# AI verification proposal

A proposal built with the Proposal Explorer of the AI Verification Tech Map (https://trustbutveri.fyi/), from its records of 2026-10-09. Interactive version: https://trustbutveri.fyi/explorer/?mechanisms=M-0018,M-0020,M-0009

How to read it: a claim is something one party wants to verify about another's AI hardware or software. A mechanism is a general technique for verifying claims; it is "aimed at" a claim when that is its direct purpose, and "supporting" when it contributes without being aimed at it. A claim is addressed when a mechanism in the proposal is aimed at it and is not excluded by the filters; addressed does not mean verified, so check that mechanism's development status, security evidence and findings. Definitions: https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/methodology/ (roles, properties and findings) and https://trustbutveri.fyi/about/readiness/ (development status).

## Filters

Filters apply to mechanisms only and describe the setting the proposal is for.

None set. Every mechanism on the map was available.

## Overview

One row per mechanism, read from its record. Open failures: critical / significant / minor. The last three columns are the editors' reading of what the verifier sees. Findings are grouped as known failures, scope limitations and open questions. Only known failures count as failures. Counts are an inventory of published findings, not a risk score.

| Mechanism | Development | Security evidence | Prover | Attack testing | Hardware | Open failures | Weights | Inputs and outputs | Training data |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Chip location verification | Proposed | Published security analysis | Adversarial | Analysis | Existing features | 0 / 4 / 0 | not involved | not involved | not involved |
| Remote detection of data centres | Proposed | Published security analysis | Adversarial | Analysis | None | 0 / 0 / 0 | not involved | not involved | not involved |
| Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors | Proposed | Published security analysis | Adversarial | Analysis | New chip design | 0 / 3 / 0 | hidden | hidden | hidden |

## Claims

No claims chosen.

## Mechanisms

### Chip location verification

Timing a chip's signed replies to trusted servers at known places, so that the speed of light bounds how far away the chip can be. ([Chip location verification](https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-location-verification/))

- Assessment: mechanism family.
- Development: Proposed (legacy code R1), assessed for bounding how far a chip is from trusted landmark servers when checked.
- Security evidence: Published security analysis. Independent evaluation: unassessed. Formal proof: unassessed. Deployment assurance: unassessed.
- Claims in this proposal: none of them.
- Threat model: adversarial prover. Hardware: existing features. Prover cooperation: required. Attack testing: analysis. Category: Compute accounting & provenance.
- What the verifier sees: model weights not involved; inputs and outputs not involved; training data not involved. Times signed replies from chips; it does not handle model data.

### Remote detection of data centres

Remote detection locates large data centres and estimates their power capacity without site access, using satellite imagery, heat signatures and public records such as permits. ([Remote detection of data centres](https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/remote-detection-of-data-centres/))

- Assessment: mechanism family.
- Development: Proposed (legacy code R1), assessed for finding undeclared data centres above an agreed compute threshold.
- Security evidence: Published security analysis. Independent evaluation: unassessed. Formal proof: unassessed. Deployment assurance: unassessed.
- Claims in this proposal: none of them.
- Threat model: adversarial prover. Hardware: none. Prover cooperation: not required. Attack testing: analysis. Category: Remote & side-channel sensing.
- What the verifier sees: model weights not involved; inputs and outputs not involved; training data not involved. Works from outside the facility; it does not handle model data.

### Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

A proposed add-on for AI chips: an auditable guarantee processor, sealed in a tamper-protected enclosure, that would check and enforce agreed rules on chip use. ([Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors](https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/))

- Assessment: mechanism family.
- Development: Proposed (legacy code R1), assessed for checking and enforcing training-compute limits on chips, against adversaries up to states.
- Security evidence: Published security analysis. Independent evaluation: unassessed. Formal proof: unassessed. Deployment assurance: unassessed.
- Claims in this proposal: none of them.
- Threat model: adversarial prover. Hardware: new chip design. Prover cooperation: required. Attack testing: analysis. Category: On-chip & hardware-enabled.
- What the verifier sees: model weights hidden; inputs and outputs hidden; training data hidden. The guarantee processor sees the chip's traffic inside a sealed enclosure and reports only whether rules were kept.


## Properties

**Built for an adversarial prover**

- Chip location verification
- Remote detection of data centres
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

**No new hardware needed**

- Chip location verification
- Remote detection of data centres


## Attack testing

Attack testing records published testing for this use. It does not by itself show independent review, a formal proof or that a deployed system is secure.

**Testing history**

- Chip location verification: Analysis
- Remote detection of data centres: Analysis
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Analysis


## Limits

**Open significant failures**

- Extracting a chip's key lets another device answer for it (known failure, theoretical argument, in Chip location verification; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-location-verification/evidence/flaws/1/) [1][6]. Ping-based protocols rely on cryptographic keys stored on the chip. Tee and Happel argue that an adversary with physical access could extract these keys and so compromise location verification. They propose GPU fingerprints as a mitigation, so far tested on 24 GPUs. Brass and Aarne assume the keys are stored securely, for example in a TPM.
- Added delay can shift an estimated position (known failure, demonstrated attack, in Chip location verification; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-location-verification/evidence/flaws/2/) [1][4]. Brass and Aarne cite internet-geolocation research in which artificially increased round-trip times moved the estimated location by up to 1,000 km, with a 74% chance of avoiding detection. Avellar and Grunewald list inflated ping times from circuitous routing as an evasion route. Added delay only loosens a distance bound, and Brass and Aarne propose a hard time limit as the counter: a chip that replies too slowly cannot be ruled out of a restricted location.
- Faster-than-assumed network paths (known failure, theoretical argument, in Chip location verification; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-location-verification/evidence/flaws/3/) [1][4]. Brass and Aarne list dark fibre and other private high-speed interconnects as ways to lower measured delays artificially. They judge that leasing dark fibre would probably not be a considerable challenge for covertly or openly adversarial actors. Avellar and Grunewald note that this can make a chip appear to be somewhere else entirely. A limit set at the vacuum speed of light cannot be beaten, but it makes honest chips fail more often.
- Compromised landmarks can falsify measurements (known failure, theoretical argument, in Chip location verification; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/chip-location-verification/evidence/flaws/4/) [1][4][5]. A party that controls landmark servers can report false timing. Brass and Aarne cite research in which manipulating a third of the landmarks shifted the estimated location by about 700 km. Avellar and Grunewald note that compromised landmarks let adversaries spoof travel-time measurements directly. The draft specification asks verifiers to require anchors in diverse places, run by several independent operators.
- State attackers can likely defeat current secure enclosures (known failure, theoretical argument, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/evidence/flaws/1/) [14][16]. The flexHEG authors write that "nation-state attackers can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures", and that the marginal cost of circumvention per device is hard to estimate. RAND similarly judges that anti-tamper measures "would not be insurmountable for a determined and well-resourced adversary", although they raise costs and can reveal tampering.
- Firmware-only retrofits rely on Secure Boot, which fault injection can bypass (known failure, theoretical argument, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/evidence/flaws/2/) [14]. Part II notes that the most common attack on Secure Boot replaces the firmware and applies a voltage glitch while the signature is being checked. It also notes that sophisticated actors may use microprobing or laser voltage probing to read key registers.
- FLOP accounting can be laundered through external data (known failure, theoretical argument, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/evidence/flaws/4/) [14]. Results of earlier or parallel workloads could be hidden in the "external data" fed to a device, which would falsify the total FLOP count unless the inputs are explained or time delays are imposed.

**Scope limitations**

- Facilities can be disguised or hidden (scope limitation, theoretical argument, in Remote detection of data centres; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/remote-detection-of-data-centres/evidence/flaws/1/) [8]. Halstead and Larsen discuss two ways to hide a facility. One is to disguise it as a legitimate industrial site. The other is to build it underground, with cooling that avoids visible heat plumes. They note that the underground option requires bespoke engineering.
- Small sites may not be detectable (scope limitation, theoretical argument, in Remote detection of data centres; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/remote-detection-of-data-centres/evidence/flaws/2/) [8][10]. Halstead and Larsen conclude that a sufficiently small covert project could not be ruled out with confidence. In their estimates, the chance of detection is lower for smaller sites. Krawec notes that small data centres in existing buildings may lack the distinctive features of large facilities.

  Related mechanism: Chip registries and manufacturing records (R1, not in the proposal). Accounts for chips from the fab onwards, which does not depend on a site being visible.
- Many important rules cannot be checked on-chip (scope limitation, theoretical argument, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/evidence/flaws/3/) [13][15]. Malicious intent "is not a technical property observable on-chip", and misuse depends on what is done with a computation's results. A guarantee processor cannot easily tell whether a network is the whole system or one expert in a mixture-of-experts system. Part III judges that a fully local ruleset "may not be entirely feasible" for the same reason.
- Coverage stops at flexHEG-equipped chips (scope limitation, open question, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/evidence/flaws/6/) [13][15]. Motivated actors will always be able to use some compute that is not flexHEG-equipped. Recalling existing consumer GPUs would likely be impractical, and reaching perfect coverage, or conclusively proving that no secret government data centres exist, would be "practically quite difficult".

  Related mechanism: Chip registries and manufacturing records (R1, not in the proposal). Accounts for which chips exist and who holds them.

  Related mechanism: Remote detection of data centres (R1, in the proposal). Looks for undeclared facilities that hold other chips.

**Open questions**

- Search for unknown sites is undemonstrated (open question, open question, in Remote detection of data centres; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/remote-detection-of-data-centres/evidence/flaws/3/) [10]. Krawec reports that telling data centres apart from other industrial facilities systematically is difficult. Automating detection would need large amounts of training imagery and a purpose-trained model. In Krawec's words, automated data-centre detection "remains primarily conceptual at present".
- Supply-chain diversion and hidden backdoors (open question, open question, in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; https://trustbutveri.fyi/mechanisms/flexheg-guarantee-processors/evidence/flaws/5/) [14][15]. Components could be diverted before a guarantee processor is added, and backdoors could be introduced during design or manufacturing. Open-source designs and physical scans of randomly selected chips are proposed as countermeasures. Part III proposes international oversight of production and extensive testing of a random sample of finished devices.

  Related mechanism: Chip registries and manufacturing records (R1, not in the proposal). Records each chip's identity and owner from the fab onwards, which bears on diversion before a guarantee processor is fitted. It does not address hidden backdoors.

**Not yet demonstrated**

- Chip location verification: Proposed (legacy code R1), assessed for bounding how far a chip is from trusted landmark servers when checked
- Remote detection of data centres: Proposed (legacy code R1), assessed for finding undeclared data centres above an agreed compute threshold
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Proposed (legacy code R1), assessed for checking and enforcing training-compute limits on chips, against adversaries up to states

**Need new chip designs**

- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors


## Possible additions

Mechanisms on the map, not in the proposal, that the records connect to an unaddressed or partly addressed claim, an open failure or a dependency. Pointers, not recommendations: each brings its own readiness level and findings, and none is claimed to close a failure.

- **Tamper evidence for verifier devices** (Research demonstration (legacy code R2), assessed for detecting probing of proposed verifier hardware, using server and electronics prototypes as evidence)
  - Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors waits on it: State-level attackers who hold the hardware can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures.
- **Chip registries and manufacturing records** (Proposed (legacy code R1), assessed for a checkable record of which chips were made and who declared owning them)
  - Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors waits on it: Governing all relevant chips depends on knowing where they are, through chip registries and detection of undeclared facilities.
- **TEE remote attestation for AI workloads** (Operational use (legacy code R3), assessed for showing which software ran to a party that distrusts the operator holding the hardware)
  - Chip location verification depends on it.
  - Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors depends on it.


## Dependencies

**Missing prerequisites**

- TEE remote attestation for AI workloads (Operational use (legacy code R3), assessed for showing which software ran to a party that distrusts the operator holding the hardware), needed by Chip location verification and Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors
- Chip registries and manufacturing records (Proposed (legacy code R1), assessed for a checkable record of which chips were made and who declared owning them), needed by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

**Shared foundations**

- TEE remote attestation for AI workloads, relied on by Chip location verification and Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

**Blockers**

- Chip location verification: No public code or reproducible end-to-end location results are available for the reported H100 prototype. (adversarial validation) [2][3]
- Chip location verification: Per-chip keys must be provisioned and protected against extraction; hardware-integrated, tamper-resistant versions still need R&D. (hardware trust) [1][6][18]
- Chip location verification: The time limit forces a trade-off: a limit at the speed of light in fibre can be beaten by faster links, while one at the vacuum speed of light makes honest chips fail often. (protocol soundness) [1]
- Chip location verification: A trusted landmark network must be built and secured, and who should operate it, under what oversight, is unsettled. (access & governance) [1][4]
- Remote detection of data centres: Wide-area, automated detection of data centres is not yet practical and needs large training datasets. (coverage & hidden compute) [10]
- Remote detection of data centres: No measured detection or false-alarm rates for finding undeclared facilities have been published. (adversarial validation) [8][10]
- Remote detection of data centres: Recent high-resolution imagery is costly, is limited by weather and needs trained analysts. (access & governance) [10]
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Integrated flexHEG needs substantial help from the accelerator manufacturer, and the authors estimate 3.7–7.9 years, from when the manufacturer starts work, for such hardware to displace other accelerators in frontier development. (access & governance) [14]
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: State-level attackers who hold the hardware can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures. (hardware trust; waits on Tamper evidence for verifier devices) [14][16]
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Rival states would need to trust the design and manufacture of guarantee processors and enclosures, for example through open design, redundant processors from each side or oversight of production. (hardware trust) [13][15]
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Restricting future rule updates would need a formal language for rules, which the authors judge most likely infeasible for early flexHEG versions. (protocol soundness) [13]
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Governing all relevant chips depends on knowing where they are, through chip registries and detection of undeclared facilities. (coverage & hidden compute; waits on Chip registries and manufacturing records) [15]


## What the verifier sees

- Model weights: shown by none; depends on the design for none; hidden by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; not involved in Chip location verification and Remote detection of data centres; unspecified for none.
- Inputs and outputs: shown by none; depends on the design for none; hidden by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; not involved in Chip location verification and Remote detection of data centres; unspecified for none.
- Training data: shown by none; depends on the design for none; hidden by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors; not involved in Chip location verification and Remote detection of data centres; unspecified for none.

## Implementations

- Chip location verification: [Lucid sovereignty (location) certificates](https://trustbutveri.fyi/implementations/lucid-location-certificates/) (R1, standard)
- Remote detection of data centres: none on the map
- Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: none on the map

## Sources

1. Location Verification for AI Chips, A. Brass & O. Aarne (2024). https://www.iaps.ai/research/location-verification-for-ai-chips
2. Location Verification for AI Chips (issue brief), A. Brass (2025). https://static1.squarespace.com/static/64edf8e7f2b10d716b5ba0e1/t/6827b67275666f3757f134ea/1747433075281/Location+Verification+two-pager.pdf
3. Ping-based Location, Ulyssean (2025). https://ping-location.info/
4. Near-Term Verification Methods for AI Chip Exports, B. Avellar & E. Grunewald (2026). https://www.iaps.ai/research/near-term-verification-methods-for-ai-chip-exports
5. Sovereignty Certificates: draft specification, version 0.1.0, Sovereignty Certificates Working Group (2025). https://github.com/Lucid-Computing/sovereignty-certificate-specification
6. GPU Fingerprinting for Location Verification, W. Tee & J. Happel (2026). https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.01930
7. Secure, Governable Chips: Using On-Chip Mechanisms to Manage National Security Risks from AI & Advanced Computing, O. Aarne et al. (2024). https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/secure-governable-chips
8. Covert AI Projects, B. Halstead & T. Larsen (2026). https://ai-2040.com/supplements/covert-ai-projects
9. Verifying International Agreements on AI: Six Layers of Verification for Rules on Large-Scale AI Development and Deployment, M. Baker et al. (2025). https://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WRA4077-1.html
10. Tracking Hyperscale AI Data Center Growth with Satellite Imagery, C. Krawec (2026). https://fas.org/publication/tracking-hyperscale/
11. Introducing the Frontier Data Centers Hub, Epoch AI (2025). https://epoch.ai/latest/introducing-the-frontier-data-centers-hub
12. AI Data Centers Documentation – Methodology, Epoch AI (2026). https://epoch.ai/data/data-centers-documentation/methodology
13. Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees for AI Compute, J. Petrie et al. (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.15093
14. Technical Options for Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees, J. Petrie & O. Aarne (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.03409
15. International Security Applications of Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees, O. Aarne & J. Petrie (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.15100
16. Hardware-Enabled Governance Mechanisms: Developing Technical Solutions to Exempt Items Otherwise Classified Under Export Control Classification Numbers 3A090 and 4A090, G. Kulp et al. (2024). https://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WRA3056-1.html
17. Hardware-Enabled Mechanisms for Verifying Responsible AI Development, A. O'Gara et al. (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.03742
18. Hardware-Level Governance of AI Compute: A Feasibility Taxonomy for Regulatory Compliance and Treaty Verification, S. Ansari (2026). https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.04712