Source · Tier A · Peer-reviewed
Unlocking Apple's Private Cloud Compute: An Analysis of Privacy-Preserving Artificial Intelligence
Y. Dittmar, M. J. Stephan, T. Völkl, M. Hollick, J. Classen. 2026. Proceedings of the 19th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks (WiSec '26).
See what cites it| Link | https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.24239 |
|---|---|
| DOI | 10.1145/3765613.3811691 |
| arXiv | 2605.24239 |
| Version | Read the arXiv HTML v1 (22 May 2026), whose ACM reference format names WiSec '26 (30 June–3 July 2026, Saarbrücken) and prints the DOI above (doi.org returned 403 to the fetch tool, so the DOI was not resolved). Authors at the Hasso Plattner Institute, TU Darmstadt and IMDEA Networks; none at Apple. |
| Accessed | 2026-09-24 |
| Note | Independent analysis that reverse-engineers PCC's client on macOS 15.5 and iOS 26.2 and queries the production service. Reports that there are no reproducible builds or symbols, request-token handling that departs from Apple's documentation (reusable one-time tokens, skipped signature validation, linkable salts), disclosure to Apple, and that Apple only clarified its documentation. It does not test attestation. |