# AI verification proposal A proposal built with the Proposal Explorer of the AI Verification Tech Map (https://trustbutveri.fyi/), from its records of 2026-10-08. Interactive version: https://trustbutveri.fyi/explorer/?mechanisms=M-0007,M-0019&ready=R2 How to read it: a claim is something one party wants to verify about another's AI hardware or software. A mechanism is a general technique for verifying claims; it is "aimed at" a claim when that is its direct purpose, and "supporting" when it contributes without being aimed at it. A claim is addressed when a mechanism in the proposal is aimed at it and is not excluded by the filters; addressed does not mean verified, so check that mechanism's readiness and open flaws. Readiness levels R0 to R4 describe one record's public evidence for its assessed use and are never combined. Definitions: https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/methodology/ (roles, properties and flaws) and https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/readiness/ (readiness levels). ## Filters Filters apply to mechanisms only and describe the setting the proposal is for. - **Minimum readiness: R2 Demonstrated.** Keeps mechanisms whose readiness level is at least this one. A level describes the public evidence for a mechanism's stated use, not its cost or feasibility. R3 can still have open critical flaws. 15 of 25 mechanisms on the map pass these filters. ## Overview One row per mechanism, read from its record. Open flaws: critical / significant / minor. The last three columns are the editors' reading of what the verifier sees. | Mechanism | Readiness | Prover | Attack testing | Hardware | Open flaws | Weights | Inputs and outputs | Training data | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting (excluded by the filters) | R1 | Adversarial | Analysis | None | 0 / 3 / 0 | depends | depends | not involved | | Chip registries and manufacturing records (excluded by the filters) | R1 | Semi-trusted | Analysis | Existing features | 0 / 3 / 0 | not involved | not involved | not involved | ## Claims No claims chosen. ## Mechanisms ### Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting Cryptographic evidence that a given amount of matrix-multiplication work was completed, proposed as one input to accounting for spare capacity on declared hardware. ([Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting](https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/proofs-of-useful-work/)) - Assessment: mechanism family. - Readiness: R1 Proposed, assessed for bounding the spare capacity of declared hardware that could run training. - Claims in this proposal: none of them. - Threat model: adversarial prover. Hardware: none. Prover cooperation: required. Attack testing: analysis. Category: Cryptographic & computational. - What the verifier sees: model weights depends; inputs and outputs depends; training data not involved. Checking a sampled tile of a matrix multiplication reveals that tile, which may hold model or input data; the authors suggest a zero-knowledge proof when the matrices must stay private. - Filter conflict: Readiness R1 is below the minimum of R2. ### Chip registries and manufacturing records Recording each AI chip's identity and owner from the fab onwards, and cryptographically fixing manufacturing records, so that chips can be accounted for later. ([Chip registries and manufacturing records](https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-registries-and-manufacturing-records/)) - Assessment: mechanism family. - Readiness: R1 Proposed, assessed for a checkable record of which chips were made and who declared owning them. - Claims in this proposal: none of them. - Threat model: semi-trusted prover. Hardware: existing features. Prover cooperation: required. Attack testing: analysis. Category: Compute accounting & provenance. - What the verifier sees: model weights not involved; inputs and outputs not involved; training data not involved. Records chip identities and owners; it does not handle model data. - Filter conflict: Readiness R1 is below the minimum of R2. ## Properties Not counted as properties, because the filters exclude them: Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting and Chip registries and manufacturing records. ## Attack testing Published attempts to break a system, including those that found failures. Testing history does not establish that open flaws are resolved. **Testing history** - Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting: Analysis (excluded by filters) - Chip registries and manufacturing records: Analysis (excluded by filters) ## Limits **Excluded by the filters** - Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting: Readiness R1 is below the minimum of R2. - Chip registries and manufacturing records: Readiness R1 is below the minimum of R2. **Open significant flaws** - Proves that work was done, not that no capacity remains (theoretical argument, in Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/proofs-of-useful-work/#flaw-1) [1]. Proof-of-work accounting bounds unmonitored compute only relative to an estimate of what the actor has. Attestable states that the verifier "needs a credible estimate of the compute available" to the actor, and that a proof "cannot discover a datacenter that was never declared". Related mechanism: Chip registries and manufacturing records (R1, in the proposal). A registry of chips is one basis for the estimate of available compute that the flaw's source says the verifier needs. Related mechanism: Remote detection of data centres (R1, not in the proposal). Looks for data centres that were never declared, which a proof cannot discover. - Security rests on new hardness assumptions (open question, in Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/proofs-of-useful-work/#flaw-2) [3][4]. Komargodski and Weinstein base security on hardness assumptions about batches of low-rank random linear equations, and list PoUW "from more standard or well-studied assumptions" as an open problem. Pearl's floating-point variant introduces a further "quantized-subspace hardness" assumption. - Known shortcuts let a miner claim somewhat more work than it did (theoretical argument, in Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/proofs-of-useful-work/#flaw-3) [4]. Pearl's specification lists known mining speedups: crafted inputs, precision shortcuts, seed grinding, work reuse, and faster kernels or hardware. A policy check caps the summands a miner may skip at one-sixteenth of those in a tile. For capacity bounding, any gap between work proven and work possible leaves spare capacity. - Records cover only chips that were recorded (theoretical argument, in Chip registries and manufacturing records; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-registries-and-manufacturing-records/#flaw-1) [8][10]. A registry or commitment accounts only for chips entered into it. Cankaya asks how a verifier would know it had found all chips, or how much "dark compute" remains, and notes that a fraudulent original record would mean unregistered chips had been made in advance. Halstead and Larsen propose reconstructing earlier production by auditing upstream suppliers. Related mechanism: Remote detection of data centres (R1, not in the proposal). Looks for large data centres that were never declared, which a registry cannot show. - Documents and serial numbers can be forged (theoretical argument, in Chip registries and manufacturing records; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-registries-and-manufacturing-records/#flaw-2) [7]. Avellar and Grunewald note that export documents can be forged, that companies can hide information behind obscure corporate structures, and that it may be possible to forge serial numbers on chips and racks. They recommend cryptographic attestation of a powered-on chip as an extra check. - Insiders could alter records before they are fixed (theoretical argument, in Chip registries and manufacturing records; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-registries-and-manufacturing-records/#flaw-3) [8]. Cankaya argues that insiders who can photograph process secrets could also tamper with production records. A commitment makes changes after publication detectable, but it cannot show that the records were accurate when committed. **Not yet demonstrated** - Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting: R1 Proposed, assessed for bounding the spare capacity of declared hardware that could run training - Chip registries and manufacturing records: R1 Proposed, assessed for a checkable record of which chips were made and who declared owning them ## Possible additions Mechanisms on the map, not in the proposal, that the records connect to an unaddressed or partly addressed claim, an open flaw or a dependency. Pointers, not recommendations: each brings its own readiness level and flaws, and none is claimed to close a flaw. - **Remote detection of data centres** (R1 Proposed, assessed for finding undeclared data centres above an agreed compute threshold). Excluded by the filters: readiness R1 - Bears on the open significant flaw "Proves that work was done, not that no capacity remains" in Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting. Looks for data centres that were never declared, which a proof cannot discover. - Bears on the open significant flaw "Records cover only chips that were recorded" in Chip registries and manufacturing records. Looks for large data centres that were never declared, which a registry cannot show. ## Dependencies **Blockers** - Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting: Bounding spare capacity needs a credible estimate of the compute available to the actor, including third-party access. (capacity bounds) [1] - Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting: Proofs of work cannot find facilities that were never declared. (coverage & hidden compute) [1] - Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting: As of September 2026 no implementation, demonstration or independent evaluation of proofs of work for capacity bounding has been published. (adversarial validation) - Chip registries and manufacturing records: No AI chip registry operates, and covering re-exports would need cooperation from re-exporters and foreign governments that may not be feasible everywhere. (access & governance) [6][7] - Chip registries and manufacturing records: Linking records to physical chips needs hard-to-spoof unique IDs and inspections. (hardware trust) [6][7][8] - Chip registries and manufacturing records: Chips produced before a registry starts must be reconstructed from supplier records. (coverage & hidden compute) [8][10] ## What the verifier sees - Model weights: shown by none; depends on the design for Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting; hidden by none; not involved in Chip registries and manufacturing records; unspecified for none. - Inputs and outputs: shown by none; depends on the design for Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting; hidden by none; not involved in Chip registries and manufacturing records; unspecified for none. - Training data: shown by none; depends on the design for none; hidden by none; not involved in Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting and Chip registries and manufacturing records; unspecified for none. ## Implementations - Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting: [Pearl proof-of-useful-work blockchain](https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/pearl-proof-of-useful-work/) (R3, open-source project) - Chip registries and manufacturing records: none on the map ## Sources 1. Pacing AI Requires Proof, Attestable (2026). https://attestable.com/blog/pacing-ai-requires-proof 2. Mechanisms to Verify International Agreements About AI Development, A. Scher & L. Thiergart (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.15867 3. Proofs of Useful Work from Arbitrary Matrix Multiplication, I. Komargodski & O. Weinstein (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.09971 4. Pearl Floating Point Scheme Specification, Pearl Research Team (2026). https://pearlresearch.ai/Pearl_Whitepaper.pdf 5. pearl: Monorepo for the Pearl network, Pearl Research Labs (2026). https://github.com/pearl-research-labs/pearl 6. Verifying International Agreements on AI: Six Layers of Verification for Rules on Large-Scale AI Development and Deployment, M. Baker et al. (2025). https://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WRA4077-1.html 7. Near-Term Verification Methods for AI Chip Exports, B. Avellar & E. Grunewald (2026). https://www.iaps.ai/research/near-term-verification-methods-for-ai-chip-exports 8. TSMC most definitely has a golden record of all AI chips it made, N. Cankaya (2025). https://nacicankaya.substack.com/p/tsmc-most-definitely-has-a-golden 9. Hardware-Level Governance of AI Compute: A Feasibility Taxonomy for Regulatory Compliance and Treaty Verification, S. Ansari (2026). https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.04712 10. Covert AI Projects, B. Halstead & T. Larsen (2026). https://ai-2040.com/supplements/covert-ai-projects