{
  "schema_version": "1.2",
  "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/explorer/?mechanisms=M-0012&implementations=M-0012:I-0007",
  "data_generated": "2026-10-08",
  "definitions": {
    "methodology": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/methodology/",
    "readiness": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/readiness/",
    "filters": [
      {
        "id": "prover",
        "label": "Prover",
        "question": "How far can the party being checked be trusted?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "cooperative",
            "label": "Cooperative"
          },
          {
            "value": "semi-trusted",
            "label": "Semi-trusted"
          },
          {
            "value": "adversarial",
            "label": "Adversarial"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose threat model holds against at least this prover. Adversarial is the strongest assumption.",
        "about": "The prover is the party being checked. Semi-trusted designs rely on part of its stack: usually the chip vendor's hardware root of trust, its firmware or counters, or its supply-chain records. Adversarial designs aim to hold even if it cheats wherever the checks allow, within their stated assumptions."
      },
      {
        "id": "onsite",
        "label": "Verifier devices on site",
        "question": "May the verifier install its own hardware at the prover's sites?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "no",
            "label": "Not allowed"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Not allowed\" removes mechanisms that need a retrofit device, such as a network tap or a sealed sensor.",
        "about": "Some mechanisms need a device the verifier owns or trusts at the prover's facility, such as a network tap, a bandwidth limiter or a sealed sensor. Choose Not allowed when the setting rules that out. Inspectors are not covered."
      },
      {
        "id": "coop",
        "label": "Prover cooperation",
        "question": "How much must the prover take part?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "partial",
            "label": "Partial at most"
          },
          {
            "value": "none",
            "label": "Not required"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Partial at most\" removes mechanisms that need the prover's active participation. \"Not required\" keeps only those that work without it.",
        "about": "Required: the prover takes part, for example by logging requests, producing proofs or opening records. Partial: some access, such as installing a device. Not required: works from outside, such as satellite imagery."
      },
      {
        "id": "chips",
        "label": "Chips",
        "question": "May the proposal depend on new chip designs?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "existing",
            "label": "Existing chips only"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Existing chips only\" removes mechanisms that need changes to future chip designs.",
        "about": "New chip features take years to reach a deployed fleet and cover only chips made after they ship. Mechanisms that use shipping features, such as trusted execution environments or performance counters, stay."
      },
      {
        "id": "ready",
        "label": "Minimum readiness",
        "question": "How mature must each mechanism be?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "R1",
            "label": "R1 Proposed"
          },
          {
            "value": "R2",
            "label": "R2 Demonstrated"
          },
          {
            "value": "R3",
            "label": "R3 In production"
          },
          {
            "value": "R4",
            "label": "R4 Deployment-ready"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose readiness level is at least this one.",
        "about": "A level describes the public evidence for a mechanism's stated use, not its cost or feasibility. R3 can still have open critical flaws."
      },
      {
        "id": "tested",
        "label": "Attack testing",
        "question": "How hard has each mechanism been attacked in public?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "analysis",
            "label": "Published analysis"
          },
          {
            "value": "red-teamed",
            "label": "Red-teamed"
          },
          {
            "value": "independent-red-team",
            "label": "Independent red-team"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose strongest published attack testing is at least this.",
        "about": "The strongest published attempt to break the mechanism for its verification use: a security analysis, red-teaming by its developers or collaborators, or a red team independent of them."
      },
      {
        "id": "hide",
        "label": "Keep hidden from the verifier",
        "question": "What must the verifier never see?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "weights",
            "label": "Model weights"
          },
          {
            "value": "io",
            "label": "Inputs and outputs"
          },
          {
            "value": "training",
            "label": "Training data"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Removes mechanisms that show the asset to the verifier. Conditional or unspecified exposure stays with a note and needs checking against the privacy requirement.",
        "about": "Model weights: the checked model's parameters. Inputs and outputs: the requests a deployed model serves and its responses. Training data: what a model was trained on. Each mechanism's exposure is the editors' reading of its record: shown, depends on the design (kept, with a note), hidden, not involved, or unspecified for a selected implementation. Code and configuration are not covered yet."
      }
    ],
    "exposure": "For model weights, inputs and outputs, and training data. This is the editors' reading of each mechanism's record (its threat model, how it works and its limitations), not a field of the record. Shown: the verifier sees it. Depends: on the design or variant, or the verifier sees only samples. Hidden: the verifier sees only commitments, hashes, proofs or results. Not involved: the record does not handle it. Unspecified: the selected implementation has no asset-specific assessment here.",
    "claim_status": {
      "addressed": "A mechanism in the proposal is aimed at this claim and is not excluded by the filters.",
      "partly-addressed": "Only supporting mechanisms, or mechanisms aimed at it that the filters exclude.",
      "unaddressed": "No mechanism in the proposal addresses this claim."
    },
    "finding_scope": "Evidence scope describes where a finding was demonstrated; it does not establish applicability to every implementation in the mechanism family.",
    "claim_finding_scope": "open_critical_findings names active findings on the assessed records; open_critical_context names conditional family findings whose implementation applicability is unassessed.",
    "legacy_status": "The status field retains covered/partial/none for compatibility. It names claim links, never successful verification. Use claim_status and status_label for presentation."
  },
  "filters": {
    "prover": "",
    "onsite": "",
    "coop": "",
    "chips": "",
    "ready": "",
    "tested": "",
    "hide": []
  },
  "mechanisms_passing_filters": 25,
  "claims": [],
  "mechanisms": [
    {
      "id": "M-0012",
      "title": "Model identity attestation",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/model-identity-attestation/",
      "assessment_record": {
        "id": "I-0007",
        "title": "Attestable Audits",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/attestable-audits/"
      },
      "selected_implementation": {
        "id": "I-0007",
        "title": "Attestable Audits",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/attestable-audits/"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "level": "R2",
        "scope": "showing users that the model answering them is the audited one",
        "confidence": "low",
        "evidence": [
          "S-0009"
        ]
      },
      "assessed_properties": {
        "threat_model": "semi-trusted",
        "hardware_requirement": "existing-features",
        "prover_cooperation": "required",
        "adversarial_evaluation": "analysis"
      },
      "claims": [],
      "exposure": {
        "weights": "unknown",
        "io": "unknown",
        "training": "unknown",
        "note": "This Explorer has no asset-specific exposure assessment for this implementation. Check its source and deployment assumptions.",
        "sources": []
      },
      "family_finding_context": [
        {
          "n": 1,
          "title": "Underlying attestation can be forged or relayed",
          "kind": "demonstrated-attack",
          "severity": "critical",
          "status": "open",
          "evidence_scope": "inherited",
          "scope_note": "Critical for the enclave route against an operator with physical access to affected hardware, or control of an unpatched SEV-SNP hypervisor. It does not apply to the recomputation route. PAL*M excludes physical attacks, and Tinfoil acknowledges this boundary.",
          "related_finding": {
            "record": "M-0008",
            "flaw": 1
          },
          "description": "The enclave route inherits the platform-specific TEE attestation failures. Intel TDX forgery and H100 relay were demonstrated with physical access and host control. Battering RAM defeated AMD SEV-SNP attestation on DDR4 servers; RMPocalypse did so from malicious host software on platforms without AMD's fixes. These demonstrate failures of the trust roots, not of each model-commitment protocol.",
          "response": "The TEE.fail authors report that physical interposer attacks are outside Intel's and AMD's threat models. AMD reports fixes for RMPocalypse.",
          "sources": [
            "S-1202",
            "S-1210",
            "S-1212",
            "S-1213",
            "S-1206",
            "S-0012"
          ],
          "helps": [
            {
              "by": "M-0009",
              "how": "A tamper-protected enclosure around the chip is the proposed answer when the party that holds the hardware may attack it physically."
            }
          ],
          "record": "M-0012",
          "represented_by": []
        },
        {
          "n": 2,
          "title": "Launch-state attestation does not by itself cover weights loaded later",
          "kind": "theoretical-argument",
          "severity": "significant",
          "status": "mitigated",
          "evidence_scope": null,
          "scope_note": null,
          "related_finding": null,
          "description": "Attestation measures launch state, and weights are read from disk after boot. A signature checked at load time does not stop a malicious hypervisor from altering the disk afterwards. Tinfoil reports mitigating this with dm-verity checks on every read. Unmeasured runtime configuration remains a general risk.",
          "response": null,
          "sources": [
            "S-0013",
            "S-0014"
          ],
          "record": "M-0012",
          "represented_by": []
        },
        {
          "n": 3,
          "title": "For private models, a user can confirm consistency but not content",
          "kind": "open-question",
          "severity": "significant",
          "status": "open",
          "evidence_scope": null,
          "scope_note": null,
          "related_finding": null,
          "description": "When weights are not published, users can check that the same root hash is served each time, but not what the model is. Pairing the hash with an attested evaluation, as in Attestable Audits, is one proposed remedy.",
          "response": null,
          "sources": [
            "S-0013",
            "S-0009"
          ],
          "record": "M-0012",
          "represented_by": []
        },
        {
          "n": 4,
          "title": "Recomputation depends on trusted logging and randomness, and its tolerance leaves a covert channel",
          "kind": "demonstrated-attack",
          "severity": "significant",
          "status": "open",
          "evidence_scope": null,
          "scope_note": null,
          "related_finding": null,
          "description": "The recomputation variant assumes that every input, output and seed is logged correctly, and that the attacker can neither predict nor manipulate which messages are sampled for verification. Legitimate nondeterminism concentrates at a few token positions, and slow leaks within the tolerated slack remain possible. An independent study showed that an adversary who controls the prompts roughly doubles the bits leaked per token, reducing the exfiltration slowdown from 146–254 times under benign prompts to 60–118 times. The attack targets the exfiltration bound, not the check that outputs match the declared model.",
          "response": null,
          "sources": [
            "S-0015",
            "S-1507"
          ],
          "helps": [
            {
              "by": "M-0013",
              "how": "Taps are proposed to copy and hash traffic on the monitored links, reducing reliance on the prover's own log. This still depends on the monitored boundary and trusted capture."
            },
            {
              "by": "M-0002",
              "how": "Bit-exact inference would remove the numerical tolerance that leaves this channel."
            }
          ],
          "record": "M-0012",
          "represented_by": []
        }
      ],
      "filter_issues": []
    }
  ],
  "strengths": {
    "covered": [],
    "production": [],
    "adversarial": [],
    "noNewHardware": [
      "M-0012"
    ],
    "mitigated": [],
    "notCounted": []
  },
  "properties": {
    "covered": [],
    "production": [],
    "adversarial": [],
    "noNewHardware": [
      "M-0012"
    ],
    "mitigated": [],
    "notCounted": []
  },
  "attack_testing": [
    {
      "id": "M-0012",
      "record": "I-0007",
      "evaluation": "analysis",
      "in_setting": true
    }
  ],
  "selected_implementations": {
    "M-0012": "I-0007"
  },
  "weaknesses": {
    "gaps": [],
    "excluded": [],
    "unlinked": [],
    "critical": [],
    "significant": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0012",
        "n": 1,
        "title": "Relies on the TEE vendor and inherits TEE attacks",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": "inherited",
        "scope_note": "The prototype trusts AWS Nitro, not the Intel TDX or AMD SEV-SNP attestation roots targeted by the cited confidential-VM studies. Those studies are class context, not a demonstrated attack on this Nitro prototype.",
        "related_finding": {
          "record": "M-0008",
          "flaw": 5
        },
        "description": "The design depends on trusting the TEE vendor, AWS in the prototype. The authors cite memory-aliasing, ciphertext side-channel and malicious-interrupt attacks on confidential VMs (BadRAM, CIPHERLEAKS, Heckler). Their answer is to revoke vulnerable base images once such attacks are discovered.",
        "response": "The authors propose revoking vulnerable base images; they do not report a red-team evaluation of the prototype.",
        "sources": [
          "S-0009"
        ],
        "record": "I-0007"
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0012",
        "n": 2,
        "title": "Prompt-based model exfiltration is a residual gap",
        "kind": "open-question",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "The authors state that \"prompt-based model exfiltration during the user interaction step remains a residual gap\".",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0009"
        ],
        "record": "I-0007"
      }
    ],
    "criticalMechanisms": [],
    "significantMechanisms": [
      "M-0012"
    ],
    "familyContext": [
      {
        "id": "M-0012",
        "implementation": "I-0007",
        "flaws": [
          {
            "n": 1,
            "title": "Underlying attestation can be forged or relayed",
            "kind": "demonstrated-attack",
            "severity": "critical",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "inherited",
            "scope_note": "Critical for the enclave route against an operator with physical access to affected hardware, or control of an unpatched SEV-SNP hypervisor. It does not apply to the recomputation route. PAL*M excludes physical attacks, and Tinfoil acknowledges this boundary.",
            "related_finding": {
              "record": "M-0008",
              "flaw": 1
            },
            "description": "The enclave route inherits the platform-specific TEE attestation failures. Intel TDX forgery and H100 relay were demonstrated with physical access and host control. Battering RAM defeated AMD SEV-SNP attestation on DDR4 servers; RMPocalypse did so from malicious host software on platforms without AMD's fixes. These demonstrate failures of the trust roots, not of each model-commitment protocol.",
            "response": "The TEE.fail authors report that physical interposer attacks are outside Intel's and AMD's threat models. AMD reports fixes for RMPocalypse.",
            "sources": [
              "S-1202",
              "S-1210",
              "S-1212",
              "S-1213",
              "S-1206",
              "S-0012"
            ],
            "helps": [
              {
                "by": "M-0009",
                "how": "A tamper-protected enclosure around the chip is the proposed answer when the party that holds the hardware may attack it physically."
              }
            ],
            "record": "M-0012",
            "represented_by": []
          },
          {
            "n": 2,
            "title": "Launch-state attestation does not by itself cover weights loaded later",
            "kind": "theoretical-argument",
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "mitigated",
            "evidence_scope": null,
            "scope_note": null,
            "related_finding": null,
            "description": "Attestation measures launch state, and weights are read from disk after boot. A signature checked at load time does not stop a malicious hypervisor from altering the disk afterwards. Tinfoil reports mitigating this with dm-verity checks on every read. Unmeasured runtime configuration remains a general risk.",
            "response": null,
            "sources": [
              "S-0013",
              "S-0014"
            ],
            "record": "M-0012",
            "represented_by": []
          },
          {
            "n": 3,
            "title": "For private models, a user can confirm consistency but not content",
            "kind": "open-question",
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": null,
            "scope_note": null,
            "related_finding": null,
            "description": "When weights are not published, users can check that the same root hash is served each time, but not what the model is. Pairing the hash with an attested evaluation, as in Attestable Audits, is one proposed remedy.",
            "response": null,
            "sources": [
              "S-0013",
              "S-0009"
            ],
            "record": "M-0012",
            "represented_by": []
          },
          {
            "n": 4,
            "title": "Recomputation depends on trusted logging and randomness, and its tolerance leaves a covert channel",
            "kind": "demonstrated-attack",
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": null,
            "scope_note": null,
            "related_finding": null,
            "description": "The recomputation variant assumes that every input, output and seed is logged correctly, and that the attacker can neither predict nor manipulate which messages are sampled for verification. Legitimate nondeterminism concentrates at a few token positions, and slow leaks within the tolerated slack remain possible. An independent study showed that an adversary who controls the prompts roughly doubles the bits leaked per token, reducing the exfiltration slowdown from 146–254 times under benign prompts to 60–118 times. The attack targets the exfiltration bound, not the check that outputs match the declared model.",
            "response": null,
            "sources": [
              "S-0015",
              "S-1507"
            ],
            "helps": [
              {
                "by": "M-0013",
                "how": "Taps are proposed to copy and hash traffic on the monitored links, reducing reliance on the prover's own log. This still depends on the monitored boundary and trusted capture."
              },
              {
                "by": "M-0002",
                "how": "Bit-exact inference would remove the numerical tolerance that leaves this channel."
              }
            ],
            "record": "M-0012",
            "represented_by": []
          }
        ]
      }
    ],
    "minor": 1,
    "minorFindings": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0012",
        "n": 3,
        "title": "CPU-only enclaves force small, quantized models and high cost",
        "kind": "open-question",
        "severity": "minor",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Memory limits required 4-bit quantization, and the quantized model scored 51.4% on zero-shot MMLU. CPU inference cost 21.7 times as much per token as GPU inference, and the enclave roughly doubled the CPU cost. The authors wrote that H100 confidential computing had no multi-GPU support. NVIDIA's white paper of August 2025 describes a protected-PCIe mode that passes all eight GPUs of a Hopper HGX node to one confidential VM, with NVLink traffic unencrypted.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0009",
          "S-1200"
        ],
        "record": "I-0007"
      }
    ],
    "minorBy": [
      {
        "id": "M-0012",
        "n": 1
      }
    ],
    "notDemonstrated": [],
    "newChip": []
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "mech": "M-0012",
      "record": "I-0007",
      "n": 1,
      "title": "Relies on the TEE vendor and inherits TEE attacks",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": "inherited",
      "scope_note": "The prototype trusts AWS Nitro, not the Intel TDX or AMD SEV-SNP attestation roots targeted by the cited confidential-VM studies. Those studies are class context, not a demonstrated attack on this Nitro prototype.",
      "related_finding": {
        "record": "M-0008",
        "flaw": 5
      },
      "description": "The design depends on trusting the TEE vendor, AWS in the prototype. The authors cite memory-aliasing, ciphertext side-channel and malicious-interrupt attacks on confidential VMs (BadRAM, CIPHERLEAKS, Heckler). Their answer is to revoke vulnerable base images once such attacks are discovered.",
      "response": "The authors propose revoking vulnerable base images; they do not report a red-team evaluation of the prototype.",
      "sources": [
        "S-0009"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0012",
      "record": "I-0007",
      "n": 2,
      "title": "Prompt-based model exfiltration is a residual gap",
      "kind": "open-question",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "The authors state that \"prompt-based model exfiltration during the user interaction step remains a residual gap\".",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-0009"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0012",
      "record": "I-0007",
      "n": 3,
      "title": "CPU-only enclaves force small, quantized models and high cost",
      "kind": "open-question",
      "severity": "minor",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Memory limits required 4-bit quantization, and the quantized model scored 51.4% on zero-shot MMLU. CPU inference cost 21.7 times as much per token as GPU inference, and the enclave roughly doubled the CPU cost. The authors wrote that H100 confidential computing had no multi-GPU support. NVIDIA's white paper of August 2025 describes a protected-PCIe mode that passes all eight GPUs of a Hopper HGX node to one confidential VM, with NVLink traffic unencrypted.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-0009",
        "S-1200"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "possible_additions": [
    {
      "id": "M-0008",
      "title": "TEE remote attestation for AI workloads",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/tee-remote-attestation/",
      "readiness": "R3",
      "fits_filters": true,
      "filter_issues": [],
      "reasons": [
        {
          "kind": "blocker",
          "mech": "M-0012",
          "text": "The prototype needs porting to GPU confidential computing to handle larger models; the authors expect an overhead as small as 5 times there."
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "goal": null,
  "design": null,
  "dependencies": {
    "prerequisites": [
      {
        "id": "M-0008",
        "neededBy": [
          "M-0012"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "shared": [],
    "blockers": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0012",
        "n": 1,
        "text": "The prototype needs porting to GPU confidential computing to handle larger models; the authors expect an overhead as small as 5 times there.",
        "theme": "performance-compatibility",
        "blocked_by": "M-0008",
        "sources": [
          "S-0009"
        ],
        "inProposal": false
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0012",
        "n": 2,
        "text": "As of September 2026 no code has been released for the prototype.",
        "theme": "adversarial-validation",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0009"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      }
    ]
  },
  "exposure": {
    "weights": {
      "shown": [],
      "partial": [],
      "hidden": [],
      "none": [],
      "unknown": [
        "M-0012"
      ]
    },
    "io": {
      "shown": [],
      "partial": [],
      "hidden": [],
      "none": [],
      "unknown": [
        "M-0012"
      ]
    },
    "training": {
      "shown": [],
      "partial": [],
      "hidden": [],
      "none": [],
      "unknown": [
        "M-0012"
      ]
    }
  },
  "implementations": [
    {
      "mechanism": "M-0012",
      "selected": {
        "id": "I-0007",
        "title": "Attestable Audits",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/attestable-audits/"
      },
      "implementations": [
        {
          "id": "I-0007",
          "title": "Attestable Audits",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/attestable-audits/"
        },
        {
          "id": "I-0022",
          "title": "PAL*M",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/palm/"
        },
        {
          "id": "I-0006",
          "title": "Tinfoil model identity (Modelwrap)",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/tinfoil-model-identity/"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "sources": [
    {
      "id": "S-0009",
      "title": "Attestable Audits: Verifiable AI Safety Benchmarks Using Trusted Execution Environments",
      "authors": "C. Schnabl et al.",
      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.23706",
      "path": "/sources/schnabl-attestable-audits/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1200",
      "title": "NVIDIA Secure AI with Blackwell and Hopper GPUs (White Paper)",
      "authors": "NVIDIA",
      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://docs.nvidia.com/nvidia-secure-ai-with-blackwell-and-hopper-gpus-whitepaper.pdf",
      "path": "/sources/nvidia-secure-ai-blackwell-hopper-whitepaper/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1202",
      "title": "TEE.fail: Breaking Trusted Execution Environments via DDR5 Memory Bus Interposition",
      "authors": "J. Chuang et al.",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://tee.fail/",
      "path": "/sources/chuang-tee-fail/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1210",
      "title": "Battering RAM: Low-Cost Interposer Attacks on Confidential Computing via Dynamic Memory Aliasing",
      "authors": "J. De Meulemeester et al.",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://batteringram.eu/",
      "path": "/sources/de-meulemeester-battering-ram/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1212",
      "title": "RMPocalypse: How a Catch-22 Breaks AMD SEV-SNP",
      "authors": "B. Schlüter & S. Shinde",
      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://rmpocalypse.github.io/",
      "path": "/sources/schluter-rmpocalypse/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1213",
      "title": "SEV-SNP RMP Initialization Vulnerability (AMD-SB-3020)",
      "authors": "AMD",
      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-3020.html",
      "path": "/sources/amd-sb-3020-rmp-initialization/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1206",
      "title": "A primer on secure enclaves",
      "authors": "Tinfoil",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://docs.tinfoil.sh/verification/secure-enclave-primer",
      "path": "/sources/tinfoil-docs-secure-enclave-primer/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0012",
      "title": "PAL*M: Property Attestation for Large Generative Models",
      "authors": "P. Chantasantitam et al.",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.16199",
      "path": "/sources/chantasantitam-palm/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0013",
      "title": "How Tinfoil Proves Exactly What Model Is Running",
      "authors": "Tinfoil Team",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://tinfoil.sh/blog/2026-02-03-proving-model-identity",
      "path": "/sources/tinfoil-proving-model-identity/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0014",
      "title": "On TEEs for Privacy-Preserving Monitoring in AI Governance",
      "authors": "Gloria Z",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://techgov.intelligence.org/blog/on-tees-for-privacy-preserving-monitoring-in-ai-governance",
      "path": "/sources/zhao-tees-privacy-preserving-monitoring/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0015",
      "title": "Verifying LLM Inference to Detect Model Weight Exfiltration",
      "authors": "R. Rinberg et al.",
      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.02620",
      "path": "/sources/rinberg-verifying-llm-inference-weight-exfiltration/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1507",
      "title": "Adversarial Entropy Inflation Against Gumbel-Based Inference Verification",
      "authors": "N. Kezins",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.23375",
      "path": "/sources/kezins-adversarial-entropy-inflation/"
    }
  ]
}