{
  "schema_version": "1.2",
  "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/explorer/?mechanisms=M-0022,M-0003&prover=semi-trusted",
  "data_generated": "2026-10-08",
  "definitions": {
    "methodology": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/methodology/",
    "readiness": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/readiness/",
    "filters": [
      {
        "id": "prover",
        "label": "Prover",
        "question": "How far can the party being checked be trusted?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "cooperative",
            "label": "Cooperative"
          },
          {
            "value": "semi-trusted",
            "label": "Semi-trusted"
          },
          {
            "value": "adversarial",
            "label": "Adversarial"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose threat model holds against at least this prover. Adversarial is the strongest assumption.",
        "about": "The prover is the party being checked. Semi-trusted designs rely on part of its stack: usually the chip vendor's hardware root of trust, its firmware or counters, or its supply-chain records. Adversarial designs aim to hold even if it cheats wherever the checks allow, within their stated assumptions."
      },
      {
        "id": "onsite",
        "label": "Verifier devices on site",
        "question": "May the verifier install its own hardware at the prover's sites?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "no",
            "label": "Not allowed"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Not allowed\" removes mechanisms that need a retrofit device, such as a network tap or a sealed sensor.",
        "about": "Some mechanisms need a device the verifier owns or trusts at the prover's facility, such as a network tap, a bandwidth limiter or a sealed sensor. Choose Not allowed when the setting rules that out. Inspectors are not covered."
      },
      {
        "id": "coop",
        "label": "Prover cooperation",
        "question": "How much must the prover take part?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "partial",
            "label": "Partial at most"
          },
          {
            "value": "none",
            "label": "Not required"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Partial at most\" removes mechanisms that need the prover's active participation. \"Not required\" keeps only those that work without it.",
        "about": "Required: the prover takes part, for example by logging requests, producing proofs or opening records. Partial: some access, such as installing a device. Not required: works from outside, such as satellite imagery."
      },
      {
        "id": "chips",
        "label": "Chips",
        "question": "May the proposal depend on new chip designs?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "existing",
            "label": "Existing chips only"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "\"Existing chips only\" removes mechanisms that need changes to future chip designs.",
        "about": "New chip features take years to reach a deployed fleet and cover only chips made after they ship. Mechanisms that use shipping features, such as trusted execution environments or performance counters, stay."
      },
      {
        "id": "ready",
        "label": "Minimum readiness",
        "question": "How mature must each mechanism be?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "R1",
            "label": "R1 Proposed"
          },
          {
            "value": "R2",
            "label": "R2 Demonstrated"
          },
          {
            "value": "R3",
            "label": "R3 In production"
          },
          {
            "value": "R4",
            "label": "R4 Deployment-ready"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose readiness level is at least this one.",
        "about": "A level describes the public evidence for a mechanism's stated use, not its cost or feasibility. R3 can still have open critical flaws."
      },
      {
        "id": "tested",
        "label": "Attack testing",
        "question": "How hard has each mechanism been attacked in public?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "analysis",
            "label": "Published analysis"
          },
          {
            "value": "red-teamed",
            "label": "Red-teamed"
          },
          {
            "value": "independent-red-team",
            "label": "Independent red-team"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Keeps mechanisms whose strongest published attack testing is at least this.",
        "about": "The strongest published attempt to break the mechanism for its verification use: a security analysis, red-teaming by its developers or collaborators, or a red team independent of them."
      },
      {
        "id": "hide",
        "label": "Keep hidden from the verifier",
        "question": "What must the verifier never see?",
        "options": [
          {
            "value": "weights",
            "label": "Model weights"
          },
          {
            "value": "io",
            "label": "Inputs and outputs"
          },
          {
            "value": "training",
            "label": "Training data"
          }
        ],
        "rule": "Removes mechanisms that show the asset to the verifier. Conditional or unspecified exposure stays with a note and needs checking against the privacy requirement.",
        "about": "Model weights: the checked model's parameters. Inputs and outputs: the requests a deployed model serves and its responses. Training data: what a model was trained on. Each mechanism's exposure is the editors' reading of its record: shown, depends on the design (kept, with a note), hidden, not involved, or unspecified for a selected implementation. Code and configuration are not covered yet."
      }
    ],
    "exposure": "For model weights, inputs and outputs, and training data. This is the editors' reading of each mechanism's record (its threat model, how it works and its limitations), not a field of the record. Shown: the verifier sees it. Depends: on the design or variant, or the verifier sees only samples. Hidden: the verifier sees only commitments, hashes, proofs or results. Not involved: the record does not handle it. Unspecified: the selected implementation has no asset-specific assessment here.",
    "claim_status": {
      "addressed": "A mechanism in the proposal is aimed at this claim and is not excluded by the filters.",
      "partly-addressed": "Only supporting mechanisms, or mechanisms aimed at it that the filters exclude.",
      "unaddressed": "No mechanism in the proposal addresses this claim."
    },
    "finding_scope": "Evidence scope describes where a finding was demonstrated; it does not establish applicability to every implementation in the mechanism family.",
    "claim_finding_scope": "open_critical_findings names active findings on the assessed records; open_critical_context names conditional family findings whose implementation applicability is unassessed.",
    "legacy_status": "The status field retains covered/partial/none for compatibility. It names claim links, never successful verification. Use claim_status and status_label for presentation."
  },
  "filters": {
    "prover": "semi-trusted",
    "onsite": "",
    "coop": "",
    "chips": "",
    "ready": "",
    "tested": "",
    "hide": []
  },
  "mechanisms_passing_filters": 25,
  "claims": [],
  "mechanisms": [
    {
      "id": "M-0022",
      "title": "Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/side-channel-suppression/",
      "assessment_record": {
        "id": "M-0022",
        "title": "Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/side-channel-suppression/"
      },
      "selected_implementation": null,
      "readiness": {
        "level": "R1",
        "scope": "bounding physical covert channels out of a verified enclosure",
        "confidence": "medium",
        "evidence": [
          "S-0038"
        ]
      },
      "assessed_properties": {
        "threat_model": "adversarial",
        "hardware_requirement": "retrofit-device",
        "prover_cooperation": "partial",
        "adversarial_evaluation": "analysis"
      },
      "claims": [],
      "exposure": {
        "weights": "none",
        "io": "none",
        "training": "none",
        "note": "Shields and filters a facility; it does not handle model data."
      },
      "family_finding_context": [],
      "filter_issues": []
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0003",
      "title": "Whole-workload recomputation (reproducible packets)",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/reproducible-computation-packets/",
      "assessment_record": {
        "id": "M-0003",
        "title": "Whole-workload recomputation (reproducible packets)",
        "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/reproducible-computation-packets/"
      },
      "selected_implementation": null,
      "readiness": {
        "level": "R1",
        "scope": "recomputing whole workloads to show a cluster runs only declared inference",
        "confidence": "medium",
        "evidence": [
          "S-0067",
          "S-0017",
          "S-1006",
          "S-1008",
          "S-1511",
          "S-0027"
        ]
      },
      "assessed_properties": {
        "threat_model": "adversarial",
        "hardware_requirement": "retrofit-device",
        "prover_cooperation": "required",
        "adversarial_evaluation": "none"
      },
      "claims": [],
      "exposure": {
        "weights": "partial",
        "io": "partial",
        "training": "partial",
        "note": "Recomputing sampled units needs weights and sampled inputs or training data inside the checking environment. The design depends on securing that environment; disclosure depends on its confidentiality boundary.",
        "sources": [
          "S-0017",
          "S-0067"
        ]
      },
      "family_finding_context": [],
      "filter_issues": []
    }
  ],
  "strengths": {
    "covered": [],
    "production": [],
    "adversarial": [
      "M-0022",
      "M-0003"
    ],
    "noNewHardware": [],
    "mitigated": [],
    "notCounted": []
  },
  "properties": {
    "covered": [],
    "production": [],
    "adversarial": [
      "M-0022",
      "M-0003"
    ],
    "noNewHardware": [],
    "mitigated": [],
    "notCounted": []
  },
  "attack_testing": [
    {
      "id": "M-0022",
      "record": "M-0022",
      "evaluation": "analysis",
      "in_setting": true
    }
  ],
  "selected_implementations": {},
  "weaknesses": {
    "gaps": [],
    "excluded": [],
    "unlinked": [],
    "critical": [],
    "significant": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0022",
        "n": 1,
        "title": "Supply-chain implants may evade inspection",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Cankaya identifies malicious hardware embedded deep in purchased components as a residual risk that visual inspection and disassembly may not catch. He notes that radiographic examination under high-security standards could mitigate it.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0038"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0022",
        "n": 2,
        "title": "Openings for airflow, power and optics weaken shielding",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "Cankaya notes that keeping attenuation high while passing high-power airflow, cabling and optical links adds complexity beyond existing shielded-enclosure specifications.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0038"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0022",
        "n": 3,
        "title": "Inspection assumptions may not hold",
        "kind": "open-question",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "The design's statistical argument assumes that visual or disassembly inspection catches every flaw that is present in a sampled unit. Cankaya is unsure whether destructive teardowns are defence-dominant or offence-dominant.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0038"
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0003",
        "n": 1,
        "title": "Spare compute is outside the scheme",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "The plan states that it does not verify that spare compute is not used for unapproved workloads, because this seems very challenging. Recomputation checks the correctness of declared work, not its completeness.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0067",
          "S-0017"
        ],
        "helps": [
          {
            "by": "M-0007",
            "how": "Proposed as one input to accounting for spare capacity on declared hardware."
          }
        ]
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0003",
        "n": 2,
        "title": "Non-compliant work could be encoded inside compliant-looking packets",
        "kind": "theoretical-argument",
        "severity": "significant",
        "status": "open",
        "evidence_scope": null,
        "scope_note": null,
        "related_finding": null,
        "description": "The plan notes that an AI company might try to encode a non-compliant workload inside a workload that looks compliant on the surface.",
        "response": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0067"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "criticalMechanisms": [],
    "significantMechanisms": [
      "M-0022",
      "M-0003"
    ],
    "familyContext": [],
    "minor": 0,
    "minorFindings": [],
    "minorBy": [],
    "notDemonstrated": [
      "M-0022",
      "M-0003"
    ],
    "newChip": []
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "mech": "M-0022",
      "record": "M-0022",
      "n": 1,
      "title": "Supply-chain implants may evade inspection",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Cankaya identifies malicious hardware embedded deep in purchased components as a residual risk that visual inspection and disassembly may not catch. He notes that radiographic examination under high-security standards could mitigate it.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-0038"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0022",
      "record": "M-0022",
      "n": 2,
      "title": "Openings for airflow, power and optics weaken shielding",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "Cankaya notes that keeping attenuation high while passing high-power airflow, cabling and optical links adds complexity beyond existing shielded-enclosure specifications.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-0038"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0022",
      "record": "M-0022",
      "n": 3,
      "title": "Inspection assumptions may not hold",
      "kind": "open-question",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "The design's statistical argument assumes that visual or disassembly inspection catches every flaw that is present in a sampled unit. Cankaya is unsure whether destructive teardowns are defence-dominant or offence-dominant.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-0038"
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0003",
      "record": "M-0003",
      "n": 1,
      "title": "Spare compute is outside the scheme",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "The plan states that it does not verify that spare compute is not used for unapproved workloads, because this seems very challenging. Recomputation checks the correctness of declared work, not its completeness.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-0067",
        "S-0017"
      ],
      "helps": [
        {
          "by": "M-0007",
          "how": "Proposed as one input to accounting for spare capacity on declared hardware."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "mech": "M-0003",
      "record": "M-0003",
      "n": 2,
      "title": "Non-compliant work could be encoded inside compliant-looking packets",
      "kind": "theoretical-argument",
      "severity": "significant",
      "status": "open",
      "evidence_scope": null,
      "scope_note": null,
      "related_finding": null,
      "description": "The plan notes that an AI company might try to encode a non-compliant workload inside a workload that looks compliant on the surface.",
      "response": null,
      "sources": [
        "S-0067"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "possible_additions": [
    {
      "id": "M-0007",
      "title": "Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/proofs-of-useful-work/",
      "readiness": "R1",
      "fits_filters": true,
      "filter_issues": [],
      "reasons": [
        {
          "kind": "flaw",
          "mech": "M-0003",
          "n": 1,
          "title": "Spare compute is outside the scheme",
          "severity": "significant",
          "how": "Proposed as one input to accounting for spare capacity on declared hardware."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0002",
      "title": "Deterministic and bit-exact inference",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/deterministic-inference/",
      "readiness": "R3",
      "fits_filters": true,
      "filter_issues": [],
      "reasons": [
        {
          "kind": "blocker",
          "mech": "M-0003",
          "text": "Workloads are not reproducible by default, and achieving reproducibility may cost performance."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "M-0013",
      "title": "Network taps and certifiers",
      "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/network-taps-and-certifiers/",
      "readiness": "R1",
      "fits_filters": true,
      "filter_issues": [],
      "reasons": [
        {
          "kind": "blocker",
          "mech": "M-0003",
          "text": "All traffic must reach the recomputation server via network taps, and the server's integrity is critical."
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "goal": null,
  "design": null,
  "dependencies": {
    "prerequisites": [
      {
        "id": "M-0002",
        "neededBy": [
          "M-0003"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "M-0013",
        "neededBy": [
          "M-0003"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "shared": [],
    "blockers": [
      {
        "mech": "M-0022",
        "n": 1,
        "text": "No prototype or red-team exists; the design is a first-pass viability study.",
        "theme": "adversarial-validation",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0038"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0022",
        "n": 2,
        "text": "Volume costs of TEMPEST-grade power-line filters are uncertain, because existing products are mostly made to order.",
        "theme": "performance-compatibility",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0038"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0003",
        "n": 1,
        "text": "Workloads are not reproducible by default, and achieving reproducibility may cost performance.",
        "theme": "performance-compatibility",
        "blocked_by": "M-0002",
        "sources": [
          "S-0067"
        ],
        "inProposal": false
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0003",
        "n": 2,
        "text": "Network packets are not individually reproducible by default; making them so may need considerable software, firmware and hardware work. Amodo rates this 'not on track'.",
        "theme": "performance-compatibility",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-1008"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0003",
        "n": 3,
        "text": "All traffic must reach the recomputation server via network taps, and the server's integrity is critical.",
        "theme": "hardware-trust",
        "blocked_by": "M-0013",
        "sources": [
          "S-0067",
          "S-1008"
        ],
        "inProposal": false
      },
      {
        "mech": "M-0003",
        "n": 4,
        "text": "Recomputing training steps needs checkpoints: writing one at every step would cost more than 100% overhead, so Amodo's design needs a spare data-parallel replica that tracks the weights instead.",
        "theme": "performance-compatibility",
        "blocked_by": null,
        "sources": [
          "S-0017"
        ],
        "inProposal": null
      }
    ]
  },
  "exposure": {
    "weights": {
      "shown": [],
      "partial": [
        "M-0003"
      ],
      "hidden": [],
      "none": [
        "M-0022"
      ],
      "unknown": []
    },
    "io": {
      "shown": [],
      "partial": [
        "M-0003"
      ],
      "hidden": [],
      "none": [
        "M-0022"
      ],
      "unknown": []
    },
    "training": {
      "shown": [],
      "partial": [
        "M-0003"
      ],
      "hidden": [],
      "none": [
        "M-0022"
      ],
      "unknown": []
    }
  },
  "implementations": [
    {
      "mechanism": "M-0022",
      "selected": null,
      "implementations": [
        {
          "id": "I-0011",
          "title": "AI 2040 inference-only verification stack",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/ai-2040-inference-only-verification-plan/"
        },
        {
          "id": "I-0012",
          "title": "Low-trust AI compute verification system overview",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/low-trust-compute-verification-system-overview/"
        },
        {
          "id": "I-0010",
          "title": "RAND secure inference data center (SIDC) design",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/rand-secure-inference-data-centers/"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "mechanism": "M-0003",
      "selected": null,
      "implementations": [
        {
          "id": "I-0011",
          "title": "AI 2040 inference-only verification stack",
          "url": "https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/ai-2040-inference-only-verification-plan/"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "sources": [
    {
      "id": "S-0038",
      "title": "Suppressing Side Channels in an Untrusted Data Center via Retrofitted Defenses",
      "authors": "N. Cankaya",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://techgov.intelligence.org/blog/suppressing-side-channels-in-an-untrusted-data-center-via-retrofitted-defenses",
      "path": "/sources/cankaya-suppressing-side-channels/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0067",
      "title": "Verification Plan",
      "authors": "R. Dean",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://ai-2040.com/supplements/verification-plan",
      "path": "/sources/dean-verification-plan/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0017",
      "title": "Example Schemes for Verifying High-Stakes AI Agreements",
      "authors": "Amodo Design",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://amododesign.com/notes/2026-06-23-verification-algorithms/",
      "path": "/sources/amodo-example-schemes-high-stakes-ai-agreements/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1006",
      "title": "Scaling Recomputation Inference Verification",
      "authors": "Amodo Design",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://amododesign.com/notes/2026-09-02-scaling-recomputation-inference-verification/",
      "path": "/sources/amodo-scaling-recomputation-inference-verification/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1008",
      "title": "AI 2040 Plan A — Verification SITREP",
      "authors": "Amodo Design",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://amododesign.com/ai-verification/plan-a-sitrep/",
      "path": "/sources/amodo-plan-a-verification-sitrep/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-1511",
      "title": "Get Involved in Verification",
      "authors": "AI Futures Project",
      "year": 2026,
      "url": "https://ai-2040.com/supplements/verification-plan/get-involved",
      "path": "/sources/ai-futures-get-involved-verification/"
    },
    {
      "id": "S-0027",
      "title": "Proof-of-Learning is Currently More Broken Than You Think",
      "authors": "C. Fang et al.",
      "year": 2023,
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2208.03567",
      "path": "/sources/fang-proof-of-learning-broken/"
    }
  ]
}