{
  "schema_version": "1.2",
  "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/explorer/?mechanisms=M-0018,M-0013&implementations=M-0018:I-0009",
  "data_generated": "2026-10-08",
  "definitions": {
    "methodology": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/methodology/",
    "readiness": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/readiness/",
    "filters": [
      {
        "id": "prover",
        "label": "Prover",
        "question": "How far can the party being checked be trusted?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "cooperative",
            "label": "Cooperative"
          },
          {
            "value": "semi-trusted",
            "label": "Semi-trusted"
          },
          {
            "value": "adversarial",
            "label": "Adversarial"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose threat model holds against at least this prover. Adversarial is the strongest assumption.",
        "about": "The prover is the party being checked. Semi-trusted designs rely on part of its stack: usually the chip vendor's hardware root of trust, its firmware or counters, or its supply-chain records. Adversarial designs aim to hold even if it cheats wherever the checks allow, within their stated assumptions."
      },
      {
        "id": "onsite",
        "label": "Verifier devices on site",
        "question": "May the verifier install its own hardware at the prover's sites?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "no",
            "label": "Not allowed"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Not allowed\" removes mechanisms that need a retrofit device, such as a network tap or a sealed sensor.",
        "about": "Some mechanisms need a device the verifier owns or trusts at the prover's facility, such as a network tap, a bandwidth limiter or a sealed sensor. Choose Not allowed when the setting rules that out. Inspectors are not covered."
      },
      {
        "id": "coop",
        "label": "Prover cooperation",
        "question": "How much must the prover take part?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "partial",
            "label": "Partial at most"
          },
          {
            "value": "none",
            "label": "Not required"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Partial at most\" removes mechanisms that need the prover's active participation. \"Not required\" keeps only those that work without it.",
        "about": "Required: the prover takes part, for example by logging requests, producing proofs or opening records. Partial: some access, such as installing a device. Not required: works from outside, such as satellite imagery."
      },
      {
        "id": "chips",
        "label": "Chips",
        "question": "May the proposal depend on new chip designs?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "existing",
            "label": "Existing chips only"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Existing chips only\" removes mechanisms that need changes to future chip designs.",
        "about": "New chip features take years to reach a deployed fleet and cover only chips made after they ship. Mechanisms that use shipping features, such as trusted execution environments or performance counters, stay."
      },
      {
        "id": "ready",
        "label": "Minimum readiness",
        "question": "How mature must each mechanism be?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "R1",
            "label": "R1 Proposed"
          },
          {
            "value": "R2",
            "label": "R2 Demonstrated"
          },
          {
            "value": "R3",
            "label": "R3 In production"
          },
          {
            "value": "R4",
            "label": "R4 Deployment-ready"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose readiness level is at least this one.",
        "about": "A level describes the public evidence for a mechanism's stated use, not its cost or feasibility. R3 can still have open critical flaws."
      },
      {
        "id": "tested",
        "label": "Attack testing",
        "question": "How hard has each mechanism been attacked in public?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "analysis",
            "label": "Published analysis"
          },
          {
            "value": "red-teamed",
            "label": "Red-teamed"
          },
          {
            "value": "independent-red-team",
            "label": "Independent red-team"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose strongest published attack testing is at least this.",
        "about": "The strongest published attempt to break the mechanism for its verification use: a security analysis, red-teaming by its developers or collaborators, or a red team independent of them."
      },
      {
        "id": "hide",
        "label": "Keep hidden from the verifier",
        "question": "What must the verifier never see?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "weights",
            "label": "Model weights"
          },
          {
            "value": "io",
            "label": "Inputs and outputs"
          },
          {
            "value": "training",
            "label": "Training data"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Removes mechanisms that show the asset to the verifier. Conditional or unspecified exposure stays with a note and needs checking against the privacy requirement.",
        "about": "Model weights: the checked model's parameters. Inputs and outputs: the requests a deployed model serves and its responses. Training data: what a model was trained on. Each mechanism's exposure is the editors' reading of its record: shown, depends on the design (kept, with a note), hidden, not involved, or unspecified for a selected implementation. Code and configuration are not covered yet."
      }
    ],
    "exposure": "For model weights, inputs and outputs, and training data. This is the editors' reading of each mechanism's record (its threat model, how it works and its limitations), not a field of the record. Shown: the verifier sees it. Depends: on the design or variant, or the verifier sees only samples. Hidden: the verifier sees only commitments, hashes, proofs or results. Not involved: the record does not handle it. Unspecified: the selected implementation has no asset-specific assessment here.",
    "claim_status": {
      "addressed": "A mechanism in the proposal is aimed at this claim and is not excluded by the filters.",
      "partly-addressed": "Only supporting mechanisms, or mechanisms aimed at it that the filters exclude.",
      "unaddressed": "No mechanism in the proposal addresses this claim."
    },
    "finding_scope": "Evidence scope describes where a finding was demonstrated; it does not establish applicability to every implementation in the mechanism family.",
    "claim_finding_scope": "open_critical_findings names active findings on the assessed records; open_critical_context names conditional family findings whose implementation applicability is unassessed.",
    "legacy_status": "The status field retains covered/partial/none for compatibility. It names claim links, never successful verification. Use claim_status and status_label for presentation."
  },
  "filters": {
    "prover": "",
    "onsite": "",
    "coop": "",
    "chips": "",
    "ready": "",
    "tested": "",
    "hide": []
  },
  "mechanisms_passing_filters": 25,
  "claims": [],
  "mechanisms": [
    {
      "id": "M-0018",
      "title": "Chip location verification",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-location-verification/",
      "assessment_record": {
        "id": "I-0009",
        "title": "Lucid sovereignty (location) certificates",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/lucid-location-certificates/"
      },
      "selected_implementation": {
        "id": "I-0009",
        "title": "Lucid sovereignty (location) certificates",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/lucid-location-certificates/"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "level": "R1",
        "scope": "certifying the region where an attested workload ran at a given time",
        "confidence": "medium",
        "evidence": [
          "S-1404",
          "S-1405",
          "S-1406",
          "S-1407"
        ]
      },
      "assessed_properties": {
        "threat_model": "semi-trusted",
        "hardware_requirement": "existing-features",
        "prover_cooperation": "required",
        "adversarial_evaluation": "analysis"
      },
      "claims": [],
      "exposure": {
        "weights": "unknown",
        "io": "unknown",
        "training": "unknown",
        "note": "This Explorer has no asset-specific exposure assessment for this implementation. Check its source and deployment assumptions.",
        "sources": []
      },
      "family_finding_context": [
        {
          "n": 1,
          "title": "Extracting a chip's key lets another device answer for it",
          "kind": "theoretical-argument",
          "severity": "significant",
          "status": "open",
          "evidence_scope": null,
          "scope_note": null,
          "related_finding": null,
          "description": "Ping-based protocols rely on cryptographic keys stored on the chip. Tee and Happel argue that an adversary with physical access could extract these keys and so compromise location verification. They propose GPU fingerprints as a mitigation, so far tested on 24 GPUs. Brass and Aarne assume the keys are stored securely, for example in a TPM.",
          "response": null,
          "sources": [
            "S-1403",
            "S-1400"
          ],
          "record": "M-0018",
          "represented_by": []
        },
        {
          "n": 2,
          "title": "Added delay can shift an estimated position",
          "kind": "demonstrated-attack",
          "severity": "significant",
          "status": "open",
          "evidence_scope": null,
          "scope_note": null,
          "related_finding": null,
          "description": "Brass and Aarne cite internet-geolocation research in which artificially increased round-trip times moved the estimated location by up to 1,000 km, with a 74% chance of avoiding detection. Avellar and Grunewald list inflated ping times from circuitous routing as an evasion route. Added delay only loosens a distance bound, and Brass and Aarne propose a hard time limit as the counter: a chip that replies too slowly cannot be ruled out of a restricted location.",
          "response": null,
          "sources": [
            "S-1400",
            "S-1402"
          ],
          "record": "M-0018",
          "represented_by": []
        },
        {
          "n": 3,
          "title": "Faster-than-assumed network paths",
          "kind": "theoretical-argument",
          "severity": "significant",
          "status": "open",
          "evidence_scope": null,
          "scope_note": null,
          "related_finding": null,
          "description": "Brass and Aarne list dark fibre and other private high-speed interconnects as ways to lower measured delays artificially. They judge that leasing dark fibre would probably not be a considerable challenge for covertly or openly adversarial actors. Avellar and Grunewald note that this can make a chip appear to be somewhere else entirely. A limit set at the vacuum speed of light cannot be beaten, but it makes honest chips fail more often.",
          "response": null,
          "sources": [
            "S-1400",
            "S-1402"
          ],
          "record": "M-0018",
          "represented_by": []
        },
        {
          "n": 4,
          "title": "Compromised landmarks can falsify measurements",
          "kind": "theoretical-argument",
          "severity": "significant",
          "status": "open",
          "evidence_scope": null,
          "scope_note": null,
          "related_finding": null,
          "description": "A party that controls landmark servers can report false timing. Brass and Aarne cite research in which manipulating a third of the landmarks shifted the estimated location by about 700 km. Avellar and Grunewald note that compromised landmarks let adversaries spoof travel-time measurements directly. The draft specification asks verifiers to require anchors in diverse places, run by several independent operators.",
          "response": null,
          "sources": [
            "S-1400",
            "S-1402",
            "S-1404"
          ],
          "record": "M-0018",
          "represented_by": []
        }
      ],
      "filter_issues": []
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0013",
      "title": "Network taps and certifiers",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/network-taps-and-certifiers/",
      "assessment_record": {
        "id": "M-0013",
        "title": "Network taps and certifiers",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/network-taps-and-certifiers/"
      },
      "selected_implementation": null,
      "readiness": {
        "level": "R1",
        "scope": "committing a complete record of cluster traffic, so declared inference can be checked",
        "confidence": "medium",
        "evidence": [
          "S-1300",
          "S-0031",
          "S-0018",
          "S-0067",
          "S-1312",
          "S-1007",
          "S-1319",
          "S-1320"
        ]
      },
      "assessed_properties": {
        "threat_model": "adversarial",
        "hardware_requirement": "retrofit-device",
        "prover_cooperation": "required",
        "adversarial_evaluation": "analysis"
      },
      "claims": [],
      "exposure": {
        "weights": "partial",
        "io": "partial",
        "training": "partial",
        "note": "Only hashes leave the site; records picked for a challenge are opened for replay at a verification facility."
      },
      "family_finding_context": [],
      "filter_issues": []
    }
  ],
  "strengths": {
    "covered": [],
    "production": [],
    "adversarial": [
      "M-0013"
    ],
    "noNewHardware": [
      "M-0018"
    ],
    "mitigated": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0013",
        "n": 6,
        "title": "Verifier dictionary attacks on hashes",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "minor",
        "status": "mitigated",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Hashes of very short outputs could be brute-forced by the verifier. The paper recommends hashing at least 5 tokens together, or at least 10 if the attacker filters for likely tokens.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1300"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "notCounted": []
  },
  "properties": {
    "covered": [],
    "production": [],
    "adversarial": [
      "M-0013"
    ],
    "noNewHardware": [
      "M-0018"
    ],
    "mitigated": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0013",
        "n": 6,
        "title": "Verifier dictionary attacks on hashes",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "minor",
        "status": "mitigated",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Hashes of very short outputs could be brute-forced by the verifier. The paper recommends hashing at least 5 tokens together, or at least 10 if the attacker filters for likely tokens.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1300"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "notCounted": []
  },
  "attack_testing": [
    {
      "id": "M-0018",
      "record": "I-0009",
      "evaluation": "analysis",
      "in_setting": true
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0013",
      "record": "M-0013",
      "evaluation": "analysis",
      "in_setting": true
    }
  ],
  "selected_implementations": {
    "M-0018": "I-0009"
  },
  "weaknesses": {
    "gaps": [],
    "excluded": [],
    "unlinked": [],
    "critical": [],
    "significant": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0018",
        "n": 1,
        "title": "Physical attacks on the trusted hardware are out of scope",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "The specification places the hardware root of trust and the TEE in the trusted computing base. It assumes they resist software attacks, notes that the attacker may have physical access, and leaves sophisticated physical attacks, such as bus probing and side-channel analysis, as a residual risk. It says that future revisions may add requirements for physical tamper evidence.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1404"
        ],
        "record": "I-0009"
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0018",
        "n": 2,
        "title": "On-chip keys may be extractable",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Tee and Happel argue that ping-based location protocols backed by keys stored on the chip can be compromised if an adversary with physical access extracts those keys. In this specification, the evidence chain rests on the hardware root of trust's signed quote, whose signing key must be protected by the hardware.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1403",
          "S-1404"
        ],
        "record": "I-0009"
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0018",
        "n": 3,
        "title": "General delay and landmark attacks apply",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Attacks on delay-based location verification in general also apply. Brass and Aarne discuss adding delay, using faster paths such as dark fibre, and compromising landmarks. The specification counters anchor impersonation with a signed anchor directory. Against collusion it recommends anchors in diverse places run by several independent operators, and peer monitoring that temporarily removes anchors whose timings deviate.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1400",
          "S-1404"
        ],
        "record": "I-0009"
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0013",
        "n": 1,
        "title": "Output nondeterminism leaves covert capacity",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Hashing cannot remove information hidden in the outputs themselves. The Secure Gateway Device paper estimates that about 0.1 bit per token remains even with seed-synchronized replay checks. For a 200k-GPU inference cluster at full load (2,000 tokens per GPU per second), that is about 40 Mbit/s of covert egress, enough to move a 1 TB model in under three days. The paper names this the core remaining challenge and points to deterministic replay or active scrubbing of hardware-induced entropy. An independent study found that an adversary who chooses the prompts roughly doubles the bits leaked per token under Gumbel-based inference verification; see Bounding unexplained information in outputs.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1300",
          "S-1507"
        ],
        "helps": [
          {
            "by": "M-0002",
            "how": "Deterministic replay is one of the two remedies the flaw's source names."
          },
          {
            "by": "M-0024",
            "how": "Bounds the hidden information outputs can carry by measuring what the declared computation fails to predict."
          }
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0013",
        "n": 2,
        "title": "Some links cannot be passively tapped",
        "kind": "open-question",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Cankaya notes that copper-connected scale-up domains (for example NVL72 racks and TPU v7 cubes) are much harder to tap than fibre, and that optical budgets make passive taps impractical on 400GBASE-SR8 multimode links. Amodo found no taps advertised for 53 GBaud links as of May 2026.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0031",
          "S-1310"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0013",
        "n": 3,
        "title": "Encrypted fabrics hide plaintext from both parties",
        "kind": "open-question",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Cankaya notes that with TEE-protected sessions whose keys are ephemeral and managed inside the TEE, neither the operator nor the manufacturer can recover session keys after the session, so tapped traffic could not be opened for recomputation. For other encrypted fabrics, the operator can retain keys.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0031"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0013",
        "n": 4,
        "title": "Residual side channels in simple passive setups",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Amodo's analysis of its own tapped prototype lists unvalidated header fields, timing of permitted traffic and variation in response formatting as residual channels, and concludes that the passive tap must be replaced by an active one.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1312"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0013",
        "n": 5,
        "title": "Completeness rests on physical monitoring left out of scope",
        "kind": "open-question",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "The Secure Gateway Device paper assumes the facility is physically monitored, and states that the whole architecture depends on the device being the only communication channel. It names radio emanation, power-line signalling and thermal channels as covert channels beyond that scope.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1300"
        ],
        "helps": [
          {
            "by": "M-0022",
            "how": "Addresses the radio, power-line and thermal channels that network-level designs leave out."
          }
        ]
      }
    ],
    "criticalMechanisms": [],
    "significantMechanisms": [
      "M-0018",
      "M-0013"
    ],
    "familyContext": [
      {
        "id": "M-0018",
        "implementation": "I-0009",
        "flaws": [
          {
            "n": 1,
            "title": "Extracting a chip's key lets another device answer for it",
            "kind": "theoretical-argument",
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": null,
            "scope_note": null,
            "related_finding": null,
            "description": "Ping-based protocols rely on cryptographic keys stored on the chip. Tee and Happel argue that an adversary with physical access could extract these keys and so compromise location verification. They propose GPU fingerprints as a mitigation, so far tested on 24 GPUs. Brass and Aarne assume the keys are stored securely, for example in a TPM.",
            "response": null,
            "sources": [
              "S-1403",
              "S-1400"
            ],
            "record": "M-0018",
            "represented_by": []
          },
          {
            "n": 2,
            "title": "Added delay can shift an estimated position",
            "kind": "demonstrated-attack",
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": null,
            "scope_note": null,
            "related_finding": null,
            "description": "Brass and Aarne cite internet-geolocation research in which artificially increased round-trip times moved the estimated location by up to 1,000 km, with a 74% chance of avoiding detection. Avellar and Grunewald list inflated ping times from circuitous routing as an evasion route. Added delay only loosens a distance bound, and Brass and Aarne propose a hard time limit as the counter: a chip that replies too slowly cannot be ruled out of a restricted location.",
            "response": null,
            "sources": [
              "S-1400",
              "S-1402"
            ],
            "record": "M-0018",
            "represented_by": []
          },
          {
            "n": 3,
            "title": "Faster-than-assumed network paths",
            "kind": "theoretical-argument",
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": null,
            "scope_note": null,
            "related_finding": null,
            "description": "Brass and Aarne list dark fibre and other private high-speed interconnects as ways to lower measured delays artificially. They judge that leasing dark fibre would probably not be a considerable challenge for covertly or openly adversarial actors. Avellar and Grunewald note that this can make a chip appear to be somewhere else entirely. A limit set at the vacuum speed of light cannot be beaten, but it makes honest chips fail more often.",
            "response": null,
            "sources": [
              "S-1400",
              "S-1402"
            ],
            "record": "M-0018",
            "represented_by": []
          },
          {
            "n": 4,
            "title": "Compromised landmarks can falsify measurements",
            "kind": "theoretical-argument",
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": null,
            "scope_note": null,
            "related_finding": null,
            "description": "A party that controls landmark servers can report false timing. Brass and Aarne cite research in which manipulating a third of the landmarks shifted the estimated location by about 700 km. Avellar and Grunewald note that compromised landmarks let adversaries spoof travel-time measurements directly. The draft specification asks verifiers to require anchors in diverse places, run by several independent operators.",
            "response": null,
            "sources": [
              "S-1400",
              "S-1402",
              "S-1404"
            ],
            "record": "M-0018",
            "represented_by": []
          }
        ]
      }
    ],
    "minor": 0,
    "minorFindings": [],
    "minorBy": [],
    "notDemonstrated": [
      "M-0018",
      "M-0013"
    ],
    "newChip": []
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "mech": "M-0018",
      "record": "I-0009",
      "n": 1,
      "title": "Physical attacks on the trusted hardware are out of scope",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "The specification places the hardware root of trust and the TEE in the trusted computing base. It assumes they resist software attacks, notes that the attacker may have physical access, and leaves sophisticated physical attacks, such as bus probing and side-channel analysis, as a residual risk. It says that future revisions may add requirements for physical tamper evidence.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1404"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0018",
      "record": "I-0009",
      "n": 2,
      "title": "On-chip keys may be extractable",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Tee and Happel argue that ping-based location protocols backed by keys stored on the chip can be compromised if an adversary with physical access extracts those keys. In this specification, the evidence chain rests on the hardware root of trust's signed quote, whose signing key must be protected by the hardware.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1403",
        "S-1404"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0018",
      "record": "I-0009",
      "n": 3,
      "title": "General delay and landmark attacks apply",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Attacks on delay-based location verification in general also apply. Brass and Aarne discuss adding delay, using faster paths such as dark fibre, and compromising landmarks. The specification counters anchor impersonation with a signed anchor directory. Against collusion it recommends anchors in diverse places run by several independent operators, and peer monitoring that temporarily removes anchors whose timings deviate.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1400",
        "S-1404"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0013",
      "record": "M-0013",
      "n": 1,
      "title": "Output nondeterminism leaves covert capacity",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Hashing cannot remove information hidden in the outputs themselves. The Secure Gateway Device paper estimates that about 0.1 bit per token remains even with seed-synchronized replay checks. For a 200k-GPU inference cluster at full load (2,000 tokens per GPU per second), that is about 40 Mbit/s of covert egress, enough to move a 1 TB model in under three days. The paper names this the core remaining challenge and points to deterministic replay or active scrubbing of hardware-induced entropy. An independent study found that an adversary who chooses the prompts roughly doubles the bits leaked per token under Gumbel-based inference verification; see Bounding unexplained information in outputs.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1300",
        "S-1507"
      ],
      "helps": [
        {
          "by": "M-0002",
          "how": "Deterministic replay is one of the two remedies the flaw's source names."
        },
        {
          "by": "M-0024",
          "how": "Bounds the hidden information outputs can carry by measuring what the declared computation fails to predict."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0013",
      "record": "M-0013",
      "n": 2,
      "title": "Some links cannot be passively tapped",
      "kind": "open-question",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Cankaya notes that copper-connected scale-up domains (for example NVL72 racks and TPU v7 cubes) are much harder to tap than fibre, and that optical budgets make passive taps impractical on 400GBASE-SR8 multimode links. Amodo found no taps advertised for 53 GBaud links as of May 2026.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-0031",
        "S-1310"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0013",
      "record": "M-0013",
      "n": 3,
      "title": "Encrypted fabrics hide plaintext from both parties",
      "kind": "open-question",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Cankaya notes that with TEE-protected sessions whose keys are ephemeral and managed inside the TEE, neither the operator nor the manufacturer can recover session keys after the session, so tapped traffic could not be opened for recomputation. For other encrypted fabrics, the operator can retain keys.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-0031"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0013",
      "record": "M-0013",
      "n": 4,
      "title": "Residual side channels in simple passive setups",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Amodo's analysis of its own tapped prototype lists unvalidated header fields, timing of permitted traffic and variation in response formatting as residual channels, and concludes that the passive tap must be replaced by an active one.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1312"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0013",
      "record": "M-0013",
      "n": 5,
      "title": "Completeness rests on physical monitoring left out of scope",
      "kind": "open-question",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "The Secure Gateway Device paper assumes the facility is physically monitored, and states that the whole architecture depends on the device being the only communication channel. It names radio emanation, power-line signalling and thermal channels as covert channels beyond that scope.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1300"
      ],
      "helps": [
        {
          "by": "M-0022",
          "how": "Addresses the radio, power-line and thermal channels that network-level designs leave out."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0013",
      "record": "M-0013",
      "n": 6,
      "title": "Verifier dictionary attacks on hashes",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "minor",
      "status": "mitigated",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Hashes of very short outputs could be brute-forced by the verifier. The paper recommends hashing at least 5 tokens together, or at least 10 if the attacker filters for likely tokens.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1300"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "possible_additions": [
    {
      "id": "M-0002",
      "title": "Deterministic and bit-exact inference",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/deterministic-inference/",
      "readiness": "R3",
      "fits_filters": true,
      "filter_issues": [],
      "reasons": [
        {
          "kind": "flaw",
          "mech": "M-0013",
          "n": 1,
          "title": "Output nondeterminism leaves covert capacity",
          "severity": "significant",
          "how": "Deterministic replay is one of the two remedies the flaw's source names."
        },
        {
          "kind": "blocker",
          "mech": "M-0013",
          "text": "Nondeterministic inference leaves covert capacity in outputs that hashing cannot remove."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0024",
      "title": "Bounding unexplained information in outputs",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/bounding-unexplained-information/",
      "readiness": "R2",
      "fits_filters": true,
      "filter_issues": [],
      "reasons": [
        {
          "kind": "flaw",
          "mech": "M-0013",
          "n": 1,
          "title": "Output nondeterminism leaves covert capacity",
          "severity": "significant",
          "how": "Bounds the hidden information outputs can carry by measuring what the declared computation fails to predict."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0022",
      "title": "Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/side-channel-suppression/",
      "readiness": "R1",
      "fits_filters": true,
      "filter_issues": [],
      "reasons": [
        {
          "kind": "flaw",
          "mech": "M-0013",
          "n": 5,
          "title": "Completeness rests on physical monitoring left out of scope",
          "severity": "significant",
          "how": "Addresses the radio, power-line and thermal channels that network-level designs leave out."
        },
        {
          "kind": "blocker",
          "mech": "M-0013",
          "text": "Radio, power-line and thermal channels are not addressed by network-level designs."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0017",
      "title": "Tamper evidence for verifier devices",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/tamper-evidence-for-verifier-devices/",
      "readiness": "R2",
      "fits_filters": true,
      "filter_issues": [],
      "reasons": [
        {
          "kind": "blocker",
          "mech": "M-0013",
          "text": "Taps and gateway devices need tamper-evident housing and physical monitoring so that traffic cannot bypass them."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0001",
      "title": "Sampled inference recomputation",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/sampled-inference-recomputation/",
      "readiness": "R3",
      "fits_filters": true,
      "filter_issues": [],
      "reasons": [
        {
          "kind": "prerequisite",
          "mech": "M-0013"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0008",
      "title": "TEE remote attestation for AI workloads",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/tee-remote-attestation/",
      "readiness": "R3",
      "fits_filters": true,
      "filter_issues": [],
      "reasons": [
        {
          "kind": "prerequisite",
          "mech": "M-0018"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "goal": null,
  "design": null,
  "dependencies": {
    "prerequisites": [
      {
        "id": "M-0008",
        "neededBy": [
          "M-0018"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "M-0001",
        "neededBy": [
          "M-0013"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "M-0002",
        "neededBy": [
          "M-0013"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "M-0017",
        "neededBy": [
          "M-0013"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "M-0022",
        "neededBy": [
          "M-0013"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "shared": [],
    "blockers": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0018",
        "n": 1,
        "text": "The specification is an unfinished draft with no public implementation or evaluation.",
        "theme": "adversarial-validation",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1404",
          "S-1405"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0018",
        "n": 2,
        "text": "It needs a globally distributed, trusted anchor fleet and an endorser to run the anchor directory.",
        "theme": "access-governance",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1404"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0013",
        "n": 1,
        "text": "No complete verification tap has been demonstrated at production frontend link rates, and on the tested CPU no hash algorithm reached line rate with minimum-size frames.",
        "theme": "performance-compatibility",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1311",
          "S-1310"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0013",
        "n": 2,
        "text": "Nondeterministic inference leaves covert capacity in outputs that hashing cannot remove.",
        "theme": "evidence-binding",
        "blocked_by": "M-0002",
        "sources": [
          "S-1300"
        ],
        "inProposal": false
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0013",
        "n": 3,
        "text": "Taps and gateway devices need tamper-evident housing and physical monitoring so that traffic cannot bypass them.",
        "theme": "hardware-trust",
        "blocked_by": "M-0017",
        "sources": [
          "S-1300",
          "S-0018"
        ],
        "inProposal": false
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0013",
        "n": 4,
        "text": "Radio, power-line and thermal channels are not addressed by network-level designs.",
        "theme": "coverage-hidden-compute",
        "blocked_by": "M-0022",
        "sources": [
          "S-1300"
        ],
        "inProposal": false
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0013",
        "n": 5,
        "text": "Red-teaming by specialists is called for but has not been reported.",
        "theme": "adversarial-validation",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1300"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      }
    ]
  },
  "exposure": {
    "weights": {
      "shown": [],
      "partial": [
        "M-0013"
      ],
      "hidden": [],
      "none": [],
      "unknown": [
        "M-0018"
      ]
    },
    "io": {
      "shown": [],
      "partial": [
        "M-0013"
      ],
      "hidden": [],
      "none": [],
      "unknown": [
        "M-0018"
      ]
    },
    "training": {
      "shown": [],
      "partial": [
        "M-0013"
      ],
      "hidden": [],
      "none": [],
      "unknown": [
        "M-0018"
      ]
    }
  },
  "implementations": [
    {
      "mechanism": "M-0018",
      "selected": {
        "id": "I-0009",
        "title": "Lucid sovereignty (location) certificates",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/lucid-location-certificates/"
      },
      "implementations": [
        {
          "id": "I-0009",
          "title": "Lucid sovereignty (location) certificates",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/lucid-location-certificates/"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "mechanism": "M-0013",
      "selected": null,
      "implementations": [
        {
          "id": "I-0011",
          "title": "AI 2040 inference-only verification stack",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/ai-2040-inference-only-verification-plan/"
        },
        {
          "id": "I-0012",
          "title": "Low-trust AI compute verification system overview",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/low-trust-compute-verification-system-overview/"
        },
        {
          "id": "I-0008",
          "title": "SASH confidential network logger",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/sash-confidential-network-logger/"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "sources": [
    {
      "id": "S-1404",
      "title": "Sovereignty Certificates: draft specification, version 0.1.0",
      "authors": "Sovereignty Certificates Working Group",
      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://github.com/Lucid-Computing/sovereignty-certificate-specification",
      "path": "/sources/sovereignty-certificates-specification/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1405",
      "title": "Sovereignty Certificates Working Group",
      "authors": "",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://sovcert.org/",
      "path": "/sources/sovereignty-certificates-working-group-site/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1406",
      "title": "Lucid Computing: Verifiable AI. Proven in hardware.",
      "authors": "",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://lucidcomputing.ai/",
      "path": "/sources/lucid-computing-homepage/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1407",
      "title": "Lucid Developer Platform documentation",
      "authors": "",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://docs.lucidcomputing.ai/",
      "path": "/sources/lucid-developer-platform-docs/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1403",
      "title": "GPU Fingerprinting for Location Verification",
      "authors": "W. Tee & J. Happel",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.01930",
      "path": "/sources/tee-gpu-fingerprinting-location-verification/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1400",
      "title": "Location Verification for AI Chips",
      "authors": "A. Brass & O. Aarne",
      "year": 2024,
      "url": "https://www.iaps.ai/research/location-verification-for-ai-chips",
      "path": "/sources/brass-location-verification-ai-chips/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1402",
      "title": "Near-Term Verification Methods for AI Chip Exports",
      "authors": "B. Avellar & E. Grunewald",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://www.iaps.ai/research/near-term-verification-methods-for-ai-chip-exports",
      "path": "/sources/avellar-near-term-verification-ai-chip-exports/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1300",
      "title": "Fingerprinting All AI Cluster I/O Without Mutually Trusted Processors",
      "authors": "N. Cankaya et al.",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.10724",
      "path": "/sources/cankaya-fingerprinting-ai-cluster-io/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0031",
      "title": "The Fundamentals and Feasibility of Secure Network Taps for Verifying AI Datacenter Use",
      "authors": "N. Cankaya",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://nacicankaya.substack.com/p/research-note-the-fundamentals-and",
      "path": "/sources/cankaya-secure-network-taps/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0018",
      "title": "A System Overview for Near-Term, Low-Trust AI Compute Verification",
      "authors": "N. Cankaya",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://intelligence.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/A-system-overview-for-near-term-low-trust-AI-compute-verification.pdf",
      "path": "/sources/cankaya-system-overview-low-trust-compute-verification/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0067",
      "title": "Verification Plan",
      "authors": "R. Dean",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://ai-2040.com/supplements/verification-plan",
      "path": "/sources/dean-verification-plan/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1312",
      "title": "Fitting a Network TAP to our Inference Verification Prototype",
      "authors": "Amodo Design",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://amododesign.com/notes/2026-09-15-network-tap-inference-verification/",
      "path": "/sources/amodo-network-tap-inference-verification-prototype/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1007",
      "title": "Amodo-Design/Inference-Recomputation-Prototype (GitHub repository)",
      "authors": "Amodo Design",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://github.com/Amodo-Design/Inference-Recomputation-Prototype",
      "path": "/sources/amodo-inference-recomputation-prototype-code/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1319",
      "title": "inference-verification: Inference Verification Prototype",
      "authors": "Singapore AI Safety Hub (SASH)",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://github.com/sg-ai-safety-hub/inference-verification",
      "path": "/sources/sash-inference-verification-repo/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1320",
      "title": "Internationalising AI Verification",
      "authors": "Singapore AI Safety Hub (SASH)",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://www.aisafety.sg/research/internationalising-ai-verification",
      "path": "/sources/sash-internationalising-ai-verification/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1507",
      "title": "Adversarial Entropy Inflation Against Gumbel-Based Inference Verification",
      "authors": "N. Kezins",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.23375",
      "path": "/sources/kezins-adversarial-entropy-inflation/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1310",
      "title": "Network Tapping for AI Verification: A Technical Assessment",
      "authors": "Amodo Design",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://amododesign.com/notes/2026-05-03-network-tapping/",
      "path": "/sources/amodo-network-tapping-technical-assessment/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1311",
      "title": "Network Traffic Hashing",
      "authors": "Amodo Design",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://amododesign.com/notes/2026-07-03-network-traffic-hashing/",
      "path": "/sources/amodo-network-traffic-hashing/"
    }
  ]
}