# AI verification proposal

A proposal built with the Proposal Explorer of the AI Verification Tech Map (https://trustbutveri.fyi/), from its records of 2026-10-08. Interactive version: https://trustbutveri.fyi/explorer/?mechanisms=M-0014,M-0010,M-0017,M-0009

How to read it: a claim is something one party wants to verify about another's AI hardware or software. A mechanism is a general technique for verifying claims; it is "aimed at" a claim when that is its direct purpose, and "supporting" when it contributes without being aimed at it. A claim is addressed when a mechanism in the proposal is aimed at it and is not excluded by the filters; addressed does not mean verified, so check that mechanism's readiness and open flaws. Readiness levels R0 to R4 describe one record's public evidence for its assessed use and are never combined. Definitions: https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/methodology/ (roles, properties and flaws) and https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/readiness/ (readiness levels).

## Filters

Filters apply to mechanisms only and describe the setting the proposal is for.

None set. Every mechanism on the map was available.

## Overview

One row per mechanism, read from its record. Open flaws: critical / significant / minor. The last three columns are the editors' reading of what the verifier sees.

| Mechanism | Readiness | Prover | Attack testing | Hardware | Open flaws | Weights | Inputs and outputs | Training data |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization | R2 | Adversarial | Analysis | Retrofit device | 0 / 5 / 0 | not involved | not involved | not involved |
| On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters | R2 | Semi-trusted | Red-teamed | Existing features | 1 / 3 / 1 | depends | depends | depends |
| Tamper evidence for verifier devices | R2 | Adversarial | Analysis | Retrofit device | 0 / 3 / 0 | not involved | not involved | not involved |
| Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors | R1 | Adversarial | Analysis | New chip design | 0 / 6 / 0 | hidden | hidden | hidden |

## Claims

No claims chosen.

## Mechanisms

### Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization

Capping or removing network links between groups of accelerators, so that serving within each group still works but large training across groups becomes far slower. ([Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization](https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/bandwidth-limits-and-compartmentalization/))

- Assessment: mechanism family.
- Readiness: R2 Demonstrated, assessed for monitoring inter-node traffic with operator-run software on four GPUs.
- Claims in this proposal: none of them.
- Threat model: adversarial prover. Hardware: retrofit device. Prover cooperation: required. Attack testing: analysis. Category: Isolation & system architectures.
- What the verifier sees: model weights not involved; inputs and outputs not involved; training data not involved. Caps traffic between groups of chips; it does not read the traffic's content.

### On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

Uses timing, memory-residency and performance-counter signals measured on AI accelerators as evidence about which workloads they are running. ([On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters](https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/on-chip-telemetry/))

- Assessment: mechanism family.
- Readiness: R2 Demonstrated, assessed for workload evidence from GPU counters and timing, assuming authentic measurements.
- Claims in this proposal: none of them.
- Threat model: semi-trusted prover. Hardware: existing features. Prover cooperation: partial. Attack testing: red-teamed. Category: On-chip & hardware-enabled.
- What the verifier sees: model weights depends; inputs and outputs depends; training data depends. Counters do not read weights or data, but richer counters can leak secrets through side channels.

### Tamper evidence for verifier devices

Enclosures, seals and sensors that make physical interference with verification hardware either visible or self-defeating. ([Tamper evidence for verifier devices](https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/tamper-evidence-for-verifier-devices/))

- Assessment: mechanism family.
- Readiness: R2 Demonstrated, assessed for detecting probing of proposed verifier hardware, using server and electronics prototypes as evidence.
- Claims in this proposal: none of them.
- Threat model: adversarial prover. Hardware: retrofit device. Prover cooperation: partial. Attack testing: analysis. Category: Off-chip devices & sensors.
- What the verifier sees: model weights not involved; inputs and outputs not involved; training data not involved. Protects verifier devices; it does not handle model data.

### Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

Proposed chip add-ons, a guarantee processor inside a tamper-protected enclosure, that would check and enforce agreed rules on how AI accelerators are used. ([Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors](https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/))

- Assessment: mechanism family.
- Readiness: R1 Proposed, assessed for checking and enforcing training-compute limits on chips, against adversaries up to states.
- Claims in this proposal: none of them.
- Threat model: adversarial prover. Hardware: new chip design. Prover cooperation: required. Attack testing: analysis. Category: On-chip & hardware-enabled.
- What the verifier sees: model weights hidden; inputs and outputs hidden; training data hidden. The guarantee processor sees the chip's traffic inside a sealed enclosure and reports only whether rules were kept.


## Properties

**Built for an adversarial prover**

- Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization
- Tamper evidence for verifier devices
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

**No new hardware needed**

- On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters


## Attack testing

Published attempts to break a system, including those that found failures. Testing history does not establish that open flaws are resolved.

**Testing history**

- Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization: Analysis
- On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters: Red-teamed
- Tamper evidence for verifier devices: Analysis
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Analysis


## Limits

**Open critical flaws**

- Software-read telemetry can be forged by the operator (theoretical argument, in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/on-chip-telemetry/#flaw-1) [8][10]. NVML-based classification assumes trustworthy telemetry. Without a tamper-resistant read path, an authenticated telemetry channel and secure boot of the monitoring software, an operator who controls the full software stack could forge counter values. Monfared et al. start from the same premise: current GPUs expose little trusted telemetry and can be modified or virtualized.

  Related mechanism: Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors (R1, in the proposal). A guarantee processor on the chip would give the tamper-resistant, authenticated telemetry path the flaw says is missing.

**Open significant flaws**

- Low-communication training reduces the bandwidth training needs (theoretical argument, in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/bandwidth-limits-and-compartmentalization/#flaw-1) [2][6][7]. DiLoCo matched fully synchronous training on 8 workers while communicating 500 times less. Rahman writes that this family of methods theoretically allows large-scale training with less than 100 Mbps. Lucid includes these methods in its bounds, but notes that extreme activation compression, architectures with unusually small inter-layer widths, or modular paradigms could erode the margin.
- Operator control of pod routing collapses the bound (theoretical argument, in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/bandwidth-limits-and-compartmentalization/#flaw-2) [2]. Lucid's analysis finds that if the operator can freely assign pods to routers, it could dedicate a whole cell of 100 or more pods to one pipeline stage. The bound then falls to about 90–220x uncompressed and as low as about 25x with compression. The proposed mitigation, auditor-controlled random assignment that is periodically re-randomized, has not been implemented.
- Undeclared local storage raises per-pod capacity (theoretical argument, in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/bandwidth-limits-and-compartmentalization/#flaw-3) [2]. More memory or storage per pod helps an adversary. Lucid requires per-pod storage to be declared, capped and physically inspected.
- Training within one pod is not covered (open question, in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/bandwidth-limits-and-compartmentalization/#flaw-4) [2]. Lucid's bounds concern pre-training models larger than the pods are sized for. Training models that fit in one pod, fine-tuning and reinforcement-learning post-training within one pod are outside the modelled threat.
- Parallel scale-up switches are hard enforcement points (theoretical argument, in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/bandwidth-limits-and-compartmentalization/#flaw-5) [5]. In GB200 topologies, GPUs reach GPUs in other nodes through NVSwitches without a NIC on the path. Amodo notes that limits are hard to enforce there because many switches work in parallel, so compromising one or two would bypass the limit.
- Adversarially disguised fine-tuning partly evades classification (demonstrated attack, in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/on-chip-telemetry/#flaw-2) [10]. Across 20 evasion strategy families in five monitor-evader rounds, the classifier's accuracy against the most challenging disguised workloads held out from training was 43–87%. White-box LoRA fine-tuning was the only evasion family detected less than half the time. The evaluation covered single nodes, PyTorch-level evasion and NVIDIA hardware.
- Timing challenges do not identify the individual chip (theoretical argument, in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/on-chip-telemetry/#flaw-3) [8]. GEMM and VDF challenges can be answered by identical GPUs elsewhere, and floating-point fingerprints distinguish GPU models, not individual devices. GPU virtualization adds timing leakage that prevents attributing compute use.
- Counters leak information about protected workloads (theoretical argument, in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/on-chip-telemetry/#flaw-4) [11][12]. Performance counters have been used as a side channel against TEEs, for example in CounterSEVeillance. NVIDIA disables performance counters in full confidential-computing mode, stating that they could provide an avenue for side-channel attacks. Richer counters for verification therefore pull against confidentiality.
- Seals are often defeated with simple methods (demonstrated attack, in Tamper evidence for verifier devices; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/tamper-evidence-for-verifier-devices/#flaw-1) [19][20]. Mechanism-class evidence. Published defeats of general security seals. They warn about proposed verifier-device seals, but do not demonstrate defeat of an AI verification enclosure or sensor. In 1996 a Los Alamos vulnerability assessment defeated all 94 security seals it examined, with 132 defeats in total, using rapid, inexpensive, low-tech methods. It found that seal cost did not predict security. In 2001 Johnston reported that high-tech seals are often easier to defeat than low-tech ones.
- Security depends on inspection protocols (theoretical argument, in Tamper evidence for verifier devices; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/tamper-evidence-for-verifier-devices/#flaw-2) [18][20]. Mechanism-class evidence. An inspection and protocol requirement drawn from safeguards and enclosure studies, not a reported break of a deployed AI verifier. Johnston argues that a seal is no better than the protocols for using it, and that inspectors are usually given little useful information on how to detect tampering. The Sandia survey notes that larger enclosures are hard to inspect fully and that sensor data must be authenticated.
- Attack classes outside published models (open question, in Tamper evidence for verifier devices; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/tamper-evidence-for-verifier-devices/#flaw-3) [13][14][21]. Mechanism-class evidence. The radio compensation result is emulated using measured channel data under a known-reference attacker model. It is not a physical bypass demonstration against an AI verifier enclosure. The authors of the batteryless cover say they cannot assess chemical-solvent attacks, which exceed their expertise, and deem cover removal impractical. Anti-Tamper Radio's reference can drift as the environment or measurement system ages; the authors suggest gradually renewing the reference. A 2025 follow-up by some of the same authors shows, by emulation on measured channel data, that an attacker who knows the reference channel and the needle's effect on it could inject a signal that cancels the change caused by a needle insertion. It proposes a reconfigurable intelligent surface that randomizes the channel as a countermeasure.
- State attackers can likely defeat current secure enclosures (theoretical argument, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/#flaw-1) [23][25]. The flexHEG authors write that "nation-state attackers can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures", and that the marginal cost of circumvention per device is hard to estimate. RAND similarly judges that anti-tamper measures "would not be insurmountable for a determined and well-resourced adversary", although they raise costs and can reveal tampering.
- Firmware-only retrofits rely on Secure Boot, which fault injection can bypass (theoretical argument, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/#flaw-2) [23]. Part II notes that the most common attack on Secure Boot replaces the firmware and applies a voltage glitch while the signature is being checked. It also notes that sophisticated actors may use microprobing or laser voltage probing to read key registers.
- Many important rules cannot be checked on-chip (theoretical argument, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/#flaw-3) [22][24]. Malicious intent "is not a technical property observable on-chip", and misuse depends on what is done with a computation's results. A guarantee processor cannot easily tell whether a network is the whole system or one expert in a mixture-of-experts system. Part III judges that a fully local ruleset "may not be entirely feasible" for the same reason.
- FLOP accounting can be laundered through external data (theoretical argument, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/#flaw-4) [23]. Results of earlier or parallel workloads could be hidden in the "external data" fed to a device, which would falsify the total FLOP count unless the inputs are explained or time delays are imposed.
- Supply-chain diversion and hidden backdoors (open question, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/#flaw-5) [23][24]. Components could be diverted before a guarantee processor is added, and backdoors could be introduced during design or manufacturing. Open-source designs and physical scans of randomly selected chips are proposed as countermeasures. Part III proposes international oversight of production and extensive testing of a random sample of finished devices.

  Related mechanism: Chip registries and manufacturing records (R1, not in the proposal). Records each chip's identity and owner from the fab onwards, which bears on diversion before a guarantee processor is fitted. It does not address hidden backdoors.
- Coverage stops at flexHEG-equipped chips (open question, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/#flaw-6) [22][24]. Motivated actors will always be able to use some compute that is not flexHEG-equipped. Recalling existing consumer GPUs would likely be impractical, and reaching perfect coverage, or conclusively proving that no secret government data centres exist, would be "practically quite difficult".

  Related mechanism: Chip registries and manufacturing records (R1, not in the proposal). Accounts for which chips exist and who holds them.

  Related mechanism: Remote detection of data centres (R1, not in the proposal). Looks for undeclared facilities that hold other chips.

**Open minor flaws**

- No quantified error rates or formal thresholds for timing primitives (open question, in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/on-chip-telemetry/#flaw-5) [8]. Monfared et al. state that false-positive and false-negative rates are not quantified and leave hardware-specific formal thresholds to future work.

**Not yet demonstrated**

- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: R1 Proposed, assessed for checking and enforcing training-compute limits on chips, against adversaries up to states

**Need new chip designs**

- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors


## Possible additions

Mechanisms on the map, not in the proposal, that the records connect to an unaddressed or partly addressed claim, an open flaw or a dependency. Pointers, not recommendations: each brings its own readiness level and flaws, and none is claimed to close a flaw.

- **Chip registries and manufacturing records** (R1 Proposed, assessed for a checkable record of which chips were made and who declared owning them)
  - Bears on the open significant flaw "Supply-chain diversion and hidden backdoors" in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors. Records each chip's identity and owner from the fab onwards, which bears on diversion before a guarantee processor is fitted. It does not address hidden backdoors.
  - Bears on the open significant flaw "Coverage stops at flexHEG-equipped chips" in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors. Accounts for which chips exist and who holds them.
  - Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors waits on it: Governing all relevant chips depends on knowing where they are, through chip registries and detection of undeclared facilities.
- **Remote detection of data centres** (R1 Proposed, assessed for finding undeclared data centres above an agreed compute threshold)
  - Bears on the open significant flaw "Coverage stops at flexHEG-equipped chips" in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors. Looks for undeclared facilities that hold other chips.
- **Network taps and certifiers** (R1 Proposed, assessed for committing a complete record of cluster traffic, so declared inference can be checked)
  - Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization waits on it: The verifier must know that all traffic leaving a pod crosses the capped, monitored links.
- **TEE remote attestation for AI workloads** (R3 In production, assessed for showing which software ran to a party that distrusts the operator holding the hardware)
  - On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters depends on it.
  - Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors depends on it.


## Dependencies

**Missing prerequisites**

- TEE remote attestation for AI workloads (R3 In production, assessed for showing which software ran to a party that distrusts the operator holding the hardware), needed by On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters and Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors
- Chip registries and manufacturing records (R1 Proposed, assessed for a checkable record of which chips were made and who declared owning them), needed by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

**Shared foundations**

- Tamper evidence for verifier devices, relied on by Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization and Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors (in the proposal)
- TEE remote attestation for AI workloads, relied on by On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters and Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

**Blockers**

- Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization: No cap that a verifier can check has been implemented or red-teamed. (adversarial validation) [2]
- Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization: The verifier must know that all traffic leaving a pod crosses the capped, monitored links. (coverage & hidden compute; waits on Network taps and certifiers) [3]
- Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization: Shaping devices and routing assignments must be trusted by both parties; Amodo has not yet fully analysed resilience to a compromised DPU. (hardware trust; waits on Tamper evidence for verifier devices) [2][5]
- Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization: Advances in low-communication training could shrink the margin that the cap enforces. (capacity bounds) [2][6][7]
- On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters: Shipping accelerators need a tamper-resistant, authenticated telemetry path. (hardware trust; waits on Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors) [9][10]
- On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters: NVIDIA's full confidential-computing mode disables the hardware performance counters its profiling tools use, so telemetry that needs them conflicts with it. (privacy & leakage) [11][12]
- On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters: Continuous challenge puzzles cost power and throughput on production workloads. (performance & compatibility) [8]
- On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters: Evaluation has not gone beyond single nodes, framework-level evasion and one vendor's hardware. (adversarial validation) [10]
- Tamper evidence for verifier devices: No tamper-evident enclosure has been designed for AI verifier hardware at retrofit scale. (hardware trust) [3]
- Tamper evidence for verifier devices: Battery-backed designs add bulk, limit operating temperature (+10 °C to +35 °C for the IBM 4765) and complicate transport. (performance & compatibility) [14]
- Tamper evidence for verifier devices: Active monitoring needs power, and visual inspection of large enclosures faces access limits. (access & governance) [18]
- Tamper evidence for verifier devices: No evaluation has been published in the AI verification setting. (adversarial validation) [3]
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Integrated flexHEG needs substantial help from the accelerator manufacturer, and the authors estimate 3.7–7.9 years, from when the manufacturer starts work, for such hardware to displace other accelerators in frontier development. (access & governance) [23]
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: State-level attackers who hold the hardware can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures. (hardware trust; waits on Tamper evidence for verifier devices) [23][25]
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Rival states would need to trust the design and manufacture of guarantee processors and enclosures, for example through open design, redundant processors from each side or oversight of production. (hardware trust) [22][24]
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Restricting future rule updates would need a formal language for rules, which the authors judge most likely infeasible for early flexHEG versions. (protocol soundness) [22]
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Governing all relevant chips depends on knowing where they are, through chip registries and detection of undeclared facilities. (coverage & hidden compute; waits on Chip registries and manufacturing records) [24]


## What the verifier sees

- Model weights: shown by none; depends on the design for On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters; hidden by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; not involved in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization and Tamper evidence for verifier devices; unspecified for none.
- Inputs and outputs: shown by none; depends on the design for On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters; hidden by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; not involved in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization and Tamper evidence for verifier devices; unspecified for none.
- Training data: shown by none; depends on the design for On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters; hidden by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; not involved in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization and Tamper evidence for verifier devices; unspecified for none.

## Implementations

- Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization: [AI 2040 inference-only verification stack](https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/ai-2040-inference-only-verification-plan/) (R1, proposed architecture); [RAND secure inference data center (SIDC) design](https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/rand-secure-inference-data-centers/) (R1, proposed architecture)
- On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters: none on the map
- Tamper evidence for verifier devices: [AI 2040 inference-only verification stack](https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/ai-2040-inference-only-verification-plan/) (R1, proposed architecture)
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: none on the map

## Sources

1. Verification Plan, R. Dean (2026). https://ai-2040.com/supplements/verification-plan
2. Traffic Shaping for Workload Classification, Lucid Computing (2026). https://lucidcomputing.substack.com/p/traffic-shaping-for-workload-classification
3. A System Overview for Near-Term, Low-Trust AI Compute Verification, N. Cankaya (2026). https://intelligence.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/A-system-overview-for-near-term-low-trust-AI-compute-verification.pdf
4. De-risking Interconnect Limits for AI Verification, A. Scher et al. (2026). https://techgov.intelligence.org/blog/de-risking-interconnect-limits-for-ai-verification
5. The Tray as a Bandwidth Boundary, Amodo Design (2026). https://amododesign.com/notes/2026-03-16-dpu-bandwidth-limiter/
6. DiLoCo: Distributed Low-Communication Training of Language Models, A. Douillard et al. (2024). https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.08105
7. Does Distributed Training Undermine Compute Governance?, R. Rahman (2026). https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.29359
8. Timing and Memory Telemetry on GPUs for AI Governance, S. K. Monfared et al. (2026). https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.09369
9. Guaranteeable Memory: An HBM-Based Chiplet for Verifiable AI Workloads, J. Petrie (2025). https://openreview.net/forum?id=uc79kOv0MV
10. Detecting Hidden ML Training With Zero-Overhead Telemetry, R. Rahman & S. Tajdari (2026). https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.19262
11. On TEEs for Privacy-Preserving Monitoring in AI Governance, Gloria Z (2026). https://techgov.intelligence.org/blog/on-tees-for-privacy-preserving-monitoring-in-ai-governance
12. NVIDIA Secure AI with Blackwell and Hopper GPUs (White Paper), NVIDIA (2025). https://docs.nvidia.com/nvidia-secure-ai-with-blackwell-and-hopper-gpus-whitepaper.pdf
13. Anti-Tamper Radio: System-Level Tamper Detection for Computing Systems, P. Staat et al. (2022). https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9833631/
14. Secure Physical Enclosures from Covers with Tamper-Resistance, V. Immler et al. (2019). https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/7334
15. ImpedanceVerif: On-Chip Impedance Sensing for System-Level Tampering Detection, T. Mosavirik et al. (2023). https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/946
16. IBM 4765 Cryptographic Coprocessor Security Module: Security Policy, IBM Corporation (2012). https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/security-policies/140sp1505.pdf
17. PHYSEC SEAL: Change detection for maximum safety, PHYSEC GmbH (2026). https://www.physec.de/en/solutions/physec-seal/
18. Tamper-Indicating Enclosures, A Current Survey, H. A. Smartt & Z. N. Gastelum (2015). https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1256541
19. Physical Security and Tamper-Indicating Devices, R. G. Johnston & A. R. E. Garcia (1996). https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/459707
20. Tamper Detection for Safeguards and Treaty Monitoring: Fantasies, Realities, and Potentials, R. G. Johnston (2001). https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/81john.pdf
21. Anti-Tamper Radio Meets Reconfigurable Intelligent Surface for System-Level Tamper Detection, M. S. Tabar et al. (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.14279
22. Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees for AI Compute, J. Petrie et al. (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.15093
23. Technical Options for Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees, J. Petrie & O. Aarne (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.03409
24. International Security Applications of Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees, O. Aarne & J. Petrie (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.15100
25. Hardware-Enabled Governance Mechanisms: Developing Technical Solutions to Exempt Items Otherwise Classified Under Export Control Classification Numbers 3A090 and 4A090, G. Kulp et al. (2024). https://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WRA3056-1.html
26. Secure, Governable Chips: Using On-Chip Mechanisms to Manage National Security Risks from AI & Advanced Computing, O. Aarne et al. (2024). https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/secure-governable-chips
27. Hardware-Enabled Mechanisms for Verifying Responsible AI Development, A. O'Gara et al. (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.03742