Source · Tier A · Peer-reviewed
WireTap: Breaking Server SGX via DRAM Bus Interposition
A. Seto, O. K. Duran, S. Amer, J. Chuang, S. van Schaik, D. Genkin, C. Garman. 2025. 2025 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS '25).
| Link | https://wiretap.fail/ |
|---|---|
| DOI | 10.1145/3719027.3765204 |
| Version | Read the authors' site and the paper PDF linked from it (https://wiretap.fail/files/wiretap.pdf) on 2026-09-24. The DOI and venue are from the ACM reference block printed in the PDF; the ACM Digital Library page could not be fetched. |
| Accessed | 2026-09-24 |
| Note | Independent attack paper (Purdue University, Georgia Tech). DDR4 memory-bus interposer built for under $1000 (bill of materials $857) that records bus traffic. Recovers the ECDSA attestation key of Intel SGX's Quoting Enclave from a Xeon Scalable server in fully trusted status and forges SGX DCAP quotes. The site states that Intel considers the attack outside the SGX threat model and that there are no mitigations besides physical security. Several authors also wrote TEE.fail (S-1202). |