{ "schema_version": "1.3", "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/explorer/?mechanisms=M-0023,M-0017&implementations=M-0017:I-0011", "data_generated": "2026-10-09", "definitions": { "methodology": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/methodology/", "readiness": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/readiness/", "filters": [ { "id": "prover", "label": "Prover", "question": "How far can the party being checked be trusted?", "options": [ { "value": "cooperative", "label": "Cooperative" }, { "value": "semi-trusted", "label": "Semi-trusted" }, { "value": "adversarial", "label": "Adversarial" } ], "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose threat model holds against at least this prover. Adversarial is the strongest assumption.", "about": "The prover is the party being checked. Semi-trusted designs rely on part of its stack: usually the chip vendor's hardware root of trust, its firmware or counters, or its supply-chain records. Adversarial designs aim to hold even if it cheats wherever the checks allow, within their stated assumptions." }, { "id": "onsite", "label": "Verifier devices on site", "question": "May the verifier install its own hardware at the prover's sites?", "options": [ { "value": "no", "label": "Not allowed" } ], "rule": "\"Not allowed\" removes mechanisms that need a retrofit device, such as a network tap or a sealed sensor.", "about": "Some mechanisms need a device the verifier owns or trusts at the prover's facility, such as a network tap, a bandwidth limiter or a sealed sensor. Choose Not allowed when the setting rules that out. Inspectors are not covered." }, { "id": "coop", "label": "Prover cooperation", "question": "How much must the prover take part?", "options": [ { "value": "partial", "label": "Partial at most" }, { "value": "none", "label": "Not required" } ], "rule": "\"Partial at most\" removes mechanisms that need the prover's active participation. \"Not required\" keeps only those that work without it.", "about": "Required: the prover takes part, for example by logging requests, producing proofs or opening records. Partial: some access, such as installing a device. Not required: works from outside, such as satellite imagery." }, { "id": "chips", "label": "Chips", "question": "May the proposal depend on new chip designs?", "options": [ { "value": "existing", "label": "Existing chips only" } ], "rule": "\"Existing chips only\" removes mechanisms that need changes to future chip designs.", "about": "New chip features take years to reach a deployed fleet and cover only chips made after they ship. Mechanisms that use shipping features, such as trusted execution environments or performance counters, stay." }, { "id": "ready", "label": "Minimum development status", "question": "Development status", "options": [ { "value": "R1", "label": "Proposed" }, { "value": "R2", "label": "Research demonstration" }, { "value": "R3", "label": "Operational use" }, { "value": "R4", "label": "Legacy independent-evaluation filter", "legacy": true } ], "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose readiness level is at least this one.", "about": "A level describes the public evidence for a mechanism's stated use, not its cost or feasibility. R3 can still have open critical flaws." }, { "id": "tested", "label": "Attack testing", "question": "How hard has each mechanism been attacked in public?", "options": [ { "value": "analysis", "label": "Published analysis" }, { "value": "red-teamed", "label": "Red-teamed" }, { "value": "independent-red-team", "label": "Independent red-team" } ], "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose strongest published attack testing is at least this.", "about": "The strongest published attempt to break the mechanism for its verification use: a security analysis, red-teaming by its developers or collaborators, or a red team independent of them." }, { "id": "hide", "label": "Keep hidden from the verifier", "question": "What must the verifier never see?", "options": [ { "value": "weights", "label": "Model weights" }, { "value": "io", "label": "Inputs and outputs" }, { "value": "training", "label": "Training data" } ], "rule": "Removes mechanisms that show the asset to the verifier. Conditional or unspecified exposure stays with a note and needs checking against the privacy requirement.", "about": "Model weights: the checked model's parameters. Inputs and outputs: the requests a deployed model serves and its responses. Training data: what a model was trained on. Each mechanism's exposure is the editors' reading of its record: shown, depends on the design (kept, with a note), hidden, not involved, or unspecified for a selected implementation. Code and configuration are not covered yet." } ], "exposure": "For model weights, inputs and outputs, and training data. This is the editors' reading of each mechanism's record (its threat model, how it works and its limitations), not a field of the record. Shown: the verifier sees it. Depends: on the design or variant, or the verifier sees only samples. Hidden: the verifier sees only commitments, hashes, proofs or results. Not involved: the record does not handle it. Unspecified: the selected implementation has no asset-specific assessment here.", "claim_status": { "addressed": "A mechanism in the proposal is aimed at this claim and is not excluded by the filters.", "partly-addressed": "Only supporting mechanisms, or mechanisms aimed at it that the filters exclude.", "unaddressed": "No mechanism in the proposal addresses this claim." }, "finding_classification": { "failure": { "label": "Known failures", "singular": "Known failure", "anchor": "known-flaws" }, "scope-limitation": { "label": "Scope limitations", "singular": "Scope limitation", "anchor": "scope-limitations" }, "open-question": { "label": "Open questions", "singular": "Open question", "anchor": "open-questions" } }, "finding_scope": "Evidence scope describes where a finding was demonstrated; it does not establish applicability to every implementation in the mechanism family.", "claim_finding_scope": "open_critical_findings names active failures on the assessed records; open_critical_context names conditional family failures whose implementation applicability is unassessed.", "legacy_status": "The status field retains covered/partial/none for compatibility. It names claim links, never successful verification. Use claim_status and status_label for presentation." }, "filters": { "prover": "", "onsite": "", "coop": "", "chips": "", "ready": "", "tested": "", "hide": [] }, "mechanisms_passing_filters": 25, "claims": [], "mechanisms": [ { "id": "M-0023", "title": "Safeguard attestation", "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/safeguard-attestation/", "assessment_record": { "id": "M-0023", "title": "Safeguard attestation", "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/safeguard-attestation/" }, "finding_counts": { "failure": 2, "scope_limitation": 3, "open_question": 0, "open_failures": { "critical": 0, "significant": 2, "minor": 0 } }, "selected_implementation": null, "readiness": { "level": "R2", "scope": "attesting that a declared safeguard mediated a service's responses", "confidence": "low", "evidence": [ "S-1500", "S-1501", "S-3362", "S-0012", "S-1503", "S-1504", "S-1202", "S-3126" ] }, "development_status": { "code": "R2", "label": "Research demonstration", "short": "Research demo", "rank": 2, "legacy_code": "R2" }, "security_evidence": { "attack_testing": { "status": "analysis", "label": "Published security analysis", "kind": "analysis" }, "independent_evaluation": { "status": "unassessed" }, "formal_proof": { "status": "unassessed" }, "deployment_assurance": { "status": "unassessed" }, "legacy_evaluation_code": null, "scoped_findings": [ { "n": 4, "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": "unassessed", "sources": [ "S-1500", "S-1501" ] }, { "n": 5, "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": "inherited", "sources": [ "S-1202", "S-3126", "S-1210", "S-1212", "S-1213", "S-0012", "S-0014", "S-1500", "S-0018" ], "related_finding": { "record": "M-0008", "flaw": 1 } } ], "open_failures": { "critical": 0, "significant": 2, "minor": 0 } }, "assessed_properties": { "threat_model": "semi-trusted", "hardware_requirement": "existing-features", "prover_cooperation": "required", "adversarial_evaluation": "analysis" }, "claims": [], "exposure": { "weights": "partial", "io": "partial", "training": "none", "note": "The enclave route signs hashes of the safeguard, request and response; a low-trust design has the verifier re-run and screen sampled requests itself." }, "family_finding_context": [], "filter_issues": [] }, { "id": "M-0017", "title": "Tamper evidence for verifier devices", "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/tamper-evidence-for-verifier-devices/", "assessment_record": { "id": "I-0011", "title": "AI 2040 inference-only verification stack", "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/ai-2040-inference-only-verification-plan/" }, "finding_counts": { "failure": 1, "scope_limitation": 2, "open_question": 0, "open_failures": { "critical": 0, "significant": 1, "minor": 0 } }, "selected_implementation": { "id": "I-0011", "title": "AI 2040 inference-only verification stack", "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/ai-2040-inference-only-verification-plan/" }, "readiness": { "level": "R1", "scope": "showing that retrofitted data centres run only inference", "confidence": "medium", "evidence": [ "S-0067", "S-1511", "S-1512", "S-1008", "S-1312" ] }, "development_status": { "code": "R1", "label": "Proposed", "short": "Proposed", "rank": 1, "legacy_code": "R1" }, "security_evidence": { "attack_testing": { "status": "none", "label": "No published adversarial analysis recorded", "kind": "none" }, "independent_evaluation": { "status": "unassessed" }, "formal_proof": { "status": "unassessed" }, "deployment_assurance": { "status": "unassessed" }, "legacy_evaluation_code": null, "scoped_findings": [ { "n": 3, "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": "unassessed", "sources": [ "S-1511", "S-0015", "S-1507", "S-0067" ] } ], "open_failures": { "critical": 0, "significant": 1, "minor": 0 } }, "assessed_properties": { "threat_model": "adversarial", "hardware_requirement": "retrofit-device", "prover_cooperation": "required", "adversarial_evaluation": "none" }, "claims": [], "exposure": { "weights": "unknown", "io": "unknown", "training": "unknown", "note": "This Explorer has no asset-specific exposure assessment for this implementation. Check its source and deployment assumptions.", "sources": [] }, "family_finding_context": [ { "n": 1, "historical": false, "title": "Seals are often defeated with simple methods", "classification": "failure", "kind": "demonstrated-attack", "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": "mechanism", "scope_note": "Published defeats of general security seals. They warn about proposed verifier-device seals, but do not demonstrate defeat of an AI verification enclosure or sensor.", "related_finding": null, "description": "In 1996 a Los Alamos vulnerability assessment defeated all 94 security seals it examined, with 132 defeats in total, using rapid, inexpensive, low-tech methods. It found that seal cost did not predict security. In 2001 Johnston reported that high-tech seals are often easier to defeat than low-tech ones.", "response": null, "sources": [ "S-1317", "S-1318" ], "record": "M-0017", "represented_by": [] }, { "n": 2, "historical": false, "title": "Security depends on inspection protocols", "classification": "scope-limitation", "kind": "theoretical-argument", "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": "mechanism", "scope_note": "An inspection and protocol requirement drawn from safeguards and enclosure studies, not a reported break of a deployed AI verifier.", "related_finding": null, "description": "Johnston argues that a seal is no better than the protocols for using it, and that inspectors are usually given little useful information on how to detect tampering. The Sandia survey notes that larger enclosures are hard to inspect fully and that sensor data must be authenticated.", "response": null, "sources": [ "S-1318", "S-1316" ], "record": "M-0017", "represented_by": [] }, { "n": 3, "historical": false, "title": "Attack classes outside published models", "classification": "failure", "kind": "open-question", "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": "mechanism", "scope_note": "The radio compensation result is emulated using measured channel data under a known-reference attacker model. It is not a physical bypass demonstration against an AI verifier enclosure.", "related_finding": null, "description": "The authors of the batteryless cover say they cannot assess chemical-solvent attacks, which exceed their expertise, and deem cover removal impractical. Anti-Tamper Radio's reference can drift as the environment or measurement system ages; the authors suggest gradually renewing the reference. A 2025 follow-up by some of the same authors shows, by emulation on measured channel data, that an attacker who knows the reference channel and the needle's effect on it could inject a signal that cancels the change caused by a needle insertion. It proposes a reconfigurable intelligent surface that randomizes the channel as a countermeasure.", "response": null, "sources": [ "S-1315", "S-0052", "S-3261" ], "record": "M-0017", "represented_by": [] } ], "filter_issues": [] } ], "strengths": { "covered": [], "production": [], "operationalUse": [], "adversarial": [ "M-0017" ], "noNewHardware": [ "M-0023" ], "mitigated": [], "notCounted": [] }, "properties": { "covered": [], "production": [], "operationalUse": [], "adversarial": [ "M-0017" ], "noNewHardware": [ "M-0023" ], "mitigated": [], "notCounted": [] }, "attack_testing": [ { "id": "M-0023", "record": "M-0023", "evaluation": "analysis", "in_setting": true } ], "selected_implementations": { "M-0017": "I-0011" }, "weaknesses": { "gaps": [], "excluded": [], "unlinked": [], "critical": [], "significant": [ { "mech": "M-0023", "n": 4, "historical": false, "title": "Components outside the attested boundary", "classification": "failure", "kind": "theoretical-argument", "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": null, "scope_note": null, "related_finding": null, "description": "In the proof-of-guardrail experiments, the guardrail model and the agent's backend model were both reached through external APIs, and the authors leave the decision to trust those APIs to the verifier. The measured wrapper must also have no vulnerability that lets the unmeasured agent bypass the guardrail, for example by executing arbitrary commands inside the enclave. The code's README states that the enclave does not currently restrict the agent's arbitrary command execution, which could be used to bypass guardrails.", "response": null, "sources": [ "S-1500", "S-1501" ] }, { "mech": "M-0023", "n": 5, "historical": false, "title": "Memory-bus interposition extracts attestation keys and forges attestations", "classification": "failure", "kind": "demonstrated-attack", "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": "inherited", "scope_note": "Applies to variants using the affected Intel or AMD trust roots. PAL*M excludes physical attacks. A TDX-backed safeguard claim against a physical host attacker would be defeated, but these studies do not demonstrate a break of the AWS Nitro proof-of-guardrail prototype or of verifier-side recomputation.", "related_finding": { "record": "M-0008", "flaw": 1 }, "description": "The TEE findings cover DDR5 attacks on Intel TDX, the H100 relay demonstration, DDR4 attacks on AMD SEV-SNP, and software-only SEV-SNP forgery before AMD's fixes. These are inherited hardware limits; a governance analysis explains why physical access matters in a treaty setting.", "response": "Intel and AMD place the physical attack class outside their threat models, according to the researchers. AMD reports firmware fixes for RMPocalypse.", "sources": [ "S-1202", "S-3126", "S-1210", "S-1212", "S-1213", "S-0012", "S-0014", "S-1500", "S-0018" ], "helps": [ { "by": "M-0009", "how": "A tamper-protected enclosure around the chip is the proposed answer when the party that holds the hardware may attack it physically." } ] }, { "mech": "M-0017", "n": 3, "historical": false, "title": "A recomputation family degrades against prompt-controlling adversaries", "classification": "failure", "kind": "demonstrated-attack", "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": null, "scope_note": null, "related_finding": null, "description": "The plan's companion page names DiFR among the recomputation schemes being tested. An independent study found that Gumbel-based inference verification, the family that includes Token-DiFR, leaks roughly twice as many bits per token when the adversary chooses prompts that disrupt the text's structure, across six models of 1 to 32 billion parameters. The slowdown it imposes on a hidden-signalling adversary falls from 146–254 times under benign prompts to 60–118 times. The attack weakens the bound on hidden information in outputs, which the plan relies on to keep undeclared results from leaving.", "response": null, "sources": [ "S-1511", "S-0015", "S-1507", "S-0067" ], "record": "I-0011" } ], "criticalMechanisms": [], "significantMechanisms": [ "M-0023", "M-0017" ], "familyContext": [ { "id": "M-0017", "implementation": "I-0011", "flaws": [ { "n": 1, "historical": false, "title": "Seals are often defeated with simple methods", "classification": "failure", "kind": "demonstrated-attack", "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": "mechanism", "scope_note": "Published defeats of general security seals. They warn about proposed verifier-device seals, but do not demonstrate defeat of an AI verification enclosure or sensor.", "related_finding": null, "description": "In 1996 a Los Alamos vulnerability assessment defeated all 94 security seals it examined, with 132 defeats in total, using rapid, inexpensive, low-tech methods. It found that seal cost did not predict security. In 2001 Johnston reported that high-tech seals are often easier to defeat than low-tech ones.", "response": null, "sources": [ "S-1317", "S-1318" ], "record": "M-0017", "represented_by": [] }, { "n": 2, "historical": false, "title": "Security depends on inspection protocols", "classification": "scope-limitation", "kind": "theoretical-argument", "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": "mechanism", "scope_note": "An inspection and protocol requirement drawn from safeguards and enclosure studies, not a reported break of a deployed AI verifier.", "related_finding": null, "description": "Johnston argues that a seal is no better than the protocols for using it, and that inspectors are usually given little useful information on how to detect tampering. The Sandia survey notes that larger enclosures are hard to inspect fully and that sensor data must be authenticated.", "response": null, "sources": [ "S-1318", "S-1316" ], "record": "M-0017", "represented_by": [] }, { "n": 3, "historical": false, "title": "Attack classes outside published models", "classification": "failure", "kind": "open-question", "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": "mechanism", "scope_note": "The radio compensation result is emulated using measured channel data under a known-reference attacker model. It is not a physical bypass demonstration against an AI verifier enclosure.", "related_finding": null, "description": "The authors of the batteryless cover say they cannot assess chemical-solvent attacks, which exceed their expertise, and deem cover removal impractical. Anti-Tamper Radio's reference can drift as the environment or measurement system ages; the authors suggest gradually renewing the reference. A 2025 follow-up by some of the same authors shows, by emulation on measured channel data, that an attacker who knows the reference channel and the needle's effect on it could inject a signal that cancels the change caused by a needle insertion. It proposes a reconfigurable intelligent surface that randomizes the channel as a countermeasure.", "response": null, "sources": [ "S-1315", "S-0052", "S-3261" ], "record": "M-0017", "represented_by": [] } ] } ], "scopeLimitations": [ { "mech": "M-0023", "n": 1, "historical": false, "title": "Attestation shows a safeguard ran, not that it is effective", "classification": "scope-limitation", "kind": "theoretical-argument", "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": null, "scope_note": null, "related_finding": null, "description": "Proof of guardrail ensures that the guardrail executed, but the guardrail can still err or be jailbroken. Because the guardrail must be open source, a malicious developer can attack it with jailbreaks while still presenting a valid proof. In the authors' evaluation, Llama Guard 3 reached an F1 score of 0.56 on the unsafe class of the ToxicChat dataset. The authors state that proof of guardrail should not be interpreted or advertised as proof of safety.", "response": null, "sources": [ "S-1500" ] }, { "mech": "M-0023", "n": 2, "historical": false, "title": "Selective attestation leaves traffic uncovered", "classification": "scope-limitation", "kind": "theoretical-argument", "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": null, "scope_note": null, "related_finding": null, "description": "Attestations are issued per response. In the prototype, the agent offers them when it receives high-stakes questions, so nothing shows that unattested traffic went through the same path. PAL*M's authors note that a prover could cherry-pick favourable executions, and suggest verifier-published nonces or requesting only session-level proofs. A governance analysis notes that auditors also need assurance that all activity is accounted for, since a host could start a second confidential virtual machine that bypasses monitoring.", "response": null, "sources": [ "S-1500", "S-0012", "S-0014" ], "helps": [ { "by": "M-0010", "how": "On-chip counters are a proposed route to evidence about everything a chip runs, including a second virtual machine that skips the safeguard." } ] }, { "mech": "M-0023", "n": 3, "historical": false, "title": "Measurements may omit behaviour-relevant configuration or runtime changes", "classification": "scope-limitation", "kind": "theoretical-argument", "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": null, "scope_note": null, "related_finding": null, "description": "Every component that influences inference behaviour must be covered by the launch measurement, including feature flags, environment variables and invocation arguments. A launch measurement also does not show that a program keeps running as measured if the kernel is later compromised.", "response": null, "sources": [ "S-0014" ] }, { "mech": "M-0017", "n": 1, "historical": false, "title": "The recomputation server must be trusted", "classification": "scope-limitation", "kind": "theoretical-argument", "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": null, "scope_note": null, "related_finding": null, "description": "The plan calls the integrity of the recomputation server an extremely important aspect, and its argument that sampling verifies all outputs assumes that the server's computations and outputs can be trusted. The companion page notes that the server sits inside the prover's facility, possibly under the prover's physical control, and that hardening it against integrity attacks needs significant research. Amodo rates recomputation-server security as not on track.", "response": null, "sources": [ "S-0067", "S-1511", "S-1008" ], "record": "I-0011" }, { "mech": "M-0017", "n": 2, "historical": false, "title": "Spare compute is not verified", "classification": "scope-limitation", "kind": "theoretical-argument", "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": null, "scope_note": null, "related_finding": null, "description": "The plan states that it does not verify that spare compute is unused for unapproved workloads, because this seems very challenging. It relies instead on side-channel bounds and memory wipes, so that the only results that persist are verified inference outputs.", "response": null, "sources": [ "S-0067" ], "record": "I-0011" } ], "openQuestions": [], "minor": 0, "minorFindings": [], "minorBy": [], "notDemonstrated": [ "M-0017" ], "newChip": [] }, "findings": [ { "mech": "M-0023", "record": "M-0023", "n": 1, "historical": false, "title": "Attestation shows a safeguard ran, not that it is effective", "classification": "scope-limitation", "kind": "theoretical-argument", "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": null, "scope_note": null, "related_finding": null, "description": "Proof of guardrail ensures that the guardrail executed, but the guardrail can still err or be jailbroken. Because the guardrail must be open source, a malicious developer can attack it with jailbreaks while still presenting a valid proof. In the authors' evaluation, Llama Guard 3 reached an F1 score of 0.56 on the unsafe class of the ToxicChat dataset. The authors state that proof of guardrail should not be interpreted or advertised as proof of safety.", "response": null, "sources": [ "S-1500" ] }, { "mech": "M-0023", "record": "M-0023", "n": 2, "historical": false, "title": "Selective attestation leaves traffic uncovered", "classification": "scope-limitation", "kind": "theoretical-argument", "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": null, "scope_note": null, "related_finding": null, "description": "Attestations are issued per response. In the prototype, the agent offers them when it receives high-stakes questions, so nothing shows that unattested traffic went through the same path. PAL*M's authors note that a prover could cherry-pick favourable executions, and suggest verifier-published nonces or requesting only session-level proofs. A governance analysis notes that auditors also need assurance that all activity is accounted for, since a host could start a second confidential virtual machine that bypasses monitoring.", "response": null, "sources": [ "S-1500", "S-0012", "S-0014" ], "helps": [ { "by": "M-0010", "how": "On-chip counters are a proposed route to evidence about everything a chip runs, including a second virtual machine that skips the safeguard." } ] }, { "mech": "M-0023", "record": "M-0023", "n": 3, "historical": false, "title": "Measurements may omit behaviour-relevant configuration or runtime changes", "classification": "scope-limitation", "kind": "theoretical-argument", "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": null, "scope_note": null, "related_finding": null, "description": "Every component that influences inference behaviour must be covered by the launch measurement, including feature flags, environment variables and invocation arguments. A launch measurement also does not show that a program keeps running as measured if the kernel is later compromised.", "response": null, "sources": [ "S-0014" ] }, { "mech": "M-0023", "record": "M-0023", "n": 4, "historical": false, "title": "Components outside the attested boundary", "classification": "failure", "kind": "theoretical-argument", "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": null, "scope_note": null, "related_finding": null, "description": "In the proof-of-guardrail experiments, the guardrail model and the agent's backend model were both reached through external APIs, and the authors leave the decision to trust those APIs to the verifier. The measured wrapper must also have no vulnerability that lets the unmeasured agent bypass the guardrail, for example by executing arbitrary commands inside the enclave. The code's README states that the enclave does not currently restrict the agent's arbitrary command execution, which could be used to bypass guardrails.", "response": null, "sources": [ "S-1500", "S-1501" ] }, { "mech": "M-0023", "record": "M-0023", "n": 5, "historical": false, "title": "Memory-bus interposition extracts attestation keys and forges attestations", "classification": "failure", "kind": "demonstrated-attack", "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": "inherited", "scope_note": "Applies to variants using the affected Intel or AMD trust roots. PAL*M excludes physical attacks. A TDX-backed safeguard claim against a physical host attacker would be defeated, but these studies do not demonstrate a break of the AWS Nitro proof-of-guardrail prototype or of verifier-side recomputation.", "related_finding": { "record": "M-0008", "flaw": 1 }, "description": "The TEE findings cover DDR5 attacks on Intel TDX, the H100 relay demonstration, DDR4 attacks on AMD SEV-SNP, and software-only SEV-SNP forgery before AMD's fixes. These are inherited hardware limits; a governance analysis explains why physical access matters in a treaty setting.", "response": "Intel and AMD place the physical attack class outside their threat models, according to the researchers. AMD reports firmware fixes for RMPocalypse.", "sources": [ "S-1202", "S-3126", "S-1210", "S-1212", "S-1213", "S-0012", "S-0014", "S-1500", "S-0018" ], "helps": [ { "by": "M-0009", "how": "A tamper-protected enclosure around the chip is the proposed answer when the party that holds the hardware may attack it physically." } ] }, { "mech": "M-0017", "record": "I-0011", "n": 1, "historical": false, "title": "The recomputation server must be trusted", "classification": "scope-limitation", "kind": "theoretical-argument", "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": null, "scope_note": null, "related_finding": null, "description": "The plan calls the integrity of the recomputation server an extremely important aspect, and its argument that sampling verifies all outputs assumes that the server's computations and outputs can be trusted. The companion page notes that the server sits inside the prover's facility, possibly under the prover's physical control, and that hardening it against integrity attacks needs significant research. Amodo rates recomputation-server security as not on track.", "response": null, "sources": [ "S-0067", "S-1511", "S-1008" ] }, { "mech": "M-0017", "record": "I-0011", "n": 2, "historical": false, "title": "Spare compute is not verified", "classification": "scope-limitation", "kind": "theoretical-argument", "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": null, "scope_note": null, "related_finding": null, "description": "The plan states that it does not verify that spare compute is unused for unapproved workloads, because this seems very challenging. It relies instead on side-channel bounds and memory wipes, so that the only results that persist are verified inference outputs.", "response": null, "sources": [ "S-0067" ] }, { "mech": "M-0017", "record": "I-0011", "n": 3, "historical": false, "title": "A recomputation family degrades against prompt-controlling adversaries", "classification": "failure", "kind": "demonstrated-attack", "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": null, "scope_note": null, "related_finding": null, "description": "The plan's companion page names DiFR among the recomputation schemes being tested. An independent study found that Gumbel-based inference verification, the family that includes Token-DiFR, leaks roughly twice as many bits per token when the adversary chooses prompts that disrupt the text's structure, across six models of 1 to 32 billion parameters. The slowdown it imposes on a hidden-signalling adversary falls from 146–254 times under benign prompts to 60–118 times. The attack weakens the bound on hidden information in outputs, which the plan relies on to keep undeclared results from leaving.", "response": null, "sources": [ "S-1511", "S-0015", "S-1507", "S-0067" ] } ], "possible_additions": [ { "id": "M-0009", "title": "Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors", "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/", "readiness": "R1", "development_status": { "code": "R1", "label": "Proposed", "short": "Proposed", "rank": 1, "legacy_code": "R1" }, "security_evidence": { "attack_testing": { "status": "analysis", "label": "Published security analysis", "kind": "analysis" }, "independent_evaluation": { "status": "unassessed" }, "formal_proof": { "status": "unassessed" }, "deployment_assurance": { "status": "unassessed" }, "legacy_evaluation_code": null, "scoped_findings": [ { "n": 1, "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": "unassessed", "sources": [ "S-1204", "S-0057" ] }, { "n": 2, "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": "unassessed", "sources": [ "S-1204" ] }, { "n": 4, "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": "unassessed", "sources": [ "S-1204" ] } ], "open_failures": { "critical": 0, "significant": 3, "minor": 0 } }, "fits_filters": true, "filter_issues": [], "reasons": [ { "kind": "flaw", "mech": "M-0023", "n": 5, "title": "Memory-bus interposition extracts attestation keys and forges attestations", "severity": "significant", "how": "A tamper-protected enclosure around the chip is the proposed answer when the party that holds the hardware may attack it physically." } ] }, { "id": "M-0012", "title": "Hardware-attested weight binding", "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/model-identity-attestation/", "readiness": "R3", "development_status": { "code": "R3", "label": "Operational use", "short": "Operational use", "rank": 3, "legacy_code": "R3" }, "security_evidence": { "attack_testing": { "status": "independent-red-team", "label": "Published attack testing", "kind": "practical", "attribution": "Independent team" }, "independent_evaluation": { "status": "unassessed" }, "formal_proof": { "status": "unassessed" }, "deployment_assurance": { "status": "unassessed" }, "legacy_evaluation_code": null, "scoped_findings": [ { "n": 1, "severity": "critical", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": "inherited", "sources": [ "S-1202", "S-1210", "S-1212", "S-1213", "S-1206", "S-0012" ], "related_finding": { "record": "M-0008", "flaw": 1 } }, { "n": 2, "severity": "significant", "status": "mitigated", "evidence_scope": "unassessed", "sources": [ "S-0013", "S-0014" ] } ], "open_failures": { "critical": 1, "significant": 0, "minor": 0 } }, "fits_filters": true, "filter_issues": [], "reasons": [ { "kind": "blocker", "mech": "M-0023", "text": "Safeguard evidence must be bound to the model actually served, which depends on model-identity attestation." } ] }, { "id": "M-0008", "title": "TEE remote attestation for AI workloads", "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/tee-remote-attestation/", "readiness": "R3", "development_status": { "code": "R3", "label": "Operational use", "short": "Operational use", "rank": 3, "legacy_code": "R3" }, "security_evidence": { "attack_testing": { "status": "independent-red-team", "label": "Published attack testing", "kind": "practical", "attribution": "Independent team" }, "independent_evaluation": { "status": "unassessed" }, "formal_proof": { "status": "unassessed" }, "deployment_assurance": { "status": "unassessed" }, "legacy_evaluation_code": null, "scoped_findings": [ { "n": 1, "severity": "critical", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": "mechanism", "sources": [ "S-1202", "S-3126", "S-0012", "S-1206", "S-0014", "S-1210", "S-1212", "S-3127" ] }, { "n": 2, "severity": "critical", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": "mechanism", "sources": [ "S-1210", "S-1211" ] }, { "n": 3, "severity": "critical", "status": "mitigated", "evidence_scope": "mechanism", "sources": [ "S-1212", "S-1213", "S-3127", "S-3128" ] }, { "n": 4, "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": "mechanism", "sources": [ "S-1202" ] }, { "n": 5, "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": "mechanism", "sources": [ "S-0012", "S-0009", "S-0014", "S-3123", "S-3129" ] }, { "n": 8, "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": "mechanism", "sources": [ "S-0014", "S-0009", "S-3130", "S-3131" ] } ], "open_failures": { "critical": 2, "significant": 3, "minor": 0 } }, "fits_filters": true, "filter_issues": [], "reasons": [ { "kind": "blocker", "mech": "M-0023", "text": "Frontier model inference typically needs several GPUs, GPU confidential computing is less mature than CPU support, and CPU inference, which an enclave prototype had to use, ran about 100 times slower than GPU inference." }, { "kind": "blocker", "mech": "M-0023", "text": "Trust rests on a small number of hardware vendors, and a per-CPU Intel attestation key has been extracted by physical attack." } ] }, { "id": "M-0015", "title": "Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure", "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/memory-wiping-and-secure-erasure/", "readiness": "R1", "development_status": { "code": "R1", "label": "Proposed", "short": "Proposed", "rank": 1, "legacy_code": "R1" }, "security_evidence": { "attack_testing": { "status": "analysis", "label": "Published security analysis", "kind": "analysis" }, "independent_evaluation": { "status": "unassessed" }, "formal_proof": { "status": "unassessed" }, "deployment_assurance": { "status": "unassessed" }, "legacy_evaluation_code": null, "scoped_findings": [ { "n": 2, "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": "unassessed", "sources": [ "S-0032", "S-0018" ] } ], "open_failures": { "critical": 0, "significant": 1, "minor": 0 } }, "fits_filters": true, "filter_issues": [], "reasons": [ { "kind": "blocker", "mech": "M-0017", "text": "Memory wiping may use existing algorithms, but hardware testing is at an early stage." } ] }, { "id": "M-0013", "title": "Network taps and certifiers", "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/network-taps-and-certifiers/", "readiness": "R1", "development_status": { "code": "R1", "label": "Proposed", "short": "Proposed", "rank": 1, "legacy_code": "R1" }, "security_evidence": { "attack_testing": { "status": "analysis", "label": "Published security analysis", "kind": "analysis" }, "independent_evaluation": { "status": "unassessed" }, "formal_proof": { "status": "unassessed" }, "deployment_assurance": { "status": "unassessed" }, "legacy_evaluation_code": null, "scoped_findings": [ { "n": 1, "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": "unassessed", "sources": [ "S-1300", "S-1507" ] }, { "n": 4, "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": "unassessed", "sources": [ "S-1312" ] }, { "n": 6, "severity": "minor", "status": "mitigated", "evidence_scope": "unassessed", "sources": [ "S-1300" ] } ], "open_failures": { "critical": 0, "significant": 2, "minor": 0 } }, "fits_filters": true, "filter_issues": [], "reasons": [ { "kind": "blocker", "mech": "M-0017", "text": "Passive optical taps work at 400G, but the 800G and 1600G line rates now arriving in data centres are undemonstrated." } ] }, { "id": "M-0022", "title": "Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities", "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/side-channel-suppression/", "readiness": "R1", "development_status": { "code": "R1", "label": "Proposed", "short": "Proposed", "rank": 1, "legacy_code": "R1" }, "security_evidence": { "attack_testing": { "status": "analysis", "label": "Published security analysis", "kind": "analysis" }, "independent_evaluation": { "status": "unassessed" }, "formal_proof": { "status": "unassessed" }, "deployment_assurance": { "status": "unassessed" }, "legacy_evaluation_code": null, "scoped_findings": [], "open_failures": { "critical": 0, "significant": 0, "minor": 0 } }, "fits_filters": true, "filter_issues": [], "reasons": [ { "kind": "blocker", "mech": "M-0017", "text": "There is no plan yet for quickly scaling side-channel defences on a frontier cluster; only early theoretical pieces exist." } ] }, { "id": "M-0003", "title": "Whole-workload recomputation (reproducible packets)", "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/reproducible-computation-packets/", "readiness": "R1", "development_status": { "code": "R1", "label": "Proposed", "short": "Proposed", "rank": 1, "legacy_code": "R1" }, "security_evidence": { "attack_testing": { "status": "none", "label": "No published adversarial analysis recorded", "kind": "none" }, "independent_evaluation": { "status": "unassessed" }, "formal_proof": { "status": "unassessed" }, "deployment_assurance": { "status": "unassessed" }, "legacy_evaluation_code": null, "scoped_findings": [], "open_failures": { "critical": 0, "significant": 0, "minor": 0 } }, "fits_filters": true, "filter_issues": [], "reasons": [ { "kind": "blocker", "mech": "M-0017", "text": "A fully reproducible inference stack needs substantial software and tooling, and per-packet network reproducibility may need considerable software, firmware and possibly hardware work." } ] }, { "id": "M-0001", "title": "Sampled inference recomputation", "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/sampled-inference-recomputation/", "readiness": "R3", "development_status": { "code": "R3", "label": "Operational use", "short": "Operational use", "rank": 3, "legacy_code": "R3" }, "security_evidence": { "attack_testing": { "status": "analysis", "label": "Published security analysis", "kind": "analysis" }, "independent_evaluation": { "status": "unassessed" }, "formal_proof": { "status": "unassessed" }, "deployment_assurance": { "status": "unassessed" }, "legacy_evaluation_code": null, "scoped_findings": [ { "n": 1, "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": "unassessed", "sources": [ "S-0020", "S-0015", "S-1507" ] }, { "n": 3, "severity": "significant", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": "unassessed", "sources": [ "S-1000", "S-0016" ] }, { "n": 4, "severity": "minor", "status": "open", "evidence_scope": "unassessed", "sources": [ "S-0016" ] } ], "open_failures": { "critical": 0, "significant": 2, "minor": 1 } }, "fits_filters": true, "filter_issues": [], "reasons": [ { "kind": "prerequisite", "mech": "M-0017" } ] } ], "goal": null, "design": null, "dependencies": { "prerequisites": [ { "id": "M-0008", "neededBy": [ "M-0023" ] }, { "id": "M-0012", "neededBy": [ "M-0023" ] }, { "id": "M-0001", "neededBy": [ "M-0017" ] }, { "id": "M-0003", "neededBy": [ "M-0017" ] } ], "shared": [], "blockers": [ { "mech": "M-0023", "n": 1, "historical": false, "text": "No published design shows that all of a provider's traffic passes through the attested safeguard path; current evidence covers individual attested responses.", "theme": "coverage-hidden-compute", "blocked_by": null, "sources": [ "S-1500", "S-0014" ], "inProposal": null }, { "mech": "M-0023", "n": 2, "historical": false, "text": "Frontier model inference typically needs several GPUs, GPU confidential computing is less mature than CPU support, and CPU inference, which an enclave prototype had to use, ran about 100 times slower than GPU inference.", "theme": "performance-compatibility", "blocked_by": "M-0008", "sources": [ "S-0014", "S-0009" ], "inProposal": false }, { "mech": "M-0023", "n": 3, "historical": false, "text": "Trust rests on a small number of hardware vendors, and a per-CPU Intel attestation key has been extracted by physical attack.", "theme": "hardware-trust", "blocked_by": "M-0008", "sources": [ "S-0014", "S-1202" ], "inProposal": false }, { "mech": "M-0023", "n": 4, "historical": false, "text": "Safeguard evidence must be bound to the model actually served, which depends on model-identity attestation.", "theme": "evidence-binding", "blocked_by": "M-0012", "sources": [ "S-0009", "S-0013" ], "inProposal": false }, { "mech": "M-0023", "n": 5, "historical": false, "text": "No independent red-team or audit of a safeguard-attestation system has been published, and the available prototypes are described by their authors as proofs of concept that have not been stress-tested by a counterparty.", "theme": "adversarial-validation", "blocked_by": null, "sources": [ "S-1501", "S-1504" ], "inProposal": null }, { "mech": "M-0017", "n": 1, "historical": false, "text": "A fully reproducible inference stack needs substantial software and tooling, and per-packet network reproducibility may need considerable software, firmware and possibly hardware work.", "theme": "performance-compatibility", "blocked_by": "M-0003", "sources": [ "S-1511" ], "inProposal": false }, { "mech": "M-0017", "n": 2, "historical": false, "text": "Passive optical taps work at 400G, but the 800G and 1600G line rates now arriving in data centres are undemonstrated.", "theme": "performance-compatibility", "blocked_by": "M-0013", "sources": [ "S-1511" ], "inProposal": false }, { "mech": "M-0017", "n": 3, "historical": false, "text": "Checking that taps are correctly installed and stay in place at scale is not a solved problem, and hardening the recomputation server inside the prover's facility needs significant research.", "theme": "hardware-trust", "blocked_by": "M-0017", "sources": [ "S-1511", "S-1008" ], "inProposal": true }, { "mech": "M-0017", "n": 4, "historical": false, "text": "There is no plan yet for quickly scaling side-channel defences on a frontier cluster; only early theoretical pieces exist.", "theme": "coverage-hidden-compute", "blocked_by": "M-0022", "sources": [ "S-1511" ], "inProposal": false }, { "mech": "M-0017", "n": 5, "historical": false, "text": "Memory wiping may use existing algorithms, but hardware testing is at an early stage.", "theme": "coverage-hidden-compute", "blocked_by": "M-0015", "sources": [ "S-1511" ], "inProposal": false }, { "mech": "M-0017", "n": 6, "historical": false, "text": "Robust red-teaming of recomputation schemes has not started, and most algorithm development remains academic.", "theme": "adversarial-validation", "blocked_by": null, "sources": [ "S-1511", "S-1008" ], "inProposal": null } ] }, "exposure": { "weights": { "shown": [], "partial": [ "M-0023" ], "hidden": [], "none": [], "unknown": [ "M-0017" ] }, "io": { "shown": [], "partial": [ "M-0023" ], "hidden": [], "none": [], "unknown": [ "M-0017" ] }, "training": { "shown": [], "partial": [], "hidden": [], "none": [ "M-0023" ], "unknown": [ "M-0017" ] } }, "implementations": [ { "mechanism": "M-0023", "selected": null, "implementations": [] }, { "mechanism": "M-0017", "selected": { "id": "I-0011", "title": "AI 2040 inference-only verification stack", "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/ai-2040-inference-only-verification-plan/" }, "implementations": [ { "id": "I-0011", "title": "AI 2040 inference-only verification stack", "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/ai-2040-inference-only-verification-plan/" } ] } ], "sources": [ { "id": "S-1500", "title": "Proof-of-Guardrail in AI Agents and What (Not) to Trust from It", "authors": "X. Jin et al.", "year": 2026, "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.05786", "path": "/sources/jin-proof-of-guardrail/" }, { "id": "S-1501", "title": "Verifiable-ClawGuard: proof-of-guardrail reference code", "authors": "SaharaLabsAI", "year": 2026, "url": "https://github.com/SaharaLabsAI/Verifiable-ClawGuard", "path": "/sources/sahara-verifiable-clawguard-code/" }, { "id": "S-3362", "title": "Safety Without Compromising on Privacy", "authors": "D. McCann-Sayles et al.", "year": 2026, "url": "https://tinfoil.sh/blog/2026-09-14-safety-without-compromising-privacy", "path": "/sources/tinfoil-safety-without-compromising-privacy/" }, { "id": "S-0012", "title": "PAL*M: Property Attestation for Large Generative Models", "authors": "P. Chantasantitam et al.", "year": 2026, "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.16199", "path": "/sources/chantasantitam-palm/" }, { "id": "S-1503", "title": "Enabling Verifiably-Scoped Monitoring through Large Language Models and Trusted Compute", "authors": "B. Penchas et al.", "year": 2026, "url": "https://icml.cc/virtual/2026/78630", "path": "/sources/penchas-verifiably-scoped-monitoring/" }, { "id": "S-1504", "title": "Auditor-in-a-Box: Tools for Third-Party Auditing", "authors": "R. Rinberg & B. Penchas", "year": 2026, "url": "https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/uWYk7MM9hAf9GEbGe/auditor-in-a-box-tools-for-third-party-auditing", "path": "/sources/rinberg-auditor-in-a-box/" }, { "id": "S-1202", "title": "TEE.fail: Breaking Trusted Execution Environments via DDR5 Memory Bus Interposition", "authors": "J. Chuang et al.", "year": 2026, "url": "https://tee.fail/", "path": "/sources/chuang-tee-fail/" }, { "id": "S-3126", "title": "DDRop: Active Memory Interposer Attacks on Confidential VMs by Dropping DDR5 Writes", "authors": "J. De Meulemeester et al.", "year": 2026, "url": "https://ddropattack.eu/", "path": "/sources/de-meulemeester-ddrop/" }, { "id": "S-0014", "title": "On TEEs for Privacy-Preserving Monitoring in AI Governance", "authors": "Gloria Z", "year": 2026, "url": "https://techgov.intelligence.org/blog/on-tees-for-privacy-preserving-monitoring-in-ai-governance", "path": "/sources/zhao-tees-privacy-preserving-monitoring/" }, { "id": "S-1210", "title": "Battering RAM: Low-Cost Interposer Attacks on Confidential Computing via Dynamic Memory Aliasing", "authors": "J. De Meulemeester et al.", "year": 2026, "url": "https://batteringram.eu/", "path": "/sources/de-meulemeester-battering-ram/" }, { "id": "S-1212", "title": "RMPocalypse: How a Catch-22 Breaks AMD SEV-SNP", "authors": "B. Schlüter & S. Shinde", "year": 2025, "url": "https://rmpocalypse.github.io/", "path": "/sources/schluter-rmpocalypse/" }, { "id": "S-1213", "title": "SEV-SNP RMP Initialization Vulnerability (AMD-SB-3020)", "authors": "AMD", "year": 2025, "url": "https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-3020.html", "path": "/sources/amd-sb-3020-rmp-initialization/" }, { "id": "S-0018", "title": "A System Overview for Near-Term, Low-Trust AI Compute Verification", "authors": "N. Cankaya", "year": 2026, "url": "https://intelligence.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/A-system-overview-for-near-term-low-trust-AI-compute-verification.pdf", "path": "/sources/cankaya-system-overview-low-trust-compute-verification/" }, { "id": "S-0067", "title": "Verification Plan", "authors": "R. Dean", "year": 2026, "url": "https://ai-2040.com/supplements/verification-plan", "path": "/sources/dean-verification-plan/" }, { "id": "S-1511", "title": "Get Involved in Verification", "authors": "AI Futures Project", "year": 2026, "url": "https://ai-2040.com/supplements/verification-plan/get-involved", "path": "/sources/ai-futures-get-involved-verification/" }, { "id": "S-1512", "title": "Verifying international AI deals: Plan A, the state-of-play, and what you can do to help", "authors": "T. Milton et al.", "year": 2026, "url": "https://amodo.substack.com/p/verifying-international-ai-deals", "path": "/sources/milton-verifying-international-ai-deals/" }, { "id": "S-1008", "title": "AI 2040 Plan A — Verification SITREP", "authors": "Amodo Design", "year": 2026, "url": "https://amododesign.com/ai-verification/plan-a-sitrep/", "path": "/sources/amodo-plan-a-verification-sitrep/" }, { "id": "S-1312", "title": "Fitting a Network TAP to our Inference Verification Prototype", "authors": "Amodo Design", "year": 2026, "url": "https://amododesign.com/notes/2026-09-15-network-tap-inference-verification/", "path": "/sources/amodo-network-tap-inference-verification-prototype/" }, { "id": "S-0015", "title": "Verifying LLM Inference to Detect Model Weight Exfiltration", "authors": "R. Rinberg et al.", "year": 2025, "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.02620", "path": "/sources/rinberg-verifying-llm-inference-weight-exfiltration/" }, { "id": "S-1507", "title": "Adversarial Entropy Inflation Against Gumbel-Based Inference Verification", "authors": "N. Kezins", "year": 2026, "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.23375", "path": "/sources/kezins-adversarial-entropy-inflation/" }, { "id": "S-1317", "title": "Physical Security and Tamper-Indicating Devices", "authors": "R. G. Johnston & A. R. E. Garcia", "year": 1996, "url": "https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/459707", "path": "/sources/johnston-physical-security-tamper-indicating-devices/" }, { "id": "S-1318", "title": "Tamper Detection for Safeguards and Treaty Monitoring: Fantasies, Realities, and Potentials", "authors": "R. G. Johnston", "year": 2001, "url": "https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/81john.pdf", "path": "/sources/johnston-tamper-detection-safeguards-treaty-monitoring/" }, { "id": "S-1316", "title": "Tamper-Indicating Enclosures, A Current Survey", "authors": "H. A. Smartt & Z. N. Gastelum", "year": 2015, "url": "https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1256541", "path": "/sources/smartt-tamper-indicating-enclosures-survey/" }, { "id": "S-1315", "title": "Secure Physical Enclosures from Covers with Tamper-Resistance", "authors": "V. Immler et al.", "year": 2019, "url": "https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/7334", "path": "/sources/immler-secure-physical-enclosures-covers/" }, { "id": "S-0052", "title": "Anti-Tamper Radio: System-Level Tamper Detection for Computing Systems", "authors": "P. Staat et al.", "year": 2022, "url": "https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9833631/", "path": "/sources/staat-anti-tamper-radio/" }, { "id": "S-3261", "title": "Anti-Tamper Radio Meets Reconfigurable Intelligent Surface for System-Level Tamper Detection", "authors": "M. S. Tabar et al.", "year": 2025, "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.14279", "path": "/sources/tabar-anti-tamper-radio-ris/" }, { "id": "S-0009", "title": "Attestable Audits: Verifiable AI Safety Benchmarks Using Trusted Execution Environments", "authors": "C. Schnabl et al.", "year": 2025, "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.23706", "path": "/sources/schnabl-attestable-audits/" }, { "id": "S-0013", "title": "How Tinfoil Proves Exactly What Model Is Running", "authors": "Tinfoil Team", "year": 2026, "url": "https://tinfoil.sh/blog/2026-02-03-proving-model-identity", "path": "/sources/tinfoil-proving-model-identity/" } ] }