Mechanisms · category

On-chip & hardware-enabled

Mechanisms built into accelerators or their firmware: trusted execution, attestation, hardware-enabled governance, on-chip telemetry and limits.

Name	Type	Development	Security evidence	Verifies	Threat model
Apple Private Cloud Compute Apple's cloud AI inference service, in which user devices send requests only to servers that attest to running software published in a public transparency log. Product · Realises TEE remote attestation for AI workloads Provider-reported	Implementation	Operational use Operational use for showing users which software serves their AI requests, not which model. Medium confidence. Implementation · Semi-trusted prover	Published attack testing · independent	The declared model is the one being served	Semi-trusted prover
Hardware-attested weight binding Checks that a hardware enclave serves committed model weights, by attesting software that tests the weights against a hash commitment when they are read. ⚠ Open critical failure Provider-reported	Mechanism	Operational use Operational use for showing users, through hardware attestation, that a service runs its committed weights. Medium confidence. Mechanism · Semi-trusted prover	Published attack testing · independent	The declared model is the one being served Declared safeguards were applied during inference The declared evaluation was run	Semi-trusted prover
TEE remote attestation for AI workloads Trusted execution environments (TEEs) in CPUs and GPUs sign reports of launched software, so remote verifiers can check which code an AI workload started with. ⚠ Open critical failures Provider-reported	Mechanism	Operational use Operational use for showing a verifier which software ran despite distrust of the hardware operator. Medium confidence. Mechanism · Semi-trusted prover	Published attack testing · independent	The declared evaluation was run The declared model is the one being served Declared safeguards were applied during inference This compute runs inference, not training A training run stayed within declared limits	Semi-trusted prover
Tinfoil model identity (Modelwrap) Tinfoil's open-source tool for proving which model weights its enclave-hosted inference service runs, by building a hash of the weights into the hardware attestation. Product · Realises Hardware-attested weight binding, TEE remote attestation for AI workloads ⚠ Open critical failure Provider-reported	Implementation	Operational use Operational use for showing clients that the served weights match a committed hash. Medium confidence. Implementation · Semi-trusted prover	Published analysis or argument	The declared model is the one being served	Semi-trusted prover
WhatsApp Private Processing Meta's server system for WhatsApp AI features, whose clients check a confidential virtual machine's attestation and transparency-log proofs before connecting. Product · Realises TEE remote attestation for AI workloads Provider-reported	Implementation	Operational use Operational use for showing WhatsApp clients which logged software and artifacts serve their AI requests. Medium confidence. Implementation · Semi-trusted prover	Published analysis or argument	The declared model is the one being served	Semi-trusted prover
Attestable Audits A research prototype that runs AI safety benchmarks inside a trusted execution environment (TEE) and publishes TEE-signed records linking the model, audit and results. Research prototype · Realises TEE remote attestation for AI workloads, Hardware-attested weight binding, Confidential multi-party verification	Implementation	Research demonstration Research demonstration for attesting a benchmark audit run on a confidential model in an enclave. Low confidence. Implementation · Semi-trusted prover	Published analysis or argument	The declared model is the one being served The declared evaluation was run	Semi-trusted prover
Confidential multi-party verification Parties who distrust each other run an agreed check on private models or records, using attested enclaves or zero-knowledge proofs, releasing only the result.	Mechanism	Research demonstration Research demonstration for audits or evaluations of a private model that reveal neither party's inputs. Medium confidence. Mechanism · Semi-trusted prover	Published analysis or argument	The declared evaluation was run The declared model is the one being served Declared safeguards were applied during inference A training run stayed within declared limits	Semi-trusted prover
Cove Draft Parties who distrust each other chain enclave-run stages; owners release keys to private data only to stages they approved, and each stage issues a certificate. Open-source project · Realises Confidential multi-party verification, TEE remote attestation for AI workloads Provider-reported	Implementation	Research demonstration Draft. Research demonstration for composing owner-approved confidential workflow stages on Intel TDX. Medium confidence. Implementation · Semi-trusted prover	Published analysis or argument	The declared evaluation was run	Semi-trusted prover
On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters On-chip measurements, such as task timings, whether data sits in chip memory, and performance counters, used as statistical evidence of what AI chips are running.	Mechanism	Research demonstration Research demonstration for workload evidence from GPU counters and timing, assuming authentic measurements. Medium confidence. Mechanism · Semi-trusted prover	Published attack testing · developers	This compute runs inference, not training Declared hardware is idle or shut down A training run stayed within declared limits	Semi-trusted prover
PAL*M Draft A research prototype in which confidential-computing hardware signs hashes of the models, datasets and results involved in training, evaluation and inference. Research prototype · Realises TEE remote attestation for AI workloads, Hardware-attested weight binding	Implementation	Research demonstration Draft. Research demonstration for attesting declared model operations on a confidential CPU–GPU prototype. Medium confidence. Implementation · Semi-trusted prover	Published analysis or argument	The declared model is the one being served The declared evaluation was run A training run stayed within declared limits	Semi-trusted prover
PySyft double-blind evaluations OpenMined's PySyft lets a model owner and an evaluator run tests in an attested enclave without showing each other the weights or the private prompts. Research prototype · Realises Confidential multi-party verification Provider-reported	Implementation	Research demonstration Research demonstration for evaluating a private model on private prompts, neither party seeing the other's inputs. Medium confidence. Implementation · Semi-trusted prover	Published analysis or argument	The declared evaluation was run	Semi-trusted prover
Safeguard attestation TEE-signed evidence that an AI service sent a given response through its declared safeguard path, such as a wrapper that calls a guardrail classifier. Provider-reported	Mechanism	Research demonstration Research demonstration for attesting that a declared safeguard mediated a service's responses. Low confidence. Mechanism · Semi-trusted prover	Published analysis or argument	Declared safeguards were applied during inference	Semi-trusted prover
SAGE Draft A software-only attestation scheme in which a GPU must compute a checksum over its own code within a time limit, without trusted GPU hardware. Research prototype · Realises Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges	Implementation	Research demonstration Draft. Research demonstration for attesting code execution on a GPU that lacks hardware trusted-execution support. Medium confidence. Implementation · Adversarial prover	Published analysis or argument	The declared model is the one being served	Adversarial prover
Workload classification from telemetry and side channels Inferring from GPU counters or power draw whether chips are training models, serving them or doing non-AI work, without reading weights or data.	Mechanism	Research demonstration Research demonstration for telling training from inference and other work using genuine telemetry, including disguised workloads. Medium confidence. Mechanism · Adversarial prover	Published attack testing · developers	This compute runs inference, not training A training run stayed within declared limits	Adversarial prover
Chip location verification Timing a chip's signed replies to trusted servers at known places, so that the speed of light bounds how far away the chip can be.	Mechanism	Proposed Proposed for bounding how far a chip is from trusted landmark servers when checked. Medium confidence. Mechanism · Adversarial prover	Published analysis or argument	Chips are where they are declared to be There is no undeclared relevant compute	Adversarial prover
Hardware performance throttling and licensing Proposed on-chip mechanisms that cut an AI accelerator's performance when a license expires or a trusted trigger fires, bounding what the hardware can do.	Mechanism	Proposed Proposed for performance limits a verifier can rely on, against an operator trying to bypass them. Medium confidence. Mechanism · Adversarial prover	Published analysis or argument	Compute stock is at most a declared amount A training run stayed within declared limits Declared hardware is idle or shut down	Adversarial prover
Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors A proposed add-on for AI chips: an auditable guarantee processor, sealed in a tamper-protected enclosure, that would check and enforce agreed rules on chip use.	Mechanism	Proposed Proposed for checking and enforcing training-compute limits on chips, against adversaries up to states. Medium confidence. Mechanism · Adversarial prover	Published analysis or argument	A training run stayed within declared limits The declared model is the one being served Chips are where they are declared to be Communication between compute groups is bounded Declared safeguards were applied during inference	Adversarial prover
Lucid sovereignty (location) certificates A draft specification, hosted by Lucid Computing, for short-lived certificates that bound where a workload runs by timing signed messages to servers at known locations. Standard · Realises Chip location verification Provider-reported	Implementation	Proposed Proposed for certifying the region where an attested workload ran at a given time. Medium confidence. Implementation · Semi-trusted prover	Published analysis or argument	Chips are where they are declared to be	Semi-trusted prover

Includes records that list this as a secondary category. Claims in grey italics are supported rather than aimed at.