Proposal Explorer
ResetA verification proposal from the AI Verification Tech Map, from its records of 2026-10-08. https://trustbutveri.fyi/explorer/?mechanisms=M-0007,M-0002&chips=existing&hide=weights,io
Analysis
Applied filters: Chips: Existing chips only; Keep hidden from the verifier: model weights, inputs and outputs. Not set (Any): Prover, Verifier devices on site, Prover cooperation, Minimum readiness, Attack testing.
Overview
| Mechanism | Readiness | Open flaws |
|---|---|---|
| Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting | R1 | 3 significant |
| Deterministic and bit-exact inference | R3 | 1 significant1 minor |
- Open flaws: n critical n significant n minor
Claim coverageNo claims yet
Add claims to see which ones the mechanisms address.
Properties1 in production · 2 built for an adversarial prover
- In production
- R3 Deterministic and bit-exact inference for reproducing open-model inference from receipts in Gensyn's information-market service
- Built for an adversarial prover
- Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting and Deterministic and bit-exact inference
- No new hardware needed
- Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting and Deterministic and bit-exact inference
Attack testing2 mechanisms with published testing
Published attempts to break a system, including those that found failures. Testing history does not show that open flaws are resolved.
Limits1 not yet demonstrated · 2 mechanisms with open significant findings
- Open significant flaws
4 flaws in 2 mechanisms
Proves that work was done, not that no capacity remains in Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting
Proof-of-work accounting bounds unmonitored compute only relative to an estimate of what the actor has. Attestable states that the verifier "needs a credible estimate of the compute available" to the actor, and that a proof "cannot discover a datacenter that was never declared". 1
Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record
Related mechanism R1 Chip registries and manufacturing records: A registry of chips is one basis for the estimate of available compute that the flaw's source says the verifier needs. A pointer, not evidence that this flaw is mitigated. Add
Related mechanism R1 Remote detection of data centres: Looks for data centres that were never declared, which a proof cannot discover. A pointer, not evidence that this flaw is mitigated. Add
Security rests on new hardness assumptions in Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting
Komargodski and Weinstein base security on hardness assumptions about batches of low-rank random linear equations, and list PoUW "from more standard or well-studied assumptions" as an open problem. Pearl's floating-point variant introduces a further "quantized-subspace hardness" assumption. 3 4
Open question · Significant · Open. On the record
Known shortcuts let a miner claim somewhat more work than it did in Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting
Pearl's specification lists known mining speedups: crafted inputs, precision shortcuts, seed grinding, work reuse, and faster kernels or hardware. A policy check caps the summands a miner may skip at one-sixteenth of those in a tile. For capacity bounding, any gap between work proven and work possible leaves spare capacity. 4
Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record
Cross-hardware replay relies on reverse-engineered, closed behaviour in Deterministic and bit-exact inference
Emulating one GPU's rounding on another requires reverse-engineering tensor-core arithmetic and modelling proprietary kernel choices. Hawkeye covers a subset of NVIDIA architectures and states that attention and other higher-level operations need further reverse engineering. For the bit-exact emulator, a proprietary Hopper kernel family is an open edge case. 6 8
Open question · Significant · Open. On the record
- Open minor flaws
1 mechanism with minor findings
Some kernels remain genuinely nondeterministic in Deterministic and bit-exact inference
The bit-exact work separates kernels that are deterministic but not batch-invariant from truly nondeterministic ones that use atomic functions. Some integer de-quantization kernels use atomic additions and remain nondeterministic, so exact replay needs backends that avoid them. 6
Open question · Minor · Open. On the record
- Not yet demonstrated
- R1 Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting
Possible additions2 for open flaws
Mechanisms on the map that are not in the proposal. Pointers, not recommendations.
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- Bears on the open significant flaw “Proves that work was done, not that no capacity remains” in Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting. A registry of chips is one basis for the estimate of available compute that the flaw's source says the verifier needs.
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- Bears on the open significant flaw “Proves that work was done, not that no capacity remains” in Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting. Looks for data centres that were never declared, which a proof cannot discover.
Dependencies7 blockers
- Blockers
7 blockers recorded
- Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting
- Bounding spare capacity needs a credible estimate of the compute available to the actor, including third-party access. Capacity bounds 1
- Proofs of work cannot find facilities that were never declared. Coverage & hidden compute 1
- As of September 2026 no implementation, demonstration or independent evaluation of proofs of work for capacity bounding has been published. Adversarial validation
- Deterministic and bit-exact inference
- Batch-invariant kernels cost throughput: in Thinking Machines' Qwen3-8B test, an improved deterministic build took 42 s against 26 s for vLLM's default, and SGLang reports an average 34.35% slowdown on its FlashInfer and FlashAttention 3 backends. Performance & compatibility 7 9
- Coverage is incomplete: the bit-exact emulator targets dense blocks on NVIDIA GPUs and excludes mixture-of-experts inference and training, and vLLM's batch-invariant mode is in beta, with open work on AMD hardware and speculative decoding. Performance & compatibility 6 10 17
- Amodo's status page for the AI 2040 verification plan rates a reproducible inference stack for that plan as 'not started'. Performance & compatibility 18
- Exact replay requires the prover to disclose weights, software versions, parallelism and batch sizes to whoever recomputes. Privacy & leakage 6 16
- Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting
What the verifier sees2 depend on design
From the family or selected implementation's record.
- Model weights
Depends on the design for Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting and Deterministic and bit-exact inference.
- Inputs and outputs
Depends on the design for Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting and Deterministic and bit-exact inference.
- Training data
Not involved: Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting and Deterministic and bit-exact inference.
Exposure notes
- Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting: Checking a sampled tile of a matrix multiplication reveals that tile, which may hold model or input data; the authors suggest a zero-knowledge proof when the matrices must stay private.
- Deterministic and bit-exact inference: Exact replay needs the weights, configuration and replayed requests inside the recomputation environment. What the verifier sees depends on whether that environment keeps them confidential. 6 16
Implementations4 systems
- Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting
- R3 Pearl proof-of-useful-work blockchain Open-source project, Pearl Research Labs
- Deterministic and bit-exact inference
- R2 Batch-invariant inference kernels (Thinking Machines) Open-source project, Thinking Machines Lab
- R3 Verde and RepOps (Gensyn) Product, Gensyn
- R1 Low-trust AI compute verification system overview Proposed architecture, Machine Intelligence Research Institute
Sources18 cited
- Pacing AI Requires Proof, Attestable (2026). Original
- Mechanisms to Verify International Agreements About AI Development, A. Scher & L. Thiergart (2025). Original
- Proofs of Useful Work from Arbitrary Matrix Multiplication, I. Komargodski & O. Weinstein (2025). Original
- Pearl Floating Point Scheme Specification, Pearl Research Team (2026). Original
- pearl: Monorepo for the Pearl network, Pearl Research Labs (2026). Original
- Bit-Exact AI Inference Verification Without Performance Tradeoffs, N. Cankaya (2026). Original
- Defeating Nondeterminism in LLM Inference, H. He & Thinking Machines Lab (2025). Original
- Hawkeye: Reproducing GPU-Level Non-Determinism, E. Badash et al. (2026). Original
- Towards Deterministic Inference in SGLang and Reproducible RL Training, The SGLang Team (2025). Original
- Batch Invariance (vLLM documentation), vLLM project (2026). Original
- gensyn-ai/ree: Gensyn Reproducible Execution Environment (GitHub repository), Gensyn (2026). Original
- EigenCloud Brings Verifiable AI to Mass Market with EigenAI and EigenCompute Launches, EigenCloud (2025). Original
- Building Delphi: Pricing, Settlement, and Agentic Trading, D. Jedamski (2026). Original
- Reproducible Execution Environment (REE) (Gensyn documentation), Gensyn (2026). Original
- What is Delphi? (Delphi documentation), Gensyn (2026). Original
- A System Overview for Near-Term, Low-Trust AI Compute Verification, N. Cankaya (2026). Original
- [Feature]: Batch Invariant Feature and Performance Optimization (vLLM issue #27433), vLLM project contributors (2025). Original
- AI 2040 Plan A — Verification SITREP, Amodo Design (2026). Original
Share the link to this proposal. This proposal is also available as plain text and JSON.
Filter mechanisms
Filters apply to mechanisms only. They describe the setting a proposal is for, and all are off by default. A mechanism that a filter rules out is flagged and does not count towards claim coverage. Selected implementations use their own record fields. A match means not excluded; conditional or unspecified exposure stays with a note. Passing a filter does not establish that the assumptions hold in a deployment.
21 of 25 mechanisms match · Clear all
Prover
How far can the party being checked be trusted?
The prover is the party being checked. Semi-trusted designs rely on part of its stack: usually the chip vendor's hardware root of trust, its firmware or counters, or its supply-chain records. Adversarial designs aim to hold even if it cheats wherever the checks allow, within their stated assumptions.
Keeps mechanisms whose threat model holds against at least this prover. Adversarial is the strongest assumption. Definitions
Verifier devices on site
May the verifier install its own hardware at the prover's sites?
Some mechanisms need a device the verifier owns or trusts at the prover's facility, such as a network tap, a bandwidth limiter or a sealed sensor. Choose Not allowed when the setting rules that out. Inspectors are not covered.
"Not allowed" removes mechanisms that need a retrofit device, such as a network tap or a sealed sensor. Definitions
Prover cooperation
How much must the prover take part?
Required: the prover takes part, for example by logging requests, producing proofs or opening records. Partial: some access, such as installing a device. Not required: works from outside, such as satellite imagery.
"Partial at most" removes mechanisms that need the prover's active participation. "Not required" keeps only those that work without it. Definitions
Chips
May the proposal depend on new chip designs?
New chip features take years to reach a deployed fleet and cover only chips made after they ship. Mechanisms that use shipping features, such as trusted execution environments or performance counters, stay.
"Existing chips only" removes mechanisms that need changes to future chip designs. Definitions
Minimum readiness
How mature must each mechanism be?
- Any (selected)21 match
- R1 Proposed21 match
- R2 Demonstrated13 match
- R3 In production4 match
- R4 Deployment-ready0 match
A level describes the public evidence for a mechanism's stated use, not its cost or feasibility. R3 can still have open critical flaws.
Keeps mechanisms whose readiness level is at least this one. Definitions
Attack testing
How hard has each mechanism been attacked in public?
The strongest published attempt to break the mechanism for its verification use: a security analysis, red-teaming by its developers or collaborators, or a red team independent of them.
Keeps mechanisms whose strongest published attack testing is at least this. Definitions
Keep hidden from the verifier
What must the verifier never see? Choose any.
Model weights: the checked model's parameters. Inputs and outputs: the requests a deployed model serves and its responses. Training data: what a model was trained on. Each mechanism's exposure is the editors' reading of its record: shown, depends on the design (kept, with a note), hidden, not involved, or unspecified for a selected implementation. Code and configuration are not covered yet.
Removes mechanisms that show the asset to the verifier. Conditional or unspecified exposure stays with a note and needs checking against the privacy requirement.
Claims
A claim is something one party wants to verify about another party's AI hardware or software. Each claim's number shows how the proposal addresses it.
- Addressed. A mechanism in the proposal is aimed at this claim and is not excluded by the filters.
- Partly addressed. Only supporting mechanisms, or mechanisms aimed at it that the filters exclude.
- Unaddressed. No mechanism in the proposal addresses this claim.
Addressed means a mechanism in the proposal is aimed at the claim and is not excluded by your filters. It does not mean the claim is verified: check its assessed use, readiness, assumptions and open flaws.
Mechanisms
A mechanism is a general technique for verifying claims. Its badge is its readiness level for its stated use. An optional implementation choice narrows its assumptions, assessed use and claim links to that record. Lines join it to the claims it addresses. Click a line for details.Under its name it lists the claims it is aimed at or supports.
- Aimed at the claim: verifying it is a direct purpose of the mechanism.
- Supports the claim: helps verify it without being aimed at it.
- Faint: excluded by your filters, so it does not count towards claim coverage.
Overview
One row per mechanism in the proposal. Every mark comes from that mechanism's record, as listed in the panels below; what the verifier sees is the editors' reading of the record's text. Flaw counts are per mechanism. Summary counts name mechanisms with open findings, not a sum of attacks. Choosing an implementation narrows each row to that record's assessed use; family findings remain as context.
What the verifier sees
For model weights, inputs and outputs, and training data. This is the editors' reading of each mechanism's record (its threat model, how it works and its limitations), not a field of the record. Shown: the verifier sees it. Depends: on the design or variant, or the verifier sees only samples. Hidden: the verifier sees only commitments, hashes, proofs or results. Not involved: the record does not handle it. Unspecified: the selected implementation has no asset-specific assessment here.
Possible additions
Mechanisms on the map, not in the proposal, that the records connect to an unaddressed or partly addressed claim, an open flaw or a dependency. They are pointers, not recommendations: each brings its own readiness level and flaws, and none is claimed to close a flaw. Links from flaws are the editors' reading of the two records.
Start from a goal
A goal is something a rule or agreement about AI sets out to achieve. Choosing one loads the claims it needs verified. Your mechanisms and filters stay as they are.
- Cap frontier training2 direct, 3 supportingKeep every AI training run below an agreed amount of compute.
- Pause frontier AI development2 direct, 3 supportingStop new AI training runs and experiments for an agreed period, while existing models stay in service.
- Deploy only evaluated models2 direct, 3 supportingDeploy powerful AI models widely only after their risks have been evaluated and judged manageable.
- Prevent catastrophic misuse2 direct, 2 supportingKeep capable AI models from helping anyone carry out catastrophic attacks, such as biological or chemical ones.
- Prevent weight theft1 direct, 1 supportingKeep the weights of capable AI models from being copied out of the facilities that hold them.
- Enforce chip export controls1 directKeep export-controlled AI chips at the destinations they were authorised for.
Start from a published design
Choosing a design loads the mechanisms its record realises or depends on. If the proposal has no claims yet, it also loads the claims that record says the design addresses.
- AI 2040 inference-only verification stack7 mechanismsProposed architecture, AI Futures Project
- Low-trust AI compute verification system overview7 mechanismsProposed architecture, Machine Intelligence Research Institute
- RAND secure inference data center (SIDC) design3 mechanismsProposed architecture, RAND