# AI verification proposal

A proposal built with the Proposal Explorer of the AI Verification Tech Map (https://trustbutveri.fyi/), from its records of 2026-10-08. Interactive version: https://trustbutveri.fyi/explorer/?mechanisms=M-0009,M-0017,M-0019,M-0010

How to read it: a claim is something one party wants to verify about another's AI hardware or software. A mechanism is a general technique for verifying claims; it is "aimed at" a claim when that is its direct purpose, and "supporting" when it contributes without being aimed at it. A claim is addressed when a mechanism in the proposal is aimed at it and is not excluded by the filters; addressed does not mean verified, so check that mechanism's readiness and open flaws. Readiness levels R0 to R4 describe one record's public evidence for its assessed use and are never combined. Definitions: https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/methodology/ (roles, properties and flaws) and https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/readiness/ (readiness levels).

## Filters

Filters apply to mechanisms only and describe the setting the proposal is for.

None set. Every mechanism on the map was available.

## Overview

One row per mechanism, read from its record. Open flaws: critical / significant / minor. The last three columns are the editors' reading of what the verifier sees.

| Mechanism | Readiness | Prover | Attack testing | Hardware | Open flaws | Weights | Inputs and outputs | Training data |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors | R1 | Adversarial | Analysis | New chip design | 0 / 6 / 0 | hidden | hidden | hidden |
| Tamper evidence for verifier devices | R2 | Adversarial | Analysis | Retrofit device | 0 / 3 / 0 | not involved | not involved | not involved |
| Chip registries and manufacturing records | R1 | Semi-trusted | Analysis | Existing features | 0 / 3 / 0 | not involved | not involved | not involved |
| On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters | R2 | Semi-trusted | Red-teamed | Existing features | 1 / 3 / 1 | depends | depends | depends |

## Claims

No claims chosen.

## Mechanisms

### Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

Proposed chip add-ons, a guarantee processor inside a tamper-protected enclosure, that would check and enforce agreed rules on how AI accelerators are used. ([Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors](https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/))

- Assessment: mechanism family.
- Readiness: R1 Proposed, assessed for checking and enforcing training-compute limits on chips, against adversaries up to states.
- Claims in this proposal: none of them.
- Threat model: adversarial prover. Hardware: new chip design. Prover cooperation: required. Attack testing: analysis. Category: On-chip & hardware-enabled.
- What the verifier sees: model weights hidden; inputs and outputs hidden; training data hidden. The guarantee processor sees the chip's traffic inside a sealed enclosure and reports only whether rules were kept.

### Tamper evidence for verifier devices

Enclosures, seals and sensors that make physical interference with verification hardware either visible or self-defeating. ([Tamper evidence for verifier devices](https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/tamper-evidence-for-verifier-devices/))

- Assessment: mechanism family.
- Readiness: R2 Demonstrated, assessed for detecting probing of proposed verifier hardware, using server and electronics prototypes as evidence.
- Claims in this proposal: none of them.
- Threat model: adversarial prover. Hardware: retrofit device. Prover cooperation: partial. Attack testing: analysis. Category: Off-chip devices & sensors.
- What the verifier sees: model weights not involved; inputs and outputs not involved; training data not involved. Protects verifier devices; it does not handle model data.

### Chip registries and manufacturing records

Recording each AI chip's identity and owner from the fab onwards, and cryptographically fixing manufacturing records, so that chips can be accounted for later. ([Chip registries and manufacturing records](https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-registries-and-manufacturing-records/))

- Assessment: mechanism family.
- Readiness: R1 Proposed, assessed for a checkable record of which chips were made and who declared owning them.
- Claims in this proposal: none of them.
- Threat model: semi-trusted prover. Hardware: existing features. Prover cooperation: required. Attack testing: analysis. Category: Compute accounting & provenance.
- What the verifier sees: model weights not involved; inputs and outputs not involved; training data not involved. Records chip identities and owners; it does not handle model data.

### On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

Uses timing, memory-residency and performance-counter signals measured on AI accelerators as evidence about which workloads they are running. ([On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters](https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/on-chip-telemetry/))

- Assessment: mechanism family.
- Readiness: R2 Demonstrated, assessed for workload evidence from GPU counters and timing, assuming authentic measurements.
- Claims in this proposal: none of them.
- Threat model: semi-trusted prover. Hardware: existing features. Prover cooperation: partial. Attack testing: red-teamed. Category: On-chip & hardware-enabled.
- What the verifier sees: model weights depends; inputs and outputs depends; training data depends. Counters do not read weights or data, but richer counters can leak secrets through side channels.


## Properties

**Built for an adversarial prover**

- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors
- Tamper evidence for verifier devices

**No new hardware needed**

- Chip registries and manufacturing records
- On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters


## Attack testing

Published attempts to break a system, including those that found failures. Testing history does not establish that open flaws are resolved.

**Testing history**

- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Analysis
- Tamper evidence for verifier devices: Analysis
- Chip registries and manufacturing records: Analysis
- On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters: Red-teamed


## Limits

**Open critical flaws**

- Software-read telemetry can be forged by the operator (theoretical argument, in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/on-chip-telemetry/#flaw-1) [22][24]. NVML-based classification assumes trustworthy telemetry. Without a tamper-resistant read path, an authenticated telemetry channel and secure boot of the monitoring software, an operator who controls the full software stack could forge counter values. Monfared et al. start from the same premise: current GPUs expose little trusted telemetry and can be modified or virtualized.

  Related mechanism: Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors (R1, in the proposal). A guarantee processor on the chip would give the tamper-resistant, authenticated telemetry path the flaw says is missing.

**Open significant flaws**

- State attackers can likely defeat current secure enclosures (theoretical argument, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/#flaw-1) [2][4]. The flexHEG authors write that "nation-state attackers can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures", and that the marginal cost of circumvention per device is hard to estimate. RAND similarly judges that anti-tamper measures "would not be insurmountable for a determined and well-resourced adversary", although they raise costs and can reveal tampering.
- Firmware-only retrofits rely on Secure Boot, which fault injection can bypass (theoretical argument, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/#flaw-2) [2]. Part II notes that the most common attack on Secure Boot replaces the firmware and applies a voltage glitch while the signature is being checked. It also notes that sophisticated actors may use microprobing or laser voltage probing to read key registers.
- Many important rules cannot be checked on-chip (theoretical argument, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/#flaw-3) [1][3]. Malicious intent "is not a technical property observable on-chip", and misuse depends on what is done with a computation's results. A guarantee processor cannot easily tell whether a network is the whole system or one expert in a mixture-of-experts system. Part III judges that a fully local ruleset "may not be entirely feasible" for the same reason.
- FLOP accounting can be laundered through external data (theoretical argument, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/#flaw-4) [2]. Results of earlier or parallel workloads could be hidden in the "external data" fed to a device, which would falsify the total FLOP count unless the inputs are explained or time delays are imposed.
- Supply-chain diversion and hidden backdoors (open question, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/#flaw-5) [2][3]. Components could be diverted before a guarantee processor is added, and backdoors could be introduced during design or manufacturing. Open-source designs and physical scans of randomly selected chips are proposed as countermeasures. Part III proposes international oversight of production and extensive testing of a random sample of finished devices.

  Related mechanism: Chip registries and manufacturing records (R1, in the proposal). Records each chip's identity and owner from the fab onwards, which bears on diversion before a guarantee processor is fitted. It does not address hidden backdoors.
- Coverage stops at flexHEG-equipped chips (open question, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/#flaw-6) [1][3]. Motivated actors will always be able to use some compute that is not flexHEG-equipped. Recalling existing consumer GPUs would likely be impractical, and reaching perfect coverage, or conclusively proving that no secret government data centres exist, would be "practically quite difficult".

  Related mechanism: Chip registries and manufacturing records (R1, in the proposal). Accounts for which chips exist and who holds them.

  Related mechanism: Remote detection of data centres (R1, not in the proposal). Looks for undeclared facilities that hold other chips.
- Seals are often defeated with simple methods (demonstrated attack, in Tamper evidence for verifier devices; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/tamper-evidence-for-verifier-devices/#flaw-1) [14][15]. Mechanism-class evidence. Published defeats of general security seals. They warn about proposed verifier-device seals, but do not demonstrate defeat of an AI verification enclosure or sensor. In 1996 a Los Alamos vulnerability assessment defeated all 94 security seals it examined, with 132 defeats in total, using rapid, inexpensive, low-tech methods. It found that seal cost did not predict security. In 2001 Johnston reported that high-tech seals are often easier to defeat than low-tech ones.
- Security depends on inspection protocols (theoretical argument, in Tamper evidence for verifier devices; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/tamper-evidence-for-verifier-devices/#flaw-2) [12][15]. Mechanism-class evidence. An inspection and protocol requirement drawn from safeguards and enclosure studies, not a reported break of a deployed AI verifier. Johnston argues that a seal is no better than the protocols for using it, and that inspectors are usually given little useful information on how to detect tampering. The Sandia survey notes that larger enclosures are hard to inspect fully and that sensor data must be authenticated.
- Attack classes outside published models (open question, in Tamper evidence for verifier devices; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/tamper-evidence-for-verifier-devices/#flaw-3) [7][8][16]. Mechanism-class evidence. The radio compensation result is emulated using measured channel data under a known-reference attacker model. It is not a physical bypass demonstration against an AI verifier enclosure. The authors of the batteryless cover say they cannot assess chemical-solvent attacks, which exceed their expertise, and deem cover removal impractical. Anti-Tamper Radio's reference can drift as the environment or measurement system ages; the authors suggest gradually renewing the reference. A 2025 follow-up by some of the same authors shows, by emulation on measured channel data, that an attacker who knows the reference channel and the needle's effect on it could inject a signal that cancels the change caused by a needle insertion. It proposes a reconfigurable intelligent surface that randomizes the channel as a countermeasure.
- Records cover only chips that were recorded (theoretical argument, in Chip registries and manufacturing records; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-registries-and-manufacturing-records/#flaw-1) [19][21]. A registry or commitment accounts only for chips entered into it. Cankaya asks how a verifier would know it had found all chips, or how much "dark compute" remains, and notes that a fraudulent original record would mean unregistered chips had been made in advance. Halstead and Larsen propose reconstructing earlier production by auditing upstream suppliers.

  Related mechanism: Remote detection of data centres (R1, not in the proposal). Looks for large data centres that were never declared, which a registry cannot show.
- Documents and serial numbers can be forged (theoretical argument, in Chip registries and manufacturing records; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-registries-and-manufacturing-records/#flaw-2) [18]. Avellar and Grunewald note that export documents can be forged, that companies can hide information behind obscure corporate structures, and that it may be possible to forge serial numbers on chips and racks. They recommend cryptographic attestation of a powered-on chip as an extra check.
- Insiders could alter records before they are fixed (theoretical argument, in Chip registries and manufacturing records; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-registries-and-manufacturing-records/#flaw-3) [19]. Cankaya argues that insiders who can photograph process secrets could also tamper with production records. A commitment makes changes after publication detectable, but it cannot show that the records were accurate when committed.
- Adversarially disguised fine-tuning partly evades classification (demonstrated attack, in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/on-chip-telemetry/#flaw-2) [24]. Across 20 evasion strategy families in five monitor-evader rounds, the classifier's accuracy against the most challenging disguised workloads held out from training was 43–87%. White-box LoRA fine-tuning was the only evasion family detected less than half the time. The evaluation covered single nodes, PyTorch-level evasion and NVIDIA hardware.
- Timing challenges do not identify the individual chip (theoretical argument, in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/on-chip-telemetry/#flaw-3) [22]. GEMM and VDF challenges can be answered by identical GPUs elsewhere, and floating-point fingerprints distinguish GPU models, not individual devices. GPU virtualization adds timing leakage that prevents attributing compute use.
- Counters leak information about protected workloads (theoretical argument, in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/on-chip-telemetry/#flaw-4) [25][26]. Performance counters have been used as a side channel against TEEs, for example in CounterSEVeillance. NVIDIA disables performance counters in full confidential-computing mode, stating that they could provide an avenue for side-channel attacks. Richer counters for verification therefore pull against confidentiality.

**Open minor flaws**

- No quantified error rates or formal thresholds for timing primitives (open question, in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/on-chip-telemetry/#flaw-5) [22]. Monfared et al. state that false-positive and false-negative rates are not quantified and leave hardware-specific formal thresholds to future work.

**Not yet demonstrated**

- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: R1 Proposed, assessed for checking and enforcing training-compute limits on chips, against adversaries up to states
- Chip registries and manufacturing records: R1 Proposed, assessed for a checkable record of which chips were made and who declared owning them

**Need new chip designs**

- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors


## Possible additions

Mechanisms on the map, not in the proposal, that the records connect to an unaddressed or partly addressed claim, an open flaw or a dependency. Pointers, not recommendations: each brings its own readiness level and flaws, and none is claimed to close a flaw.

- **Remote detection of data centres** (R1 Proposed, assessed for finding undeclared data centres above an agreed compute threshold)
  - Bears on the open significant flaw "Coverage stops at flexHEG-equipped chips" in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors. Looks for undeclared facilities that hold other chips.
  - Bears on the open significant flaw "Records cover only chips that were recorded" in Chip registries and manufacturing records. Looks for large data centres that were never declared, which a registry cannot show.
- **TEE remote attestation for AI workloads** (R3 In production, assessed for showing which software ran to a party that distrusts the operator holding the hardware)
  - Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors depends on it.
  - On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters depends on it.


## Dependencies

**Missing prerequisites**

- TEE remote attestation for AI workloads (R3 In production, assessed for showing which software ran to a party that distrusts the operator holding the hardware), needed by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors and On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

**Shared foundations**

- TEE remote attestation for AI workloads, relied on by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors and On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

**Blockers**

- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Integrated flexHEG needs substantial help from the accelerator manufacturer, and the authors estimate 3.7–7.9 years, from when the manufacturer starts work, for such hardware to displace other accelerators in frontier development. (access & governance) [2]
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: State-level attackers who hold the hardware can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures. (hardware trust; waits on Tamper evidence for verifier devices) [2][4]
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Rival states would need to trust the design and manufacture of guarantee processors and enclosures, for example through open design, redundant processors from each side or oversight of production. (hardware trust) [1][3]
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Restricting future rule updates would need a formal language for rules, which the authors judge most likely infeasible for early flexHEG versions. (protocol soundness) [1]
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Governing all relevant chips depends on knowing where they are, through chip registries and detection of undeclared facilities. (coverage & hidden compute; waits on Chip registries and manufacturing records) [3]
- Tamper evidence for verifier devices: No tamper-evident enclosure has been designed for AI verifier hardware at retrofit scale. (hardware trust) [13]
- Tamper evidence for verifier devices: Battery-backed designs add bulk, limit operating temperature (+10 °C to +35 °C for the IBM 4765) and complicate transport. (performance & compatibility) [8]
- Tamper evidence for verifier devices: Active monitoring needs power, and visual inspection of large enclosures faces access limits. (access & governance) [12]
- Tamper evidence for verifier devices: No evaluation has been published in the AI verification setting. (adversarial validation) [13]
- Chip registries and manufacturing records: No AI chip registry operates, and covering re-exports would need cooperation from re-exporters and foreign governments that may not be feasible everywhere. (access & governance) [17][18]
- Chip registries and manufacturing records: Linking records to physical chips needs hard-to-spoof unique IDs and inspections. (hardware trust) [17][18][19]
- Chip registries and manufacturing records: Chips produced before a registry starts must be reconstructed from supplier records. (coverage & hidden compute) [19][21]
- On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters: Shipping accelerators need a tamper-resistant, authenticated telemetry path. (hardware trust; waits on Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors) [23][24]
- On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters: NVIDIA's full confidential-computing mode disables the hardware performance counters its profiling tools use, so telemetry that needs them conflicts with it. (privacy & leakage) [25][26]
- On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters: Continuous challenge puzzles cost power and throughput on production workloads. (performance & compatibility) [22]
- On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters: Evaluation has not gone beyond single nodes, framework-level evasion and one vendor's hardware. (adversarial validation) [24]


## What the verifier sees

- Model weights: shown by none; depends on the design for On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters; hidden by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; not involved in Tamper evidence for verifier devices and Chip registries and manufacturing records; unspecified for none.
- Inputs and outputs: shown by none; depends on the design for On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters; hidden by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; not involved in Tamper evidence for verifier devices and Chip registries and manufacturing records; unspecified for none.
- Training data: shown by none; depends on the design for On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters; hidden by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; not involved in Tamper evidence for verifier devices and Chip registries and manufacturing records; unspecified for none.

## Implementations

- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: none on the map
- Tamper evidence for verifier devices: [AI 2040 inference-only verification stack](https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/ai-2040-inference-only-verification-plan/) (R1, proposed architecture)
- Chip registries and manufacturing records: none on the map
- On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters: none on the map

## Sources

1. Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees for AI Compute, J. Petrie et al. (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.15093
2. Technical Options for Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees, J. Petrie & O. Aarne (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.03409
3. International Security Applications of Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees, O. Aarne & J. Petrie (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.15100
4. Hardware-Enabled Governance Mechanisms: Developing Technical Solutions to Exempt Items Otherwise Classified Under Export Control Classification Numbers 3A090 and 4A090, G. Kulp et al. (2024). https://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WRA3056-1.html
5. Secure, Governable Chips: Using On-Chip Mechanisms to Manage National Security Risks from AI & Advanced Computing, O. Aarne et al. (2024). https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/secure-governable-chips
6. Hardware-Enabled Mechanisms for Verifying Responsible AI Development, A. O'Gara et al. (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.03742
7. Anti-Tamper Radio: System-Level Tamper Detection for Computing Systems, P. Staat et al. (2022). https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9833631/
8. Secure Physical Enclosures from Covers with Tamper-Resistance, V. Immler et al. (2019). https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/7334
9. ImpedanceVerif: On-Chip Impedance Sensing for System-Level Tampering Detection, T. Mosavirik et al. (2023). https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/946
10. IBM 4765 Cryptographic Coprocessor Security Module: Security Policy, IBM Corporation (2012). https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/security-policies/140sp1505.pdf
11. PHYSEC SEAL: Change detection for maximum safety, PHYSEC GmbH (2026). https://www.physec.de/en/solutions/physec-seal/
12. Tamper-Indicating Enclosures, A Current Survey, H. A. Smartt & Z. N. Gastelum (2015). https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1256541
13. A System Overview for Near-Term, Low-Trust AI Compute Verification, N. Cankaya (2026). https://intelligence.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/A-system-overview-for-near-term-low-trust-AI-compute-verification.pdf
14. Physical Security and Tamper-Indicating Devices, R. G. Johnston & A. R. E. Garcia (1996). https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/459707
15. Tamper Detection for Safeguards and Treaty Monitoring: Fantasies, Realities, and Potentials, R. G. Johnston (2001). https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/81john.pdf
16. Anti-Tamper Radio Meets Reconfigurable Intelligent Surface for System-Level Tamper Detection, M. S. Tabar et al. (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.14279
17. Verifying International Agreements on AI: Six Layers of Verification for Rules on Large-Scale AI Development and Deployment, M. Baker et al. (2025). https://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WRA4077-1.html
18. Near-Term Verification Methods for AI Chip Exports, B. Avellar & E. Grunewald (2026). https://www.iaps.ai/research/near-term-verification-methods-for-ai-chip-exports
19. TSMC most definitely has a golden record of all AI chips it made, N. Cankaya (2025). https://nacicankaya.substack.com/p/tsmc-most-definitely-has-a-golden
20. Hardware-Level Governance of AI Compute: A Feasibility Taxonomy for Regulatory Compliance and Treaty Verification, S. Ansari (2026). https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.04712
21. Covert AI Projects, B. Halstead & T. Larsen (2026). https://ai-2040.com/supplements/covert-ai-projects
22. Timing and Memory Telemetry on GPUs for AI Governance, S. K. Monfared et al. (2026). https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.09369
23. Guaranteeable Memory: An HBM-Based Chiplet for Verifiable AI Workloads, J. Petrie (2025). https://openreview.net/forum?id=uc79kOv0MV
24. Detecting Hidden ML Training With Zero-Overhead Telemetry, R. Rahman & S. Tajdari (2026). https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.19262
25. On TEEs for Privacy-Preserving Monitoring in AI Governance, Gloria Z (2026). https://techgov.intelligence.org/blog/on-tees-for-privacy-preserving-monitoring-in-ai-governance
26. NVIDIA Secure AI with Blackwell and Hopper GPUs (White Paper), NVIDIA (2025). https://docs.nvidia.com/nvidia-secure-ai-with-blackwell-and-hopper-gpus-whitepaper.pdf