{
  "schema_version": "1.3",
  "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/explorer/?mechanisms=M-0020,M-0022&implementations=M-0022:I-0010",
  "data_generated": "2026-10-09",
  "definitions": {
    "methodology": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/methodology/",
    "readiness": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/readiness/",
    "filters": [
      {
        "id": "prover",
        "label": "Prover",
        "question": "How far can the party being checked be trusted?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "cooperative",
            "label": "Cooperative"
          },
          {
            "value": "semi-trusted",
            "label": "Semi-trusted"
          },
          {
            "value": "adversarial",
            "label": "Adversarial"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose threat model holds against at least this prover. Adversarial is the strongest assumption.",
        "about": "The prover is the party being checked. Semi-trusted designs rely on part of its stack: usually the chip vendor's hardware root of trust, its firmware or counters, or its supply-chain records. Adversarial designs aim to hold even if it cheats wherever the checks allow, within their stated assumptions."
      },
      {
        "id": "onsite",
        "label": "Verifier devices on site",
        "question": "May the verifier install its own hardware at the prover's sites?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "no",
            "label": "Not allowed"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Not allowed\" removes mechanisms that need a retrofit device, such as a network tap or a sealed sensor.",
        "about": "Some mechanisms need a device the verifier owns or trusts at the prover's facility, such as a network tap, a bandwidth limiter or a sealed sensor. Choose Not allowed when the setting rules that out. Inspectors are not covered."
      },
      {
        "id": "coop",
        "label": "Prover cooperation",
        "question": "How much must the prover take part?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "partial",
            "label": "Partial at most"
          },
          {
            "value": "none",
            "label": "Not required"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Partial at most\" removes mechanisms that need the prover's active participation. \"Not required\" keeps only those that work without it.",
        "about": "Required: the prover takes part, for example by logging requests, producing proofs or opening records. Partial: some access, such as installing a device. Not required: works from outside, such as satellite imagery."
      },
      {
        "id": "chips",
        "label": "Chips",
        "question": "May the proposal depend on new chip designs?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "existing",
            "label": "Existing chips only"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Existing chips only\" removes mechanisms that need changes to future chip designs.",
        "about": "New chip features take years to reach a deployed fleet and cover only chips made after they ship. Mechanisms that use shipping features, such as trusted execution environments or performance counters, stay."
      },
      {
        "id": "ready",
        "label": "Minimum development status",
        "question": "Development status",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "R1",
            "label": "Proposed"
          },
          {
            "value": "R2",
            "label": "Research demonstration"
          },
          {
            "value": "R3",
            "label": "Operational use"
          },
          {
            "value": "R4",
            "label": "Legacy independent-evaluation filter",
            "legacy": true
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose readiness level is at least this one.",
        "about": "A level describes the public evidence for a mechanism's stated use, not its cost or feasibility. R3 can still have open critical flaws."
      },
      {
        "id": "tested",
        "label": "Attack testing",
        "question": "How hard has each mechanism been attacked in public?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "analysis",
            "label": "Published analysis"
          },
          {
            "value": "red-teamed",
            "label": "Red-teamed"
          },
          {
            "value": "independent-red-team",
            "label": "Independent red-team"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose strongest published attack testing is at least this.",
        "about": "The strongest published attempt to break the mechanism for its verification use: a security analysis, red-teaming by its developers or collaborators, or a red team independent of them."
      },
      {
        "id": "hide",
        "label": "Keep hidden from the verifier",
        "question": "What must the verifier never see?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "weights",
            "label": "Model weights"
          },
          {
            "value": "io",
            "label": "Inputs and outputs"
          },
          {
            "value": "training",
            "label": "Training data"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Removes mechanisms that show the asset to the verifier. Conditional or unspecified exposure stays with a note and needs checking against the privacy requirement.",
        "about": "Model weights: the checked model's parameters. Inputs and outputs: the requests a deployed model serves and its responses. Training data: what a model was trained on. Each mechanism's exposure is the editors' reading of its record: shown, depends on the design (kept, with a note), hidden, not involved, or unspecified for a selected implementation. Code and configuration are not covered yet."
      }
    ],
    "exposure": "For model weights, inputs and outputs, and training data. This is the editors' reading of each mechanism's record (its threat model, how it works and its limitations), not a field of the record. Shown: the verifier sees it. Depends: on the design or variant, or the verifier sees only samples. Hidden: the verifier sees only commitments, hashes, proofs or results. Not involved: the record does not handle it. Unspecified: the selected implementation has no asset-specific assessment here.",
    "claim_status": {
      "addressed": "A mechanism in the proposal is aimed at this claim and is not excluded by the filters.",
      "partly-addressed": "Only supporting mechanisms, or mechanisms aimed at it that the filters exclude.",
      "unaddressed": "No mechanism in the proposal addresses this claim."
    },
    "finding_classification": {
      "failure": {
        "label": "Known failures",
        "singular": "Known failure",
        "anchor": "known-flaws"
      },
      "scope-limitation": {
        "label": "Scope limitations",
        "singular": "Scope limitation",
        "anchor": "scope-limitations"
      },
      "open-question": {
        "label": "Open questions",
        "singular": "Open question",
        "anchor": "open-questions"
      }
    },
    "finding_scope": "Evidence scope describes where a finding was demonstrated; it does not establish applicability to every implementation in the mechanism family.",
    "claim_finding_scope": "open_critical_findings names active failures on the assessed records; open_critical_context names conditional family failures whose implementation applicability is unassessed.",
    "legacy_status": "The status field retains covered/partial/none for compatibility. It names claim links, never successful verification. Use claim_status and status_label for presentation."
  },
  "filters": {
    "prover": "",
    "onsite": "",
    "coop": "",
    "chips": "",
    "ready": "",
    "tested": "",
    "hide": []
  },
  "mechanisms_passing_filters": 25,
  "claims": [],
  "mechanisms": [
    {
      "id": "M-0020",
      "title": "Remote detection of data centres",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/remote-detection-of-data-centres/",
      "assessment_record": {
        "id": "M-0020",
        "title": "Remote detection of data centres",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/remote-detection-of-data-centres/"
      },
      "finding_counts": {
        "failure": 0,
        "scope_limitation": 2,
        "open_question": 1,
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 0,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "selected_implementation": null,
      "readiness": {
        "level": "R1",
        "scope": "finding undeclared data centres above an agreed compute threshold",
        "confidence": "medium",
        "evidence": [
          "S-1410",
          "S-0002",
          "S-1409",
          "S-1411",
          "S-3301"
        ]
      },
      "development_status": {
        "code": "R1",
        "label": "Proposed",
        "short": "Proposed",
        "rank": 1,
        "legacy_code": "R1"
      },
      "security_evidence": {
        "attack_testing": {
          "status": "analysis",
          "label": "Published security analysis",
          "kind": "analysis"
        },
        "independent_evaluation": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "formal_proof": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "deployment_assurance": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "legacy_evaluation_code": null,
        "scoped_findings": [],
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 0,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "assessed_properties": {
        "threat_model": "adversarial",
        "hardware_requirement": "none",
        "prover_cooperation": "not-required",
        "adversarial_evaluation": "analysis"
      },
      "claims": [],
      "exposure": {
        "weights": "none",
        "io": "none",
        "training": "none",
        "note": "Works from outside the facility; it does not handle model data."
      },
      "family_finding_context": [],
      "filter_issues": []
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0022",
      "title": "Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/side-channel-suppression/",
      "assessment_record": {
        "id": "I-0010",
        "title": "RAND secure inference data center (SIDC) design",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/rand-secure-inference-data-centers/"
      },
      "finding_counts": {
        "failure": 0,
        "scope_limitation": 2,
        "open_question": 0,
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 0,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "selected_implementation": {
        "id": "I-0010",
        "title": "RAND secure inference data center (SIDC) design",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/rand-secure-inference-data-centers/"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "level": "R1",
        "scope": "the operator's own weight security, with no outside verification described",
        "confidence": "low",
        "evidence": [
          "S-1510"
        ]
      },
      "development_status": {
        "code": "R1",
        "label": "Proposed",
        "short": "Proposed",
        "rank": 1,
        "legacy_code": "R1"
      },
      "security_evidence": {
        "attack_testing": {
          "status": "analysis",
          "label": "Published security analysis",
          "kind": "analysis"
        },
        "independent_evaluation": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "formal_proof": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "deployment_assurance": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "legacy_evaluation_code": null,
        "scoped_findings": [],
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 0,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "assessed_properties": {
        "threat_model": "semi-trusted",
        "hardware_requirement": "retrofit-device",
        "prover_cooperation": "required",
        "adversarial_evaluation": "analysis"
      },
      "claims": [],
      "exposure": {
        "weights": "unknown",
        "io": "unknown",
        "training": "unknown",
        "note": "This Explorer has no asset-specific exposure assessment for this implementation. Check its source and deployment assumptions.",
        "sources": []
      },
      "family_finding_context": [
        {
          "n": 1,
          "historical": false,
          "title": "Supply-chain implants may evade inspection",
          "classification": "open-question",
          "kind": "theoretical-argument",
          "severity": "significant",
          "status": "open",
          "evidence_scope": null,
          "scope_note": null,
          "related_finding": null,
          "description": "Cankaya identifies malicious hardware embedded deep in purchased components as a residual risk that visual inspection and disassembly may not catch. He notes that radiographic examination under high-security standards could mitigate it.",
          "response": null,
          "sources": [
            "S-0038"
          ],
          "record": "M-0022",
          "represented_by": []
        },
        {
          "n": 2,
          "historical": false,
          "title": "Openings for airflow, power and optics weaken shielding",
          "classification": "scope-limitation",
          "kind": "theoretical-argument",
          "severity": "significant",
          "status": "open",
          "evidence_scope": null,
          "scope_note": null,
          "related_finding": null,
          "description": "Cankaya notes that keeping attenuation high while passing high-power airflow, cabling and optical links adds complexity beyond existing shielded-enclosure specifications.",
          "response": null,
          "sources": [
            "S-0038"
          ],
          "record": "M-0022",
          "represented_by": []
        },
        {
          "n": 3,
          "historical": false,
          "title": "Inspection assumptions may not hold",
          "classification": "open-question",
          "kind": "open-question",
          "severity": "significant",
          "status": "open",
          "evidence_scope": null,
          "scope_note": null,
          "related_finding": null,
          "description": "The design's statistical argument assumes that visual or disassembly inspection catches every flaw that is present in a sampled unit. Cankaya is unsure whether destructive teardowns are defence-dominant or offence-dominant.",
          "response": null,
          "sources": [
            "S-0038"
          ],
          "record": "M-0022",
          "represented_by": []
        }
      ],
      "filter_issues": []
    }
  ],
  "strengths": {
    "covered": [],
    "production": [],
    "operationalUse": [],
    "adversarial": [
      "M-0020"
    ],
    "noNewHardware": [
      "M-0020"
    ],
    "mitigated": [],
    "notCounted": []
  },
  "properties": {
    "covered": [],
    "production": [],
    "operationalUse": [],
    "adversarial": [
      "M-0020"
    ],
    "noNewHardware": [
      "M-0020"
    ],
    "mitigated": [],
    "notCounted": []
  },
  "attack_testing": [
    {
      "id": "M-0020",
      "record": "M-0020",
      "evaluation": "analysis",
      "in_setting": true
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0022",
      "record": "I-0010",
      "evaluation": "analysis",
      "in_setting": true
    }
  ],
  "selected_implementations": {
    "M-0022": "I-0010"
  },
  "weaknesses": {
    "gaps": [],
    "excluded": [],
    "unlinked": [],
    "critical": [],
    "significant": [],
    "criticalMechanisms": [],
    "significantMechanisms": [],
    "familyContext": [
      {
        "id": "M-0022",
        "implementation": "I-0010",
        "flaws": [
          {
            "n": 1,
            "historical": false,
            "title": "Supply-chain implants may evade inspection",
            "classification": "open-question",
            "kind": "theoretical-argument",
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": null,
            "scope_note": null,
            "related_finding": null,
            "description": "Cankaya identifies malicious hardware embedded deep in purchased components as a residual risk that visual inspection and disassembly may not catch. He notes that radiographic examination under high-security standards could mitigate it.",
            "response": null,
            "sources": [
              "S-0038"
            ],
            "record": "M-0022",
            "represented_by": []
          },
          {
            "n": 2,
            "historical": false,
            "title": "Openings for airflow, power and optics weaken shielding",
            "classification": "scope-limitation",
            "kind": "theoretical-argument",
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": null,
            "scope_note": null,
            "related_finding": null,
            "description": "Cankaya notes that keeping attenuation high while passing high-power airflow, cabling and optical links adds complexity beyond existing shielded-enclosure specifications.",
            "response": null,
            "sources": [
              "S-0038"
            ],
            "record": "M-0022",
            "represented_by": []
          },
          {
            "n": 3,
            "historical": false,
            "title": "Inspection assumptions may not hold",
            "classification": "open-question",
            "kind": "open-question",
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": null,
            "scope_note": null,
            "related_finding": null,
            "description": "The design's statistical argument assumes that visual or disassembly inspection catches every flaw that is present in a sampled unit. Cankaya is unsure whether destructive teardowns are defence-dominant or offence-dominant.",
            "response": null,
            "sources": [
              "S-0038"
            ],
            "record": "M-0022",
            "represented_by": []
          }
        ]
      }
    ],
    "scopeLimitations": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0020",
        "n": 1,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Facilities can be disguised or hidden",
        "classification": "scope-limitation",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Halstead and Larsen discuss two ways to hide a facility. One is to disguise it as a legitimate industrial site. The other is to build it underground, with cooling that avoids visible heat plumes. They note that the underground option requires bespoke engineering.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1410"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0020",
        "n": 2,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Small sites may not be detectable",
        "classification": "scope-limitation",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Halstead and Larsen conclude that a sufficiently small covert project could not be ruled out with confidence. In their estimates, the chance of detection is lower for smaller sites. Krawec notes that small data centres in existing buildings may lack the distinctive features of large facilities.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1410",
          "S-1409"
        ],
        "helps": [
          {
            "by": "M-0019",
            "how": "Accounts for chips from the fab onwards, which does not depend on a site being visible."
          }
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0022",
        "n": 1,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Everything rests on the trusted setup",
        "classification": "scope-limitation",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Reference measurements for model weights and reference data are established in a trusted setup phase. The report states that the system cannot detect compromise that happened before ingestion if the trusted setup itself is compromised.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1510"
        ],
        "record": "I-0010"
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0022",
        "n": 2,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Security weakens over long operation",
        "classification": "scope-limitation",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "minor",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "The authors claim that the facility can withstand attacks at the OC5 level for a five-year operational period. They expect its ability to withstand long OC5 campaigns to become less robust the longer the facility remains in operation.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1510"
        ],
        "record": "I-0010"
      }
    ],
    "openQuestions": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0020",
        "n": 3,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Search for unknown sites is undemonstrated",
        "classification": "open-question",
        "kind": "open-question",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Krawec reports that telling data centres apart from other industrial facilities systematically is difficult. Automating detection would need large amounts of training imagery and a purpose-trained model. In Krawec's words, automated data-centre detection \"remains primarily conceptual at present\".",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1409"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "minor": 0,
    "minorFindings": [],
    "minorBy": [],
    "notDemonstrated": [
      "M-0020",
      "M-0022"
    ],
    "newChip": []
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "mech": "M-0020",
      "record": "M-0020",
      "n": 1,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Facilities can be disguised or hidden",
      "classification": "scope-limitation",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Halstead and Larsen discuss two ways to hide a facility. One is to disguise it as a legitimate industrial site. The other is to build it underground, with cooling that avoids visible heat plumes. They note that the underground option requires bespoke engineering.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1410"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0020",
      "record": "M-0020",
      "n": 2,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Small sites may not be detectable",
      "classification": "scope-limitation",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Halstead and Larsen conclude that a sufficiently small covert project could not be ruled out with confidence. In their estimates, the chance of detection is lower for smaller sites. Krawec notes that small data centres in existing buildings may lack the distinctive features of large facilities.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1410",
        "S-1409"
      ],
      "helps": [
        {
          "by": "M-0019",
          "how": "Accounts for chips from the fab onwards, which does not depend on a site being visible."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0020",
      "record": "M-0020",
      "n": 3,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Search for unknown sites is undemonstrated",
      "classification": "open-question",
      "kind": "open-question",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Krawec reports that telling data centres apart from other industrial facilities systematically is difficult. Automating detection would need large amounts of training imagery and a purpose-trained model. In Krawec's words, automated data-centre detection \"remains primarily conceptual at present\".",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1409"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0022",
      "record": "I-0010",
      "n": 1,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Everything rests on the trusted setup",
      "classification": "scope-limitation",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Reference measurements for model weights and reference data are established in a trusted setup phase. The report states that the system cannot detect compromise that happened before ingestion if the trusted setup itself is compromised.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1510"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0022",
      "record": "I-0010",
      "n": 2,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Security weakens over long operation",
      "classification": "scope-limitation",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "minor",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "The authors claim that the facility can withstand attacks at the OC5 level for a five-year operational period. They expect its ability to withstand long OC5 campaigns to become less robust the longer the facility remains in operation.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1510"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "possible_additions": [],
  "goal": null,
  "design": null,
  "dependencies": {
    "prerequisites": [],
    "shared": [],
    "blockers": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0020",
        "n": 1,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "Wide-area, automated detection of data centres is not yet practical and needs large training datasets.",
        "theme": "coverage-hidden-compute",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1409"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0020",
        "n": 2,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "No measured detection or false-alarm rates for finding undeclared facilities have been published.",
        "theme": "adversarial-validation",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1410",
          "S-1409"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0020",
        "n": 3,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "Recent high-resolution imagery is costly, is limited by weather and needs trained analysts.",
        "theme": "access-governance",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1409"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0022",
        "n": 1,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "No prototype exists; RAND recommends prototyping key security features and integration now.",
        "theme": "adversarial-validation",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1510"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0022",
        "n": 2,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "The report describes internal integrity checks, audit logging and accreditation, but no way for a party outside the operator to verify the facility's properties.",
        "theme": "access-governance",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1510"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0022",
        "n": 3,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "Human review of every prompt and response makes each request take three to five minutes, with the review steps as the rate-limiting factor.",
        "theme": "performance-compatibility",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1510"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0022",
        "n": 4,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "Detailed design information is withheld from the public report and is to be evaluated privately with stakeholders, which limits independent public scrutiny.",
        "theme": "access-governance",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1510"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      }
    ]
  },
  "exposure": {
    "weights": {
      "shown": [],
      "partial": [],
      "hidden": [],
      "none": [
        "M-0020"
      ],
      "unknown": [
        "M-0022"
      ]
    },
    "io": {
      "shown": [],
      "partial": [],
      "hidden": [],
      "none": [
        "M-0020"
      ],
      "unknown": [
        "M-0022"
      ]
    },
    "training": {
      "shown": [],
      "partial": [],
      "hidden": [],
      "none": [
        "M-0020"
      ],
      "unknown": [
        "M-0022"
      ]
    }
  },
  "implementations": [
    {
      "mechanism": "M-0020",
      "selected": null,
      "implementations": []
    },
    {
      "mechanism": "M-0022",
      "selected": {
        "id": "I-0010",
        "title": "RAND secure inference data center (SIDC) design",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/rand-secure-inference-data-centers/"
      },
      "implementations": [
        {
          "id": "I-0011",
          "title": "AI 2040 inference-only verification stack",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/ai-2040-inference-only-verification-plan/"
        },
        {
          "id": "I-0012",
          "title": "Low-trust AI compute verification system overview",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/low-trust-compute-verification-system-overview/"
        },
        {
          "id": "I-0010",
          "title": "RAND secure inference data center (SIDC) design",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/rand-secure-inference-data-centers/"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "sources": [
    {
      "id": "S-1410",
      "title": "Covert AI Projects",
      "authors": "B. Halstead & T. Larsen",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://ai-2040.com/supplements/covert-ai-projects",
      "path": "/sources/halstead-covert-ai-projects/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0002",
      "title": "Verifying International Agreements on AI: Six Layers of Verification for Rules on Large-Scale AI Development and Deployment",
      "authors": "M. Baker et al.",
      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WRA4077-1.html",
      "path": "/sources/baker-verifying-international-agreements-ai/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1409",
      "title": "Tracking Hyperscale AI Data Center Growth with Satellite Imagery",
      "authors": "C. Krawec",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://fas.org/publication/tracking-hyperscale/",
      "path": "/sources/krawec-tracking-hyperscale-satellite-imagery/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1411",
      "title": "Introducing the Frontier Data Centers Hub",
      "authors": "Epoch AI",
      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://epoch.ai/latest/introducing-the-frontier-data-centers-hub",
      "path": "/sources/epoch-frontier-data-centers-hub/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-3301",
      "title": "AI Data Centers Documentation – Methodology",
      "authors": "Epoch AI",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://epoch.ai/data/data-centers-documentation/methodology",
      "path": "/sources/epoch-data-centers-methodology/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1510",
      "title": "Highly Secure Inference Data Centers: A Vertically Integrated Strategy for Security Engineering",
      "authors": "S. F. Comer et al.",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA4827-1.html",
      "path": "/sources/comer-highly-secure-inference-data-centers/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0038",
      "title": "Suppressing Side Channels in an Untrusted Data Center via Retrofitted Defenses",
      "authors": "N. Cankaya",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://techgov.intelligence.org/blog/suppressing-side-channels-in-an-untrusted-data-center-via-retrofitted-defenses",
      "path": "/sources/cankaya-suppressing-side-channels/"
    }
  ]
}