD treat interposer attacks as outside their threat models and recommend physically secure servers. AMD reports firmware fixes for RMPocalypse.",
        "sources": [
          "S-1206",
          "S-1202",
          "S-1210",
          "S-1212",
          "S-1213",
          "S-1207"
        ],
        "record": "I-0006"
      }
    ],
    "significant": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0018",
        "n": 1,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Extracting a chip's key lets another device answer for it",
        "classification": "failure",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Ping-based protocols rely on cryptographic keys stored on the chip. Tee and Happel argue that an adversary with physical access could extract these keys and so compromise location verification. They propose GPU fingerprints as a mitigation, so far tested on 24 GPUs. Brass and Aarne assume the keys are stored securely, for example in a TPM.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1403",
          "S-1400"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0018",
        "n": 2,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Added delay can shift an estimated position",
        "classification": "failure",
        "kind": "demonstrated-attack",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Brass and Aarne cite internet-geolocation research in which artificially increased round-trip times moved the estimated location by up to 1,000 km, with a 74% chance of avoiding detection. Avellar and Grunewald list inflated ping times from circuitous routing as an evasion route. Added delay only loosens a distance bound, and Brass and Aarne propose a hard time limit as the counter: a chip that replies too slowly cannot be ruled out of a restricted location.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1400",
          "S-1402"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0018",
        "n": 3,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Faster-than-assumed network paths",
        "classification": "failure",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Brass and Aarne list dark fibre and other private high-speed interconnects as ways to lower measured delays artificially. They judge that leasing dark fibre would probably not be a considerable challenge for covertly or openly adversarial actors. Avellar and Grunewald note that this can make a chip appear to be somewhere else entirely. A limit set at the vacuum speed of light cannot be beaten, but it makes honest chips fail more often.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1400",
          "S-1402"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0018",
        "n": 4,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Compromised landmarks can falsify measurements",
        "classification": "failure",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "A party that controls landmark servers can report false timing. Brass and Aarne cite research in which manipulating a third of the landmarks shifted the estimated location by about 700 km. Avellar and Grunewald note that compromised landmarks let adversaries spoof travel-time measurements directly. The draft specification asks verifiers to require anchors in diverse places, run by several independent operators.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1400",
          "S-1402",
          "S-1404"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "criticalMechanisms": [
      "M-0012"
    ],
    "significantMechanisms": [
      "M-0018"
    ],
    "familyContext": [
      {
        "id": "M-0012",
        "implementation": "I-0006",
        "flaws": [
          {
            "n": 1,
            "historical": false,
            "title": "Underlying attestation can be forged or relayed",
            "classification": "failure",
            "kind": "demonstrated-attack",
            "severity": "critical",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "inherited",
            "scope_note": "Critical for weight binding against an operator with physical access to affected hardware, or with control of the hypervisor on an AMD SEV-SNP platform without AMD's fixes. PAL*M excludes physical attacks, and Tinfoil acknowledges this boundary.",
            "related_finding": {
              "record": "M-0008",
              "flaw": 1
            },
            "description": "The enclave route inherits the platform-specific TEE attestation failures. Intel TDX forgery and H100 relay were demonstrated with physical access and host control. Battering RAM defeated AMD SEV-SNP attestation on DDR4 servers; RMPocalypse did so from malicious host software on platforms without AMD's fixes. These demonstrate failures of the trust roots, not of each model-commitment protocol.",
            "response": "The TEE.fail authors report that physical interposer attacks are outside Intel's and AMD's threat models. AMD reports fixes for RMPocalypse.",
            "sources": [
              "S-1202",
              "S-1210",
              "S-1212",
              "S-1213",
              "S-1206",
              "S-0012"
            ],
            "helps": [
              {
                "by": "M-0009",
                "how": "A tamper-protected enclosure around the chip is the proposed answer when the party that holds the hardware may attack it physically."
              }
            ],
            "record": "M-0012",
            "represented_by": []
          },
          {
            "n": 2,
            "historical": false,
            "title": "Launch-state attestation does not by itself cover weights loaded later",
            "classification": "failure",
            "kind": "theoretical-argument",
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "mitigated",
            "evidence_scope": null,
            "scope_note": null,
            "related_finding": null,
            "description": "Attestation measures launch state, and weights are read from disk after boot. A signature checked at load time does not stop a malicious hypervisor from altering the disk afterwards. Tinfoil reports mitigating this with dm-verity checks on every read. Unmeasured runtime configuration remains a general risk.",
            "response": null,
            "sources": [
              "S-0013",
              "S-0014"
            ],
            "record": "M-0012",
            "represented_by": []
          },
          {
            "n": 3,
            "historical": false,
            "title": "For private models, a user can confirm consistency but not content",
            "classification": "scope-limitation",
            "kind": "open-question",
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": null,
            "scope_note": null,
            "related_finding": null,
            "description": "When weights are not published, users can check that the same root hash is served each time, but not what the model is. Pairing the hash with an attested evaluation, as in Attestable Audits, is one proposed remedy.",
            "response": null,
            "sources": [
              "S-0013",
              "S-0009"
            ],
            "record": "M-0012",
            "represented_by": []
          }
        ]
      }
    ],
    "scopeLimitations": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0012",
        "n": 2,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Side channels, I/O leakage and denial of service are outside enclave protection",
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        "severity": "significant",
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        "description": "Tinfoil's documentation lists timing, power and electromagnetic side channels, host observation of access patterns and I/O, denial of service, supply-chain compromise and rollback as limitations.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1206"
        ],
        "record": "I-0006"
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0012",
        "n": 3,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Private models can be checked only for consistency",
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        "kind": "open-question",
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        "status": "open",
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        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "For unpublished weights, the root hash appears in the attestation without the weights being exposed. Users can then confirm only that they get the same model each time.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0013"
        ],
        "record": "I-0006"
      }
    ],
    "openQuestions": [],
    "minor": 0,
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      "M-0018"
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    "newChip": []
  },
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    {
      "mech": "M-0018",
      "record": "M-0018",
      "n": 1,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Extracting a chip's key lets another device answer for it",
      "classification": "failure",
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      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Ping-based protocols rely on cryptographic keys stored on the chip. Tee and Happel argue that an adversary with physical access could extract these keys and so compromise location verification. They propose GPU fingerprints as a mitigation, so far tested on 24 GPUs. Brass and Aarne assume the keys are stored securely, for example in a TPM.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1403",
        "S-1400"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0018",
      "record": "M-0018",
      "n": 2,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Added delay can shift an estimated position",
      "classification": "failure",
      "kind": "demonstrated-attack",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Brass and Aarne cite internet-geolocation research in which artificially increased round-trip times moved the estimated location by up to 1,000 km, with a 74% chance of avoiding detection. Avellar and Grunewald list inflated ping times from circuitous routing as an evasion route. Added delay only loosens a distance bound, and Brass and Aarne propose a hard time limit as the counter: a chip that replies too slowly cannot be ruled out of a restricted location.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1400",
        "S-1402"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0018",
      "record": "M-0018",
      "n": 3,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Faster-than-assumed network paths",
      "classification": "failure",
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      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
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      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Brass and Aarne list dark fibre and other private high-speed interconnects as ways to lower measured delays artificially. They judge that leasing dark fibre would probably not be a considerable challenge for covertly or openly adversarial actors. Avellar and Grunewald note that this can make a chip appear to be somewhere else entirely. A limit set at the vacuum speed of light cannot be beaten, but it makes honest chips fail more often.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1400",
        "S-1402"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0018",
      "record": "M-0018",
      "n": 4,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Compromised landmarks can falsify measurements",
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      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "A party that controls landmark servers can report false timing. Brass and Aarne cite research in which manipulating a third of the landmarks shifted the estimated location by about 700 km. Avellar and Grunewald note that compromised landmarks let adversaries spoof travel-time measurements directly. The draft specification asks verifiers to require anchors in diverse places, run by several independent operators.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1400",
        "S-1402",
        "S-1404"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0012",
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      "n": 1,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Inherits attacks on the underlying TEEs",
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      "scope_note": "Critical when model identity must hold against an operator with physical access to an affected host. Tinfoil documents physical attacks as an enclave limitation. These are hardware-class demonstrations, not a published break of Modelwrap or Tinfoil's deployed verification chain.",
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        "record": "M-0008",
        "flaw": 1
      },
      "description": "Tinfoil's model commitment and boot-time GPU check depend on the CPU attestation. The TEE findings distinguish Intel TDX forgery on DDR5, AMD SEV-SNP forgery on DDR4 in Battering RAM, and software-only RMPocalypse on platforms lacking AMD's fixes. TEE.fail recovered a guest OpenSSL key on AMD, not an AMD attestation key. Its GPU relay demonstration used an H100 with forged TDX evidence; it does not establish the same result for Tinfoil's H200 or B200 configurations.",
      "response": "Tinfoil acknowledges the physical-access boundary. The TEE.fail authors report that Intel and AMD treat interposer attacks as outside their threat models and recommend physically secure servers. AMD reports firmware fixes for RMPocalypse.",
      "sources": [
        "S-1206",
        "S-1202",
        "S-1210",
        "S-1212",
        "S-1213",
        "S-1207"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0012",
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      "n": 2,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Side channels, I/O leakage and denial of service are outside enclave protection",
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      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Tinfoil's documentation lists timing, power and electromagnetic side channels, host observation of access patterns and I/O, denial of service, supply-chain compromise and rollback as limitations.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1206"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0012",
      "record": "I-0006",
      "n": 3,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Private models can be checked only for consistency",
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      "kind": "open-question",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "For unpublished weights, the root hash appears in the attestation without the weights being exposed. Users can then confirm only that they get the same model each time.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-0013"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "possible_additions": [
    {
      "id": "M-0008",
      "title": "TEE remote attestation for AI workloads",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/tee-remote-attestation/",
      "readiness": "R3",
      "development_status": {
        "code": "R3",
        "label": "Operational use",
        "short": "Operational use",
        "rank": 3,
        "legacy_code": "R3"
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          "status": "independent-red-team",
          "label": "Published attack testing",
          "kind": "practical",
          "attribution": "Independent team"
        },
        "independent_evaluation": {
          "status": "unassessed"
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        "formal_proof": {
          "status": "unassessed"
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        "deployment_assurance": {
          "status": "unassessed"
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          {
            "n": 1,
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            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "mechanism",
            "sources": [
              "S-1202",
              "S-3126",
              "S-0012",
              "S-1206",
              "S-0014",
              "S-1210",
              "S-1212",
              "S-3127"
            ]
          },
          {
            "n": 2,
            "severity": "critical",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "mechanism",
            "sources": [
              "S-1210",
              "S-1211"
            ]
          },
          {
            "n": 3,
            "severity": "critical",
            "status": "mitigated",
            "evidence_scope": "mechanism",
            "sources": [
              "S-1212",
              "S-1213",
              "S-3127",
              "S-3128"
            ]
          },
          {
            "n": 4,
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "mechanism",
            "sources": [
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            ]
          },
          {
            "n": 5,
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "mechanism",
            "sources": [
              "S-0012",
              "S-0009",
              "S-0014",
              "S-3123",
              "S-3129"
            ]
          },
          {
            "n": 8,
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "mechanism",
            "sources": [
              "S-0014",
              "S-0009",
              "S-3130",
              "S-3131"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 2,
          "significant": 3,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "fits_filters": true,
      "filter_issues": [],
      "reasons": [
        {
          "kind": "blocker",
          "mech": "M-0012",
          "text": "The underlying TEE attestation does not resist attackers with physical access to the host."
        },
        {
          "kind": "prerequisite",
          "mech": "M-0018"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "goal": null,
  "design": null,
  "dependencies": {
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      {
        "id": "M-0008",
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          "M-0018",
          "M-0012"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "shared": [
      {
        "id": "M-0008",
        "by": [
          "M-0018",
          "M-0012"
        ],
        "inProposal": false
      }
    ],
    "blockers": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0018",
        "n": 1,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "No public code or reproducible end-to-end location results are available for the reported H100 prototype.",
        "theme": "adversarial-validation",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1401",
          "S-3570"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0018",
        "n": 2,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "Per-chip keys must be provisioned and protected against extraction; hardware-integrated, tamper-resistant versions still need R&D.",
        "theme": "hardware-trust",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1400",
          "S-1403",
          "S-0007"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0018",
        "n": 3,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "The time limit forces a trade-off: a limit at the speed of light in fibre can be beaten by faster links, while one at the vacuum speed of light makes honest chips fail often.",
        "theme": "protocol-soundness",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1400"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0018",
        "n": 4,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "A trusted landmark network must be built and secured, and who should operate it, under what oversight, is unsettled.",
        "theme": "access-governance",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1400",
          "S-1402"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0012",
        "n": 1,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "The underlying TEE attestation does not resist attackers with physical access to the host.",
        "theme": "hardware-trust",
        "blocked_by": "M-0008",
        "sources": [
          "S-1202",
          "S-1206"
        ],
        "inProposal": false
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0012",
        "n": 2,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "No independent evaluation of the model-identity chain has been published.",
        "theme": "adversarial-validation",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [],
        "inProposal": null
      }
    ]
  },
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      "unknown": []
    },
    "io": {
      "shown": [],
      "partial": [],
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      "none": [
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      ],
      "unknown": [
        "M-0012"
      ]
    },
    "training": {
      "shown": [],
      "partial": [],
      "hidden": [],
      "none": [
        "M-0018",
        "M-0012"
      ],
      "unknown": []
    }
  },
  "implementations": [
    {
      "mechanism": "M-0018",
      "selected": null,
      "implementations": [
        {
          "id": "I-0009",
          "title": "Lucid sovereignty (location) certificates",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/lucid-location-certificates/"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "mechanism": "M-0012",
      "selected": {
        "id": "I-0006",
        "title": "Tinfoil model identity (Modelwrap)",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/tinfoil-model-identity/"
      },
      "implementations": [
        {
          "id": "I-0007",
          "title": "Attestable Audits",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/attestable-audits/"
        },
        {
          "id": "I-0022",
          "title": "PAL*M",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/palm/"
        },
        {
          "id": "I-0006",
          "title": "Tinfoil model identity (Modelwrap)",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/tinfoil-model-identity/"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "sources": [
    {
      "id": "S-1400",
      "title": "Location Verification for AI Chips",
      "authors": "A. Brass & O. Aarne",
      "year": 2024,
      "url": "https://www.iaps.ai/research/location-verification-for-ai-chips",
      "path": "/sources/brass-location-verification-ai-chips/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1401",
      "title": "Location Verification for AI Chips (issue brief)",
      "authors": "A. Brass",
      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/64edf8e7f2b10d716b5ba0e1/t/6827b67275666f3757f134ea/1747433075281/Location+Verification+two-pager.pdf",
      "path": "/sources/brass-location-verification-issue-brief/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-3570",
      "title": "Ping-based Location",
      "authors": "Ulyssean",
      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://ping-location.info/",
      "path": "/sources/ulyssean-ping-based-location-demo/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1402",
      "title": "Near-Term Verification Methods for AI Chip Exports",
      "authors": "B. Avellar & E. Grunewald",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://www.iaps.ai/research/near-term-verification-methods-for-ai-chip-exports",
      "path": "/sources/avellar-near-term-verification-ai-chip-exports/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1404",
      "title": "Sovereignty Certificates: draft specification, version 0.1.0",
      "authors": "Sovereignty Certificates Working Group",
      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://github.com/Lucid-Computing/sovereignty-certificate-specification",
      "path": "/sources/sovereignty-certificates-specification/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1403",
      "title": "GPU Fingerprinting for Location Verification",
      "authors": "W. Tee & J. Happel",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.01930",
      "path": "/sources/tee-gpu-fingerprinting-location-verification/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0056",
      "title": "Secure, Governable Chips: Using On-Chip Mechanisms to Manage National Security Risks from AI & Advanced Computing",
      "authors": "O. Aarne et al.",
      "year": 2024,
      "url": "https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/secure-governable-chips",
      "path": "/sources/aarne-secure-governable-chips/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0013",
      "title": "How Tinfoil Proves Exactly What Model Is Running",
      "authors": "Tinfoil Team",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://tinfoil.sh/blog/2026-02-03-proving-model-identity",
      "path": "/sources/tinfoil-proving-model-identity/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1206",
      "title": "A primer on secure enclaves",
      "authors": "Tinfoil",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://docs.tinfoil.sh/verification/secure-enclave-primer",
      "path": "/sources/tinfoil-docs-secure-enclave-primer/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1207",
      "title": "Backend infrastructure",
      "authors": "Tinfoil",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://docs.tinfoil.sh/verification/attestation-architecture",
      "path": "/sources/tinfoil-docs-attestation-architecture/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1208",
      "title": "How verification works in Tinfoil",
      "authors": "Tinfoil",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://docs.tinfoil.sh/verification/verification-in-tinfoil",
      "path": "/sources/tinfoil-docs-verification-in-tinfoil/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1209",
      "title": "modelwrap: Reproducible dm-verity read-only image of Huggingface models",
      "authors": "Tinfoil",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://github.com/tinfoilsh/modelwrap",
      "path": "/sources/tinfoil-modelwrap-code/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1202",
      "title": "TEE.fail: Breaking Trusted Execution Environments via DDR5 Memory Bus Interposition",
      "authors": "J. Chuang et al.",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://tee.fail/",
      "path": "/sources/chuang-tee-fail/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1210",
      "title": "Battering RAM: Low-Cost Interposer Attacks on Confidential Computing via Dynamic Memory Aliasing",
      "authors": "J. De Meulemeester et al.",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://batteringram.eu/",
      "path": "/sources/de-meulemeester-battering-ram/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1212",
      "title": "RMPocalypse: How a Catch-22 Breaks AMD SEV-SNP",
      "authors": "B. Schlüter & S. Shinde",
      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://rmpocalypse.github.io/",
      "path": "/sources/schluter-rmpocalypse/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1213",
      "title": "SEV-SNP RMP Initialization Vulnerability (AMD-SB-3020)",
      "authors": "AMD",
      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-3020.html",
      "path": "/sources/amd-sb-3020-rmp-initialization/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0012",
      "title": "PAL*M: Property Attestation for Large Generative Models",
      "authors": "P. Chantasantitam et al.",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.16199",
      "path": "/sources/chantasantitam-palm/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0014",
      "title": "On TEEs for Privacy-Preserving Monitoring in AI Governance",
      "authors": "Gloria Z",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://techgov.intelligence.org/blog/on-tees-for-privacy-preserving-monitoring-in-ai-governance",
      "path": "/sources/zhao-tees-privacy-preserving-monitoring/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0009",
      "title": "Attestable Audits: Verifiable AI Safety Benchmarks Using Trusted Execution Environments",
      "authors": "C. Schnabl et al.",
      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.23706",
      "path": "/sources/schnabl-attestable-audits/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0007",
      "title": "Hardware-Level Governance of AI Compute: A Feasibility Taxonomy for Regulatory Compliance and Treaty Verification",
      "authors": "S. Ansari",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.04712",
      "path": "/sources/ansari-hardware-level-governance-ai-compute/"
    }
  ]
}