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A verification proposal from the AI Verification Tech Map, from its records of 2026-10-09. https://trustbutveri.fyi/explorer/?mechanisms=M-0016,M-0020&ready=R3&tested=analysis

Claims

Mechanisms2

Filters:×× 4 of 25 match · Clear

Applied filters: Minimum development status: Operational use; Attack testing: Published analysis. Not set (Any): Prover, Verifier devices on site, Prover cooperation, Chips, Keep hidden from the verifier.

Analysis

Applied filters: Minimum development status: Operational use; Attack testing: Published analysis. Not set (Any): Prover, Verifier devices on site, Prover cooperation, Chips, Keep hidden from the verifier.

MechanismDevelopmentSecurity evidenceOpen failures
Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges ⚠ excluded by your filters: development: Research demonstration Research demoPublished security analysis1 significant
Remote detection of data centres ⚠ excluded by your filters: development: Proposed ProposedPublished security analysisnone
  • Open failures: n critical n significant n minor
  • ⚠ Dimmed: excluded by your filters, with the conflicting field highlighted
Claim coverageNo claims yet

Add claims to see which ones the mechanisms address.

PropertiesNone recorded
Attack testing2 mechanisms with published testing

Attack testing records published testing for this use. It does not by itself show independent review, a formal proof or that a deployed system is secure.

Limits2 scope limitations · 2 open questions · 2 excluded by filters · 1 not yet demonstrated · 1 mechanism with open significant failures
Excluded by your filters
Open significant failures
1 failure in 1 mechanism
  • Remote memory narrows the timing margin in Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges

    Data-centre remote memory access returns in about 1–2 µs, against about 70–200 ns for local DRAM. The MIRI overview says verification of memory saturation depends on ruling out remote access by latency or physical disconnection. It names pre-staging data into local memory as the remaining evasion and proposes an unpredictable, capacity-filling challenge to close it. 1

    Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

    Related mechanism Research demo Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization: Physical disconnection is proposed to exclude remote memory between the separated groups during a challenge. It depends on the isolation boundary being enforced. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. Add

Scope limitations
  • Facilities can be disguised or hidden in Remote detection of data centres

    Halstead and Larsen discuss two ways to hide a facility. One is to disguise it as a legitimate industrial site. The other is to build it underground, with cooling that avoids visible heat plumes. They note that the underground option requires bespoke engineering. 11

    Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

  • Small sites may not be detectable in Remote detection of data centres

    Halstead and Larsen conclude that a sufficiently small covert project could not be ruled out with confidence. In their estimates, the chance of detection is lower for smaller sites. Krawec notes that small data centres in existing buildings may lack the distinctive features of large facilities. 11 13

    Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

    Related mechanism Proposed Chip registries and manufacturing records: Accounts for chips from the fab onwards, which does not depend on a site being visible. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. Add

Open questions
  • Error rates not quantified in Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges

    Monfared et al. show separable timing distributions. Their acceptance rule passes a GPU when its mean time per round stays at or below a chosen maximum, and an appendix outlines statistical tests for the proof-of-work puzzle. They leave hardware-specific threshold values to future work and report no false-positive or false-negative rates. 3

    Open question · Open question. On the record

  • Search for unknown sites is undemonstrated in Remote detection of data centres

    Krawec reports that telling data centres apart from other industrial facilities systematically is difficult. Automating detection would need large amounts of training imagery and a purpose-trained model. In Krawec's words, automated data-centre detection "remains primarily conceptual at present". 13

    Open question · Open question. On the record

Possible additions1 for open failures · 1 for dependencies

Mechanisms on the map that are not in the proposal. Pointers, not recommendations.

  • Excluded by filters: development: Research demonstration

    • Bears on the open significant failure “Remote memory narrows the timing margin” in Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges. Physical disconnection is proposed to exclude remote memory between the separated groups during a challenge. It depends on the isolation boundary being enforced.
    • Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges waits on it. Outside help, such as remote memory, must be excluded during challenges.
Dependencies6 blockers
Blockers
6 blockers recorded
  • Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges
    • No network-level memory challenge across data-centre servers has been demonstrated. Adversarial validation 1
    • Challenges that fill memory displace workloads; filling a pod's volatile memory takes tens of minutes and SSDs take hours. Performance & compatibility 1 3
    • Outside help, such as remote memory, must be excluded during challenges. Coverage & hidden compute. Waits on Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization 1
  • Remote detection of data centres
    • Wide-area, automated detection of data centres is not yet practical and needs large training datasets. Coverage & hidden compute 13
    • No measured detection or false-alarm rates for finding undeclared facilities have been published. Adversarial validation 11 13
    • Recent high-resolution imagery is costly, is limited by weather and needs trained analysts. Access & governance 13
What the verifier seesNo outright disclosure specified

From the family or selected implementation's record.

Exposure notes
Implementations5 systems
Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges
Remote detection of data centres
None on the map
Sources15 cited

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Filter mechanisms

Filters apply to mechanisms only. They describe the setting a proposal is for, and all are off by default. A mechanism that a filter rules out is flagged and does not count towards claim coverage. Selected implementations use their own record fields. A match means not excluded; conditional or unspecified exposure stays with a note. Passing a filter does not establish that the assumptions hold in a deployment.

4 of 25 mechanisms match · Clear all

Prover

How far can the party being checked be trusted?

The prover is the party being checked. Semi-trusted designs rely on part of its stack: usually the chip vendor's hardware root of trust, its firmware or counters, or its supply-chain records. Adversarial designs aim to hold even if it cheats wherever the checks allow, within their stated assumptions.

Keeps mechanisms whose threat model holds against at least this prover. Adversarial is the strongest assumption. Definitions

Verifier devices on site

May the verifier install its own hardware at the prover's sites?

Some mechanisms need a device the verifier owns or trusts at the prover's facility, such as a network tap, a bandwidth limiter or a sealed sensor. Choose Not allowed when the setting rules that out. Inspectors are not covered.

"Not allowed" removes mechanisms that need a retrofit device, such as a network tap or a sealed sensor. Definitions

Prover cooperation

How much must the prover take part?

Required: the prover takes part, for example by logging requests, producing proofs or opening records. Partial: some access, such as installing a device. Not required: works from outside, such as satellite imagery.

"Partial at most" removes mechanisms that need the prover's active participation. "Not required" keeps only those that work without it. Definitions

Chips

May the proposal depend on new chip designs?

New chip features take years to reach a deployed fleet and cover only chips made after they ship. Mechanisms that use shipping features, such as trusted execution environments or performance counters, stay.

"Existing chips only" removes mechanisms that need changes to future chip designs. Definitions

Minimum development status

Development status

A level describes the public evidence for a mechanism's stated use, not its cost or feasibility. R3 can still have open critical flaws.

Keeps mechanisms whose readiness level is at least this one. Definitions

Attack testing

How hard has each mechanism been attacked in public?

The strongest published attempt to break the mechanism for its verification use: a security analysis, red-teaming by its developers or collaborators, or a red team independent of them.

Keeps mechanisms whose strongest published attack testing is at least this. Definitions

Keep hidden from the verifier

What must the verifier never see? Choose any.

Model weights: the checked model's parameters. Inputs and outputs: the requests a deployed model serves and its responses. Training data: what a model was trained on. Each mechanism's exposure is the editors' reading of its record: shown, depends on the design (kept, with a note), hidden, not involved, or unspecified for a selected implementation. Code and configuration are not covered yet.

Removes mechanisms that show the asset to the verifier. Conditional or unspecified exposure stays with a note and needs checking against the privacy requirement.

Claims

A claim is something one party wants to verify about another party's AI hardware or software. Each claim's number shows how the proposal addresses it.

  • Addressed. A mechanism in the proposal is aimed at this claim and is not excluded by the filters.
  • Partly addressed. Only supporting mechanisms, or mechanisms aimed at it that the filters exclude.
  • Unaddressed. No mechanism in the proposal addresses this claim.

Addressed means a mechanism in the proposal is aimed at the claim and is not excluded by your filters. It does not mean the claim is verified: check its assessed use, development status, security evidence, assumptions and findings.

All claims

Mechanisms

A mechanism is a general technique for verifying claims. Its badge is its development status for its stated use. An optional implementation choice narrows its assumptions, assessed use and claim links to that record. Lines join it to the claims it addresses. Click a line for details.Under its name it lists the claims it is aimed at or supports.

  • Aimed at the claim: verifying it is a direct purpose of the mechanism.
  • Supports the claim: helps verify it without being aimed at it.
  • Faint: excluded by your filters, so it does not count towards claim coverage.

All mechanisms

Overview

One row per mechanism in the proposal. Every mark comes from that mechanism's record, as listed in the panels below; what the verifier sees is the editors' reading of the record's text. Failure counts are per mechanism. Summary counts name mechanisms with open failures, not a sum of attacks. Choosing an implementation narrows each row to that record's assessed use; family findings remain as context. Findings are grouped as known failures, scope limitations and open questions. Only known failures count as failures. Counts are an inventory of published findings, not a risk score.

What the verifier sees

For model weights, inputs and outputs, and training data. This is the editors' reading of each mechanism's record (its threat model, how it works and its limitations), not a field of the record. Shown: the verifier sees it. Depends: on the design or variant, or the verifier sees only samples. Hidden: the verifier sees only commitments, hashes, proofs or results. Not involved: the record does not handle it. Unspecified: the selected implementation has no asset-specific assessment here.

Possible additions

Mechanisms on the map, not in the proposal, that the records connect to an unaddressed or partly addressed claim, an open failure or a dependency. They are pointers, not recommendations: each brings its own readiness level and findings, and none is claimed to close a failure. Links from failures are the editors' reading of the two records.

Start from a published design

Choosing a design loads the mechanisms its record realises or depends on. If the proposal has no claims yet, it also loads the claims that record says the design addresses.

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