{
  "schema_version": "1.3",
  "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/explorer/?mechanisms=M-0014,M-0007,M-0020&tested=analysis",
  "data_generated": "2026-10-09",
  "definitions": {
    "methodology": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/methodology/",
    "readiness": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/readiness/",
    "filters": [
      {
        "id": "prover",
        "label": "Prover",
        "question": "How far can the party being checked be trusted?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "cooperative",
            "label": "Cooperative"
          },
          {
            "value": "semi-trusted",
            "label": "Semi-trusted"
          },
          {
            "value": "adversarial",
            "label": "Adversarial"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose threat model holds against at least this prover. Adversarial is the strongest assumption.",
        "about": "The prover is the party being checked. Semi-trusted designs rely on part of its stack: usually the chip vendor's hardware root of trust, its firmware or counters, or its supply-chain records. Adversarial designs aim to hold even if it cheats wherever the checks allow, within their stated assumptions."
      },
      {
        "id": "onsite",
        "label": "Verifier devices on site",
        "question": "May the verifier install its own hardware at the prover's sites?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "no",
            "label": "Not allowed"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Not allowed\" removes mechanisms that need a retrofit device, such as a network tap or a sealed sensor.",
        "about": "Some mechanisms need a device the verifier owns or trusts at the prover's facility, such as a network tap, a bandwidth limiter or a sealed sensor. Choose Not allowed when the setting rules that out. Inspectors are not covered."
      },
      {
        "id": "coop",
        "label": "Prover cooperation",
        "question": "How much must the prover take part?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "partial",
            "label": "Partial at most"
          },
          {
            "value": "none",
            "label": "Not required"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Partial at most\" removes mechanisms that need the prover's active participation. \"Not required\" keeps only those that work without it.",
        "about": "Required: the prover takes part, for example by logging requests, producing proofs or opening records. Partial: some access, such as installing a device. Not required: works from outside, such as satellite imagery."
      },
      {
        "id": "chips",
        "label": "Chips",
        "question": "May the proposal depend on new chip designs?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "existing",
            "label": "Existing chips only"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Existing chips only\" removes mechanisms that need changes to future chip designs.",
        "about": "New chip features take years to reach a deployed fleet and cover only chips made after they ship. Mechanisms that use shipping features, such as trusted execution environments or performance counters, stay."
      },
      {
        "id": "ready",
        "label": "Minimum development status",
        "question": "Development status",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "R1",
            "label": "Proposed"
          },
          {
            "value": "R2",
            "label": "Research demonstration"
          },
          {
            "value": "R3",
            "label": "Operational use"
          },
          {
            "value": "R4",
            "label": "Legacy independent-evaluation filter",
            "legacy": true
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose readiness level is at least this one.",
        "about": "A level describes the public evidence for a mechanism's stated use, not its cost or feasibility. R3 can still have open critical flaws."
      },
      {
        "id": "tested",
        "label": "Attack testing",
        "question": "How hard has each mechanism been attacked in public?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "analysis",
            "label": "Published analysis"
          },
          {
            "value": "red-teamed",
            "label": "Red-teamed"
          },
          {
            "value": "independent-red-team",
            "label": "Independent red-team"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose strongest published attack testing is at least this.",
        "about": "The strongest published attempt to break the mechanism for its verification use: a security analysis, red-teaming by its developers or collaborators, or a red team independent of them."
      },
      {
        "id": "hide",
        "label": "Keep hidden from the verifier",
        "question": "What must the verifier never see?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "weights",
            "label": "Model weights"
          },
          {
            "value": "io",
            "label": "Inputs and outputs"
          },
          {
            "value": "training",
            "label": "Training data"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Removes mechanisms that show the asset to the verifier. Conditional or unspecified exposure stays with a note and needs checking against the privacy requirement.",
        "about": "Model weights: the checked model's parameters. Inputs and outputs: the requests a deployed model serves and its responses. Training data: what a model was trained on. Each mechanism's exposure is the editors' reading of its record: shown, depends on the design (kept, with a note), hidden, not involved, or unspecified for a selected implementation. Code and configuration are not covered yet."
      }
    ],
    "exposure": "For model weights, inputs and outputs, and training data. This is the editors' reading of each mechanism's record (its threat model, how it works and its limitations), not a field of the record. Shown: the verifier sees it. Depends: on the design or variant, or the verifier sees only samples. Hidden: the verifier sees only commitments, hashes, proofs or results. Not involved: the record does not handle it. Unspecified: the selected implementation has no asset-specific assessment here.",
    "claim_status": {
      "addressed": "A mechanism in the proposal is aimed at this claim and is not excluded by the filters.",
      "partly-addressed": "Only supporting mechanisms, or mechanisms aimed at it that the filters exclude.",
      "unaddressed": "No mechanism in the proposal addresses this claim."
    },
    "finding_classification": {
      "failure": {
        "label": "Known failures",
        "singular": "Known failure",
        "anchor": "known-flaws"
      },
      "scope-limitation": {
        "label": "Scope limitations",
        "singular": "Scope limitation",
        "anchor": "scope-limitations"
      },
      "open-question": {
        "label": "Open questions",
        "singular": "Open question",
        "anchor": "open-questions"
      }
    },
    "finding_scope": "Evidence scope describes where a finding was demonstrated; it does not establish applicability to every implementation in the mechanism family.",
    "claim_finding_scope": "open_critical_findings names active failures on the assessed records; open_critical_context names conditional family failures whose implementation applicability is unassessed.",
    "legacy_status": "The status field retains covered/partial/none for compatibility. It names claim links, never successful verification. Use claim_status and status_label for presentation."
  },
  "filters": {
    "prover": "",
    "onsite": "",
    "coop": "",
    "chips": "",
    "ready": "",
    "tested": "analysis",
    "hide": []
  },
  "mechanisms_passing_filters": 24,
  "claims": [],
  "mechanisms": [
    {
      "id": "M-0014",
      "title": "Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/bandwidth-limits-and-compartmentalization/",
      "assessment_record": {
        "id": "M-0014",
        "title": "Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/bandwidth-limits-and-compartmentalization/"
      },
      "finding_counts": {
        "failure": 2,
        "scope_limitation": 2,
        "open_question": 1,
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 2,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "selected_implementation": null,
      "readiness": {
        "level": "R2",
        "scope": "monitoring inter-node traffic with operator-run software on four GPUs",
        "confidence": "low",
        "evidence": [
          "S-0067",
          "S-1301",
          "S-0018",
          "S-3220",
          "S-1313"
        ]
      },
      "development_status": {
        "code": "R2",
        "label": "Research demonstration",
        "short": "Research demo",
        "rank": 2,
        "legacy_code": "R2"
      },
      "security_evidence": {
        "attack_testing": {
          "status": "analysis",
          "label": "Published security analysis",
          "kind": "analysis"
        },
        "independent_evaluation": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "formal_proof": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "deployment_assurance": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "legacy_evaluation_code": null,
        "scoped_findings": [
          {
            "n": 2,
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "unassessed",
            "sources": [
              "S-1301"
            ]
          },
          {
            "n": 5,
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "unassessed",
            "sources": [
              "S-1313"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 2,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "assessed_properties": {
        "threat_model": "adversarial",
        "hardware_requirement": "retrofit-device",
        "prover_cooperation": "required",
        "adversarial_evaluation": "analysis"
      },
      "claims": [],
      "exposure": {
        "weights": "none",
        "io": "none",
        "training": "none",
        "note": "Caps traffic between groups of chips; it does not read the traffic's content."
      },
      "family_finding_context": [],
      "filter_issues": []
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0007",
      "title": "Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/proofs-of-useful-work/",
      "assessment_record": {
        "id": "M-0007",
        "title": "Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/proofs-of-useful-work/"
      },
      "finding_counts": {
        "failure": 1,
        "scope_limitation": 1,
        "open_question": 1,
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 1,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "selected_implementation": null,
      "readiness": {
        "level": "R1",
        "scope": "bounding the spare capacity of declared hardware that could run training",
        "confidence": "low",
        "evidence": [
          "S-1102",
          "S-0005",
          "S-1609",
          "S-1105",
          "S-1107"
        ]
      },
      "development_status": {
        "code": "R1",
        "label": "Proposed",
        "short": "Proposed",
        "rank": 1,
        "legacy_code": "R1"
      },
      "security_evidence": {
        "attack_testing": {
          "status": "analysis",
          "label": "Published security analysis",
          "kind": "analysis"
        },
        "independent_evaluation": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "formal_proof": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "deployment_assurance": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "legacy_evaluation_code": null,
        "scoped_findings": [
          {
            "n": 3,
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "unassessed",
            "sources": [
              "S-1105"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 1,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "assessed_properties": {
        "threat_model": "adversarial",
        "hardware_requirement": "none",
        "prover_cooperation": "required",
        "adversarial_evaluation": "analysis"
      },
      "claims": [],
      "exposure": {
        "weights": "partial",
        "io": "partial",
        "training": "none",
        "note": "Checking a sampled tile of a matrix multiplication reveals that tile, which may hold model or input data; the authors suggest a zero-knowledge proof when the matrices must stay private."
      },
      "family_finding_context": [],
      "filter_issues": []
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0020",
      "title": "Remote detection of data centres",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/remote-detection-of-data-centres/",
      "assessment_record": {
        "id": "M-0020",
        "title": "Remote detection of data centres",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/remote-detection-of-data-centres/"
      },
      "finding_counts": {
        "failure": 0,
        "scope_limitation": 2,
        "open_question": 1,
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 0,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "selected_implementation": null,
      "readiness": {
        "level": "R1",
        "scope": "finding undeclared data centres above an agreed compute threshold",
        "confidence": "medium",
        "evidence": [
          "S-1410",
          "S-0002",
          "S-1409",
          "S-1411",
          "S-3301"
        ]
      },
      "development_status": {
        "code": "R1",
        "label": "Proposed",
        "short": "Proposed",
        "rank": 1,
        "legacy_code": "R1"
      },
      "security_evidence": {
        "attack_testing": {
          "status": "analysis",
          "label": "Published security analysis",
          "kind": "analysis"
        },
        "independent_evaluation": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "formal_proof": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "deployment_assurance": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "legacy_evaluation_code": null,
        "scoped_findings": [],
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 0,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "assessed_properties": {
        "threat_model": "adversarial",
        "hardware_requirement": "none",
        "prover_cooperation": "not-required",
        "adversarial_evaluation": "analysis"
      },
      "claims": [],
      "exposure": {
        "weights": "none",
        "io": "none",
        "training": "none",
        "note": "Works from outside the facility; it does not handle model data."
      },
      "family_finding_context": [],
      "filter_issues": []
    }
  ],
  "strengths": {
    "covered": [],
    "production": [],
    "operationalUse": [],
    "adversarial": [
      "M-0014",
      "M-0007",
      "M-0020"
    ],
    "noNewHardware": [
      "M-0007",
      "M-0020"
    ],
    "mitigated": [],
    "notCounted": []
  },
  "properties": {
    "covered": [],
    "production": [],
    "operationalUse": [],
    "adversarial": [
      "M-0014",
      "M-0007",
      "M-0020"
    ],
    "noNewHardware": [
      "M-0007",
      "M-0020"
    ],
    "mitigated": [],
    "notCounted": []
  },
  "attack_testing": [
    {
      "id": "M-0014",
      "record": "M-0014",
      "evaluation": "analysis",
      "in_setting": true
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0007",
      "record": "M-0007",
      "evaluation": "analysis",
      "in_setting": true
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0020",
      "record": "M-0020",
      "evaluation": "analysis",
      "in_setting": true
    }
  ],
  "selected_implementations": {},
  "weaknesses": {
    "gaps": [],
    "excluded": [],
    "unlinked": [],
    "critical": [],
    "significant": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0014",
        "n": 2,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Operator control of pod routing collapses the bound",
        "classification": "failure",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Lucid's analysis finds that if the operator can freely assign pods to routers, it could dedicate a whole cell of 100 or more pods to one pipeline stage. The bound then falls to about 90–220x uncompressed and as low as about 25x with compression. The proposed mitigation, auditor-controlled random assignment that is periodically re-randomized, has not been implemented.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1301"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0014",
        "n": 5,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Parallel scale-up switches are hard enforcement points",
        "classification": "failure",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "In GB200 topologies, GPUs reach GPUs in other nodes through NVSwitches without a NIC on the path. Amodo notes that limits are hard to enforce there because many switches work in parallel, so compromising one or two would bypass the limit.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1313"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0007",
        "n": 3,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Known shortcuts let a miner claim somewhat more work than it did",
        "classification": "failure",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Pearl's specification lists known mining speedups: crafted inputs, precision shortcuts, seed grinding, work reuse, and faster kernels or hardware. A policy check caps the summands a miner may skip at one-sixteenth of those in a tile. For capacity bounding, any gap between work proven and work possible leaves spare capacity.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1105"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "criticalMechanisms": [],
    "significantMechanisms": [
      "M-0014",
      "M-0007"
    ],
    "familyContext": [],
    "scopeLimitations": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0014",
        "n": 3,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Undeclared local storage raises per-pod capacity",
        "classification": "scope-limitation",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "More memory or storage per pod helps an adversary. Lucid requires per-pod storage to be declared, capped and physically inspected.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1301"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0014",
        "n": 4,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Training within one pod is not covered",
        "classification": "scope-limitation",
        "kind": "open-question",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Lucid's bounds concern pre-training models larger than the pods are sized for. Training models that fit in one pod, fine-tuning and reinforcement-learning post-training within one pod are outside the modelled threat.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1301"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0007",
        "n": 1,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Proves that work was done, not that no capacity remains",
        "classification": "scope-limitation",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Proof-of-work accounting bounds unmonitored compute only relative to an estimate of what the actor has. Attestable states that the verifier \"needs a credible estimate of the compute available\" to the actor, and that a proof \"cannot discover a datacenter that was never declared\".",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1102"
        ],
        "helps": [
          {
            "by": "M-0019",
            "how": "A registry of chips is one basis for the estimate of available compute that the flaw's source says the verifier needs."
          },
          {
            "by": "M-0020",
            "how": "Looks for data centres that were never declared, which a proof cannot discover."
          }
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0020",
        "n": 1,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Facilities can be disguised or hidden",
        "classification": "scope-limitation",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Halstead and Larsen discuss two ways to hide a facility. One is to disguise it as a legitimate industrial site. The other is to build it underground, with cooling that avoids visible heat plumes. They note that the underground option requires bespoke engineering.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1410"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0020",
        "n": 2,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Small sites may not be detectable",
        "classification": "scope-limitation",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Halstead and Larsen conclude that a sufficiently small covert project could not be ruled out with confidence. In their estimates, the chance of detection is lower for smaller sites. Krawec notes that small data centres in existing buildings may lack the distinctive features of large facilities.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1410",
          "S-1409"
        ],
        "helps": [
          {
            "by": "M-0019",
            "how": "Accounts for chips from the fab onwards, which does not depend on a site being visible."
          }
        ]
      }
    ],
    "openQuestions": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0014",
        "n": 1,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Low-communication training reduces the bandwidth training needs",
        "classification": "open-question",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "DiLoCo matched fully synchronous training on 8 workers while communicating 500 times less. Rahman writes that this family of methods theoretically allows large-scale training with less than 100 Mbps. Lucid includes these methods in its bounds, but notes that extreme activation compression, architectures with unusually small inter-layer widths, or modular paradigms could erode the margin.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1314",
          "S-0060",
          "S-1301"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0007",
        "n": 2,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Security rests on new hardness assumptions",
        "classification": "open-question",
        "kind": "open-question",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Komargodski and Weinstein base security on hardness assumptions about batches of low-rank random linear equations, and list PoUW \"from more standard or well-studied assumptions\" as an open problem. Pearl's floating-point variant introduces a further \"quantized-subspace hardness\" assumption.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1609",
          "S-1105"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0020",
        "n": 3,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Search for unknown sites is undemonstrated",
        "classification": "open-question",
        "kind": "open-question",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Krawec reports that telling data centres apart from other industrial facilities systematically is difficult. Automating detection would need large amounts of training imagery and a purpose-trained model. In Krawec's words, automated data-centre detection \"remains primarily conceptual at present\".",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1409"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "minor": 0,
    "minorFindings": [],
    "minorBy": [],
    "notDemonstrated": [
      "M-0007",
      "M-0020"
    ],
    "newChip": []
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "mech": "M-0014",
      "record": "M-0014",
      "n": 1,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Low-communication training reduces the bandwidth training needs",
      "classification": "open-question",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "DiLoCo matched fully synchronous training on 8 workers while communicating 500 times less. Rahman writes that this family of methods theoretically allows large-scale training with less than 100 Mbps. Lucid includes these methods in its bounds, but notes that extreme activation compression, architectures with unusually small inter-layer widths, or modular paradigms could erode the margin.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1314",
        "S-0060",
        "S-1301"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0014",
      "record": "M-0014",
      "n": 2,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Operator control of pod routing collapses the bound",
      "classification": "failure",
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      "description": "Lucid's analysis finds that if the operator can freely assign pods to routers, it could dedicate a whole cell of 100 or more pods to one pipeline stage. The bound then falls to about 90–220x uncompressed and as low as about 25x with compression. The proposed mitigation, auditor-controlled random assignment that is periodically re-randomized, has not been implemented.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1301"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0014",
      "record": "M-0014",
      "n": 3,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Undeclared local storage raises per-pod capacity",
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      "scope_note": null,
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      "description": "More memory or storage per pod helps an adversary. Lucid requires per-pod storage to be declared, capped and physically inspected.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1301"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0014",
      "record": "M-0014",
      "n": 4,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Training within one pod is not covered",
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      "description": "Lucid's bounds concern pre-training models larger than the pods are sized for. Training models that fit in one pod, fine-tuning and reinforcement-learning post-training within one pod are outside the modelled threat.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1301"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0014",
      "record": "M-0014",
      "n": 5,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Parallel scale-up switches are hard enforcement points",
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      "description": "In GB200 topologies, GPUs reach GPUs in other nodes through NVSwitches without a NIC on the path. Amodo notes that limits are hard to enforce there because many switches work in parallel, so compromising one or two would bypass the limit.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1313"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0007",
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      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1102"
      ],
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        {
          "by": "M-0019",
          "how": "A registry of chips is one basis for the estimate of available compute that the flaw's source says the verifier needs."
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        {
          "by": "M-0020",
          "how": "Looks for data centres that were never declared, which a proof cannot discover."
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      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0007",
      "record": "M-0007",
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      "historical": false,
      "title": "Security rests on new hardness assumptions",
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      "description": "Komargodski and Weinstein base security on hardness assumptions about batches of low-rank random linear equations, and list PoUW \"from more standard or well-studied assumptions\" as an open problem. Pearl's floating-point variant introduces a further \"quantized-subspace hardness\" assumption.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1609",
        "S-1105"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0007",
      "record": "M-0007",
      "n": 3,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Known shortcuts let a miner claim somewhat more work than it did",
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      "description": "Pearl's specification lists known mining speedups: crafted inputs, precision shortcuts, seed grinding, work reuse, and faster kernels or hardware. A policy check caps the summands a miner may skip at one-sixteenth of those in a tile. For capacity bounding, any gap between work proven and work possible leaves spare capacity.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1105"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0020",
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      "historical": false,
      "title": "Facilities can be disguised or hidden",
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      "description": "Halstead and Larsen discuss two ways to hide a facility. One is to disguise it as a legitimate industrial site. The other is to build it underground, with cooling that avoids visible heat plumes. They note that the underground option requires bespoke engineering.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1410"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0020",
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      "n": 2,
      "historical": false,
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      "description": "Halstead and Larsen conclude that a sufficiently small covert project could not be ruled out with confidence. In their estimates, the chance of detection is lower for smaller sites. Krawec notes that small data centres in existing buildings may lack the distinctive features of large facilities.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1410",
        "S-1409"
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        {
          "by": "M-0019",
          "how": "Accounts for chips from the fab onwards, which does not depend on a site being visible."
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      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0020",
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      "n": 3,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Search for unknown sites is undemonstrated",
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      "description": "Krawec reports that telling data centres apart from other industrial facilities systematically is difficult. Automating detection would need large amounts of training imagery and a purpose-trained model. In Krawec's words, automated data-centre detection \"remains primarily conceptual at present\".",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1409"
      ]
    }
  ],
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    {
      "id": "M-0017",
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          {
            "n": 3,
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              "S-1315",
              "S-0052",
              "S-3261"
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          }
        ],
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          "critical": 0,
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        }
      },
      "fits_filters": true,
      "filter_issues": [],
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        {
          "kind": "blocker",
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        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0013",
      "title": "Network taps and certifiers",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/network-taps-and-certifiers/",
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        "code": "R1",
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            "n": 1,
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              "S-1507"
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          },
          {
            "n": 4,
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "unassessed",
            "sources": [
              "S-1312"
            ]
          },
          {
            "n": 6,
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            "evidence_scope": "unassessed",
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              "S-1300"
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          }
        ],
        "open_failures": {
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        }
      },
      "fits_filters": true,
      "filter_issues": [],
      "reasons": [
        {
          "kind": "blocker",
          "mech": "M-0014",
          "text": "The verifier must know that all traffic leaving a pod crosses the capped, monitored links."
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
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        "id": "M-0017",
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      {
        "mech": "M-0014",
        "n": 1,
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        "text": "No cap that a verifier can check has been implemented or red-teamed.",
        "theme": "adversarial-validation",
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          "S-1301"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0014",
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        "text": "The verifier must know that all traffic leaving a pod crosses the capped, monitored links.",
        "theme": "coverage-hidden-compute",
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        "sources": [
          "S-0018"
        ],
        "inProposal": false
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0014",
        "n": 3,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "Shaping devices and routing assignments must be trusted by both parties; Amodo has not yet fully analysed resilience to a compromised DPU.",
        "theme": "hardware-trust",
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        "sources": [
          "S-1301",
          "S-1313"
        ],
        "inProposal": false
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0014",
        "n": 4,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "Advances in low-communication training could shrink the margin that the cap enforces.",
        "theme": "capacity-bounds",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1314",
          "S-0060",
          "S-1301"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0007",
        "n": 1,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "Bounding spare capacity needs a credible estimate of the compute available to the actor, including third-party access.",
        "theme": "capacity-bounds",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1102"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0007",
        "n": 2,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "Proofs of work cannot find facilities that were never declared.",
        "theme": "coverage-hidden-compute",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1102"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0007",
        "n": 3,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "As of September 2026 no implementation, demonstration or independent evaluation of proofs of work for capacity bounding has been published.",
        "theme": "adversarial-validation",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0020",
        "n": 1,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "Wide-area, automated detection of data centres is not yet practical and needs large training datasets.",
        "theme": "coverage-hidden-compute",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1409"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0020",
        "n": 2,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "No measured detection or false-alarm rates for finding undeclared facilities have been published.",
        "theme": "adversarial-validation",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1410",
          "S-1409"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0020",
        "n": 3,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "Recent high-resolution imagery is costly, is limited by weather and needs trained analysts.",
        "theme": "access-governance",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1409"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      }
    ]
  },
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      ],
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    },
    "io": {
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        "M-0014",
        "M-0020"
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    },
    "training": {
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      "partial": [],
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      "none": [
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        "M-0007",
        "M-0020"
      ],
      "unknown": []
    }
  },
  "implementations": [
    {
      "mechanism": "M-0014",
      "selected": null,
      "implementations": [
        {
          "id": "I-0011",
          "title": "AI 2040 inference-only verification stack",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/ai-2040-inference-only-verification-plan/"
        },
        {
          "id": "I-0010",
          "title": "RAND secure inference data center (SIDC) design",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/rand-secure-inference-data-centers/"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "mechanism": "M-0007",
      "selected": null,
      "implementations": [
        {
          "id": "I-0004",
          "title": "Pearl proof-of-useful-work blockchain",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/pearl-proof-of-useful-work/"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "mechanism": "M-0020",
      "selected": null,
      "implementations": []
    }
  ],
  "sources": [
    {
      "id": "S-0067",
      "title": "Verification Plan",
      "authors": "R. Dean",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://ai-2040.com/supplements/verification-plan",
      "path": "/sources/dean-verification-plan/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1301",
      "title": "Traffic Shaping for Workload Classification",
      "authors": "Lucid Computing",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://lucidcomputing.substack.com/p/traffic-shaping-for-workload-classification",
      "path": "/sources/lucid-traffic-shaping-workload-classification/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0018",
      "title": "A System Overview for Near-Term, Low-Trust AI Compute Verification",
      "authors": "N. Cankaya",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://intelligence.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/A-system-overview-for-near-term-low-trust-AI-compute-verification.pdf",
      "path": "/sources/cankaya-system-overview-low-trust-compute-verification/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-3220",
      "title": "De-risking Interconnect Limits for AI Verification",
      "authors": "A. Scher et al.",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://techgov.intelligence.org/blog/de-risking-interconnect-limits-for-ai-verification",
      "path": "/sources/scher-derisking-interconnect-limits/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1313",
      "title": "The Tray as a Bandwidth Boundary",
      "authors": "Amodo Design",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://amododesign.com/notes/2026-03-16-dpu-bandwidth-limiter/",
      "path": "/sources/amodo-tray-bandwidth-boundary/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1314",
      "title": "DiLoCo: Distributed Low-Communication Training of Language Models",
      "authors": "A. Douillard et al.",
      "year": 2024,
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.08105",
      "path": "/sources/douillard-diloco/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0060",
      "title": "Does Distributed Training Undermine Compute Governance?",
      "authors": "R. Rahman",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.29359",
      "path": "/sources/rahman-distributed-training-compute-governance/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1102",
      "title": "Pacing AI Requires Proof",
      "authors": "Attestable",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://attestable.com/blog/pacing-ai-requires-proof",
      "path": "/sources/attestable-pacing-ai-requires-proof/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0005",
      "title": "Mechanisms to Verify International Agreements About AI Development",
      "authors": "A. Scher & L. Thiergart",
      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.15867",
      "path": "/sources/scher-mechanisms-verify-ai-agreements/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1609",
      "title": "Proofs of Useful Work from Arbitrary Matrix Multiplication",
      "authors": "I. Komargodski & O. Weinstein",
      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.09971",
      "path": "/sources/komargodski-proofs-useful-work-matrix-multiplication/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1105",
      "title": "Pearl Floating Point Scheme Specification",
      "authors": "Pearl Research Team",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://pearlresearch.ai/Pearl_Whitepaper.pdf",
      "path": "/sources/pearl-floating-point-scheme-specification/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1107",
      "title": "pearl: Monorepo for the Pearl network",
      "authors": "Pearl Research Labs",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://github.com/pearl-research-labs/pearl",
      "path": "/sources/pearl-network-monorepo/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1410",
      "title": "Covert AI Projects",
      "authors": "B. Halstead & T. Larsen",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://ai-2040.com/supplements/covert-ai-projects",
      "path": "/sources/halstead-covert-ai-projects/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0002",
      "title": "Verifying International Agreements on AI: Six Layers of Verification for Rules on Large-Scale AI Development and Deployment",
      "authors": "M. Baker et al.",
      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WRA4077-1.html",
      "path": "/sources/baker-verifying-international-agreements-ai/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1409",
      "title": "Tracking Hyperscale AI Data Center Growth with Satellite Imagery",
      "authors": "C. Krawec",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://fas.org/publication/tracking-hyperscale/",
      "path": "/sources/krawec-tracking-hyperscale-satellite-imagery/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1411",
      "title": "Introducing the Frontier Data Centers Hub",
      "authors": "Epoch AI",
      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://epoch.ai/latest/introducing-the-frontier-data-centers-hub",
      "path": "/sources/epoch-frontier-data-centers-hub/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-3301",
      "title": "AI Data Centers Documentation – Methodology",
      "authors": "Epoch AI",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://epoch.ai/data/data-centers-documentation/methodology",
      "path": "/sources/epoch-data-centers-methodology/"
    }
  ]
}