# AI verification proposal

A proposal built with the Proposal Explorer of the AI Verification Tech Map (https://trustbutveri.fyi/), from its records of 2026-10-08. Interactive version: https://trustbutveri.fyi/explorer/?mechanisms=M-0018,M-0009&implementations=M-0018:I-0009

How to read it: a claim is something one party wants to verify about another's AI hardware or software. A mechanism is a general technique for verifying claims; it is "aimed at" a claim when that is its direct purpose, and "supporting" when it contributes without being aimed at it. A claim is addressed when a mechanism in the proposal is aimed at it and is not excluded by the filters; addressed does not mean verified, so check that mechanism's readiness and open flaws. Readiness levels R0 to R4 describe one record's public evidence for its assessed use and are never combined. Definitions: https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/methodology/ (roles, properties and flaws) and https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/readiness/ (readiness levels).

## Filters

Filters apply to mechanisms only and describe the setting the proposal is for.

None set. Every mechanism on the map was available.

## Overview

One row per mechanism, read from its record. Open flaws: critical / significant / minor. The last three columns are the editors' reading of what the verifier sees.

| Mechanism | Readiness | Prover | Attack testing | Hardware | Open flaws | Weights | Inputs and outputs | Training data |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Chip location verification / Lucid sovereignty (location) certificates | R1 | Semi-trusted | Analysis | Existing features | 0 / 3 / 0 | unspecified | unspecified | unspecified |
| Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors | R1 | Adversarial | Analysis | New chip design | 0 / 6 / 0 | hidden | hidden | hidden |

## Claims

No claims chosen.

## Mechanisms

### Chip location verification

A draft specification, hosted by Lucid Computing, for short-lived certificates that bound where a workload runs by timing signed exchanges with fixed anchors. ([Chip location verification](https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-location-verification/))

- Assessment: selected implementation [Lucid sovereignty (location) certificates](https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/lucid-location-certificates/).
- Readiness: R1 Proposed, assessed for certifying the region where an attested workload ran at a given time.
- Claims in this proposal: none of them.
- Threat model: semi-trusted prover. Hardware: existing features. Prover cooperation: required. Attack testing: analysis. Category: Compute accounting & provenance.
- What the verifier sees: model weights unspecified; inputs and outputs unspecified; training data unspecified. This Explorer has no asset-specific exposure assessment for this implementation. Check its source and deployment assumptions.

### Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

Proposed chip add-ons, a guarantee processor inside a tamper-protected enclosure, that would check and enforce agreed rules on how AI accelerators are used. ([Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors](https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/))

- Assessment: mechanism family.
- Readiness: R1 Proposed, assessed for checking and enforcing training-compute limits on chips, against adversaries up to states.
- Claims in this proposal: none of them.
- Threat model: adversarial prover. Hardware: new chip design. Prover cooperation: required. Attack testing: analysis. Category: On-chip & hardware-enabled.
- What the verifier sees: model weights hidden; inputs and outputs hidden; training data hidden. The guarantee processor sees the chip's traffic inside a sealed enclosure and reports only whether rules were kept.


## Properties

**Built for an adversarial prover**

- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

**No new hardware needed**

- Chip location verification


## Attack testing

Published attempts to break a system, including those that found failures. Testing history does not establish that open flaws are resolved.

**Testing history**

- Chip location verification / Lucid sovereignty (location) certificates: Analysis
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Analysis


## Limits

**Open significant flaws**

- Physical attacks on the trusted hardware are out of scope (theoretical argument, in Lucid sovereignty (location) certificates; https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/lucid-location-certificates/#flaw-1) [1]. The specification places the hardware root of trust and the TEE in the trusted computing base. It assumes they resist software attacks, notes that the attacker may have physical access, and leaves sophisticated physical attacks, such as bus probing and side-channel analysis, as a residual risk. It says that future revisions may add requirements for physical tamper evidence.
- On-chip keys may be extractable (theoretical argument, in Lucid sovereignty (location) certificates; https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/lucid-location-certificates/#flaw-2) [1][5]. Tee and Happel argue that ping-based location protocols backed by keys stored on the chip can be compromised if an adversary with physical access extracts those keys. In this specification, the evidence chain rests on the hardware root of trust's signed quote, whose signing key must be protected by the hardware.
- General delay and landmark attacks apply (theoretical argument, in Lucid sovereignty (location) certificates; https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/lucid-location-certificates/#flaw-3) [1][6]. Attacks on delay-based location verification in general also apply. Brass and Aarne discuss adding delay, using faster paths such as dark fibre, and compromising landmarks. The specification counters anchor impersonation with a signed anchor directory. Against collusion it recommends anchors in diverse places run by several independent operators, and peer monitoring that temporarily removes anchors whose timings deviate.
- State attackers can likely defeat current secure enclosures (theoretical argument, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/#flaw-1) [9][11]. The flexHEG authors write that "nation-state attackers can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures", and that the marginal cost of circumvention per device is hard to estimate. RAND similarly judges that anti-tamper measures "would not be insurmountable for a determined and well-resourced adversary", although they raise costs and can reveal tampering.
- Firmware-only retrofits rely on Secure Boot, which fault injection can bypass (theoretical argument, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/#flaw-2) [9]. Part II notes that the most common attack on Secure Boot replaces the firmware and applies a voltage glitch while the signature is being checked. It also notes that sophisticated actors may use microprobing or laser voltage probing to read key registers.
- Many important rules cannot be checked on-chip (theoretical argument, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/#flaw-3) [8][10]. Malicious intent "is not a technical property observable on-chip", and misuse depends on what is done with a computation's results. A guarantee processor cannot easily tell whether a network is the whole system or one expert in a mixture-of-experts system. Part III judges that a fully local ruleset "may not be entirely feasible" for the same reason.
- FLOP accounting can be laundered through external data (theoretical argument, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/#flaw-4) [9]. Results of earlier or parallel workloads could be hidden in the "external data" fed to a device, which would falsify the total FLOP count unless the inputs are explained or time delays are imposed.
- Supply-chain diversion and hidden backdoors (open question, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/#flaw-5) [9][10]. Components could be diverted before a guarantee processor is added, and backdoors could be introduced during design or manufacturing. Open-source designs and physical scans of randomly selected chips are proposed as countermeasures. Part III proposes international oversight of production and extensive testing of a random sample of finished devices.

  Related mechanism: Chip registries and manufacturing records (R1, not in the proposal). Records each chip's identity and owner from the fab onwards, which bears on diversion before a guarantee processor is fitted. It does not address hidden backdoors.
- Coverage stops at flexHEG-equipped chips (open question, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/#flaw-6) [8][10]. Motivated actors will always be able to use some compute that is not flexHEG-equipped. Recalling existing consumer GPUs would likely be impractical, and reaching perfect coverage, or conclusively proving that no secret government data centres exist, would be "practically quite difficult".

  Related mechanism: Chip registries and manufacturing records (R1, not in the proposal). Accounts for which chips exist and who holds them.

  Related mechanism: Remote detection of data centres (R1, not in the proposal). Looks for undeclared facilities that hold other chips.

**Family finding context**

- Context for Lucid sovereignty (location) certificates; applicability depends on the finding's scope. Extracting a chip's key lets another device answer for it (theoretical argument, in Chip location verification; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-location-verification/#flaw-1) [5][6]. Ping-based protocols rely on cryptographic keys stored on the chip. Tee and Happel argue that an adversary with physical access could extract these keys and so compromise location verification. They propose GPU fingerprints as a mitigation, so far tested on 24 GPUs. Brass and Aarne assume the keys are stored securely, for example in a TPM.
- Context for Lucid sovereignty (location) certificates; applicability depends on the finding's scope. Added delay can shift an estimated position (demonstrated attack, in Chip location verification; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-location-verification/#flaw-2) [6][7]. Brass and Aarne cite internet-geolocation research in which artificially increased round-trip times moved the estimated location by up to 1,000 km, with a 74% chance of avoiding detection. Avellar and Grunewald list inflated ping times from circuitous routing as an evasion route. Added delay only loosens a distance bound, and Brass and Aarne propose a hard time limit as the counter: a chip that replies too slowly cannot be ruled out of a restricted location.
- Context for Lucid sovereignty (location) certificates; applicability depends on the finding's scope. Faster-than-assumed network paths (theoretical argument, in Chip location verification; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-location-verification/#flaw-3) [6][7]. Brass and Aarne list dark fibre and other private high-speed interconnects as ways to lower measured delays artificially. They judge that leasing dark fibre would probably not be a considerable challenge for covertly or openly adversarial actors. Avellar and Grunewald note that this can make a chip appear to be somewhere else entirely. A limit set at the vacuum speed of light cannot be beaten, but it makes honest chips fail more often.
- Context for Lucid sovereignty (location) certificates; applicability depends on the finding's scope. Compromised landmarks can falsify measurements (theoretical argument, in Chip location verification; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-location-verification/#flaw-4) [1][6][7]. A party that controls landmark servers can report false timing. Brass and Aarne cite research in which manipulating a third of the landmarks shifted the estimated location by about 700 km. Avellar and Grunewald note that compromised landmarks let adversaries spoof travel-time measurements directly. The draft specification asks verifiers to require anchors in diverse places, run by several independent operators.

**Not yet demonstrated**

- Chip location verification: R1 Proposed, assessed for certifying the region where an attested workload ran at a given time
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: R1 Proposed, assessed for checking and enforcing training-compute limits on chips, against adversaries up to states

**Need new chip designs**

- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors


## Possible additions

Mechanisms on the map, not in the proposal, that the records connect to an unaddressed or partly addressed claim, an open flaw or a dependency. Pointers, not recommendations: each brings its own readiness level and flaws, and none is claimed to close a flaw.

- **Chip registries and manufacturing records** (R1 Proposed, assessed for a checkable record of which chips were made and who declared owning them)
  - Bears on the open significant flaw "Supply-chain diversion and hidden backdoors" in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors. Records each chip's identity and owner from the fab onwards, which bears on diversion before a guarantee processor is fitted. It does not address hidden backdoors.
  - Bears on the open significant flaw "Coverage stops at flexHEG-equipped chips" in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors. Accounts for which chips exist and who holds them.
  - Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors waits on it: Governing all relevant chips depends on knowing where they are, through chip registries and detection of undeclared facilities.
- **Remote detection of data centres** (R1 Proposed, assessed for finding undeclared data centres above an agreed compute threshold)
  - Bears on the open significant flaw "Coverage stops at flexHEG-equipped chips" in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors. Looks for undeclared facilities that hold other chips.
- **Tamper evidence for verifier devices** (R2 Demonstrated, assessed for detecting probing of proposed verifier hardware, using server and electronics prototypes as evidence)
  - Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors waits on it: State-level attackers who hold the hardware can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures.
- **TEE remote attestation for AI workloads** (R3 In production, assessed for showing which software ran to a party that distrusts the operator holding the hardware)
  - Chip location verification depends on it.
  - Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors depends on it.


## Dependencies

**Missing prerequisites**

- TEE remote attestation for AI workloads (R3 In production, assessed for showing which software ran to a party that distrusts the operator holding the hardware), needed by Chip location verification and Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors
- Chip registries and manufacturing records (R1 Proposed, assessed for a checkable record of which chips were made and who declared owning them), needed by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

**Shared foundations**

- TEE remote attestation for AI workloads, relied on by Chip location verification and Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

**Blockers**

- Chip location verification: The specification is an unfinished draft with no public implementation or evaluation. (adversarial validation) [1][2]
- Chip location verification: It needs a globally distributed, trusted anchor fleet and an endorser to run the anchor directory. (access & governance) [1]
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Integrated flexHEG needs substantial help from the accelerator manufacturer, and the authors estimate 3.7–7.9 years, from when the manufacturer starts work, for such hardware to displace other accelerators in frontier development. (access & governance) [9]
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: State-level attackers who hold the hardware can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures. (hardware trust; waits on Tamper evidence for verifier devices) [9][11]
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Rival states would need to trust the design and manufacture of guarantee processors and enclosures, for example through open design, redundant processors from each side or oversight of production. (hardware trust) [8][10]
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Restricting future rule updates would need a formal language for rules, which the authors judge most likely infeasible for early flexHEG versions. (protocol soundness) [8]
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Governing all relevant chips depends on knowing where they are, through chip registries and detection of undeclared facilities. (coverage & hidden compute; waits on Chip registries and manufacturing records) [10]


## What the verifier sees

- Model weights: shown by none; depends on the design for none; hidden by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; not involved in none; unspecified for Chip location verification.
- Inputs and outputs: shown by none; depends on the design for none; hidden by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; not involved in none; unspecified for Chip location verification.
- Training data: shown by none; depends on the design for none; hidden by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; not involved in none; unspecified for Chip location verification.

## Implementations

- Chip location verification: [Lucid sovereignty (location) certificates](https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/lucid-location-certificates/) (R1, standard)
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: none on the map

## Sources

1. Sovereignty Certificates: draft specification, version 0.1.0, Sovereignty Certificates Working Group (2025). https://github.com/Lucid-Computing/sovereignty-certificate-specification
2. Sovereignty Certificates Working Group (2026). https://sovcert.org/
3. Lucid Computing: Verifiable AI. Proven in hardware. (2026). https://lucidcomputing.ai/
4. Lucid Developer Platform documentation (2026). https://docs.lucidcomputing.ai/
5. GPU Fingerprinting for Location Verification, W. Tee & J. Happel (2026). https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.01930
6. Location Verification for AI Chips, A. Brass & O. Aarne (2024). https://www.iaps.ai/research/location-verification-for-ai-chips
7. Near-Term Verification Methods for AI Chip Exports, B. Avellar & E. Grunewald (2026). https://www.iaps.ai/research/near-term-verification-methods-for-ai-chip-exports
8. Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees for AI Compute, J. Petrie et al. (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.15093
9. Technical Options for Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees, J. Petrie & O. Aarne (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.03409
10. International Security Applications of Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees, O. Aarne & J. Petrie (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.15100
11. Hardware-Enabled Governance Mechanisms: Developing Technical Solutions to Exempt Items Otherwise Classified Under Export Control Classification Numbers 3A090 and 4A090, G. Kulp et al. (2024). https://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WRA3056-1.html
12. Secure, Governable Chips: Using On-Chip Mechanisms to Manage National Security Risks from AI & Advanced Computing, O. Aarne et al. (2024). https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/secure-governable-chips
13. Hardware-Enabled Mechanisms for Verifying Responsible AI Development, A. O'Gara et al. (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.03742