# AI verification proposal

A proposal built with the Proposal Explorer of the AI Verification Tech Map (https://trustbutveri.fyi/), from its records of 2026-10-09. Interactive version: https://trustbutveri.fyi/explorer/?mechanisms=M-0015,M-0009,M-0019&tested=analysis

How to read it: a claim is something one party wants to verify about another's AI hardware or software. A mechanism is a general technique for verifying claims; it is "aimed at" a claim when that is its direct purpose, and "supporting" when it contributes without being aimed at it. A claim is addressed when a mechanism in the proposal is aimed at it and is not excluded by the filters; addressed does not mean verified, so check that mechanism's development status, security evidence and findings. Definitions: https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/methodology/ (roles, properties and findings) and https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/readiness/ (development status).

## Filters

Filters apply to mechanisms only and describe the setting the proposal is for.

- **Attack testing: Published analysis.** Keeps mechanisms whose strongest published attack testing is at least this. The strongest published attempt to break the mechanism for its verification use: a security analysis, red-teaming by its developers or collaborators, or a red team independent of them.

24 of 25 mechanisms on the map pass these filters.

## Overview

One row per mechanism, read from its record. Open failures: critical / significant / minor. The last three columns are the editors' reading of what the verifier sees. Findings are grouped as known failures, scope limitations and open questions. Only known failures count as failures. Counts are an inventory of published findings, not a risk score.

| Mechanism | Development | Security evidence | Prover | Attack testing | Hardware | Open failures | Weights | Inputs and outputs | Training data |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure | Proposed | Published security analysis | Adversarial | Analysis | None | 0 / 1 / 0 | not involved | not involved | not involved |
| Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors | Proposed | Published security analysis | Adversarial | Analysis | New chip design | 0 / 3 / 0 | hidden | hidden | hidden |
| Chip registries and manufacturing records | Proposed | Published security analysis | Semi-trusted | Analysis | Existing features | 0 / 1 / 0 | not involved | not involved | not involved |

## Claims

No claims chosen.

## Mechanisms

### Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure

Overwriting a device's memory in a way a verifier can check, so that data from earlier, undeclared work cannot persist in memory the wipe reaches. ([Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure](https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/memory-wiping-and-secure-erasure/))

- Assessment: mechanism family.
- Development: Proposed (legacy code R1), assessed for showing that no data from earlier work persists in memory the wipe reaches.
- Security evidence: Published security analysis. Independent evaluation: unassessed. Formal proof: unassessed. Deployment assurance: unassessed.
- Claims in this proposal: none of them.
- Threat model: adversarial prover. Hardware: none. Prover cooperation: required. Attack testing: analysis. Category: Isolation & system architectures.
- What the verifier sees: model weights not involved; inputs and outputs not involved; training data not involved. Overwrites memory with verifier-chosen data; it does not handle model data.

### Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

A proposed add-on for AI chips: an auditable guarantee processor, sealed in a tamper-protected enclosure, that would check and enforce agreed rules on chip use. ([Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors](https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/))

- Assessment: mechanism family.
- Development: Proposed (legacy code R1), assessed for checking and enforcing training-compute limits on chips, against adversaries up to states.
- Security evidence: Published security analysis. Independent evaluation: unassessed. Formal proof: unassessed. Deployment assurance: unassessed.
- Claims in this proposal: none of them.
- Threat model: adversarial prover. Hardware: new chip design. Prover cooperation: required. Attack testing: analysis. Category: On-chip & hardware-enabled.
- What the verifier sees: model weights hidden; inputs and outputs hidden; training data hidden. The guarantee processor sees the chip's traffic inside a sealed enclosure and reports only whether rules were kept.

### Chip registries and manufacturing records

Recording each AI chip's identity and owner from the fab onwards, and cryptographically fixing manufacturing records, so that chips can be accounted for later. ([Chip registries and manufacturing records](https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-registries-and-manufacturing-records/))

- Assessment: mechanism family.
- Development: Proposed (legacy code R1), assessed for a checkable record of which chips were made and who declared owning them.
- Security evidence: Published security analysis. Independent evaluation: unassessed. Formal proof: unassessed. Deployment assurance: unassessed.
- Claims in this proposal: none of them.
- Threat model: semi-trusted prover. Hardware: existing features. Prover cooperation: required. Attack testing: analysis. Category: Compute accounting & provenance.
- What the verifier sees: model weights not involved; inputs and outputs not involved; training data not involved. Records chip identities and owners; it does not handle model data.


## Properties

**Built for an adversarial prover**

- Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

**No new hardware needed**

- Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure
- Chip registries and manufacturing records


## Attack testing

Attack testing records published testing for this use. It does not by itself show independent review, a formal proof or that a deployed system is secure.

**Testing history**

- Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure: Analysis
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Analysis
- Chip registries and manufacturing records: Analysis


## Limits

**Open significant failures**

- Outside help during challenges (known failure, theoretical argument, in Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/memory-wiping-and-secure-erasure/evidence/flaws/2/) [3][4]. Classic proofs of secure erasure assume the device is isolated during the protocol. Bursuc et al. relax this to a bound on how close a helper can be, enforced by round-trip times. In data centres, remote memory access has round trips of about 1–2 µs, against about 70–200 ns for local DRAM. The MIRI overview therefore says verification depends on ruling out RDMA by latency or physical disconnection.

  Related mechanism: Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges (R2, not in the proposal). Timed challenges bound how far away a helper can be by how quickly it must answer.

  Related mechanism: Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization (R2, not in the proposal). Removing or capping links between groups of accelerators limits remote memory access during a challenge.
- State attackers can likely defeat current secure enclosures (known failure, theoretical argument, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/evidence/flaws/1/) [10][12]. The flexHEG authors write that "nation-state attackers can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures", and that the marginal cost of circumvention per device is hard to estimate. RAND similarly judges that anti-tamper measures "would not be insurmountable for a determined and well-resourced adversary", although they raise costs and can reveal tampering.
- Firmware-only retrofits rely on Secure Boot, which fault injection can bypass (known failure, theoretical argument, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/evidence/flaws/2/) [10]. Part II notes that the most common attack on Secure Boot replaces the firmware and applies a voltage glitch while the signature is being checked. It also notes that sophisticated actors may use microprobing or laser voltage probing to read key registers.
- FLOP accounting can be laundered through external data (known failure, theoretical argument, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/evidence/flaws/4/) [10]. Results of earlier or parallel workloads could be hidden in the "external data" fed to a device, which would falsify the total FLOP count unless the inputs are explained or time delays are imposed.
- Documents and serial numbers can be forged (known failure, theoretical argument, in Chip registries and manufacturing records; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-registries-and-manufacturing-records/evidence/flaws/2/) [16]. Avellar and Grunewald note that export documents can be forged, that companies can hide information behind obscure corporate structures, and that it may be possible to forge serial numbers on chips and racks. They recommend cryptographic attestation of a powered-on chip as an extra check.

**Scope limitations**

- Memory the wipe cannot reach (scope limitation, open question, in Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/memory-wiping-and-secure-erasure/evidence/flaws/1/) [5][6]. Amodo's inventory of a GB200 system lists many memory stores beyond GPU HBM and host DRAM. It notes that SSD controller DRAM sits on a private bus that host commands cannot read or write, and that its optimized algorithm leaves 25 GiB of HBM unattested. It also asks how switch memory could be wiped.
- Gap between erased and total memory (scope limitation, theoretical argument, in Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/memory-wiping-and-secure-erasure/evidence/flaws/3/) [3]. Bursuc et al. note that memory left between the erased region and the device's full memory could hold data, and that their bounds are tighter only against a restricted adversary.
- Many important rules cannot be checked on-chip (scope limitation, theoretical argument, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/evidence/flaws/3/) [9][11]. Malicious intent "is not a technical property observable on-chip", and misuse depends on what is done with a computation's results. A guarantee processor cannot easily tell whether a network is the whole system or one expert in a mixture-of-experts system. Part III judges that a fully local ruleset "may not be entirely feasible" for the same reason.
- Coverage stops at flexHEG-equipped chips (scope limitation, open question, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/evidence/flaws/6/) [9][11]. Motivated actors will always be able to use some compute that is not flexHEG-equipped. Recalling existing consumer GPUs would likely be impractical, and reaching perfect coverage, or conclusively proving that no secret government data centres exist, would be "practically quite difficult".

  Related mechanism: Chip registries and manufacturing records (R1, in the proposal). Accounts for which chips exist and who holds them.

  Related mechanism: Remote detection of data centres (R1, not in the proposal). Looks for undeclared facilities that hold other chips.
- Records cover only chips that were recorded (scope limitation, theoretical argument, in Chip registries and manufacturing records; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-registries-and-manufacturing-records/evidence/flaws/1/) [17][19]. A registry or commitment accounts only for chips entered into it. Cankaya asks how a verifier would know it had found all chips, or how much "dark compute" remains, and notes that a fraudulent original record would mean unregistered chips had been made in advance. Halstead and Larsen propose reconstructing earlier production by auditing upstream suppliers.

  Related mechanism: Remote detection of data centres (R1, not in the proposal). Looks for large data centres that were never declared, which a registry cannot show.
- Insiders could alter records before they are fixed (scope limitation, theoretical argument, in Chip registries and manufacturing records; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-registries-and-manufacturing-records/evidence/flaws/3/) [17]. Cankaya argues that insiders who can photograph process secrets could also tamper with production records. A commitment makes changes after publication detectable, but it cannot show that the records were accurate when committed.

**Open questions**

- Supply-chain diversion and hidden backdoors (open question, open question, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/evidence/flaws/5/) [10][11]. Components could be diverted before a guarantee processor is added, and backdoors could be introduced during design or manufacturing. Open-source designs and physical scans of randomly selected chips are proposed as countermeasures. Part III proposes international oversight of production and extensive testing of a random sample of finished devices.

  Related mechanism: Chip registries and manufacturing records (R1, in the proposal). Records each chip's identity and owner from the fab onwards, which bears on diversion before a guarantee processor is fitted. It does not address hidden backdoors.

**Not yet demonstrated**

- Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure: Proposed (legacy code R1), assessed for showing that no data from earlier work persists in memory the wipe reaches
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Proposed (legacy code R1), assessed for checking and enforcing training-compute limits on chips, against adversaries up to states
- Chip registries and manufacturing records: Proposed (legacy code R1), assessed for a checkable record of which chips were made and who declared owning them

**Need new chip designs**

- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors


## Possible additions

Mechanisms on the map, not in the proposal, that the records connect to an unaddressed or partly addressed claim, an open failure or a dependency. Pointers, not recommendations: each brings its own readiness level and findings, and none is claimed to close a failure.

- **Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization** (Research demonstration (legacy code R2), assessed for monitoring inter-node traffic with operator-run software on four GPUs)
  - Bears on the open significant failure "Outside help during challenges" in Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure. Removing or capping links between groups of accelerators limits remote memory access during a challenge.
- **Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges** (Research demonstration (legacy code R2), assessed for detecting whether a GPU is doing other work)
  - Bears on the open significant failure "Outside help during challenges" in Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure. Timed challenges bound how far away a helper can be by how quickly it must answer.
  - Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure waits on it: Timed challenges must exclude remote memory and other helpers.
- **Tamper evidence for verifier devices** (Research demonstration (legacy code R2), assessed for detecting probing of proposed verifier hardware, using server and electronics prototypes as evidence)
  - Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors waits on it: State-level attackers who hold the hardware can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures.
- **TEE remote attestation for AI workloads** (Operational use (legacy code R3), assessed for showing which software ran to a party that distrusts the operator holding the hardware)
  - Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors depends on it.


## Dependencies

**Missing prerequisites**

- Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges (Research demonstration (legacy code R2), assessed for detecting whether a GPU is doing other work), needed by Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure
- TEE remote attestation for AI workloads (Operational use (legacy code R3), assessed for showing which software ran to a party that distrusts the operator holding the hardware), needed by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

**Blockers**

- Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure: Wipes take time: tens of minutes for a pod's volatile memory and hours for SSDs, displacing work. (performance & compatibility) [4][5][6]
- Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure: Timed challenges must exclude remote memory and other helpers. (coverage & hidden compute; waits on Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges) [3][4]
- Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure: All memory stores in a system must be inventoried and wiped at the same time. (coverage & hidden compute) [5]
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Integrated flexHEG needs substantial help from the accelerator manufacturer, and the authors estimate 3.7–7.9 years, from when the manufacturer starts work, for such hardware to displace other accelerators in frontier development. (access & governance) [10]
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: State-level attackers who hold the hardware can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures. (hardware trust; waits on Tamper evidence for verifier devices) [10][12]
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Rival states would need to trust the design and manufacture of guarantee processors and enclosures, for example through open design, redundant processors from each side or oversight of production. (hardware trust) [9][11]
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Restricting future rule updates would need a formal language for rules, which the authors judge most likely infeasible for early flexHEG versions. (protocol soundness) [9]
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Governing all relevant chips depends on knowing where they are, through chip registries and detection of undeclared facilities. (coverage & hidden compute; waits on Chip registries and manufacturing records) [11]
- Chip registries and manufacturing records: No implementation of an AI chip registry has been publicly reported, and covering re-exports would need cooperation from re-exporters and foreign governments that may not be feasible everywhere. (access & governance) [15][16]
- Chip registries and manufacturing records: Linking records to physical chips needs hard-to-spoof unique IDs and inspections. (hardware trust) [15][16][17]
- Chip registries and manufacturing records: Chips produced before a registry starts must be reconstructed from supplier records. (coverage & hidden compute) [17][19]


## What the verifier sees

- Model weights: shown by none; depends on the design for none; hidden by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; not involved in Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure and Chip registries and manufacturing records; unspecified for none.
- Inputs and outputs: shown by none; depends on the design for none; hidden by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; not involved in Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure and Chip registries and manufacturing records; unspecified for none.
- Training data: shown by none; depends on the design for none; hidden by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; not involved in Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure and Chip registries and manufacturing records; unspecified for none.

## Implementations

- Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure: [AI 2040 inference-only verification stack](https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/ai-2040-inference-only-verification-plan/) (R1, proposed architecture); [Low-trust AI compute verification system overview](https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/low-trust-compute-verification-system-overview/) (R1, proposed architecture)
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: none on the map
- Chip registries and manufacturing records: none on the map

## Sources

1. Verification Plan, R. Dean (2026). https://ai-2040.com/supplements/verification-plan
2. Secure Code Update for Embedded Devices via Proofs of Secure Erasure, D. Perito & G. Tsudik (2010). https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-15497-3_39
3. Software-Based Memory Erasure with Relaxed Isolation Requirements, S. Bursuc et al. (2024). https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10664348/
4. A System Overview for Near-Term, Low-Trust AI Compute Verification, N. Cankaya (2026). https://intelligence.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/A-system-overview-for-near-term-low-trust-AI-compute-verification.pdf
5. Memory Wipes - Performance Analysis, Amodo Design (2026). https://amododesign.com/notes/2026-07-01-memory-wiping/
6. Improving Disk Wiping Speed for Memory Wipes, Amodo Design (2026). https://amododesign.com/notes/2026-09-14-disk-wiping-speed/
7. Amodo-Design/PoSE-Memory-Wiping (GitHub repository), Amodo Design (2026). https://github.com/Amodo-Design/PoSE-Memory-Wiping
8. Empirical Evaluation of Memory-Erasure Protocols, R. Gil-Pons et al. (2025). https://www.scitepress.org/Papers/2025/135548/135548.pdf
9. Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees for AI Compute, J. Petrie et al. (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.15093
10. Technical Options for Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees, J. Petrie & O. Aarne (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.03409
11. International Security Applications of Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees, O. Aarne & J. Petrie (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.15100
12. Hardware-Enabled Governance Mechanisms: Developing Technical Solutions to Exempt Items Otherwise Classified Under Export Control Classification Numbers 3A090 and 4A090, G. Kulp et al. (2024). https://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WRA3056-1.html
13. Secure, Governable Chips: Using On-Chip Mechanisms to Manage National Security Risks from AI & Advanced Computing, O. Aarne et al. (2024). https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/secure-governable-chips
14. Hardware-Enabled Mechanisms for Verifying Responsible AI Development, A. O'Gara et al. (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.03742
15. Verifying International Agreements on AI: Six Layers of Verification for Rules on Large-Scale AI Development and Deployment, M. Baker et al. (2025). https://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WRA4077-1.html
16. Near-Term Verification Methods for AI Chip Exports, B. Avellar & E. Grunewald (2026). https://www.iaps.ai/research/near-term-verification-methods-for-ai-chip-exports
17. TSMC most definitely has a golden record of all AI chips it made, N. Cankaya (2025). https://nacicankaya.substack.com/p/tsmc-most-definitely-has-a-golden
18. Hardware-Level Governance of AI Compute: A Feasibility Taxonomy for Regulatory Compliance and Treaty Verification, S. Ansari (2026). https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.04712
19. Covert AI Projects, B. Halstead & T. Larsen (2026). https://ai-2040.com/supplements/covert-ai-projects