{
  "schema_version": "1.2",
  "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/explorer/?mechanisms=M-0022&implementations=M-0022:I-0010",
  "data_generated": "2026-10-08",
  "definitions": {
    "methodology": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/methodology/",
    "readiness": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/readiness/",
    "filters": [
      {
        "id": "prover",
        "label": "Prover",
        "question": "How far can the party being checked be trusted?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "cooperative",
            "label": "Cooperative"
          },
          {
            "value": "semi-trusted",
            "label": "Semi-trusted"
          },
          {
            "value": "adversarial",
            "label": "Adversarial"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose threat model holds against at least this prover. Adversarial is the strongest assumption.",
        "about": "The prover is the party being checked. Semi-trusted designs rely on part of its stack: usually the chip vendor's hardware root of trust, its firmware or counters, or its supply-chain records. Adversarial designs aim to hold even if it cheats wherever the checks allow, within their stated assumptions."
      },
      {
        "id": "onsite",
        "label": "Verifier devices on site",
        "question": "May the verifier install its own hardware at the prover's sites?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "no",
            "label": "Not allowed"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Not allowed\" removes mechanisms that need a retrofit device, such as a network tap or a sealed sensor.",
        "about": "Some mechanisms need a device the verifier owns or trusts at the prover's facility, such as a network tap, a bandwidth limiter or a sealed sensor. Choose Not allowed when the setting rules that out. Inspectors are not covered."
      },
      {
        "id": "coop",
        "label": "Prover cooperation",
        "question": "How much must the prover take part?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "partial",
            "label": "Partial at most"
          },
          {
            "value": "none",
            "label": "Not required"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Partial at most\" removes mechanisms that need the prover's active participation. \"Not required\" keeps only those that work without it.",
        "about": "Required: the prover takes part, for example by logging requests, producing proofs or opening records. Partial: some access, such as installing a device. Not required: works from outside, such as satellite imagery."
      },
      {
        "id": "chips",
        "label": "Chips",
        "question": "May the proposal depend on new chip designs?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "existing",
            "label": "Existing chips only"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Existing chips only\" removes mechanisms that need changes to future chip designs.",
        "about": "New chip features take years to reach a deployed fleet and cover only chips made after they ship. Mechanisms that use shipping features, such as trusted execution environments or performance counters, stay."
      },
      {
        "id": "ready",
        "label": "Minimum readiness",
        "question": "How mature must each mechanism be?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "R1",
            "label": "R1 Proposed"
          },
          {
            "value": "R2",
            "label": "R2 Demonstrated"
          },
          {
            "value": "R3",
            "label": "R3 In production"
          },
          {
            "value": "R4",
            "label": "R4 Deployment-ready"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose readiness level is at least this one.",
        "about": "A level describes the public evidence for a mechanism's stated use, not its cost or feasibility. R3 can still have open critical flaws."
      },
      {
        "id": "tested",
        "label": "Attack testing",
        "question": "How hard has each mechanism been attacked in public?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "analysis",
            "label": "Published analysis"
          },
          {
            "value": "red-teamed",
            "label": "Red-teamed"
          },
          {
            "value": "independent-red-team",
            "label": "Independent red-team"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose strongest published attack testing is at least this.",
        "about": "The strongest published attempt to break the mechanism for its verification use: a security analysis, red-teaming by its developers or collaborators, or a red team independent of them."
      },
      {
        "id": "hide",
        "label": "Keep hidden from the verifier",
        "question": "What must the verifier never see?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "weights",
            "label": "Model weights"
          },
          {
            "value": "io",
            "label": "Inputs and outputs"
          },
          {
            "value": "training",
            "label": "Training data"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Removes mechanisms that show the asset to the verifier. Conditional or unspecified exposure stays with a note and needs checking against the privacy requirement.",
        "about": "Model weights: the checked model's parameters. Inputs and outputs: the requests a deployed model serves and its responses. Training data: what a model was trained on. Each mechanism's exposure is the editors' reading of its record: shown, depends on the design (kept, with a note), hidden, not involved, or unspecified for a selected implementation. Code and configuration are not covered yet."
      }
    ],
    "exposure": "For model weights, inputs and outputs, and training data. This is the editors' reading of each mechanism's record (its threat model, how it works and its limitations), not a field of the record. Shown: the verifier sees it. Depends: on the design or variant, or the verifier sees only samples. Hidden: the verifier sees only commitments, hashes, proofs or results. Not involved: the record does not handle it. Unspecified: the selected implementation has no asset-specific assessment here.",
    "claim_status": {
      "addressed": "A mechanism in the proposal is aimed at this claim and is not excluded by the filters.",
      "partly-addressed": "Only supporting mechanisms, or mechanisms aimed at it that the filters exclude.",
      "unaddressed": "No mechanism in the proposal addresses this claim."
    },
    "finding_scope": "Evidence scope describes where a finding was demonstrated; it does not establish applicability to every implementation in the mechanism family.",
    "claim_finding_scope": "open_critical_findings names active findings on the assessed records; open_critical_context names conditional family findings whose implementation applicability is unassessed.",
    "legacy_status": "The status field retains covered/partial/none for compatibility. It names claim links, never successful verification. Use claim_status and status_label for presentation."
  },
  "filters": {
    "prover": "",
    "onsite": "",
    "coop": "",
    "chips": "",
    "ready": "",
    "tested": "",
    "hide": []
  },
  "mechanisms_passing_filters": 25,
  "claims": [],
  "mechanisms": [
    {
      "id": "M-0022",
      "title": "Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/side-channel-suppression/",
      "assessment_record": {
        "id": "I-0010",
        "title": "RAND secure inference data center (SIDC) design",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/rand-secure-inference-data-centers/"
      },
      "selected_implementation": {
        "id": "I-0010",
        "title": "RAND secure inference data center (SIDC) design",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/rand-secure-inference-data-centers/"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "level": "R1",
        "scope": "the operator's own weight security, with no outside verification described",
        "confidence": "low",
        "evidence": [
          "S-1510"
        ]
      },
      "assessed_properties": {
        "threat_model": "semi-trusted",
        "hardware_requirement": "retrofit-device",
        "prover_cooperation": "required",
        "adversarial_evaluation": "analysis"
      },
      "claims": [],
      "exposure": {
        "weights": "unknown",
        "io": "unknown",
        "training": "unknown",
        "note": "This Explorer has no asset-specific exposure assessment for this implementation. Check its source and deployment assumptions.",
        "sources": []
      },
      "family_finding_context": [
        {
          "n": 1,
          "title": "Supply-chain implants may evade inspection",
          "kind": "theoretical-argument",
          "severity": "significant",
          "status": "open",
          "evidence_scope": null,
          "scope_note": null,
          "related_finding": null,
          "description": "Cankaya identifies malicious hardware embedded deep in purchased components as a residual risk that visual inspection and disassembly may not catch. He notes that radiographic examination under high-security standards could mitigate it.",
          "response": null,
          "sources": [
            "S-0038"
          ],
          "record": "M-0022",
          "represented_by": []
        },
        {
          "n": 2,
          "title": "Openings for airflow, power and optics weaken shielding",
          "kind": "theoretical-argument",
          "severity": "significant",
          "status": "open",
          "evidence_scope": null,
          "scope_note": null,
          "related_finding": null,
          "description": "Cankaya notes that keeping attenuation high while passing high-power airflow, cabling and optical links adds complexity beyond existing shielded-enclosure specifications.",
          "response": null,
          "sources": [
            "S-0038"
          ],
          "record": "M-0022",
          "represented_by": []
        },
        {
          "n": 3,
          "title": "Inspection assumptions may not hold",
          "kind": "open-question",
          "severity": "significant",
          "status": "open",
          "evidence_scope": null,
          "scope_note": null,
          "related_finding": null,
          "description": "The design's statistical argument assumes that visual or disassembly inspection catches every flaw that is present in a sampled unit. Cankaya is unsure whether destructive teardowns are defence-dominant or offence-dominant.",
          "response": null,
          "sources": [
            "S-0038"
          ],
          "record": "M-0022",
          "represented_by": []
        }
      ],
      "filter_issues": []
    }
  ],
  "strengths": {
    "covered": [],
    "production": [],
    "adversarial": [],
    "noNewHardware": [],
    "mitigated": [],
    "notCounted": []
  },
  "properties": {
    "covered": [],
    "production": [],
    "adversarial": [],
    "noNewHardware": [],
    "mitigated": [],
    "notCounted": []
  },
  "attack_testing": [
    {
      "id": "M-0022",
      "record": "I-0010",
      "evaluation": "analysis",
      "in_setting": true
    }
  ],
  "selected_implementations": {
    "M-0022": "I-0010"
  },
  "weaknesses": {
    "gaps": [],
    "excluded": [],
    "unlinked": [],
    "critical": [],
    "significant": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0022",
        "n": 1,
        "title": "Everything rests on the trusted setup",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Reference measurements for model weights and reference data are established in a trusted setup phase. The report states that the system cannot detect compromise that happened before ingestion if the trusted setup itself is compromised.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1510"
        ],
        "record": "I-0010"
      }
    ],
    "criticalMechanisms": [],
    "significantMechanisms": [
      "M-0022"
    ],
    "familyContext": [
      {
        "id": "M-0022",
        "implementation": "I-0010",
        "flaws": [
          {
            "n": 1,
            "title": "Supply-chain implants may evade inspection",
            "kind": "theoretical-argument",
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": null,
            "scope_note": null,
            "related_finding": null,
            "description": "Cankaya identifies malicious hardware embedded deep in purchased components as a residual risk that visual inspection and disassembly may not catch. He notes that radiographic examination under high-security standards could mitigate it.",
            "response": null,
            "sources": [
              "S-0038"
            ],
            "record": "M-0022",
            "represented_by": []
          },
          {
            "n": 2,
            "title": "Openings for airflow, power and optics weaken shielding",
            "kind": "theoretical-argument",
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": null,
            "scope_note": null,
            "related_finding": null,
            "description": "Cankaya notes that keeping attenuation high while passing high-power airflow, cabling and optical links adds complexity beyond existing shielded-enclosure specifications.",
            "response": null,
            "sources": [
              "S-0038"
            ],
            "record": "M-0022",
            "represented_by": []
          },
          {
            "n": 3,
            "title": "Inspection assumptions may not hold",
            "kind": "open-question",
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": null,
            "scope_note": null,
            "related_finding": null,
            "description": "The design's statistical argument assumes that visual or disassembly inspection catches every flaw that is present in a sampled unit. Cankaya is unsure whether destructive teardowns are defence-dominant or offence-dominant.",
            "response": null,
            "sources": [
              "S-0038"
            ],
            "record": "M-0022",
            "represented_by": []
          }
        ]
      }
    ],
    "minor": 1,
    "minorFindings": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0022",
        "n": 2,
        "title": "Security weakens over long operation",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "minor",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "The authors claim that the facility can withstand attacks at the OC5 level for a five-year operational period. They expect its ability to withstand long OC5 campaigns to become less robust the longer the facility remains in operation.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1510"
        ],
        "record": "I-0010"
      }
    ],
    "minorBy": [
      {
        "id": "M-0022",
        "n": 1
      }
    ],
    "notDemonstrated": [
      "M-0022"
    ],
    "newChip": []
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "mech": "M-0022",
      "record": "I-0010",
      "n": 1,
      "title": "Everything rests on the trusted setup",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Reference measurements for model weights and reference data are established in a trusted setup phase. The report states that the system cannot detect compromise that happened before ingestion if the trusted setup itself is compromised.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1510"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0022",
      "record": "I-0010",
      "n": 2,
      "title": "Security weakens over long operation",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "minor",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "The authors claim that the facility can withstand attacks at the OC5 level for a five-year operational period. They expect its ability to withstand long OC5 campaigns to become less robust the longer the facility remains in operation.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1510"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "possible_additions": [
    {
      "id": "M-0012",
      "title": "Model identity attestation",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/model-identity-attestation/",
      "readiness": "R3",
      "fits_filters": true,
      "filter_issues": [],
      "reasons": [
        {
          "kind": "prerequisite",
          "mech": "M-0022"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "goal": null,
  "design": null,
  "dependencies": {
    "prerequisites": [
      {
        "id": "M-0012",
        "neededBy": [
          "M-0022"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "shared": [],
    "blockers": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0022",
        "n": 1,
        "text": "No prototype exists; RAND recommends prototyping key security features and integration now.",
        "theme": "adversarial-validation",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1510"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0022",
        "n": 2,
        "text": "The report describes internal integrity checks, audit logging and accreditation, but no way for a party outside the operator to verify the facility's properties.",
        "theme": "access-governance",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1510"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0022",
        "n": 3,
        "text": "Human review of every prompt and response makes each request take three to five minutes, with the review steps as the rate-limiting factor.",
        "theme": "performance-compatibility",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1510"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0022",
        "n": 4,
        "text": "Detailed design information is withheld from the public report and is to be evaluated privately with stakeholders, which limits independent public scrutiny.",
        "theme": "access-governance",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1510"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      }
    ]
  },
  "exposure": {
    "weights": {
      "shown": [],
      "partial": [],
      "hidden": [],
      "none": [],
      "unknown": [
        "M-0022"
      ]
    },
    "io": {
      "shown": [],
      "partial": [],
      "hidden": [],
      "none": [],
      "unknown": [
        "M-0022"
      ]
    },
    "training": {
      "shown": [],
      "partial": [],
      "hidden": [],
      "none": [],
      "unknown": [
        "M-0022"
      ]
    }
  },
  "implementations": [
    {
      "mechanism": "M-0022",
      "selected": {
        "id": "I-0010",
        "title": "RAND secure inference data center (SIDC) design",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/rand-secure-inference-data-centers/"
      },
      "implementations": [
        {
          "id": "I-0011",
          "title": "AI 2040 inference-only verification stack",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/ai-2040-inference-only-verification-plan/"
        },
        {
          "id": "I-0012",
          "title": "Low-trust AI compute verification system overview",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/low-trust-compute-verification-system-overview/"
        },
        {
          "id": "I-0010",
          "title": "RAND secure inference data center (SIDC) design",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/rand-secure-inference-data-centers/"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "sources": [
    {
      "id": "S-1510",
      "title": "Highly Secure Inference Data Centers: A Vertically Integrated Strategy for Security Engineering",
      "authors": "S. F. Comer et al.",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA4827-1.html",
      "path": "/sources/comer-highly-secure-inference-data-centers/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0038",
      "title": "Suppressing Side Channels in an Untrusted Data Center via Retrofitted Defenses",
      "authors": "N. Cankaya",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://techgov.intelligence.org/blog/suppressing-side-channels-in-an-untrusted-data-center-via-retrofitted-defenses",
      "path": "/sources/cankaya-suppressing-side-channels/"
    }
  ]
}