{
  "schema_version": "1.2",
  "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/explorer/?mechanisms=M-0022,M-0002&implementations=M-0022:I-0012",
  "data_generated": "2026-10-08",
  "definitions": {
    "methodology": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/methodology/",
    "readiness": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/readiness/",
    "filters": [
      {
        "id": "prover",
        "label": "Prover",
        "question": "How far can the party being checked be trusted?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "cooperative",
            "label": "Cooperative"
          },
          {
            "value": "semi-trusted",
            "label": "Semi-trusted"
          },
          {
            "value": "adversarial",
            "label": "Adversarial"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose threat model holds against at least this prover. Adversarial is the strongest assumption.",
        "about": "The prover is the party being checked. Semi-trusted designs rely on part of its stack: usually the chip vendor's hardware root of trust, its firmware or counters, or its supply-chain records. Adversarial designs aim to hold even if it cheats wherever the checks allow, within their stated assumptions."
      },
      {
        "id": "onsite",
        "label": "Verifier devices on site",
        "question": "May the verifier install its own hardware at the prover's sites?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "no",
            "label": "Not allowed"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Not allowed\" removes mechanisms that need a retrofit device, such as a network tap or a sealed sensor.",
        "about": "Some mechanisms need a device the verifier owns or trusts at the prover's facility, such as a network tap, a bandwidth limiter or a sealed sensor. Choose Not allowed when the setting rules that out. Inspectors are not covered."
      },
      {
        "id": "coop",
        "label": "Prover cooperation",
        "question": "How much must the prover take part?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "partial",
            "label": "Partial at most"
          },
          {
            "value": "none",
            "label": "Not required"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Partial at most\" removes mechanisms that need the prover's active participation. \"Not required\" keeps only those that work without it.",
        "about": "Required: the prover takes part, for example by logging requests, producing proofs or opening records. Partial: some access, such as installing a device. Not required: works from outside, such as satellite imagery."
      },
      {
        "id": "chips",
        "label": "Chips",
        "question": "May the proposal depend on new chip designs?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "existing",
            "label": "Existing chips only"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Existing chips only\" removes mechanisms that need changes to future chip designs.",
        "about": "New chip features take years to reach a deployed fleet and cover only chips made after they ship. Mechanisms that use shipping features, such as trusted execution environments or performance counters, stay."
      },
      {
        "id": "ready",
        "label": "Minimum readiness",
        "question": "How mature must each mechanism be?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "R1",
            "label": "R1 Proposed"
          },
          {
            "value": "R2",
            "label": "R2 Demonstrated"
          },
          {
            "value": "R3",
            "label": "R3 In production"
          },
          {
            "value": "R4",
            "label": "R4 Deployment-ready"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose readiness level is at least this one.",
        "about": "A level describes the public evidence for a mechanism's stated use, not its cost or feasibility. R3 can still have open critical flaws."
      },
      {
        "id": "tested",
        "label": "Attack testing",
        "question": "How hard has each mechanism been attacked in public?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "analysis",
            "label": "Published analysis"
          },
          {
            "value": "red-teamed",
            "label": "Red-teamed"
          },
          {
            "value": "independent-red-team",
            "label": "Independent red-team"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose strongest published attack testing is at least this.",
        "about": "The strongest published attempt to break the mechanism for its verification use: a security analysis, red-teaming by its developers or collaborators, or a red team independent of them."
      },
      {
        "id": "hide",
        "label": "Keep hidden from the verifier",
        "question": "What must the verifier never see?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "weights",
            "label": "Model weights"
          },
          {
            "value": "io",
            "label": "Inputs and outputs"
          },
          {
            "value": "training",
            "label": "Training data"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Removes mechanisms that show the asset to the verifier. Conditional or unspecified exposure stays with a note and needs checking against the privacy requirement.",
        "about": "Model weights: the checked model's parameters. Inputs and outputs: the requests a deployed model serves and its responses. Training data: what a model was trained on. Each mechanism's exposure is the editors' reading of its record: shown, depends on the design (kept, with a note), hidden, not involved, or unspecified for a selected implementation. Code and configuration are not covered yet."
      }
    ],
    "exposure": "For model weights, inputs and outputs, and training data. This is the editors' reading of each mechanism's record (its threat model, how it works and its limitations), not a field of the record. Shown: the verifier sees it. Depends: on the design or variant, or the verifier sees only samples. Hidden: the verifier sees only commitments, hashes, proofs or results. Not involved: the record does not handle it. Unspecified: the selected implementation has no asset-specific assessment here.",
    "claim_status": {
      "addressed": "A mechanism in the proposal is aimed at this claim and is not excluded by the filters.",
      "partly-addressed": "Only supporting mechanisms, or mechanisms aimed at it that the filters exclude.",
      "unaddressed": "No mechanism in the proposal addresses this claim."
    },
    "finding_scope": "Evidence scope describes where a finding was demonstrated; it does not establish applicability to every implementation in the mechanism family.",
    "claim_finding_scope": "open_critical_findings names active findings on the assessed records; open_critical_context names conditional family findings whose implementation applicability is unassessed.",
    "legacy_status": "The status field retains covered/partial/none for compatibility. It names claim links, never successful verification. Use claim_status and status_label for presentation."
  },
  "filters": {
    "prover": "",
    "onsite": "",
    "coop": "",
    "chips": "",
    "ready": "",
    "tested": "",
    "hide": []
  },
  "mechanisms_passing_filters": 25,
  "claims": [],
  "mechanisms": [
    {
      "id": "M-0022",
      "title": "Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/side-channel-suppression/",
      "assessment_record": {
        "id": "I-0012",
        "title": "Low-trust AI compute verification system overview",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/low-trust-compute-verification-system-overview/"
      },
      "selected_implementation": {
        "id": "I-0012",
        "title": "Low-trust AI compute verification system overview",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/low-trust-compute-verification-system-overview/"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "level": "R1",
        "scope": "screening challenged records to show declared inference compute is not training",
        "confidence": "medium",
        "evidence": [
          "S-0018",
          "S-1300"
        ]
      },
      "assessed_properties": {
        "threat_model": "adversarial",
        "hardware_requirement": "retrofit-device",
        "prover_cooperation": "required",
        "adversarial_evaluation": "analysis"
      },
      "claims": [],
      "exposure": {
        "weights": "unknown",
        "io": "unknown",
        "training": "unknown",
        "note": "This Explorer has no asset-specific exposure assessment for this implementation. Check its source and deployment assumptions.",
        "sources": []
      },
      "family_finding_context": [
        {
          "n": 1,
          "title": "Supply-chain implants may evade inspection",
          "kind": "theoretical-argument",
          "severity": "significant",
          "status": "open",
          "evidence_scope": null,
          "scope_note": null,
          "related_finding": null,
          "description": "Cankaya identifies malicious hardware embedded deep in purchased components as a residual risk that visual inspection and disassembly may not catch. He notes that radiographic examination under high-security standards could mitigate it.",
          "response": null,
          "sources": [
            "S-0038"
          ],
          "record": "M-0022",
          "represented_by": []
        },
        {
          "n": 2,
          "title": "Openings for airflow, power and optics weaken shielding",
          "kind": "theoretical-argument",
          "severity": "significant",
          "status": "open",
          "evidence_scope": null,
          "scope_note": null,
          "related_finding": null,
          "description": "Cankaya notes that keeping attenuation high while passing high-power airflow, cabling and optical links adds complexity beyond existing shielded-enclosure specifications.",
          "response": null,
          "sources": [
            "S-0038"
          ],
          "record": "M-0022",
          "represented_by": []
        },
        {
          "n": 3,
          "title": "Inspection assumptions may not hold",
          "kind": "open-question",
          "severity": "significant",
          "status": "open",
          "evidence_scope": null,
          "scope_note": null,
          "related_finding": null,
          "description": "The design's statistical argument assumes that visual or disassembly inspection catches every flaw that is present in a sampled unit. Cankaya is unsure whether destructive teardowns are defence-dominant or offence-dominant.",
          "response": null,
          "sources": [
            "S-0038"
          ],
          "record": "M-0022",
          "represented_by": []
        }
      ],
      "filter_issues": []
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0002",
      "title": "Deterministic and bit-exact inference",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/deterministic-inference/",
      "assessment_record": {
        "id": "M-0002",
        "title": "Deterministic and bit-exact inference",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/deterministic-inference/"
      },
      "selected_implementation": null,
      "readiness": {
        "level": "R3",
        "scope": "reproducing open-model inference from receipts in Gensyn's information-market service",
        "confidence": "low",
        "evidence": [
          "S-0020",
          "S-1009",
          "S-1010",
          "S-1012",
          "S-1013",
          "S-1812",
          "S-3021",
          "S-3022",
          "S-3023",
          "S-0075"
        ]
      },
      "assessed_properties": {
        "threat_model": "adversarial",
        "hardware_requirement": "none",
        "prover_cooperation": "required",
        "adversarial_evaluation": "analysis"
      },
      "claims": [],
      "exposure": {
        "weights": "partial",
        "io": "partial",
        "training": "none",
        "note": "Exact replay needs the weights, configuration and replayed requests inside the recomputation environment. What the verifier sees depends on whether that environment keeps them confidential.",
        "sources": [
          "S-0018",
          "S-0020"
        ]
      },
      "family_finding_context": [],
      "filter_issues": []
    }
  ],
  "strengths": {
    "covered": [],
    "production": [
      "M-0002"
    ],
    "adversarial": [
      "M-0022",
      "M-0002"
    ],
    "noNewHardware": [
      "M-0002"
    ],
    "mitigated": [],
    "notCounted": []
  },
  "properties": {
    "covered": [],
    "production": [
      "M-0002"
    ],
    "adversarial": [
      "M-0022",
      "M-0002"
    ],
    "noNewHardware": [
      "M-0002"
    ],
    "mitigated": [],
    "notCounted": []
  },
  "attack_testing": [
    {
      "id": "M-0022",
      "record": "I-0012",
      "evaluation": "analysis",
      "in_setting": true
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0002",
      "record": "M-0002",
      "evaluation": "analysis",
      "in_setting": true
    }
  ],
  "selected_implementations": {
    "M-0022": "I-0012"
  },
  "weaknesses": {
    "gaps": [],
    "excluded": [],
    "unlinked": [],
    "critical": [],
    "significant": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0022",
        "n": 1,
        "title": "Mismatches cannot be attributed to cheating or error",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "A failed hash or replay does not show whether it came from an evasion attempt, a random bit flip or an evaluation error. The author notes that if detected anomalies can plausibly be waved off as malfunctions, deterrence becomes less effective, so the parties need an agreed escalation procedure that ends in attribution.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0018"
        ],
        "record": "I-0012"
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0022",
        "n": 3,
        "title": "Inspector agents may be manipulable",
        "kind": "open-question",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Automated compliance screening with LLM-based inspector agents must resist prompt-injection attacks. Adversarially trained systems might hide malicious actions with steganography, which makes backdoor detection an open problem.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0018"
        ],
        "record": "I-0012"
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0002",
        "n": 2,
        "title": "Cross-hardware replay relies on reverse-engineered, closed behaviour",
        "kind": "open-question",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Emulating one GPU's rounding on another requires reverse-engineering tensor-core arithmetic and modelling proprietary kernel choices. Hawkeye covers a subset of NVIDIA architectures and states that attention and other higher-level operations need further reverse engineering. For the bit-exact emulator, a proprietary Hopper kernel family is an open edge case.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1010",
          "S-0020"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "criticalMechanisms": [],
    "significantMechanisms": [
      "M-0022",
      "M-0002"
    ],
    "familyContext": [
      {
        "id": "M-0022",
        "implementation": "I-0012",
        "flaws": [
          {
            "n": 1,
            "title": "Supply-chain implants may evade inspection",
            "kind": "theoretical-argument",
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": null,
            "scope_note": null,
            "related_finding": null,
            "description": "Cankaya identifies malicious hardware embedded deep in purchased components as a residual risk that visual inspection and disassembly may not catch. He notes that radiographic examination under high-security standards could mitigate it.",
            "response": null,
            "sources": [
              "S-0038"
            ],
            "record": "M-0022",
            "represented_by": []
          },
          {
            "n": 2,
            "title": "Openings for airflow, power and optics weaken shielding",
            "kind": "theoretical-argument",
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": null,
            "scope_note": null,
            "related_finding": null,
            "description": "Cankaya notes that keeping attenuation high while passing high-power airflow, cabling and optical links adds complexity beyond existing shielded-enclosure specifications.",
            "response": null,
            "sources": [
              "S-0038"
            ],
            "record": "M-0022",
            "represented_by": []
          },
          {
            "n": 3,
            "title": "Inspection assumptions may not hold",
            "kind": "open-question",
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": null,
            "scope_note": null,
            "related_finding": null,
            "description": "The design's statistical argument assumes that visual or disassembly inspection catches every flaw that is present in a sampled unit. Cankaya is unsure whether destructive teardowns are defence-dominant or offence-dominant.",
            "response": null,
            "sources": [
              "S-0038"
            ],
            "record": "M-0022",
            "represented_by": []
          }
        ]
      }
    ],
    "minor": 2,
    "minorFindings": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0022",
        "n": 2,
        "title": "Deliberate faults leak a bit each",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "minor",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "A malicious device can leak one bit by deliberately outputting a wrong result, which blocks a disclosure when the cross-comparison fails. The design therefore needs a pre-agreed budget of tolerated faults.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0018"
        ],
        "record": "I-0012"
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0002",
        "n": 1,
        "title": "Some kernels remain genuinely nondeterministic",
        "kind": "open-question",
        "severity": "minor",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "The bit-exact work separates kernels that are deterministic but not batch-invariant from truly nondeterministic ones that use atomic functions. Some integer de-quantization kernels use atomic additions and remain nondeterministic, so exact replay needs backends that avoid them.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0020"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "minorBy": [
      {
        "id": "M-0022",
        "n": 1
      },
      {
        "id": "M-0002",
        "n": 1
      }
    ],
    "notDemonstrated": [
      "M-0022"
    ],
    "newChip": []
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "mech": "M-0022",
      "record": "I-0012",
      "n": 1,
      "title": "Mismatches cannot be attributed to cheating or error",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "A failed hash or replay does not show whether it came from an evasion attempt, a random bit flip or an evaluation error. The author notes that if detected anomalies can plausibly be waved off as malfunctions, deterrence becomes less effective, so the parties need an agreed escalation procedure that ends in attribution.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-0018"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0022",
      "record": "I-0012",
      "n": 2,
      "title": "Deliberate faults leak a bit each",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "minor",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "A malicious device can leak one bit by deliberately outputting a wrong result, which blocks a disclosure when the cross-comparison fails. The design therefore needs a pre-agreed budget of tolerated faults.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-0018"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0022",
      "record": "I-0012",
      "n": 3,
      "title": "Inspector agents may be manipulable",
      "kind": "open-question",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Automated compliance screening with LLM-based inspector agents must resist prompt-injection attacks. Adversarially trained systems might hide malicious actions with steganography, which makes backdoor detection an open problem.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-0018"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0002",
      "record": "M-0002",
      "n": 1,
      "title": "Some kernels remain genuinely nondeterministic",
      "kind": "open-question",
      "severity": "minor",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "The bit-exact work separates kernels that are deterministic but not batch-invariant from truly nondeterministic ones that use atomic functions. Some integer de-quantization kernels use atomic additions and remain nondeterministic, so exact replay needs backends that avoid them.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-0020"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0002",
      "record": "M-0002",
      "n": 2,
      "title": "Cross-hardware replay relies on reverse-engineered, closed behaviour",
      "kind": "open-question",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Emulating one GPU's rounding on another requires reverse-engineering tensor-core arithmetic and modelling proprietary kernel choices. Hawkeye covers a subset of NVIDIA architectures and states that attention and other higher-level operations need further reverse engineering. For the bit-exact emulator, a proprietary Hopper kernel family is an open edge case.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1010",
        "S-0020"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "possible_additions": [
    {
      "id": "M-0017",
      "title": "Tamper evidence for verifier devices",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/tamper-evidence-for-verifier-devices/",
      "readiness": "R2",
      "fits_filters": true,
      "filter_issues": [],
      "reasons": [
        {
          "kind": "blocker",
          "mech": "M-0022",
          "text": "Tamper-evident, rapidly mass-manufacturable and retrofittable enclosures for side-channel defence are an open research question, and physical security against covert communication in every monitored data centre is challenging."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0016",
      "title": "Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/timed-challenge-response/",
      "readiness": "R2",
      "fits_filters": true,
      "filter_issues": [],
      "reasons": [
        {
          "kind": "blocker",
          "mech": "M-0022",
          "text": "Distinguishing one server's DRAM contents from another's by challenge-response timing, and a general challenge-response protocol for diverse data types, are open."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0013",
      "title": "Network taps and certifiers",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/network-taps-and-certifiers/",
      "readiness": "R1",
      "fits_filters": true,
      "filter_issues": [],
      "reasons": [
        {
          "kind": "blocker",
          "mech": "M-0022",
          "text": "Empirical feasibility of passive optical splitting at 53–112 GBaud under realistic conditions is an open question."
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "goal": null,
  "design": null,
  "dependencies": {
    "prerequisites": [
      {
        "id": "M-0013",
        "neededBy": [
          "M-0022"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "shared": [],
    "blockers": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0022",
        "n": 1,
        "text": "Empirical feasibility of passive optical splitting at 53–112 GBaud under realistic conditions is an open question.",
        "theme": "performance-compatibility",
        "blocked_by": "M-0013",
        "sources": [
          "S-0018"
        ],
        "inProposal": false
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0022",
        "n": 2,
        "text": "Exact replay needs complete hardware and software metadata, and the tolerable slowdown from emulation is an open question.",
        "theme": "performance-compatibility",
        "blocked_by": "M-0002",
        "sources": [
          "S-0018"
        ],
        "inProposal": true
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0022",
        "n": 3,
        "text": "Tamper-evident, rapidly mass-manufacturable and retrofittable enclosures for side-channel defence are an open research question, and physical security against covert communication in every monitored data centre is challenging.",
        "theme": "hardware-trust",
        "blocked_by": "M-0017",
        "sources": [
          "S-0018"
        ],
        "inProposal": false
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0022",
        "n": 4,
        "text": "A mass-manufacturable, good-enough side-channel defence, particularly power-line filtering, has not been constructed or red-teamed.",
        "theme": "coverage-hidden-compute",
        "blocked_by": "M-0022",
        "sources": [
          "S-0018"
        ],
        "inProposal": true
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0022",
        "n": 5,
        "text": "Distinguishing one server's DRAM contents from another's by challenge-response timing, and a general challenge-response protocol for diverse data types, are open.",
        "theme": "coverage-hidden-compute",
        "blocked_by": "M-0016",
        "sources": [
          "S-0018"
        ],
        "inProposal": false
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0022",
        "n": 6,
        "text": "The threat model is under-developed and needs input from cybersecurity and AI threat-modelling experts.",
        "theme": "adversarial-validation",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0018"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0002",
        "n": 1,
        "text": "Batch-invariant kernels cost throughput: in Thinking Machines' Qwen3-8B test, an improved deterministic build took 42 s against 26 s for vLLM's default, and SGLang reports an average 34.35% slowdown on its FlashInfer and FlashAttention 3 backends.",
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          "S-1009",
          "S-1012"
        ],
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      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0002",
        "n": 2,
        "text": "Coverage is incomplete: the bit-exact emulator targets dense blocks on NVIDIA GPUs and excludes mixture-of-experts inference and training, and vLLM's batch-invariant mode is in beta, with open work on AMD hardware and speculative decoding.",
        "theme": "performance-compatibility",
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          "S-1013",
          "S-1814"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0002",
        "n": 3,
        "text": "Amodo's status page for the AI 2040 verification plan rates a reproducible inference stack for that plan as 'not started'.",
        "theme": "performance-compatibility",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1008"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0002",
        "n": 4,
        "text": "Exact replay requires the prover to disclose weights, software versions, parallelism and batch sizes to whoever recomputes.",
        "theme": "privacy-leakage",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0020",
          "S-0018"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      }
    ]
  },
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    "weights": {
      "shown": [],
      "partial": [
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      "hidden": [],
      "none": [],
      "unknown": [
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    },
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      "partial": [
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      "unknown": [
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    },
    "training": {
      "shown": [],
      "partial": [],
      "hidden": [],
      "none": [
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      ],
      "unknown": [
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      ]
    }
  },
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    {
      "mechanism": "M-0022",
      "selected": {
        "id": "I-0012",
        "title": "Low-trust AI compute verification system overview",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/low-trust-compute-verification-system-overview/"
      },
      "implementations": [
        {
          "id": "I-0011",
          "title": "AI 2040 inference-only verification stack",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/ai-2040-inference-only-verification-plan/"
        },
        {
          "id": "I-0012",
          "title": "Low-trust AI compute verification system overview",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/low-trust-compute-verification-system-overview/"
        },
        {
          "id": "I-0010",
          "title": "RAND secure inference data center (SIDC) design",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/rand-secure-inference-data-centers/"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
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      "selected": null,
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          "id": "I-0016",
          "title": "Batch-invariant inference kernels (Thinking Machines)",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/batch-invariant-inference-kernels/"
        },
        {
          "id": "I-0015",
          "title": "Verde and RepOps (Gensyn)",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/gensyn-verde-repops/"
        },
        {
          "id": "I-0012",
          "title": "Low-trust AI compute verification system overview",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/low-trust-compute-verification-system-overview/"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "sources": [
    {
      "id": "S-0018",
      "title": "A System Overview for Near-Term, Low-Trust AI Compute Verification",
      "authors": "N. Cankaya",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://intelligence.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/A-system-overview-for-near-term-low-trust-AI-compute-verification.pdf",
      "path": "/sources/cankaya-system-overview-low-trust-compute-verification/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1300",
      "title": "Fingerprinting All AI Cluster I/O Without Mutually Trusted Processors",
      "authors": "N. Cankaya et al.",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.10724",
      "path": "/sources/cankaya-fingerprinting-ai-cluster-io/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0038",
      "title": "Suppressing Side Channels in an Untrusted Data Center via Retrofitted Defenses",
      "authors": "N. Cankaya",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://techgov.intelligence.org/blog/suppressing-side-channels-in-an-untrusted-data-center-via-retrofitted-defenses",
      "path": "/sources/cankaya-suppressing-side-channels/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0020",
      "title": "Bit-Exact AI Inference Verification Without Performance Tradeoffs",
      "authors": "N. Cankaya",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.00279",
      "path": "/sources/cankaya-bit-exact-inference-verification/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1009",
      "title": "Defeating Nondeterminism in LLM Inference",
      "authors": "H. He & Thinking Machines Lab",
      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://thinkingmachines.ai/blog/defeating-nondeterminism-in-llm-inference/",
      "path": "/sources/he-defeating-nondeterminism-llm-inference/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1010",
      "title": "Hawkeye: Reproducing GPU-Level Non-Determinism",
      "authors": "E. Badash et al.",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://proceedings.mlsys.org/paper_files/paper/2026/hash/e217c271a57c365a246b0ad39e668ba8-Abstract-Conference.html",
      "path": "/sources/badash-hawkeye/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1012",
      "title": "Towards Deterministic Inference in SGLang and Reproducible RL Training",
      "authors": "The SGLang Team",
      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://www.lmsys.org/blog/2025-09-22-sglang-deterministic/",
      "path": "/sources/sglang-deterministic-inference/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1013",
      "title": "Batch Invariance (vLLM documentation)",
      "authors": "vLLM project",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/main/docs/features/batch_invariance.md",
      "path": "/sources/vllm-batch-invariance-docs/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1812",
      "title": "gensyn-ai/ree: Gensyn Reproducible Execution Environment (GitHub repository)",
      "authors": "Gensyn",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://github.com/gensyn-ai/ree",
      "path": "/sources/gensyn-ree-code/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-3021",
      "title": "EigenCloud Brings Verifiable AI to Mass Market with EigenAI and EigenCompute Launches",
      "authors": "EigenCloud",
      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://www.eigenlabs.org/blog/eigencloud-brings-verifiable-ai-to-mass-market-with-eigenai-and-eigencompute-launches/",
      "path": "/sources/eigencloud-eigenai-launch/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-3022",
      "title": "Building Delphi: Pricing, Settlement, and Agentic Trading",
      "authors": "D. Jedamski",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://www.gensyn.ai/blog/building-delphi-pricing-settlement-and-agentic-trading",
      "path": "/sources/gensyn-building-delphi/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-3023",
      "title": "Reproducible Execution Environment (REE) (Gensyn documentation)",
      "authors": "Gensyn",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://docs.gensyn.ai/tech",
      "path": "/sources/gensyn-ree-docs/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0075",
      "title": "What is Delphi? (Delphi documentation)",
      "authors": "Gensyn",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://docs.delphi.fyi/",
      "path": "/sources/gensyn-delphi-documentation/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1814",
      "title": "[Feature]: Batch Invariant Feature and Performance Optimization (vLLM issue #27433)",
      "authors": "vLLM project contributors",
      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/issues/27433",
      "path": "/sources/vllm-batch-invariance-tracking-issue/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1008",
      "title": "AI 2040 Plan A — Verification SITREP",
      "authors": "Amodo Design",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://amododesign.com/ai-verification/plan-a-sitrep/",
      "path": "/sources/amodo-plan-a-verification-sitrep/"
    }
  ]
}