# AI verification proposal

A proposal built with the Proposal Explorer of the AI Verification Tech Map (https://trustbutveri.fyi/), from its records of 2026-10-09. Interactive version: https://trustbutveri.fyi/explorer/?mechanisms=M-0023,M-0019,M-0009&hide=weights

How to read it: a claim is something one party wants to verify about another's AI hardware or software. A mechanism is a general technique for verifying claims; it is "aimed at" a claim when that is its direct purpose, and "supporting" when it contributes without being aimed at it. A claim is addressed when a mechanism in the proposal is aimed at it and is not excluded by the filters; addressed does not mean verified, so check that mechanism's development status, security evidence and findings. Definitions: https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/methodology/ (roles, properties and findings) and https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/readiness/ (development status).

## Filters

Filters apply to mechanisms only and describe the setting the proposal is for.

- **Keep hidden from the verifier: model weights.** Removes mechanisms that show the asset to the verifier. Conditional or unspecified exposure stays with a note and needs checking against the privacy requirement. Model weights: the checked model's parameters. Inputs and outputs: the requests a deployed model serves and its responses. Training data: what a model was trained on. Each mechanism's exposure is the editors' reading of its record: shown, depends on the design (kept, with a note), hidden, not involved, or unspecified for a selected implementation. Code and configuration are not covered yet.

24 of 25 mechanisms on the map pass these filters.

## Overview

One row per mechanism, read from its record. Open failures: critical / significant / minor. The last three columns are the editors' reading of what the verifier sees. Findings are grouped as known failures, scope limitations and open questions. Only known failures count as failures. Counts are an inventory of published findings, not a risk score.

| Mechanism | Development | Security evidence | Prover | Attack testing | Hardware | Open failures | Weights | Inputs and outputs | Training data |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Safeguard attestation | Research demonstration | Published security analysis | Semi-trusted | Analysis | Existing features | 0 / 2 / 0 | depends | depends | not involved |
| Chip registries and manufacturing records | Proposed | Published security analysis | Semi-trusted | Analysis | Existing features | 0 / 1 / 0 | not involved | not involved | not involved |
| Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors | Proposed | Published security analysis | Adversarial | Analysis | New chip design | 0 / 3 / 0 | hidden | hidden | hidden |

## Claims

No claims chosen.

## Mechanisms

### Safeguard attestation

Hardware-signed evidence that an AI service sent a given response through its declared safeguard path, such as a wrapper that calls a guardrail classifier. ([Safeguard attestation](https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/safeguard-attestation/))

- Assessment: mechanism family.
- Development: Research demonstration (legacy code R2), assessed for attesting that a declared safeguard mediated a service's responses.
- Security evidence: Published security analysis. Independent evaluation: unassessed. Formal proof: unassessed. Deployment assurance: unassessed.
- Claims in this proposal: none of them.
- Threat model: semi-trusted prover. Hardware: existing features. Prover cooperation: required. Attack testing: analysis. Category: Cryptographic & computational.
- What the verifier sees: model weights depends; inputs and outputs depends; training data not involved. The enclave route signs hashes of the safeguard, request and response; a low-trust design has the verifier re-run and screen sampled requests itself.
- Filter note: May show model weights, depending on the design. The enclave route signs hashes of the safeguard, request and response; a low-trust design has the verifier re-run and screen sampled requests itself.

### Chip registries and manufacturing records

Recording each AI chip's identity and owner from the fab onwards, and cryptographically fixing manufacturing records, so that chips can be accounted for later. ([Chip registries and manufacturing records](https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-registries-and-manufacturing-records/))

- Assessment: mechanism family.
- Development: Proposed (legacy code R1), assessed for a checkable record of which chips were made and who declared owning them.
- Security evidence: Published security analysis. Independent evaluation: unassessed. Formal proof: unassessed. Deployment assurance: unassessed.
- Claims in this proposal: none of them.
- Threat model: semi-trusted prover. Hardware: existing features. Prover cooperation: required. Attack testing: analysis. Category: Compute accounting & provenance.
- What the verifier sees: model weights not involved; inputs and outputs not involved; training data not involved. Records chip identities and owners; it does not handle model data.

### Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

A proposed add-on for AI chips: an auditable guarantee processor, sealed in a tamper-protected enclosure, that would check and enforce agreed rules on chip use. ([Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors](https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/))

- Assessment: mechanism family.
- Development: Proposed (legacy code R1), assessed for checking and enforcing training-compute limits on chips, against adversaries up to states.
- Security evidence: Published security analysis. Independent evaluation: unassessed. Formal proof: unassessed. Deployment assurance: unassessed.
- Claims in this proposal: none of them.
- Threat model: adversarial prover. Hardware: new chip design. Prover cooperation: required. Attack testing: analysis. Category: On-chip & hardware-enabled.
- What the verifier sees: model weights hidden; inputs and outputs hidden; training data hidden. The guarantee processor sees the chip's traffic inside a sealed enclosure and reports only whether rules were kept.


## Properties

**Built for an adversarial prover**

- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

**No new hardware needed**

- Safeguard attestation
- Chip registries and manufacturing records


## Attack testing

Attack testing records published testing for this use. It does not by itself show independent review, a formal proof or that a deployed system is secure.

**Testing history**

- Safeguard attestation: Analysis
- Chip registries and manufacturing records: Analysis
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Analysis


## Limits

**Open significant failures**

- Components outside the attested boundary (known failure, theoretical argument, in Safeguard attestation; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/safeguard-attestation/evidence/flaws/4/) [1][2]. In the proof-of-guardrail experiments, the guardrail model and the agent's backend model were both reached through external APIs, and the authors leave the decision to trust those APIs to the verifier. The measured wrapper must also have no vulnerability that lets the unmeasured agent bypass the guardrail, for example by executing arbitrary commands inside the enclave. The code's README states that the enclave does not currently restrict the agent's arbitrary command execution, which could be used to bypass guardrails.
- Memory-bus interposition extracts attestation keys and forges attestations (known failure, demonstrated attack, in Safeguard attestation; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/safeguard-attestation/evidence/flaws/5/) [1][4][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]. Inherited finding. Applies to variants using the affected Intel or AMD trust roots. PAL*M excludes physical attacks. A TDX-backed safeguard claim against a physical host attacker would be defeated, but these studies do not demonstrate a break of the AWS Nitro proof-of-guardrail prototype or of verifier-side recomputation. The TEE findings cover DDR5 attacks on Intel TDX, the H100 relay demonstration, DDR4 attacks on AMD SEV-SNP, and software-only SEV-SNP forgery before AMD's fixes. These are inherited hardware limits; a governance analysis explains why physical access matters in a treaty setting. Related finding: https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/tee-remote-attestation/evidence/flaws/1/.

  Response: Intel and AMD place the physical attack class outside their threat models, according to the researchers. AMD reports firmware fixes for RMPocalypse.

  Related mechanism: Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors (R1, in the proposal). A tamper-protected enclosure around the chip is the proposed answer when the party that holds the hardware may attack it physically.
- Documents and serial numbers can be forged (known failure, theoretical argument, in Chip registries and manufacturing records; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-registries-and-manufacturing-records/evidence/flaws/2/) [15]. Avellar and Grunewald note that export documents can be forged, that companies can hide information behind obscure corporate structures, and that it may be possible to forge serial numbers on chips and racks. They recommend cryptographic attestation of a powered-on chip as an extra check.
- State attackers can likely defeat current secure enclosures (known failure, theoretical argument, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/evidence/flaws/1/) [20][22]. The flexHEG authors write that "nation-state attackers can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures", and that the marginal cost of circumvention per device is hard to estimate. RAND similarly judges that anti-tamper measures "would not be insurmountable for a determined and well-resourced adversary", although they raise costs and can reveal tampering.
- Firmware-only retrofits rely on Secure Boot, which fault injection can bypass (known failure, theoretical argument, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/evidence/flaws/2/) [20]. Part II notes that the most common attack on Secure Boot replaces the firmware and applies a voltage glitch while the signature is being checked. It also notes that sophisticated actors may use microprobing or laser voltage probing to read key registers.
- FLOP accounting can be laundered through external data (known failure, theoretical argument, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/evidence/flaws/4/) [20]. Results of earlier or parallel workloads could be hidden in the "external data" fed to a device, which would falsify the total FLOP count unless the inputs are explained or time delays are imposed.

**Scope limitations**

- Attestation shows a safeguard ran, not that it is effective (scope limitation, theoretical argument, in Safeguard attestation; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/safeguard-attestation/evidence/flaws/1/) [1]. Proof of guardrail ensures that the guardrail executed, but the guardrail can still err or be jailbroken. Because the guardrail must be open source, a malicious developer can attack it with jailbreaks while still presenting a valid proof. In the authors' evaluation, Llama Guard 3 reached an F1 score of 0.56 on the unsafe class of the ToxicChat dataset. The authors state that proof of guardrail should not be interpreted or advertised as proof of safety.
- Selective attestation leaves traffic uncovered (scope limitation, theoretical argument, in Safeguard attestation; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/safeguard-attestation/evidence/flaws/2/) [1][4][9]. Attestations are issued per response. In the prototype, the agent offers them when it receives high-stakes questions, so nothing shows that unattested traffic went through the same path. PAL*M's authors note that a prover could cherry-pick favourable executions, and suggest verifier-published nonces or requesting only session-level proofs. A governance analysis notes that auditors also need assurance that all activity is accounted for, since a host could start a second confidential virtual machine that bypasses monitoring.

  Related mechanism: On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters (R2, not in the proposal). On-chip counters are a proposed route to evidence about everything a chip runs, including a second virtual machine that skips the safeguard.
- Measurements may omit behaviour-relevant configuration or runtime changes (scope limitation, theoretical argument, in Safeguard attestation; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/safeguard-attestation/evidence/flaws/3/) [9]. Every component that influences inference behaviour must be covered by the launch measurement, including feature flags, environment variables and invocation arguments. A launch measurement also does not show that a program keeps running as measured if the kernel is later compromised.
- Records cover only chips that were recorded (scope limitation, theoretical argument, in Chip registries and manufacturing records; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-registries-and-manufacturing-records/evidence/flaws/1/) [16][18]. A registry or commitment accounts only for chips entered into it. Cankaya asks how a verifier would know it had found all chips, or how much "dark compute" remains, and notes that a fraudulent original record would mean unregistered chips had been made in advance. Halstead and Larsen propose reconstructing earlier production by auditing upstream suppliers.

  Related mechanism: Remote detection of data centres (R1, not in the proposal). Looks for large data centres that were never declared, which a registry cannot show.
- Insiders could alter records before they are fixed (scope limitation, theoretical argument, in Chip registries and manufacturing records; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-registries-and-manufacturing-records/evidence/flaws/3/) [16]. Cankaya argues that insiders who can photograph process secrets could also tamper with production records. A commitment makes changes after publication detectable, but it cannot show that the records were accurate when committed.
- Many important rules cannot be checked on-chip (scope limitation, theoretical argument, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/evidence/flaws/3/) [19][21]. Malicious intent "is not a technical property observable on-chip", and misuse depends on what is done with a computation's results. A guarantee processor cannot easily tell whether a network is the whole system or one expert in a mixture-of-experts system. Part III judges that a fully local ruleset "may not be entirely feasible" for the same reason.
- Coverage stops at flexHEG-equipped chips (scope limitation, open question, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/evidence/flaws/6/) [19][21]. Motivated actors will always be able to use some compute that is not flexHEG-equipped. Recalling existing consumer GPUs would likely be impractical, and reaching perfect coverage, or conclusively proving that no secret government data centres exist, would be "practically quite difficult".

  Related mechanism: Chip registries and manufacturing records (R1, in the proposal). Accounts for which chips exist and who holds them.

  Related mechanism: Remote detection of data centres (R1, not in the proposal). Looks for undeclared facilities that hold other chips.

**Open questions**

- Supply-chain diversion and hidden backdoors (open question, open question, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/evidence/flaws/5/) [20][21]. Components could be diverted before a guarantee processor is added, and backdoors could be introduced during design or manufacturing. Open-source designs and physical scans of randomly selected chips are proposed as countermeasures. Part III proposes international oversight of production and extensive testing of a random sample of finished devices.

  Related mechanism: Chip registries and manufacturing records (R1, in the proposal). Records each chip's identity and owner from the fab onwards, which bears on diversion before a guarantee processor is fitted. It does not address hidden backdoors.

**Not yet demonstrated**

- Chip registries and manufacturing records: Proposed (legacy code R1), assessed for a checkable record of which chips were made and who declared owning them
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Proposed (legacy code R1), assessed for checking and enforcing training-compute limits on chips, against adversaries up to states

**Need new chip designs**

- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors


## Possible additions

Mechanisms on the map, not in the proposal, that the records connect to an unaddressed or partly addressed claim, an open failure or a dependency. Pointers, not recommendations: each brings its own readiness level and findings, and none is claimed to close a failure.

- **Hardware-attested weight binding** (Operational use (legacy code R3), assessed for hardware-attested weight binding showing users that a service runs its committed weights)
  - Safeguard attestation waits on it: Safeguard evidence must be bound to the model actually served, which depends on model-identity attestation.
- **TEE remote attestation for AI workloads** (Operational use (legacy code R3), assessed for showing which software ran to a party that distrusts the operator holding the hardware)
  - Safeguard attestation waits on it: Frontier model inference typically needs several GPUs, GPU confidential computing is less mature than CPU support, and CPU inference, which an enclave prototype had to use, ran about 100 times slower than GPU inference.
  - Safeguard attestation waits on it: Trust rests on a small number of hardware vendors, and a per-CPU Intel attestation key has been extracted by physical attack.
  - Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors depends on it.
- **Tamper evidence for verifier devices** (Research demonstration (legacy code R2), assessed for detecting probing of proposed verifier hardware, using server and electronics prototypes as evidence)
  - Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors waits on it: State-level attackers who hold the hardware can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures.


## Dependencies

**Missing prerequisites**

- TEE remote attestation for AI workloads (Operational use (legacy code R3), assessed for showing which software ran to a party that distrusts the operator holding the hardware), needed by Safeguard attestation and Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors
- Hardware-attested weight binding (Operational use (legacy code R3), assessed for hardware-attested weight binding showing users that a service runs its committed weights), needed by Safeguard attestation

**Shared foundations**

- TEE remote attestation for AI workloads, relied on by Safeguard attestation and Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

**Blockers**

- Safeguard attestation: No published design shows that all of a provider's traffic passes through the attested safeguard path; current evidence covers individual attested responses. (coverage & hidden compute) [1][9]
- Safeguard attestation: Frontier model inference typically needs several GPUs, GPU confidential computing is less mature than CPU support, and CPU inference, which an enclave prototype had to use, ran about 100 times slower than GPU inference. (performance & compatibility; waits on TEE remote attestation for AI workloads) [9][25]
- Safeguard attestation: Trust rests on a small number of hardware vendors, and a per-CPU Intel attestation key has been extracted by physical attack. (hardware trust; waits on TEE remote attestation for AI workloads) [7][9]
- Safeguard attestation: Safeguard evidence must be bound to the model actually served, which depends on model-identity attestation. (evidence binding; waits on Hardware-attested weight binding) [25][26]
- Safeguard attestation: No independent red-team or audit of a safeguard-attestation system has been published, and the available prototypes are described by their authors as proofs of concept that have not been stress-tested by a counterparty. (adversarial validation) [2][6]
- Chip registries and manufacturing records: No implementation of an AI chip registry has been publicly reported, and covering re-exports would need cooperation from re-exporters and foreign governments that may not be feasible everywhere. (access & governance) [14][15]
- Chip registries and manufacturing records: Linking records to physical chips needs hard-to-spoof unique IDs and inspections. (hardware trust) [14][15][16]
- Chip registries and manufacturing records: Chips produced before a registry starts must be reconstructed from supplier records. (coverage & hidden compute) [16][18]
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Integrated flexHEG needs substantial help from the accelerator manufacturer, and the authors estimate 3.7–7.9 years, from when the manufacturer starts work, for such hardware to displace other accelerators in frontier development. (access & governance) [20]
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: State-level attackers who hold the hardware can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures. (hardware trust; waits on Tamper evidence for verifier devices) [20][22]
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Rival states would need to trust the design and manufacture of guarantee processors and enclosures, for example through open design, redundant processors from each side or oversight of production. (hardware trust) [19][21]
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Restricting future rule updates would need a formal language for rules, which the authors judge most likely infeasible for early flexHEG versions. (protocol soundness) [19]
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Governing all relevant chips depends on knowing where they are, through chip registries and detection of undeclared facilities. (coverage & hidden compute; waits on Chip registries and manufacturing records) [21]


## What the verifier sees

- Model weights: shown by none; depends on the design for Safeguard attestation; hidden by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; not involved in Chip registries and manufacturing records; unspecified for none.
- Inputs and outputs: shown by none; depends on the design for Safeguard attestation; hidden by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; not involved in Chip registries and manufacturing records; unspecified for none.
- Training data: shown by none; depends on the design for none; hidden by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; not involved in Safeguard attestation and Chip registries and manufacturing records; unspecified for none.

## Implementations

- Safeguard attestation: none on the map
- Chip registries and manufacturing records: none on the map
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: none on the map

## Sources

1. Proof-of-Guardrail in AI Agents and What (Not) to Trust from It, X. Jin et al. (2026). https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.05786
2. Verifiable-ClawGuard: proof-of-guardrail reference code, SaharaLabsAI (2026). https://github.com/SaharaLabsAI/Verifiable-ClawGuard
3. Safety Without Compromising on Privacy, D. McCann-Sayles et al. (2026). https://tinfoil.sh/blog/2026-09-14-safety-without-compromising-privacy
4. PAL*M: Property Attestation for Large Generative Models, P. Chantasantitam et al. (2026). https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.16199
5. Enabling Verifiably-Scoped Monitoring through Large Language Models and Trusted Compute, B. Penchas et al. (2026). https://icml.cc/virtual/2026/78630
6. Auditor-in-a-Box: Tools for Third-Party Auditing, R. Rinberg & B. Penchas (2026). https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/uWYk7MM9hAf9GEbGe/auditor-in-a-box-tools-for-third-party-auditing
7. TEE.fail: Breaking Trusted Execution Environments via DDR5 Memory Bus Interposition, J. Chuang et al. (2026). https://tee.fail/
8. DDRop: Active Memory Interposer Attacks on Confidential VMs by Dropping DDR5 Writes, J. De Meulemeester et al. (2026). https://ddropattack.eu/
9. On TEEs for Privacy-Preserving Monitoring in AI Governance, Gloria Z (2026). https://techgov.intelligence.org/blog/on-tees-for-privacy-preserving-monitoring-in-ai-governance
10. Battering RAM: Low-Cost Interposer Attacks on Confidential Computing via Dynamic Memory Aliasing, J. De Meulemeester et al. (2026). https://batteringram.eu/
11. RMPocalypse: How a Catch-22 Breaks AMD SEV-SNP, B. Schlüter & S. Shinde (2025). https://rmpocalypse.github.io/
12. SEV-SNP RMP Initialization Vulnerability (AMD-SB-3020), AMD (2025). https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-3020.html
13. A System Overview for Near-Term, Low-Trust AI Compute Verification, N. Cankaya (2026). https://intelligence.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/A-system-overview-for-near-term-low-trust-AI-compute-verification.pdf
14. Verifying International Agreements on AI: Six Layers of Verification for Rules on Large-Scale AI Development and Deployment, M. Baker et al. (2025). https://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WRA4077-1.html
15. Near-Term Verification Methods for AI Chip Exports, B. Avellar & E. Grunewald (2026). https://www.iaps.ai/research/near-term-verification-methods-for-ai-chip-exports
16. TSMC most definitely has a golden record of all AI chips it made, N. Cankaya (2025). https://nacicankaya.substack.com/p/tsmc-most-definitely-has-a-golden
17. Hardware-Level Governance of AI Compute: A Feasibility Taxonomy for Regulatory Compliance and Treaty Verification, S. Ansari (2026). https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.04712
18. Covert AI Projects, B. Halstead & T. Larsen (2026). https://ai-2040.com/supplements/covert-ai-projects
19. Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees for AI Compute, J. Petrie et al. (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.15093
20. Technical Options for Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees, J. Petrie & O. Aarne (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.03409
21. International Security Applications of Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees, O. Aarne & J. Petrie (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.15100
22. Hardware-Enabled Governance Mechanisms: Developing Technical Solutions to Exempt Items Otherwise Classified Under Export Control Classification Numbers 3A090 and 4A090, G. Kulp et al. (2024). https://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WRA3056-1.html
23. Secure, Governable Chips: Using On-Chip Mechanisms to Manage National Security Risks from AI & Advanced Computing, O. Aarne et al. (2024). https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/secure-governable-chips
24. Hardware-Enabled Mechanisms for Verifying Responsible AI Development, A. O'Gara et al. (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.03742
25. Attestable Audits: Verifiable AI Safety Benchmarks Using Trusted Execution Environments, C. Schnabl et al. (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.23706
26. How Tinfoil Proves Exactly What Model Is Running, Tinfoil Team (2026). https://tinfoil.sh/blog/2026-02-03-proving-model-identity