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A verification proposal from the AI Verification Tech Map, from its records of 2026-10-09. https://trustbutveri.fyi/explorer/?mechanisms=M-0016,M-0019&implementations=M-0016:I-0020&chips=existing

Claims

Mechanisms2

Filters:× 23 of 25 match

Applied filters: Chips: Existing chips only. Not set (Any): Prover, Verifier devices on site, Prover cooperation, Minimum development status, Attack testing, Keep hidden from the verifier.

Analysis

Applied filters: Chips: Existing chips only. Not set (Any): Prover, Verifier devices on site, Prover cooperation, Minimum development status, Attack testing, Keep hidden from the verifier.

  • Open failures: n critical n significant n minor
Claim coverageNo claims yet

Add claims to see which ones the mechanisms address.

Properties1 built for an adversarial prover
Attack testing2 mechanisms with published testing

Attack testing records published testing for this use. It does not by itself show independent review, a formal proof or that a deployed system is secure.

Limits1 family with findings to check · 3 scope limitations · 2 not yet demonstrated · 2 mechanisms with open significant failures
Family findings
  • Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges

    Context for Data-centre memory challenging. Findings from the mechanism family appear here as context. They apply to an implementation only when its own record lists them, under the conditions stated there.

    • Timing-based software attestation has been broken in practice in Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges

      Castelluccia et al. implemented two generic attacks, one based on a return-oriented rootkit and one on code compression, together with specific attacks on SWATT and ICE-based schemes, on commodity sensor nodes. They conclude that secure time-based attestation is "very difficult, if not impossible, to design correctly". The attacks target embedded schemes, not AI accelerators. 2 3

      Response: Perrig and van Doorn, two of the designers of SWATT and ICE, replied in August 2010. They argue that the rootkit attack defeats a naive implementation, not a property the schemes claim, and that the SWATT attack was run on a re-implementation on a chip with eight times the program memory, where SWATT's own chip is almost always full of code. They accept that the attack on ICE works.

      Known failure · Demonstrated attack · Significant · Disputed. On the record

    • Remote memory narrows the timing margin in Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges

      Data-centre remote memory access returns in about 1–2 µs, against about 70–200 ns for local DRAM. The MIRI overview says verification of memory saturation depends on ruling out remote access by latency or physical disconnection. It names pre-staging data into local memory as the remaining evasion and proposes an unpredictable, capacity-filling challenge to close it. 1

      Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

      Related mechanism Research demo Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization: Physical disconnection is proposed to exclude remote memory between the separated groups during a challenge. It depends on the isolation boundary being enforced. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. Add

    • Error rates not quantified in Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges

      Monfared et al. show separable timing distributions. Their acceptance rule passes a GPU when its mean time per round stays at or below a chosen maximum, and an appendix outlines statistical tests for the proof-of-work puzzle. They leave hardware-specific threshold values to future work and report no false-positive or false-negative rates. 4

      Open question · Open question. On the record

Open significant failures
2 failures in 2 mechanisms
  • Remote memory narrows the timing margin in Data-centre memory challenging

    A remote memory access round trip takes about 1–2 µs over InfiniBand or RoCE, against about 70–200 ns for a local DRAM read. The overview says verification of memory saturation depends on ruling out remote access, by response latency or by physical disconnection. 1

    Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

  • Documents and serial numbers can be forged in Chip registries and manufacturing records

    Avellar and Grunewald note that export documents can be forged, that companies can hide information behind obscure corporate structures, and that it may be possible to forge serial numbers on chips and racks. They recommend cryptographic attestation of a powered-on chip as an extra check. 6

    Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

Scope limitations
  • Presence does not show absence in Data-centre memory challenging

    A check that data is present does not show that nothing else is stored. The overview names pre-staging data into local memory before a challenge as the remaining evasion, and proposes an unpredictable, capacity-filling challenge to close it. 1

    Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

  • Records cover only chips that were recorded in Chip registries and manufacturing records

    A registry or commitment accounts only for chips entered into it. Cankaya asks how a verifier would know it had found all chips, or how much "dark compute" remains, and notes that a fraudulent original record would mean unregistered chips had been made in advance. Halstead and Larsen propose reconstructing earlier production by auditing upstream suppliers. 7 9

    Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

    Related mechanism Proposed Remote detection of data centres: Looks for large data centres that were never declared, which a registry cannot show. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. Add

  • Insiders could alter records before they are fixed in Chip registries and manufacturing records

    Cankaya argues that insiders who can photograph process secrets could also tamper with production records. A commitment makes changes after publication detectable, but it cannot show that the records were accurate when committed. 7

    Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

Possible additions1 for dependencies

Mechanisms on the map that are not in the proposal. Pointers, not recommendations.

Dependencies1 missing prerequisite · 7 blockers
Missing prerequisites
Blockers
7 blockers recorded
  • Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges
    • No network-level probe has been shown to distinguish one server's memory contents from another's. Adversarial validation 1
    • Most of the design needs a probe in close proximity to the challenged memory. Access & governance 1
    • Filling a pod's volatile memory takes tens of minutes, and on-board SSDs take hours. Performance & compatibility 1
    • Remote memory access must be excluded during challenges. Coverage & hidden compute. Waits on Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization 1
  • Chip registries and manufacturing records
    • No implementation of an AI chip registry has been publicly reported, and covering re-exports would need cooperation from re-exporters and foreign governments that may not be feasible everywhere. Access & governance 5 6
    • Linking records to physical chips needs hard-to-spoof unique IDs and inspections. Hardware trust 5 6 7
    • Chips produced before a registry starts must be reconstructed from supplier records. Coverage & hidden compute 7 9
What the verifier sees1 unspecified

From the family or selected implementation's record.

Model weights

Not involved: Chip registries and manufacturing records.

Unspecified for Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges. Check the implementation record.

Inputs and outputs

Not involved: Chip registries and manufacturing records.

Unspecified for Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges. Check the implementation record.

Training data

Not involved: Chip registries and manufacturing records.

Unspecified for Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges. Check the implementation record.

Exposure notes
Implementations5 systems
Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges
Chip registries and manufacturing records
None on the map
Sources9 cited

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Filter mechanisms

Filters apply to mechanisms only. They describe the setting a proposal is for, and all are off by default. A mechanism that a filter rules out is flagged and does not count towards claim coverage. Selected implementations use their own record fields. A match means not excluded; conditional or unspecified exposure stays with a note. Passing a filter does not establish that the assumptions hold in a deployment.

23 of 25 mechanisms match · Clear all

Prover

How far can the party being checked be trusted?

The prover is the party being checked. Semi-trusted designs rely on part of its stack: usually the chip vendor's hardware root of trust, its firmware or counters, or its supply-chain records. Adversarial designs aim to hold even if it cheats wherever the checks allow, within their stated assumptions.

Keeps mechanisms whose threat model holds against at least this prover. Adversarial is the strongest assumption. Definitions

Verifier devices on site

May the verifier install its own hardware at the prover's sites?

Some mechanisms need a device the verifier owns or trusts at the prover's facility, such as a network tap, a bandwidth limiter or a sealed sensor. Choose Not allowed when the setting rules that out. Inspectors are not covered.

"Not allowed" removes mechanisms that need a retrofit device, such as a network tap or a sealed sensor. Definitions

Prover cooperation

How much must the prover take part?

Required: the prover takes part, for example by logging requests, producing proofs or opening records. Partial: some access, such as installing a device. Not required: works from outside, such as satellite imagery.

"Partial at most" removes mechanisms that need the prover's active participation. "Not required" keeps only those that work without it. Definitions

Chips

May the proposal depend on new chip designs?

New chip features take years to reach a deployed fleet and cover only chips made after they ship. Mechanisms that use shipping features, such as trusted execution environments or performance counters, stay.

"Existing chips only" removes mechanisms that need changes to future chip designs. Definitions

Minimum development status

Development status

A level describes the public evidence for a mechanism's stated use, not its cost or feasibility. R3 can still have open critical flaws.

Keeps mechanisms whose readiness level is at least this one. Definitions

Attack testing

How hard has each mechanism been attacked in public?

The strongest published attempt to break the mechanism for its verification use: a security analysis, red-teaming by its developers or collaborators, or a red team independent of them.

Keeps mechanisms whose strongest published attack testing is at least this. Definitions

Keep hidden from the verifier

What must the verifier never see? Choose any.

Model weights: the checked model's parameters. Inputs and outputs: the requests a deployed model serves and its responses. Training data: what a model was trained on. Each mechanism's exposure is the editors' reading of its record: shown, depends on the design (kept, with a note), hidden, not involved, or unspecified for a selected implementation. Code and configuration are not covered yet.

Removes mechanisms that show the asset to the verifier. Conditional or unspecified exposure stays with a note and needs checking against the privacy requirement.

Claims

A claim is something one party wants to verify about another party's AI hardware or software. Each claim's number shows how the proposal addresses it.

  • Addressed. A mechanism in the proposal is aimed at this claim and is not excluded by the filters.
  • Partly addressed. Only supporting mechanisms, or mechanisms aimed at it that the filters exclude.
  • Unaddressed. No mechanism in the proposal addresses this claim.

Addressed means a mechanism in the proposal is aimed at the claim and is not excluded by your filters. It does not mean the claim is verified: check its assessed use, development status, security evidence, assumptions and findings.

All claims

Mechanisms

A mechanism is a general technique for verifying claims. Its badge is its development status for its stated use. An optional implementation choice narrows its assumptions, assessed use and claim links to that record. Lines join it to the claims it addresses. Click a line for details.Under its name it lists the claims it is aimed at or supports.

  • Aimed at the claim: verifying it is a direct purpose of the mechanism.
  • Supports the claim: helps verify it without being aimed at it.
  • Faint: excluded by your filters, so it does not count towards claim coverage.

All mechanisms

Overview

One row per mechanism in the proposal. Every mark comes from that mechanism's record, as listed in the panels below; what the verifier sees is the editors' reading of the record's text. Failure counts are per mechanism. Summary counts name mechanisms with open failures, not a sum of attacks. Choosing an implementation narrows each row to that record's assessed use; family findings remain as context. Findings are grouped as known failures, scope limitations and open questions. Only known failures count as failures. Counts are an inventory of published findings, not a risk score.

What the verifier sees

For model weights, inputs and outputs, and training data. This is the editors' reading of each mechanism's record (its threat model, how it works and its limitations), not a field of the record. Shown: the verifier sees it. Depends: on the design or variant, or the verifier sees only samples. Hidden: the verifier sees only commitments, hashes, proofs or results. Not involved: the record does not handle it. Unspecified: the selected implementation has no asset-specific assessment here.

Possible additions

Mechanisms on the map, not in the proposal, that the records connect to an unaddressed or partly addressed claim, an open failure or a dependency. They are pointers, not recommendations: each brings its own readiness level and findings, and none is claimed to close a failure. Links from failures are the editors' reading of the two records.

Start from a published design

Choosing a design loads the mechanisms its record realises or depends on. If the proposal has no claims yet, it also loads the claims that record says the design addresses.

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