# AI verification proposal

A proposal built with the Proposal Explorer of the AI Verification Tech Map (https://trustbutveri.fyi/), from its records of 2026-10-08. Interactive version: https://trustbutveri.fyi/explorer/?mechanisms=M-0001&implementations=M-0001:I-0008

How to read it: a claim is something one party wants to verify about another's AI hardware or software. A mechanism is a general technique for verifying claims; it is "aimed at" a claim when that is its direct purpose, and "supporting" when it contributes without being aimed at it. A claim is addressed when a mechanism in the proposal is aimed at it and is not excluded by the filters; addressed does not mean verified, so check that mechanism's readiness and open flaws. Readiness levels R0 to R4 describe one record's public evidence for its assessed use and are never combined. Definitions: https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/methodology/ (roles, properties and flaws) and https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/readiness/ (readiness levels).

## Filters

Filters apply to mechanisms only and describe the setting the proposal is for.

None set. Every mechanism on the map was available.

## Overview

One row per mechanism, read from its record. Open flaws: critical / significant / minor. The last three columns are the editors' reading of what the verifier sees.

| Mechanism | Readiness | Prover | Attack testing | Hardware | Open flaws | Weights | Inputs and outputs | Training data |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Sampled inference recomputation / SASH confidential network logger | R1 | Semi-trusted | None | Retrofit device | 0 / 2 / 1 | unspecified | unspecified | unspecified |

## Claims

No claims chosen.

## Mechanisms

### Sampled inference recomputation

An open-source prototype that routes a facility's inference traffic through a logger and re-runs requests on a separate cluster to check it serves inference. ([Sampled inference recomputation](https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/sampled-inference-recomputation/))

- Assessment: selected implementation [SASH confidential network logger](https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/sash-confidential-network-logger/).
- Readiness: R1 Proposed, assessed for telling inference from training on a mutually inspected cluster.
- Claims in this proposal: none of them.
- Threat model: semi-trusted prover. Hardware: retrofit device. Prover cooperation: required. Attack testing: none. Category: Off-chip devices & sensors.
- What the verifier sees: model weights unspecified; inputs and outputs unspecified; training data unspecified. This Explorer has no asset-specific exposure assessment for this implementation. Check its source and deployment assumptions.


## Properties


## Attack testing

Published attempts to break a system, including those that found failures. Testing history does not establish that open flaws are resolved.


## Limits

**Open significant flaws**

- Recomputation cluster security is not monitored (open question, in SASH confidential network logger; https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/sash-confidential-network-logger/#flaw-1) [1]. SASH states that the current prototype has no means to monitor the security of the recomputation cluster, which holds a copy of the model and decides whether an alarm is raised.
- Side channels not yet addressed (open question, in SASH confidential network logger; https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/sash-confidential-network-logger/#flaw-2) [1]. SASH lists eliminating a wider range of side-channel vulnerabilities as future work.

**Family finding context**

- Context for SASH confidential network logger; applicability depends on the finding's scope. Tolerance for numerical noise leaves a covert channel (demonstrated attack, in Sampled inference recomputation; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/sampled-inference-recomputation/#flaw-1) [3][4][5]. Schemes that accept approximate matches can put an upper bound on an adversary's covert bandwidth, but they cannot close the channel. The weight-exfiltration detector cut exfiltratable information to under 0.5%, not to zero, on a 30-billion-parameter mixture-of-experts model under benign prompt traffic. Its authors called the channel's size under adversarial prompts an open empirical question. An independent study showed that an adversary who controls the prompts roughly doubles the bits leaked per token. Across six models, that cut the slowdown from 146–254 times under benign prompts to 60–118 times. The attack widens the exfiltration bound. It does not target the check that outputs match the declared model.

  Related mechanism: Deterministic and bit-exact inference (R3, not in the proposal). Bit-exact inference would remove the numerical tolerance if exact replay can be deployed with the required weights and configuration.
- Context for SASH confidential network logger; applicability depends on the finding's scope. Only recorded traffic is checked (theoretical argument, in Sampled inference recomputation; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/sampled-inference-recomputation/#flaw-2) [4][6]. Recomputation checks that recorded, declared workloads are correct. It cannot show that the record is complete. The published schemes do not cover hidden workloads run on the same compute, or substituted work. Rinberg et al. say their exfiltration-detection scheme cannot stand alone.

  Related mechanism: Network taps and certifiers (R1, not in the proposal). Taps copy and hash all traffic on the monitored links, which bears on whether the traffic record is complete. They do not show what else ran on the same chips.
- Context for SASH confidential network logger; applicability depends on the finding's scope. Some inference optimizations are not covered (theoretical argument, in Sampled inference recomputation; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/sampled-inference-recomputation/#flaw-3) [7][8]. TOPLOC's authors state that it cannot detect speculative decoding in which a cheaper model does the decoding. They did not test whether it distinguishes types of key-value (KV) cache compression. DiFR was evaluated only on sampling from a single model. Its authors sketch an extension to one speculative-decoding algorithm but do not test it.
- Context for SASH confidential network logger; applicability depends on the finding's scope. Mixed hardware widens the honest baseline (open question, in Sampled inference recomputation; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/sampled-inference-recomputation/#flaw-4) [8]. When honest reference runs span different GPU types, the spread of benign scores grows. In DiFR's tests on Qwen3-30B-A3B, pooling A100 and H200 runs left Token-DiFR unable to separate the two smallest tested changes, a temperature of 1.1 instead of 1.0 and a simulated top-2 sampling bug, at the target false-positive rate, while cross-entropy separated them. Matched provider and verifier environments, or pooling that weights rare large deviations, restored detection.

**Open minor flaws**

- Logger hardware supply chain (open question, in SASH confidential network logger; https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/sash-confidential-network-logger/#flaw-3) [1]. The prototype uses a Raspberry Pi 5 as the logger, which SASH says locks the design into Broadcom and Arm supply chains.

**Not yet demonstrated**

- Sampled inference recomputation: R1 Proposed, assessed for telling inference from training on a mutually inspected cluster


## Possible additions

Mechanisms on the map, not in the proposal, that the records connect to an unaddressed or partly addressed claim, an open flaw or a dependency. Pointers, not recommendations: each brings its own readiness level and flaws, and none is claimed to close a flaw.

- **Deterministic and bit-exact inference** (R3 In production, assessed for reproducing open-model inference from receipts in Gensyn's information-market service)
  - Sampled inference recomputation waits on it: Exact-match recomputation requires reproducible inference.
- **Tamper evidence for verifier devices** (R2 Demonstrated, assessed for detecting probing of proposed verifier hardware, using server and electronics prototypes as evidence)
  - Sampled inference recomputation depends on it.


## Dependencies

**Missing prerequisites**

- Deterministic and bit-exact inference (R3 In production, assessed for reproducing open-model inference from receipts in Gensyn's information-market service), needed by Sampled inference recomputation
- Tamper evidence for verifier devices (R2 Demonstrated, assessed for detecting probing of proposed verifier hardware, using server and electronics prototypes as evidence), needed by Sampled inference recomputation

**Blockers**

- Sampled inference recomputation: The planned FPGA logger has not yet been built. (hardware trust) [1]
- Sampled inference recomputation: The design has not been scaled to production traffic volumes. (performance & compatibility) [1]
- Sampled inference recomputation: Exact-match recomputation requires reproducible inference. (evidence binding; waits on Deterministic and bit-exact inference) [2]


## What the verifier sees

- Model weights: shown by none; depends on the design for none; hidden by none; not involved in none; unspecified for Sampled inference recomputation.
- Inputs and outputs: shown by none; depends on the design for none; hidden by none; not involved in none; unspecified for Sampled inference recomputation.
- Training data: shown by none; depends on the design for none; hidden by none; not involved in none; unspecified for Sampled inference recomputation.

## Implementations

- Sampled inference recomputation: [AI 2040 inference-only verification stack](https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/ai-2040-inference-only-verification-plan/) (R1, proposed architecture); [DiFR (Divergence From Reference)](https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/difr/) (R2, research prototype); [Low-trust AI compute verification system overview](https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/low-trust-compute-verification-system-overview/) (R1, proposed architecture); [SASH confidential network logger](https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/sash-confidential-network-logger/) (R1, research prototype); [TOPLOC](https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/toploc/) (R3, open-source project)

## Sources

1. Internationalising AI Verification, Singapore AI Safety Hub (SASH) (2026). https://www.aisafety.sg/research/internationalising-ai-verification
2. inference-verification: Inference Verification Prototype, Singapore AI Safety Hub (SASH) (2026). https://github.com/sg-ai-safety-hub/inference-verification
3. Bit-Exact AI Inference Verification Without Performance Tradeoffs, N. Cankaya (2026). https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.00279
4. Verifying LLM Inference to Detect Model Weight Exfiltration, R. Rinberg et al. (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.02620
5. Adversarial Entropy Inflation Against Gumbel-Based Inference Verification, N. Kezins (2026). https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.23375
6. Example Schemes for Verifying High-Stakes AI Agreements, Amodo Design (2026). https://amododesign.com/notes/2026-06-23-verification-algorithms/
7. TOPLOC: A Locality Sensitive Hashing Scheme for Trustless Verifiable Inference, J. M. Ong et al. (2025). https://proceedings.mlr.press/v267/ong25a.html
8. DiFR: Inference Verification Despite Nondeterminism, A. Karvonen et al. (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.20621