{
  "schema_version": "1.3",
  "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/explorer/?mechanisms=M-0019,M-0002,M-0022,M-0020",
  "data_generated": "2026-10-09",
  "definitions": {
    "methodology": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/methodology/",
    "readiness": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/readiness/",
    "filters": [
      {
        "id": "prover",
        "label": "Prover",
        "question": "How far can the party being checked be trusted?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "cooperative",
            "label": "Cooperative"
          },
          {
            "value": "semi-trusted",
            "label": "Semi-trusted"
          },
          {
            "value": "adversarial",
            "label": "Adversarial"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose threat model holds against at least this prover. Adversarial is the strongest assumption.",
        "about": "The prover is the party being checked. Semi-trusted designs rely on part of its stack: usually the chip vendor's hardware root of trust, its firmware or counters, or its supply-chain records. Adversarial designs aim to hold even if it cheats wherever the checks allow, within their stated assumptions."
      },
      {
        "id": "onsite",
        "label": "Verifier devices on site",
        "question": "May the verifier install its own hardware at the prover's sites?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "no",
            "label": "Not allowed"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Not allowed\" removes mechanisms that need a retrofit device, such as a network tap or a sealed sensor.",
        "about": "Some mechanisms need a device the verifier owns or trusts at the prover's facility, such as a network tap, a bandwidth limiter or a sealed sensor. Choose Not allowed when the setting rules that out. Inspectors are not covered."
      },
      {
        "id": "coop",
        "label": "Prover cooperation",
        "question": "How much must the prover take part?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "partial",
            "label": "Partial at most"
          },
          {
            "value": "none",
            "label": "Not required"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Partial at most\" removes mechanisms that need the prover's active participation. \"Not required\" keeps only those that work without it.",
        "about": "Required: the prover takes part, for example by logging requests, producing proofs or opening records. Partial: some access, such as installing a device. Not required: works from outside, such as satellite imagery."
      },
      {
        "id": "chips",
        "label": "Chips",
        "question": "May the proposal depend on new chip designs?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "existing",
            "label": "Existing chips only"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Existing chips only\" removes mechanisms that need changes to future chip designs.",
        "about": "New chip features take years to reach a deployed fleet and cover only chips made after they ship. Mechanisms that use shipping features, such as trusted execution environments or performance counters, stay."
      },
      {
        "id": "ready",
        "label": "Minimum development status",
        "question": "Development status",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "R1",
            "label": "Proposed"
          },
          {
            "value": "R2",
            "label": "Research demonstration"
          },
          {
            "value": "R3",
            "label": "Operational use"
          },
          {
            "value": "R4",
            "label": "Legacy independent-evaluation filter",
            "legacy": true
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose readiness level is at least this one.",
        "about": "A level describes the public evidence for a mechanism's stated use, not its cost or feasibility. R3 can still have open critical flaws."
      },
      {
        "id": "tested",
        "label": "Attack testing",
        "question": "How hard has each mechanism been attacked in public?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "analysis",
            "label": "Published analysis"
          },
          {
            "value": "red-teamed",
            "label": "Red-teamed"
          },
          {
            "value": "independent-red-team",
            "label": "Independent red-team"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose strongest published attack testing is at least this.",
        "about": "The strongest published attempt to break the mechanism for its verification use: a security analysis, red-teaming by its developers or collaborators, or a red team independent of them."
      },
      {
        "id": "hide",
        "label": "Keep hidden from the verifier",
        "question": "What must the verifier never see?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "weights",
            "label": "Model weights"
          },
          {
            "value": "io",
            "label": "Inputs and outputs"
          },
          {
            "value": "training",
            "label": "Training data"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Removes mechanisms that show the asset to the verifier. Conditional or unspecified exposure stays with a note and needs checking against the privacy requirement.",
        "about": "Model weights: the checked model's parameters. Inputs and outputs: the requests a deployed model serves and its responses. Training data: what a model was trained on. Each mechanism's exposure is the editors' reading of its record: shown, depends on the design (kept, with a note), hidden, not involved, or unspecified for a selected implementation. Code and configuration are not covered yet."
      }
    ],
    "exposure": "For model weights, inputs and outputs, and training data. This is the editors' reading of each mechanism's record (its threat model, how it works and its limitations), not a field of the record. Shown: the verifier sees it. Depends: on the design or variant, or the verifier sees only samples. Hidden: the verifier sees only commitments, hashes, proofs or results. Not involved: the record does not handle it. Unspecified: the selected implementation has no asset-specific assessment here.",
    "claim_status": {
      "addressed": "A mechanism in the proposal is aimed at this claim and is not excluded by the filters.",
      "partly-addressed": "Only supporting mechanisms, or mechanisms aimed at it that the filters exclude.",
      "unaddressed": "No mechanism in the proposal addresses this claim."
    },
    "finding_classification": {
      "failure": {
        "label": "Known failures",
        "singular": "Known failure",
        "anchor": "known-flaws"
      },
      "scope-limitation": {
        "label": "Scope limitations",
        "singular": "Scope limitation",
        "anchor": "scope-limitations"
      },
      "open-question": {
        "label": "Open questions",
        "singular": "Open question",
        "anchor": "open-questions"
      }
    },
    "finding_scope": "Evidence scope describes where a finding was demonstrated; it does not establish applicability to every implementation in the mechanism family.",
    "claim_finding_scope": "open_critical_findings names active failures on the assessed records; open_critical_context names conditional family failures whose implementation applicability is unassessed.",
    "legacy_status": "The status field retains covered/partial/none for compatibility. It names claim links, never successful verification. Use claim_status and status_label for presentation."
  },
  "filters": {
    "prover": "",
    "onsite": "",
    "coop": "",
    "chips": "",
    "ready": "",
    "tested": "",
    "hide": []
  },
  "mechanisms_passing_filters": 25,
  "claims": [],
  "mechanisms": [
    {
      "id": "M-0019",
      "title": "Chip registries and manufacturing records",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-registries-and-manufacturing-records/",
      "assessment_record": {
        "id": "M-0019",
        "title": "Chip registries and manufacturing records",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-registries-and-manufacturing-records/"
      },
      "finding_counts": {
        "failure": 1,
        "scope_limitation": 2,
        "open_question": 0,
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 1,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "selected_implementation": null,
      "readiness": {
        "level": "R1",
        "scope": "a checkable record of which chips were made and who declared owning them",
        "confidence": "medium",
        "evidence": [
          "S-0002",
          "S-1402",
          "S-1408",
          "S-0007"
        ]
      },
      "development_status": {
        "code": "R1",
        "label": "Proposed",
        "short": "Proposed",
        "rank": 1,
        "legacy_code": "R1"
      },
      "security_evidence": {
        "attack_testing": {
          "status": "analysis",
          "label": "Published security analysis",
          "kind": "analysis"
        },
        "independent_evaluation": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "formal_proof": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "deployment_assurance": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "legacy_evaluation_code": null,
        "scoped_findings": [
          {
            "n": 2,
            "severity": "significant",
            "status": "open",
            "evidence_scope": "unassessed",
            "sources": [
              "S-1402"
            ]
          }
        ],
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 1,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "assessed_properties": {
        "threat_model": "semi-trusted",
        "hardware_requirement": "existing-features",
        "prover_cooperation": "required",
        "adversarial_evaluation": "analysis"
      },
      "claims": [],
      "exposure": {
        "weights": "none",
        "io": "none",
        "training": "none",
        "note": "Records chip identities and owners; it does not handle model data."
      },
      "family_finding_context": [],
      "filter_issues": []
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0002",
      "title": "Deterministic and bit-exact inference",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/deterministic-inference/",
      "assessment_record": {
        "id": "M-0002",
        "title": "Deterministic and bit-exact inference",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/deterministic-inference/"
      },
      "finding_counts": {
        "failure": 0,
        "scope_limitation": 2,
        "open_question": 0,
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 0,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "selected_implementation": null,
      "readiness": {
        "level": "R3",
        "scope": "reproducing open-model inference from receipts in Gensyn's information-market service",
        "confidence": "low",
        "evidence": [
          "S-0020",
          "S-1009",
          "S-1010",
          "S-1012",
          "S-1013",
          "S-1812",
          "S-3021",
          "S-3022",
          "S-3023",
          "S-0075"
        ]
      },
      "development_status": {
        "code": "R3",
        "label": "Operational use",
        "short": "Operational use",
        "rank": 3,
        "legacy_code": "R3"
      },
      "security_evidence": {
        "attack_testing": {
          "status": "analysis",
          "label": "Published security analysis",
          "kind": "analysis"
        },
        "independent_evaluation": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "formal_proof": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "deployment_assurance": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "legacy_evaluation_code": null,
        "scoped_findings": [],
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 0,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "assessed_properties": {
        "threat_model": "adversarial",
        "hardware_requirement": "none",
        "prover_cooperation": "required",
        "adversarial_evaluation": "analysis"
      },
      "claims": [],
      "exposure": {
        "weights": "partial",
        "io": "partial",
        "training": "none",
        "note": "Exact replay needs the weights, configuration and replayed requests inside the recomputation environment. What the verifier sees depends on whether that environment keeps them confidential.",
        "sources": [
          "S-0018",
          "S-0020"
        ]
      },
      "family_finding_context": [],
      "filter_issues": []
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0022",
      "title": "Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/side-channel-suppression/",
      "assessment_record": {
        "id": "M-0022",
        "title": "Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/side-channel-suppression/"
      },
      "finding_counts": {
        "failure": 0,
        "scope_limitation": 1,
        "open_question": 2,
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 0,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "selected_implementation": null,
      "readiness": {
        "level": "R1",
        "scope": "bounding physical covert channels out of a verified enclosure",
        "confidence": "medium",
        "evidence": [
          "S-0038"
        ]
      },
      "development_status": {
        "code": "R1",
        "label": "Proposed",
        "short": "Proposed",
        "rank": 1,
        "legacy_code": "R1"
      },
      "security_evidence": {
        "attack_testing": {
          "status": "analysis",
          "label": "Published security analysis",
          "kind": "analysis"
        },
        "independent_evaluation": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "formal_proof": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "deployment_assurance": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "legacy_evaluation_code": null,
        "scoped_findings": [],
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 0,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "assessed_properties": {
        "threat_model": "adversarial",
        "hardware_requirement": "retrofit-device",
        "prover_cooperation": "partial",
        "adversarial_evaluation": "analysis"
      },
      "claims": [],
      "exposure": {
        "weights": "none",
        "io": "none",
        "training": "none",
        "note": "Shields and filters a facility; it does not handle model data."
      },
      "family_finding_context": [],
      "filter_issues": []
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0020",
      "title": "Remote detection of data centres",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/remote-detection-of-data-centres/",
      "assessment_record": {
        "id": "M-0020",
        "title": "Remote detection of data centres",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/remote-detection-of-data-centres/"
      },
      "finding_counts": {
        "failure": 0,
        "scope_limitation": 2,
        "open_question": 1,
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 0,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "selected_implementation": null,
      "readiness": {
        "level": "R1",
        "scope": "finding undeclared data centres above an agreed compute threshold",
        "confidence": "medium",
        "evidence": [
          "S-1410",
          "S-0002",
          "S-1409",
          "S-1411",
          "S-3301"
        ]
      },
      "development_status": {
        "code": "R1",
        "label": "Proposed",
        "short": "Proposed",
        "rank": 1,
        "legacy_code": "R1"
      },
      "security_evidence": {
        "attack_testing": {
          "status": "analysis",
          "label": "Published security analysis",
          "kind": "analysis"
        },
        "independent_evaluation": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "formal_proof": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "deployment_assurance": {
          "status": "unassessed"
        },
        "legacy_evaluation_code": null,
        "scoped_findings": [],
        "open_failures": {
          "critical": 0,
          "significant": 0,
          "minor": 0
        }
      },
      "assessed_properties": {
        "threat_model": "adversarial",
        "hardware_requirement": "none",
        "prover_cooperation": "not-required",
        "adversarial_evaluation": "analysis"
      },
      "claims": [],
      "exposure": {
        "weights": "none",
        "io": "none",
        "training": "none",
        "note": "Works from outside the facility; it does not handle model data."
      },
      "family_finding_context": [],
      "filter_issues": []
    }
  ],
  "strengths": {
    "covered": [],
    "production": [
      "M-0002"
    ],
    "operationalUse": [
      "M-0002"
    ],
    "adversarial": [
      "M-0002",
      "M-0022",
      "M-0020"
    ],
    "noNewHardware": [
      "M-0019",
      "M-0002",
      "M-0020"
    ],
    "mitigated": [],
    "notCounted": []
  },
  "properties": {
    "covered": [],
    "production": [
      "M-0002"
    ],
    "operationalUse": [
      "M-0002"
    ],
    "adversarial": [
      "M-0002",
      "M-0022",
      "M-0020"
    ],
    "noNewHardware": [
      "M-0019",
      "M-0002",
      "M-0020"
    ],
    "mitigated": [],
    "notCounted": []
  },
  "attack_testing": [
    {
      "id": "M-0019",
      "record": "M-0019",
      "evaluation": "analysis",
      "in_setting": true
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0002",
      "record": "M-0002",
      "evaluation": "analysis",
      "in_setting": true
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0022",
      "record": "M-0022",
      "evaluation": "analysis",
      "in_setting": true
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0020",
      "record": "M-0020",
      "evaluation": "analysis",
      "in_setting": true
    }
  ],
  "selected_implementations": {},
  "weaknesses": {
    "gaps": [],
    "excluded": [],
    "unlinked": [],
    "critical": [],
    "significant": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0019",
        "n": 2,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Documents and serial numbers can be forged",
        "classification": "failure",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Avellar and Grunewald note that export documents can be forged, that companies can hide information behind obscure corporate structures, and that it may be possible to forge serial numbers on chips and racks. They recommend cryptographic attestation of a powered-on chip as an extra check.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1402"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "criticalMechanisms": [],
    "significantMechanisms": [
      "M-0019"
    ],
    "familyContext": [],
    "scopeLimitations": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0019",
        "n": 1,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Records cover only chips that were recorded",
        "classification": "scope-limitation",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "A registry or commitment accounts only for chips entered into it. Cankaya asks how a verifier would know it had found all chips, or how much \"dark compute\" remains, and notes that a fraudulent original record would mean unregistered chips had been made in advance. Halstead and Larsen propose reconstructing earlier production by auditing upstream suppliers.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1408",
          "S-1410"
        ],
        "helps": [
          {
            "by": "M-0020",
            "how": "Looks for large data centres that were never declared, which a registry cannot show."
          }
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0019",
        "n": 3,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Insiders could alter records before they are fixed",
        "classification": "scope-limitation",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Cankaya argues that insiders who can photograph process secrets could also tamper with production records. A commitment makes changes after publication detectable, but it cannot show that the records were accurate when committed.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1408"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0002",
        "n": 1,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Some kernels remain genuinely nondeterministic",
        "classification": "scope-limitation",
        "kind": "open-question",
        "severity": "minor",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "The bit-exact work separates kernels that are deterministic but not batch-invariant from truly nondeterministic ones that use atomic functions. Some integer de-quantization kernels use atomic additions and remain nondeterministic, so exact replay needs backends that avoid them.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0020"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0002",
        "n": 2,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Cross-hardware replay relies on reverse-engineered, closed behaviour",
        "classification": "scope-limitation",
        "kind": "open-question",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Emulating one GPU's rounding on another requires reverse-engineering tensor-core arithmetic and modelling proprietary kernel choices. Hawkeye covers a subset of NVIDIA architectures and states that attention and other higher-level operations need further reverse engineering. For the bit-exact emulator, a proprietary Hopper kernel family is an open edge case.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1010",
          "S-0020"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0022",
        "n": 2,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Openings for airflow, power and optics weaken shielding",
        "classification": "scope-limitation",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Cankaya notes that keeping attenuation high while passing high-power airflow, cabling and optical links adds complexity beyond existing shielded-enclosure specifications.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0038"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0020",
        "n": 1,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Facilities can be disguised or hidden",
        "classification": "scope-limitation",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Halstead and Larsen discuss two ways to hide a facility. One is to disguise it as a legitimate industrial site. The other is to build it underground, with cooling that avoids visible heat plumes. They note that the underground option requires bespoke engineering.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1410"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0020",
        "n": 2,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Small sites may not be detectable",
        "classification": "scope-limitation",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Halstead and Larsen conclude that a sufficiently small covert project could not be ruled out with confidence. In their estimates, the chance of detection is lower for smaller sites. Krawec notes that small data centres in existing buildings may lack the distinctive features of large facilities.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1410",
          "S-1409"
        ],
        "helps": [
          {
            "by": "M-0019",
            "how": "Accounts for chips from the fab onwards, which does not depend on a site being visible."
          }
        ]
      }
    ],
    "openQuestions": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0022",
        "n": 1,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Supply-chain implants may evade inspection",
        "classification": "open-question",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Cankaya identifies malicious hardware embedded deep in purchased components as a residual risk that visual inspection and disassembly may not catch. He notes that radiographic examination under high-security standards could mitigate it.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0038"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0022",
        "n": 3,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Inspection assumptions may not hold",
        "classification": "open-question",
        "kind": "open-question",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "The design's statistical argument assumes that visual or disassembly inspection catches every flaw that is present in a sampled unit. Cankaya is unsure whether destructive teardowns are defence-dominant or offence-dominant.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0038"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0020",
        "n": 3,
        "historical": false,
        "title": "Search for unknown sites is undemonstrated",
        "classification": "open-question",
        "kind": "open-question",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Krawec reports that telling data centres apart from other industrial facilities systematically is difficult. Automating detection would need large amounts of training imagery and a purpose-trained model. In Krawec's words, automated data-centre detection \"remains primarily conceptual at present\".",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1409"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "minor": 0,
    "minorFindings": [],
    "minorBy": [],
    "notDemonstrated": [
      "M-0019",
      "M-0022",
      "M-0020"
    ],
    "newChip": []
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "mech": "M-0019",
      "record": "M-0019",
      "n": 1,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Records cover only chips that were recorded",
      "classification": "scope-limitation",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "A registry or commitment accounts only for chips entered into it. Cankaya asks how a verifier would know it had found all chips, or how much \"dark compute\" remains, and notes that a fraudulent original record would mean unregistered chips had been made in advance. Halstead and Larsen propose reconstructing earlier production by auditing upstream suppliers.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1408",
        "S-1410"
      ],
      "helps": [
        {
          "by": "M-0020",
          "how": "Looks for large data centres that were never declared, which a registry cannot show."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0019",
      "record": "M-0019",
      "n": 2,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Documents and serial numbers can be forged",
      "classification": "failure",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Avellar and Grunewald note that export documents can be forged, that companies can hide information behind obscure corporate structures, and that it may be possible to forge serial numbers on chips and racks. They recommend cryptographic attestation of a powered-on chip as an extra check.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1402"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0019",
      "record": "M-0019",
      "n": 3,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Insiders could alter records before they are fixed",
      "classification": "scope-limitation",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Cankaya argues that insiders who can photograph process secrets could also tamper with production records. A commitment makes changes after publication detectable, but it cannot show that the records were accurate when committed.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1408"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0002",
      "record": "M-0002",
      "n": 1,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Some kernels remain genuinely nondeterministic",
      "classification": "scope-limitation",
      "kind": "open-question",
      "severity": "minor",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "The bit-exact work separates kernels that are deterministic but not batch-invariant from truly nondeterministic ones that use atomic functions. Some integer de-quantization kernels use atomic additions and remain nondeterministic, so exact replay needs backends that avoid them.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-0020"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0002",
      "record": "M-0002",
      "n": 2,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Cross-hardware replay relies on reverse-engineered, closed behaviour",
      "classification": "scope-limitation",
      "kind": "open-question",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Emulating one GPU's rounding on another requires reverse-engineering tensor-core arithmetic and modelling proprietary kernel choices. Hawkeye covers a subset of NVIDIA architectures and states that attention and other higher-level operations need further reverse engineering. For the bit-exact emulator, a proprietary Hopper kernel family is an open edge case.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1010",
        "S-0020"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0022",
      "record": "M-0022",
      "n": 1,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Supply-chain implants may evade inspection",
      "classification": "open-question",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Cankaya identifies malicious hardware embedded deep in purchased components as a residual risk that visual inspection and disassembly may not catch. He notes that radiographic examination under high-security standards could mitigate it.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-0038"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0022",
      "record": "M-0022",
      "n": 2,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Openings for airflow, power and optics weaken shielding",
      "classification": "scope-limitation",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Cankaya notes that keeping attenuation high while passing high-power airflow, cabling and optical links adds complexity beyond existing shielded-enclosure specifications.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-0038"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0022",
      "record": "M-0022",
      "n": 3,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Inspection assumptions may not hold",
      "classification": "open-question",
      "kind": "open-question",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "The design's statistical argument assumes that visual or disassembly inspection catches every flaw that is present in a sampled unit. Cankaya is unsure whether destructive teardowns are defence-dominant or offence-dominant.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-0038"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0020",
      "record": "M-0020",
      "n": 1,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Facilities can be disguised or hidden",
      "classification": "scope-limitation",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Halstead and Larsen discuss two ways to hide a facility. One is to disguise it as a legitimate industrial site. The other is to build it underground, with cooling that avoids visible heat plumes. They note that the underground option requires bespoke engineering.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1410"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0020",
      "record": "M-0020",
      "n": 2,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Small sites may not be detectable",
      "classification": "scope-limitation",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Halstead and Larsen conclude that a sufficiently small covert project could not be ruled out with confidence. In their estimates, the chance of detection is lower for smaller sites. Krawec notes that small data centres in existing buildings may lack the distinctive features of large facilities.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1410",
        "S-1409"
      ],
      "helps": [
        {
          "by": "M-0019",
          "how": "Accounts for chips from the fab onwards, which does not depend on a site being visible."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0020",
      "record": "M-0020",
      "n": 3,
      "historical": false,
      "title": "Search for unknown sites is undemonstrated",
      "classification": "open-question",
      "kind": "open-question",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Krawec reports that telling data centres apart from other industrial facilities systematically is difficult. Automating detection would need large amounts of training imagery and a purpose-trained model. In Krawec's words, automated data-centre detection \"remains primarily conceptual at present\".",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-1409"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "possible_additions": [],
  "goal": null,
  "design": null,
  "dependencies": {
    "prerequisites": [],
    "shared": [],
    "blockers": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0019",
        "n": 1,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "No implementation of an AI chip registry has been publicly reported, and covering re-exports would need cooperation from re-exporters and foreign governments that may not be feasible everywhere.",
        "theme": "access-governance",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1402",
          "S-0002"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0019",
        "n": 2,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "Linking records to physical chips needs hard-to-spoof unique IDs and inspections.",
        "theme": "hardware-trust",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0002",
          "S-1402",
          "S-1408"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0019",
        "n": 3,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "Chips produced before a registry starts must be reconstructed from supplier records.",
        "theme": "coverage-hidden-compute",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1408",
          "S-1410"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0002",
        "n": 1,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "Batch-invariant kernels cost throughput: in Thinking Machines' Qwen3-8B test, an improved deterministic build took 42 s against 26 s for vLLM's default, and SGLang reports an average 34.35% slowdown on its FlashInfer and FlashAttention 3 backends.",
        "theme": "performance-compatibility",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1009",
          "S-1012"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0002",
        "n": 2,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "Coverage is incomplete: the bit-exact emulator targets dense blocks on NVIDIA GPUs and excludes mixture-of-experts inference and training, and vLLM's batch-invariant mode is in beta, with open work on AMD hardware and speculative decoding.",
        "theme": "performance-compatibility",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0020",
          "S-1013",
          "S-1814"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0002",
        "n": 3,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "Amodo's status page for the AI 2040 verification plan rates a reproducible inference stack for that plan as 'not started'.",
        "theme": "performance-compatibility",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1008"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0002",
        "n": 4,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "Exact replay requires the prover to disclose weights, software versions, parallelism and batch sizes to whoever recomputes.",
        "theme": "privacy-leakage",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0020",
          "S-0018"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0022",
        "n": 1,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "No prototype or red-team exists; the design is a first-pass viability study.",
        "theme": "adversarial-validation",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0038"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0022",
        "n": 2,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "Volume costs of TEMPEST-grade power-line filters are uncertain, because existing products are mostly made to order.",
        "theme": "performance-compatibility",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0038"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0020",
        "n": 1,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "Wide-area, automated detection of data centres is not yet practical and needs large training datasets.",
        "theme": "coverage-hidden-compute",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1409"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0020",
        "n": 2,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "No measured detection or false-alarm rates for finding undeclared facilities have been published.",
        "theme": "adversarial-validation",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1410",
          "S-1409"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0020",
        "n": 3,
        "historical": false,
        "text": "Recent high-resolution imagery is costly, is limited by weather and needs trained analysts.",
        "theme": "access-governance",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1409"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      }
    ]
  },
  "exposure": {
    "weights": {
      "shown": [],
      "partial": [
        "M-0002"
      ],
      "hidden": [],
      "none": [
        "M-0019",
        "M-0022",
        "M-0020"
      ],
      "unknown": []
    },
    "io": {
      "shown": [],
      "partial": [
        "M-0002"
      ],
      "hidden": [],
      "none": [
        "M-0019",
        "M-0022",
        "M-0020"
      ],
      "unknown": []
    },
    "training": {
      "shown": [],
      "partial": [],
      "hidden": [],
      "none": [
        "M-0019",
        "M-0002",
        "M-0022",
        "M-0020"
      ],
      "unknown": []
    }
  },
  "implementations": [
    {
      "mechanism": "M-0019",
      "selected": null,
      "implementations": []
    },
    {
      "mechanism": "M-0002",
      "selected": null,
      "implementations": [
        {
          "id": "I-0016",
          "title": "Batch-invariant inference kernels (Thinking Machines)",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/batch-invariant-inference-kernels/"
        },
        {
          "id": "I-0015",
          "title": "Verde and RepOps (Gensyn)",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/gensyn-verde-repops/"
        },
        {
          "id": "I-0012",
          "title": "Low-trust AI compute verification system overview",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/low-trust-compute-verification-system-overview/"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "mechanism": "M-0022",
      "selected": null,
      "implementations": [
        {
          "id": "I-0011",
          "title": "AI 2040 inference-only verification stack",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/ai-2040-inference-only-verification-plan/"
        },
        {
          "id": "I-0012",
          "title": "Low-trust AI compute verification system overview",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/low-trust-compute-verification-system-overview/"
        },
        {
          "id": "I-0010",
          "title": "RAND secure inference data center (SIDC) design",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/rand-secure-inference-data-centers/"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "mechanism": "M-0020",
      "selected": null,
      "implementations": []
    }
  ],
  "sources": [
    {
      "id": "S-0002",
      "title": "Verifying International Agreements on AI: Six Layers of Verification for Rules on Large-Scale AI Development and Deployment",
      "authors": "M. Baker et al.",
      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WRA4077-1.html",
      "path": "/sources/baker-verifying-international-agreements-ai/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1402",
      "title": "Near-Term Verification Methods for AI Chip Exports",
      "authors": "B. Avellar & E. Grunewald",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://www.iaps.ai/research/near-term-verification-methods-for-ai-chip-exports",
      "path": "/sources/avellar-near-term-verification-ai-chip-exports/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1408",
      "title": "TSMC most definitely has a golden record of all AI chips it made",
      "authors": "N. Cankaya",
      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://nacicankaya.substack.com/p/tsmc-most-definitely-has-a-golden",
      "path": "/sources/cankaya-tsmc-golden-record/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0007",
      "title": "Hardware-Level Governance of AI Compute: A Feasibility Taxonomy for Regulatory Compliance and Treaty Verification",
      "authors": "S. Ansari",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.04712",
      "path": "/sources/ansari-hardware-level-governance-ai-compute/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1410",
      "title": "Covert AI Projects",
      "authors": "B. Halstead & T. Larsen",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://ai-2040.com/supplements/covert-ai-projects",
      "path": "/sources/halstead-covert-ai-projects/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0020",
      "title": "Bit-Exact AI Inference Verification Without Performance Tradeoffs",
      "authors": "N. Cankaya",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.00279",
      "path": "/sources/cankaya-bit-exact-inference-verification/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1009",
      "title": "Defeating Nondeterminism in LLM Inference",
      "authors": "H. He & Thinking Machines Lab",
      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://thinkingmachines.ai/blog/defeating-nondeterminism-in-llm-inference/",
      "path": "/sources/he-defeating-nondeterminism-llm-inference/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1010",
      "title": "Hawkeye: Reproducing GPU-Level Non-Determinism",
      "authors": "E. Badash et al.",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://proceedings.mlsys.org/paper_files/paper/2026/hash/e217c271a57c365a246b0ad39e668ba8-Abstract-Conference.html",
      "path": "/sources/badash-hawkeye/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1012",
      "title": "Towards Deterministic Inference in SGLang and Reproducible RL Training",
      "authors": "The SGLang Team",
      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://www.lmsys.org/blog/2025-09-22-sglang-deterministic/",
      "path": "/sources/sglang-deterministic-inference/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1013",
      "title": "Batch Invariance (vLLM documentation)",
      "authors": "vLLM project",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/main/docs/features/batch_invariance.md",
      "path": "/sources/vllm-batch-invariance-docs/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1812",
      "title": "gensyn-ai/ree: Gensyn Reproducible Execution Environment (GitHub repository)",
      "authors": "Gensyn",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://github.com/gensyn-ai/ree",
      "path": "/sources/gensyn-ree-code/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-3021",
      "title": "EigenCloud Brings Verifiable AI to Mass Market with EigenAI and EigenCompute Launches",
      "authors": "EigenCloud",
      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://www.eigenlabs.org/blog/eigencloud-brings-verifiable-ai-to-mass-market-with-eigenai-and-eigencompute-launches/",
      "path": "/sources/eigencloud-eigenai-launch/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-3022",
      "title": "Building Delphi: Pricing, Settlement, and Agentic Trading",
      "authors": "D. Jedamski",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://www.gensyn.ai/blog/building-delphi-pricing-settlement-and-agentic-trading",
      "path": "/sources/gensyn-building-delphi/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-3023",
      "title": "Reproducible Execution Environment (REE) (Gensyn documentation)",
      "authors": "Gensyn",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://docs.gensyn.ai/tech",
      "path": "/sources/gensyn-ree-docs/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0075",
      "title": "What is Delphi? (Delphi documentation)",
      "authors": "Gensyn",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://docs.delphi.fyi/",
      "path": "/sources/gensyn-delphi-documentation/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0018",
      "title": "A System Overview for Near-Term, Low-Trust AI Compute Verification",
      "authors": "N. Cankaya",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://intelligence.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/A-system-overview-for-near-term-low-trust-AI-compute-verification.pdf",
      "path": "/sources/cankaya-system-overview-low-trust-compute-verification/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0038",
      "title": "Suppressing Side Channels in an Untrusted Data Center via Retrofitted Defenses",
      "authors": "N. Cankaya",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://techgov.intelligence.org/blog/suppressing-side-channels-in-an-untrusted-data-center-via-retrofitted-defenses",
      "path": "/sources/cankaya-suppressing-side-channels/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1409",
      "title": "Tracking Hyperscale AI Data Center Growth with Satellite Imagery",
      "authors": "C. Krawec",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://fas.org/publication/tracking-hyperscale/",
      "path": "/sources/krawec-tracking-hyperscale-satellite-imagery/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1411",
      "title": "Introducing the Frontier Data Centers Hub",
      "authors": "Epoch AI",
      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://epoch.ai/latest/introducing-the-frontier-data-centers-hub",
      "path": "/sources/epoch-frontier-data-centers-hub/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-3301",
      "title": "AI Data Centers Documentation – Methodology",
      "authors": "Epoch AI",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://epoch.ai/data/data-centers-documentation/methodology",
      "path": "/sources/epoch-data-centers-methodology/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1814",
      "title": "[Feature]: Batch Invariant Feature and Performance Optimization (vLLM issue #27433)",
      "authors": "vLLM project contributors",
      "year": 2025,
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/issues/27433",
      "path": "/sources/vllm-batch-invariance-tracking-issue/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1008",
      "title": "AI 2040 Plan A — Verification SITREP",
      "authors": "Amodo Design",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://amododesign.com/ai-verification/plan-a-sitrep/",
      "path": "/sources/amodo-plan-a-verification-sitrep/"
    }
  ]
}