# AI verification proposal

A proposal built with the Proposal Explorer of the AI Verification Tech Map (https://trustbutveri.fyi/), from its records of 2026-10-09. Interactive version: https://trustbutveri.fyi/explorer/?mechanisms=M-0014,M-0009,M-0019&hide=weights

How to read it: a claim is something one party wants to verify about another's AI hardware or software. A mechanism is a general technique for verifying claims; it is "aimed at" a claim when that is its direct purpose, and "supporting" when it contributes without being aimed at it. A claim is addressed when a mechanism in the proposal is aimed at it and is not excluded by the filters; addressed does not mean verified, so check that mechanism's development status, security evidence and findings. Definitions: https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/methodology/ (roles, properties and findings) and https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/readiness/ (development status).

## Filters

Filters apply to mechanisms only and describe the setting the proposal is for.

- **Keep hidden from the verifier: model weights.** Removes mechanisms that show the asset to the verifier. Conditional or unspecified exposure stays with a note and needs checking against the privacy requirement. Model weights: the checked model's parameters. Inputs and outputs: the requests a deployed model serves and its responses. Training data: what a model was trained on. Each mechanism's exposure is the editors' reading of its record: shown, depends on the design (kept, with a note), hidden, not involved, or unspecified for a selected implementation. Code and configuration are not covered yet.

24 of 25 mechanisms on the map pass these filters.

## Overview

One row per mechanism, read from its record. Open failures: critical / significant / minor. The last three columns are the editors' reading of what the verifier sees. Findings are grouped as known failures, scope limitations and open questions. Only known failures count as failures. Counts are an inventory of published findings, not a risk score.

| Mechanism | Development | Security evidence | Prover | Attack testing | Hardware | Open failures | Weights | Inputs and outputs | Training data |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization | Research demonstration | Published security analysis | Adversarial | Analysis | Retrofit device | 0 / 2 / 0 | not involved | not involved | not involved |
| Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors | Proposed | Published security analysis | Adversarial | Analysis | New chip design | 0 / 3 / 0 | hidden | hidden | hidden |
| Chip registries and manufacturing records | Proposed | Published security analysis | Semi-trusted | Analysis | Existing features | 0 / 1 / 0 | not involved | not involved | not involved |

## Claims

No claims chosen.

## Mechanisms

### Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization

Capping or removing network links between groups of AI chips, so each group can serve models but large training runs across groups become far slower. ([Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization](https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/bandwidth-limits-and-compartmentalization/))

- Assessment: mechanism family.
- Development: Research demonstration (legacy code R2), assessed for monitoring inter-node traffic with operator-run software on four GPUs.
- Security evidence: Published security analysis. Independent evaluation: unassessed. Formal proof: unassessed. Deployment assurance: unassessed.
- Claims in this proposal: none of them.
- Threat model: adversarial prover. Hardware: retrofit device. Prover cooperation: required. Attack testing: analysis. Category: Isolation & system architectures.
- What the verifier sees: model weights not involved; inputs and outputs not involved; training data not involved. Caps traffic between groups of chips; it does not read the traffic's content.

### Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

A proposed add-on for AI chips: an auditable guarantee processor, sealed in a tamper-protected enclosure, that would check and enforce agreed rules on chip use. ([Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors](https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/))

- Assessment: mechanism family.
- Development: Proposed (legacy code R1), assessed for checking and enforcing training-compute limits on chips, against adversaries up to states.
- Security evidence: Published security analysis. Independent evaluation: unassessed. Formal proof: unassessed. Deployment assurance: unassessed.
- Claims in this proposal: none of them.
- Threat model: adversarial prover. Hardware: new chip design. Prover cooperation: required. Attack testing: analysis. Category: On-chip & hardware-enabled.
- What the verifier sees: model weights hidden; inputs and outputs hidden; training data hidden. The guarantee processor sees the chip's traffic inside a sealed enclosure and reports only whether rules were kept.

### Chip registries and manufacturing records

Recording each AI chip's identity and owner from the fab onwards, and cryptographically fixing manufacturing records, so that chips can be accounted for later. ([Chip registries and manufacturing records](https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-registries-and-manufacturing-records/))

- Assessment: mechanism family.
- Development: Proposed (legacy code R1), assessed for a checkable record of which chips were made and who declared owning them.
- Security evidence: Published security analysis. Independent evaluation: unassessed. Formal proof: unassessed. Deployment assurance: unassessed.
- Claims in this proposal: none of them.
- Threat model: semi-trusted prover. Hardware: existing features. Prover cooperation: required. Attack testing: analysis. Category: Compute accounting & provenance.
- What the verifier sees: model weights not involved; inputs and outputs not involved; training data not involved. Records chip identities and owners; it does not handle model data.


## Properties

**Built for an adversarial prover**

- Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

**No new hardware needed**

- Chip registries and manufacturing records


## Attack testing

Attack testing records published testing for this use. It does not by itself show independent review, a formal proof or that a deployed system is secure.

**Testing history**

- Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization: Analysis
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Analysis
- Chip registries and manufacturing records: Analysis


## Limits

**Open significant failures**

- Operator control of pod routing collapses the bound (known failure, theoretical argument, in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/bandwidth-limits-and-compartmentalization/evidence/flaws/2/) [2]. Lucid's analysis finds that if the operator can freely assign pods to routers, it could dedicate a whole cell of 100 or more pods to one pipeline stage. The bound then falls to about 90–220x uncompressed and as low as about 25x with compression. The proposed mitigation, auditor-controlled random assignment that is periodically re-randomized, has not been implemented.
- Parallel scale-up switches are hard enforcement points (known failure, theoretical argument, in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/bandwidth-limits-and-compartmentalization/evidence/flaws/5/) [5]. In GB200 topologies, GPUs reach GPUs in other nodes through NVSwitches without a NIC on the path. Amodo notes that limits are hard to enforce there because many switches work in parallel, so compromising one or two would bypass the limit.
- State attackers can likely defeat current secure enclosures (known failure, theoretical argument, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/evidence/flaws/1/) [9][11]. The flexHEG authors write that "nation-state attackers can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures", and that the marginal cost of circumvention per device is hard to estimate. RAND similarly judges that anti-tamper measures "would not be insurmountable for a determined and well-resourced adversary", although they raise costs and can reveal tampering.
- Firmware-only retrofits rely on Secure Boot, which fault injection can bypass (known failure, theoretical argument, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/evidence/flaws/2/) [9]. Part II notes that the most common attack on Secure Boot replaces the firmware and applies a voltage glitch while the signature is being checked. It also notes that sophisticated actors may use microprobing or laser voltage probing to read key registers.
- FLOP accounting can be laundered through external data (known failure, theoretical argument, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/evidence/flaws/4/) [9]. Results of earlier or parallel workloads could be hidden in the "external data" fed to a device, which would falsify the total FLOP count unless the inputs are explained or time delays are imposed.
- Documents and serial numbers can be forged (known failure, theoretical argument, in Chip registries and manufacturing records; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-registries-and-manufacturing-records/evidence/flaws/2/) [15]. Avellar and Grunewald note that export documents can be forged, that companies can hide information behind obscure corporate structures, and that it may be possible to forge serial numbers on chips and racks. They recommend cryptographic attestation of a powered-on chip as an extra check.

**Scope limitations**

- Undeclared local storage raises per-pod capacity (scope limitation, theoretical argument, in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/bandwidth-limits-and-compartmentalization/evidence/flaws/3/) [2]. More memory or storage per pod helps an adversary. Lucid requires per-pod storage to be declared, capped and physically inspected.
- Training within one pod is not covered (scope limitation, open question, in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/bandwidth-limits-and-compartmentalization/evidence/flaws/4/) [2]. Lucid's bounds concern pre-training models larger than the pods are sized for. Training models that fit in one pod, fine-tuning and reinforcement-learning post-training within one pod are outside the modelled threat.
- Many important rules cannot be checked on-chip (scope limitation, theoretical argument, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/evidence/flaws/3/) [8][10]. Malicious intent "is not a technical property observable on-chip", and misuse depends on what is done with a computation's results. A guarantee processor cannot easily tell whether a network is the whole system or one expert in a mixture-of-experts system. Part III judges that a fully local ruleset "may not be entirely feasible" for the same reason.
- Coverage stops at flexHEG-equipped chips (scope limitation, open question, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/evidence/flaws/6/) [8][10]. Motivated actors will always be able to use some compute that is not flexHEG-equipped. Recalling existing consumer GPUs would likely be impractical, and reaching perfect coverage, or conclusively proving that no secret government data centres exist, would be "practically quite difficult".

  Related mechanism: Chip registries and manufacturing records (R1, in the proposal). Accounts for which chips exist and who holds them.

  Related mechanism: Remote detection of data centres (R1, not in the proposal). Looks for undeclared facilities that hold other chips.
- Records cover only chips that were recorded (scope limitation, theoretical argument, in Chip registries and manufacturing records; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-registries-and-manufacturing-records/evidence/flaws/1/) [16][18]. A registry or commitment accounts only for chips entered into it. Cankaya asks how a verifier would know it had found all chips, or how much "dark compute" remains, and notes that a fraudulent original record would mean unregistered chips had been made in advance. Halstead and Larsen propose reconstructing earlier production by auditing upstream suppliers.

  Related mechanism: Remote detection of data centres (R1, not in the proposal). Looks for large data centres that were never declared, which a registry cannot show.
- Insiders could alter records before they are fixed (scope limitation, theoretical argument, in Chip registries and manufacturing records; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-registries-and-manufacturing-records/evidence/flaws/3/) [16]. Cankaya argues that insiders who can photograph process secrets could also tamper with production records. A commitment makes changes after publication detectable, but it cannot show that the records were accurate when committed.

**Open questions**

- Low-communication training reduces the bandwidth training needs (open question, theoretical argument, in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/bandwidth-limits-and-compartmentalization/evidence/flaws/1/) [2][6][7]. DiLoCo matched fully synchronous training on 8 workers while communicating 500 times less. Rahman writes that this family of methods theoretically allows large-scale training with less than 100 Mbps. Lucid includes these methods in its bounds, but notes that extreme activation compression, architectures with unusually small inter-layer widths, or modular paradigms could erode the margin.
- Supply-chain diversion and hidden backdoors (open question, open question, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/evidence/flaws/5/) [9][10]. Components could be diverted before a guarantee processor is added, and backdoors could be introduced during design or manufacturing. Open-source designs and physical scans of randomly selected chips are proposed as countermeasures. Part III proposes international oversight of production and extensive testing of a random sample of finished devices.

  Related mechanism: Chip registries and manufacturing records (R1, in the proposal). Records each chip's identity and owner from the fab onwards, which bears on diversion before a guarantee processor is fitted. It does not address hidden backdoors.

**Not yet demonstrated**

- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Proposed (legacy code R1), assessed for checking and enforcing training-compute limits on chips, against adversaries up to states
- Chip registries and manufacturing records: Proposed (legacy code R1), assessed for a checkable record of which chips were made and who declared owning them

**Need new chip designs**

- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors


## Possible additions

Mechanisms on the map, not in the proposal, that the records connect to an unaddressed or partly addressed claim, an open failure or a dependency. Pointers, not recommendations: each brings its own readiness level and findings, and none is claimed to close a failure.

- **Tamper evidence for verifier devices** (Research demonstration (legacy code R2), assessed for detecting probing of proposed verifier hardware, using server and electronics prototypes as evidence)
  - Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization waits on it: Shaping devices and routing assignments must be trusted by both parties; Amodo has not yet fully analysed resilience to a compromised DPU.
  - Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors waits on it: State-level attackers who hold the hardware can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures.
- **Network taps and certifiers** (Proposed (legacy code R1), assessed for committing a complete record of cluster traffic, so declared inference can be checked)
  - Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization waits on it: The verifier must know that all traffic leaving a pod crosses the capped, monitored links.
- **TEE remote attestation for AI workloads** (Operational use (legacy code R3), assessed for showing which software ran to a party that distrusts the operator holding the hardware)
  - Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors depends on it.


## Dependencies

**Missing prerequisites**

- Tamper evidence for verifier devices (Research demonstration (legacy code R2), assessed for detecting probing of proposed verifier hardware, using server and electronics prototypes as evidence), needed by Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization
- TEE remote attestation for AI workloads (Operational use (legacy code R3), assessed for showing which software ran to a party that distrusts the operator holding the hardware), needed by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

**Shared foundations**

- Tamper evidence for verifier devices, relied on by Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization and Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

**Blockers**

- Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization: No cap that a verifier can check has been implemented or red-teamed. (adversarial validation) [2]
- Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization: The verifier must know that all traffic leaving a pod crosses the capped, monitored links. (coverage & hidden compute; waits on Network taps and certifiers) [3]
- Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization: Shaping devices and routing assignments must be trusted by both parties; Amodo has not yet fully analysed resilience to a compromised DPU. (hardware trust; waits on Tamper evidence for verifier devices) [2][5]
- Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization: Advances in low-communication training could shrink the margin that the cap enforces. (capacity bounds) [2][6][7]
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Integrated flexHEG needs substantial help from the accelerator manufacturer, and the authors estimate 3.7–7.9 years, from when the manufacturer starts work, for such hardware to displace other accelerators in frontier development. (access & governance) [9]
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: State-level attackers who hold the hardware can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures. (hardware trust; waits on Tamper evidence for verifier devices) [9][11]
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Rival states would need to trust the design and manufacture of guarantee processors and enclosures, for example through open design, redundant processors from each side or oversight of production. (hardware trust) [8][10]
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Restricting future rule updates would need a formal language for rules, which the authors judge most likely infeasible for early flexHEG versions. (protocol soundness) [8]
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Governing all relevant chips depends on knowing where they are, through chip registries and detection of undeclared facilities. (coverage & hidden compute; waits on Chip registries and manufacturing records) [10]
- Chip registries and manufacturing records: No implementation of an AI chip registry has been publicly reported, and covering re-exports would need cooperation from re-exporters and foreign governments that may not be feasible everywhere. (access & governance) [14][15]
- Chip registries and manufacturing records: Linking records to physical chips needs hard-to-spoof unique IDs and inspections. (hardware trust) [14][15][16]
- Chip registries and manufacturing records: Chips produced before a registry starts must be reconstructed from supplier records. (coverage & hidden compute) [16][18]


## What the verifier sees

- Model weights: shown by none; depends on the design for none; hidden by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; not involved in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization and Chip registries and manufacturing records; unspecified for none.
- Inputs and outputs: shown by none; depends on the design for none; hidden by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; not involved in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization and Chip registries and manufacturing records; unspecified for none.
- Training data: shown by none; depends on the design for none; hidden by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; not involved in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization and Chip registries and manufacturing records; unspecified for none.

## Implementations

- Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization: [AI 2040 inference-only verification stack](https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/ai-2040-inference-only-verification-plan/) (R1, proposed architecture); [RAND secure inference data center (SIDC) design](https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/rand-secure-inference-data-centers/) (R1, proposed architecture)
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: none on the map
- Chip registries and manufacturing records: none on the map

## Sources

1. Verification Plan, R. Dean (2026). https://ai-2040.com/supplements/verification-plan
2. Traffic Shaping for Workload Classification, Lucid Computing (2026). https://lucidcomputing.substack.com/p/traffic-shaping-for-workload-classification
3. A System Overview for Near-Term, Low-Trust AI Compute Verification, N. Cankaya (2026). https://intelligence.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/A-system-overview-for-near-term-low-trust-AI-compute-verification.pdf
4. De-risking Interconnect Limits for AI Verification, A. Scher et al. (2026). https://techgov.intelligence.org/blog/de-risking-interconnect-limits-for-ai-verification
5. The Tray as a Bandwidth Boundary, Amodo Design (2026). https://amododesign.com/notes/2026-03-16-dpu-bandwidth-limiter/
6. DiLoCo: Distributed Low-Communication Training of Language Models, A. Douillard et al. (2024). https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.08105
7. Does Distributed Training Undermine Compute Governance?, R. Rahman (2026). https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.29359
8. Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees for AI Compute, J. Petrie et al. (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.15093
9. Technical Options for Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees, J. Petrie & O. Aarne (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.03409
10. International Security Applications of Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees, O. Aarne & J. Petrie (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.15100
11. Hardware-Enabled Governance Mechanisms: Developing Technical Solutions to Exempt Items Otherwise Classified Under Export Control Classification Numbers 3A090 and 4A090, G. Kulp et al. (2024). https://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WRA3056-1.html
12. Secure, Governable Chips: Using On-Chip Mechanisms to Manage National Security Risks from AI & Advanced Computing, O. Aarne et al. (2024). https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/secure-governable-chips
13. Hardware-Enabled Mechanisms for Verifying Responsible AI Development, A. O'Gara et al. (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.03742
14. Verifying International Agreements on AI: Six Layers of Verification for Rules on Large-Scale AI Development and Deployment, M. Baker et al. (2025). https://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WRA4077-1.html
15. Near-Term Verification Methods for AI Chip Exports, B. Avellar & E. Grunewald (2026). https://www.iaps.ai/research/near-term-verification-methods-for-ai-chip-exports
16. TSMC most definitely has a golden record of all AI chips it made, N. Cankaya (2025). https://nacicankaya.substack.com/p/tsmc-most-definitely-has-a-golden
17. Hardware-Level Governance of AI Compute: A Feasibility Taxonomy for Regulatory Compliance and Treaty Verification, S. Ansari (2026). https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.04712
18. Covert AI Projects, B. Halstead & T. Larsen (2026). https://ai-2040.com/supplements/covert-ai-projects