# AI verification proposal A proposal built with the Proposal Explorer of the AI Verification Tech Map (https://trustbutveri.fyi/), from its records of 2026-10-09. Interactive version: https://trustbutveri.fyi/explorer/?mechanisms=M-0015,M-0007&hide=io How to read it: a claim is something one party wants to verify about another's AI hardware or software. A mechanism is a general technique for verifying claims; it is "aimed at" a claim when that is its direct purpose, and "supporting" when it contributes without being aimed at it. A claim is addressed when a mechanism in the proposal is aimed at it and is not excluded by the filters; addressed does not mean verified, so check that mechanism's development status, security evidence and findings. Definitions: https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/methodology/ (roles, properties and findings) and https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/readiness/ (development status). ## Filters Filters apply to mechanisms only and describe the setting the proposal is for. - **Keep hidden from the verifier: inputs and outputs.** Removes mechanisms that show the asset to the verifier. Conditional or unspecified exposure stays with a note and needs checking against the privacy requirement. Model weights: the checked model's parameters. Inputs and outputs: the requests a deployed model serves and its responses. Training data: what a model was trained on. Each mechanism's exposure is the editors' reading of its record: shown, depends on the design (kept, with a note), hidden, not involved, or unspecified for a selected implementation. Code and configuration are not covered yet. 24 of 25 mechanisms on the map pass these filters. ## Overview One row per mechanism, read from its record. Open failures: critical / significant / minor. The last three columns are the editors' reading of what the verifier sees. Findings are grouped as known failures, scope limitations and open questions. Only known failures count as failures. Counts are an inventory of published findings, not a risk score. | Mechanism | Development | Security evidence | Prover | Attack testing | Hardware | Open failures | Weights | Inputs and outputs | Training data | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure | Proposed | Published security analysis | Adversarial | Analysis | None | 0 / 1 / 0 | not involved | not involved | not involved | | Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting | Proposed | Published security analysis | Adversarial | Analysis | None | 0 / 1 / 0 | depends | depends | not involved | ## Claims No claims chosen. ## Mechanisms ### Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure Overwriting a device's memory in a way a verifier can check, so that data from earlier, undeclared work cannot persist in memory the wipe reaches. ([Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure](https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/memory-wiping-and-secure-erasure/)) - Assessment: mechanism family. - Development: Proposed (legacy code R1), assessed for showing that no data from earlier work persists in memory the wipe reaches. - Security evidence: Published security analysis. Independent evaluation: unassessed. Formal proof: unassessed. Deployment assurance: unassessed. - Claims in this proposal: none of them. - Threat model: adversarial prover. Hardware: none. Prover cooperation: required. Attack testing: analysis. Category: Isolation & system architectures. - What the verifier sees: model weights not involved; inputs and outputs not involved; training data not involved. Overwrites memory with verifier-chosen data; it does not handle model data. ### Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting Cryptographic evidence that a given amount of matrix-multiplication work was completed, proposed as one input to bounding how much spare capacity declared hardware has. ([Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting](https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/proofs-of-useful-work/)) - Assessment: mechanism family. - Development: Proposed (legacy code R1), assessed for bounding the spare capacity of declared hardware that could run training. - Security evidence: Published security analysis. Independent evaluation: unassessed. Formal proof: unassessed. Deployment assurance: unassessed. - Claims in this proposal: none of them. - Threat model: adversarial prover. Hardware: none. Prover cooperation: required. Attack testing: analysis. Category: Cryptographic & computational. - What the verifier sees: model weights depends; inputs and outputs depends; training data not involved. Checking a sampled tile of a matrix multiplication reveals that tile, which may hold model or input data; the authors suggest a zero-knowledge proof when the matrices must stay private. - Filter note: May show inputs and outputs, depending on the design. Checking a sampled tile of a matrix multiplication reveals that tile, which may hold model or input data; the authors suggest a zero-knowledge proof when the matrices must stay private. ## Properties **Built for an adversarial prover** - Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure - Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting **No new hardware needed** - Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure - Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting ## Attack testing Attack testing records published testing for this use. It does not by itself show independent review, a formal proof or that a deployed system is secure. **Testing history** - Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure: Analysis - Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting: Analysis ## Limits **Open significant failures** - Outside help during challenges (known failure, theoretical argument, in Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/memory-wiping-and-secure-erasure/evidence/flaws/2/) [3][4]. Classic proofs of secure erasure assume the device is isolated during the protocol. Bursuc et al. relax this to a bound on how close a helper can be, enforced by round-trip times. In data centres, remote memory access has round trips of about 1–2 µs, against about 70–200 ns for local DRAM. The MIRI overview therefore says verification depends on ruling out RDMA by latency or physical disconnection. Related mechanism: Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges (R2, not in the proposal). Timed challenges bound how far away a helper can be by how quickly it must answer. Related mechanism: Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization (R2, not in the proposal). Removing or capping links between groups of accelerators limits remote memory access during a challenge. - Known shortcuts let a miner claim somewhat more work than it did (known failure, theoretical argument, in Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/proofs-of-useful-work/evidence/flaws/3/) [12]. Pearl's specification lists known mining speedups: crafted inputs, precision shortcuts, seed grinding, work reuse, and faster kernels or hardware. A policy check caps the summands a miner may skip at one-sixteenth of those in a tile. For capacity bounding, any gap between work proven and work possible leaves spare capacity. **Scope limitations** - Memory the wipe cannot reach (scope limitation, open question, in Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/memory-wiping-and-secure-erasure/evidence/flaws/1/) [5][6]. Amodo's inventory of a GB200 system lists many memory stores beyond GPU HBM and host DRAM. It notes that SSD controller DRAM sits on a private bus that host commands cannot read or write, and that its optimized algorithm leaves 25 GiB of HBM unattested. It also asks how switch memory could be wiped. - Gap between erased and total memory (scope limitation, theoretical argument, in Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/memory-wiping-and-secure-erasure/evidence/flaws/3/) [3]. Bursuc et al. note that memory left between the erased region and the device's full memory could hold data, and that their bounds are tighter only against a restricted adversary. - Proves that work was done, not that no capacity remains (scope limitation, theoretical argument, in Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/proofs-of-useful-work/evidence/flaws/1/) [9]. Proof-of-work accounting bounds unmonitored compute only relative to an estimate of what the actor has. Attestable states that the verifier "needs a credible estimate of the compute available" to the actor, and that a proof "cannot discover a datacenter that was never declared". Related mechanism: Chip registries and manufacturing records (R1, not in the proposal). A registry of chips is one basis for the estimate of available compute that the flaw's source says the verifier needs. Related mechanism: Remote detection of data centres (R1, not in the proposal). Looks for data centres that were never declared, which a proof cannot discover. **Open questions** - Security rests on new hardness assumptions (open question, open question, in Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/proofs-of-useful-work/evidence/flaws/2/) [11][12]. Komargodski and Weinstein base security on hardness assumptions about batches of low-rank random linear equations, and list PoUW "from more standard or well-studied assumptions" as an open problem. Pearl's floating-point variant introduces a further "quantized-subspace hardness" assumption. **Not yet demonstrated** - Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure: Proposed (legacy code R1), assessed for showing that no data from earlier work persists in memory the wipe reaches - Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting: Proposed (legacy code R1), assessed for bounding the spare capacity of declared hardware that could run training ## Possible additions Mechanisms on the map, not in the proposal, that the records connect to an unaddressed or partly addressed claim, an open failure or a dependency. Pointers, not recommendations: each brings its own readiness level and findings, and none is claimed to close a failure. - **Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization** (Research demonstration (legacy code R2), assessed for monitoring inter-node traffic with operator-run software on four GPUs) - Bears on the open significant failure "Outside help during challenges" in Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure. Removing or capping links between groups of accelerators limits remote memory access during a challenge. - **Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges** (Research demonstration (legacy code R2), assessed for detecting whether a GPU is doing other work) - Bears on the open significant failure "Outside help during challenges" in Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure. Timed challenges bound how far away a helper can be by how quickly it must answer. - Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure waits on it: Timed challenges must exclude remote memory and other helpers. ## Dependencies **Missing prerequisites** - Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges (Research demonstration (legacy code R2), assessed for detecting whether a GPU is doing other work), needed by Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure **Blockers** - Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure: Wipes take time: tens of minutes for a pod's volatile memory and hours for SSDs, displacing work. (performance & compatibility) [4][5][6] - Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure: Timed challenges must exclude remote memory and other helpers. (coverage & hidden compute; waits on Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges) [3][4] - Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure: All memory stores in a system must be inventoried and wiped at the same time. (coverage & hidden compute) [5] - Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting: Bounding spare capacity needs a credible estimate of the compute available to the actor, including third-party access. (capacity bounds) [9] - Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting: Proofs of work cannot find facilities that were never declared. (coverage & hidden compute) [9] - Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting: As of September 2026 no implementation, demonstration or independent evaluation of proofs of work for capacity bounding has been published. (adversarial validation) ## What the verifier sees - Model weights: shown by none; depends on the design for Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting; hidden by none; not involved in Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure; unspecified for none. - Inputs and outputs: shown by none; depends on the design for Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting; hidden by none; not involved in Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure; unspecified for none. - Training data: shown by none; depends on the design for none; hidden by none; not involved in Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure and Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting; unspecified for none. ## Implementations - Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure: [AI 2040 inference-only verification stack](https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/ai-2040-inference-only-verification-plan/) (R1, proposed architecture); [Low-trust AI compute verification system overview](https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/low-trust-compute-verification-system-overview/) (R1, proposed architecture) - Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting: [Pearl proof-of-useful-work blockchain](https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/pearl-proof-of-useful-work/) (R3, open-source project) ## Sources 1. Verification Plan, R. Dean (2026). https://ai-2040.com/supplements/verification-plan 2. Secure Code Update for Embedded Devices via Proofs of Secure Erasure, D. Perito & G. Tsudik (2010). https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-15497-3_39 3. Software-Based Memory Erasure with Relaxed Isolation Requirements, S. Bursuc et al. (2024). https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10664348/ 4. A System Overview for Near-Term, Low-Trust AI Compute Verification, N. Cankaya (2026). https://intelligence.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/A-system-overview-for-near-term-low-trust-AI-compute-verification.pdf 5. Memory Wipes - Performance Analysis, Amodo Design (2026). https://amododesign.com/notes/2026-07-01-memory-wiping/ 6. Improving Disk Wiping Speed for Memory Wipes, Amodo Design (2026). https://amododesign.com/notes/2026-09-14-disk-wiping-speed/ 7. Amodo-Design/PoSE-Memory-Wiping (GitHub repository), Amodo Design (2026). https://github.com/Amodo-Design/PoSE-Memory-Wiping 8. Empirical Evaluation of Memory-Erasure Protocols, R. Gil-Pons et al. (2025). https://www.scitepress.org/Papers/2025/135548/135548.pdf 9. Pacing AI Requires Proof, Attestable (2026). https://attestable.com/blog/pacing-ai-requires-proof 10. Mechanisms to Verify International Agreements About AI Development, A. Scher & L. Thiergart (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.15867 11. Proofs of Useful Work from Arbitrary Matrix Multiplication, I. Komargodski & O. Weinstein (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.09971 12. Pearl Floating Point Scheme Specification, Pearl Research Team (2026). https://pearlresearch.ai/Pearl_Whitepaper.pdf 13. pearl: Monorepo for the Pearl network, Pearl Research Labs (2026). https://github.com/pearl-research-labs/pearl