Mechanisms · category
Off-chip devices & sensors
Retrofittable devices outside the accelerator: network taps and certifiers, power and analog sensors, tamper-evident enclosures.
| Name | Type | Readiness | Verifies | Threat model |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tamper evidence for verifier devices Enclosures, seals and sensors that make physical interference with verification hardware either visible or self-defeating. | Mechanism | R2Demonstrated | Adversarial prover | |
| Workload classification from telemetry and side channels Telling whether chips are training, serving or doing non-AI work from GPU counters or power draw, signals that do not read weights or data. | Mechanism | R2Demonstrated | This compute runs inference, not training | Adversarial prover |
| AI 2040 inference-only verification stack A proposed retrofit that isolates data-centre inference units, taps their front-end traffic and recomputes random samples to check that only declared inference runs. | Implementation | R1Proposed | This compute runs inference, not training | Adversarial prover |
| Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization Capping or removing the network links between groups of accelerators, so that serving models still works but large training runs become impractically slow. | Mechanism | R1Proposed | Communication between compute groups is bounded | Adversarial prover |
| Low-trust AI compute verification system overview A retrofittable reference design in which network taps commit to all facility traffic, and air-gapped, independently sourced checkers later re-run randomly challenged records. | Implementation | R1Proposed | This compute runs inference, not training | Adversarial prover |
| Network taps and certifiers Devices on a cluster's network links that copy and hash all traffic, so a verifier can later check sampled records against declared work. | Mechanism | R1Proposed | This compute runs inference, not training | Adversarial prover |
| RAND secure inference data center (SIDC) design A RAND design for a purpose-built facility that serves already-trained AI models while protecting weights and inference data against state-level attackers. | Implementation | R1Proposed | Model weights or data have not left the facility | Semi-trusted prover |
| SASH confidential network logger An open-source prototype that routes a facility's inference traffic through a logger and re-runs requests on a separate cluster to check it serves inference. | Implementation | R1Proposed | This compute runs inference, not training | Semi-trusted prover |
| Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities Shielding, filtering, jamming and inspecting an AI facility so that no hidden physical channel can bypass the checks placed on its official links. | Mechanism | R1Proposed | Communication between compute groups is bounded | Adversarial prover |
Includes records that list this as a secondary category.