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Built for an adversarial prover

Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting and Bounding unexplained information in outputs

No new hardware needed

Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting and Chip registries and manufacturing records

Published attempts to break a system, including those that found failures. Testing history does not show that open flaws are resolved.

• Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting: Analysis
• Bounding unexplained information in outputs: Independent red-team
• Chip registries and manufacturing records: Analysis

Open significant flaws

10 flaws in 3 mechanisms

• Proves that work was done, not that no capacity remains in Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting

  Proof-of-work accounting bounds unmonitored compute only relative to an estimate of what the actor has. Attestable states that the verifier "needs a credible estimate of the compute available" to the actor, and that a proof "cannot discover a datacenter that was never declared". ¹

  Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

  Related mechanism R1 Chip registries and manufacturing records: A registry of chips is one basis for the estimate of available compute that the flaw's source says the verifier needs. A pointer, not evidence that this flaw is mitigated. In the proposal.

  Related mechanism R1 Remote detection of data centres: Looks for data centres that were never declared, which a proof cannot discover. A pointer, not evidence that this flaw is mitigated. Add

• Security rests on new hardness assumptions in Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting

  Komargodski and Weinstein base security on hardness assumptions about batches of low-rank random linear equations, and list PoUW "from more standard or well-studied assumptions" as an open problem. Pearl's floating-point variant introduces a further "quantized-subspace hardness" assumption. ^{3 4}

  Open question · Significant · Open. On the record

• Known shortcuts let a miner claim somewhat more work than it did in Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting

  Pearl's specification lists known mining speedups: crafted inputs, precision shortcuts, seed grinding, work reuse, and faster kernels or hardware. A policy check caps the summands a miner may skip at one-sixteenth of those in a tile. For capacity bounding, any gap between work proven and work possible leaves spare capacity. ⁴

  Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

• Prompt-controlled entropy inflation widens the covert channel in Bounding unexplained information in outputs

  Gumbel-based inference verification tolerates token choices that honest GPU nondeterminism could produce, and the size of that tolerated set grows with the model's output entropy. Kezins, an independent researcher, showed that an adversary who controls the prompt distribution can raise output entropy and roughly double the bits leaked per token. Across six models of 1 to 32 billion parameters, this cut the slowdown from 146–254 times under benign prompts to 60–118 times. Kezins argues that architectures built on the same unexplained-information bound inherit this attack surface, and recommends calibrating tolerances against local token entropy rather than benign traffic. ^{7 8}

  Demonstrated attack · Significant · Open. On the record

  Related mechanism R3 Deterministic and bit-exact inference: Bit-exact replay would remove the tolerance for numerical noise that sets the size of this channel. The record notes that it needs full hardware and software metadata. A pointer, not evidence that this flaw is mitigated. Add

• Information the declared computation explains is not bounded in Bounding unexplained information in outputs

  The bound limits unexplained bits only. Outputs that the declared computation fully explains can still carry valuable information: a compression study notes that an adversary with inference access can extract more proprietary information per bit than naive transmission allows. ^{6 9}

  Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

• Channels other than checked outputs are outside the bound in Bounding unexplained information in outputs

  The inference-verification scheme treats side channels as out of scope. A low-trust system design argues that suppressing physical covert bandwidth below kilobits per second is much more achievable than aiming for zero, and that a malicious device can leak one bit of information by deliberately outputting a wrong result. ^{7 10}

  Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

  Related mechanism R1 Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities: Physical side channels need separate suppression, which is this mechanism's purpose. A pointer, not evidence that this flaw is mitigated. Add

• The facility-level design is untested in Bounding unexplained information in outputs

  The compute-verification architecture is described with protocol details, potential attacks and prototyping plans, but no prototype results have been published. ⁶

  Open question · Significant · Open. On the record

• Records cover only chips that were recorded in Chip registries and manufacturing records

  A registry or commitment accounts only for chips entered into it. Cankaya asks how a verifier would know it had found all chips, or how much "dark compute" remains, and notes that a fraudulent original record would mean unregistered chips had been made in advance. Halstead and Larsen propose reconstructing earlier production by auditing upstream suppliers. ^{13 15}

  Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

  Related mechanism R1 Remote detection of data centres: Looks for large data centres that were never declared, which a registry cannot show. A pointer, not evidence that this flaw is mitigated. Add

• Documents and serial numbers can be forged in Chip registries and manufacturing records

  Avellar and Grunewald note that export documents can be forged, that companies can hide information behind obscure corporate structures, and that it may be possible to forge serial numbers on chips and racks. They recommend cryptographic attestation of a powered-on chip as an extra check. ¹²

  Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

• Insiders could alter records before they are fixed in Chip registries and manufacturing records

  Cankaya argues that insiders who can photograph process secrets could also tamper with production records. A commitment makes changes after publication detectable, but it cannot show that the records were accurate when committed. ¹³

  Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

Not yet demonstrated

R1 Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting and R1 Chip registries and manufacturing records

Mechanisms on the map that are not in the proposal. Pointers, not recommendations. ?

• R3 Deterministic and bit-exact inference Add
  • Bears on the open significant flaw “Prompt-controlled entropy inflation widens the covert channel” in Bounding unexplained information in outputs. Bit-exact replay would remove the tolerance for numerical noise that sets the size of this channel. The record notes that it needs full hardware and software metadata.
  • Bounding unexplained information in outputs waits on it. Tolerance for numerical nondeterminism sets the size of the residual channel; bit-exact replay would remove it but needs full hardware and software metadata.
• R1 Remote detection of data centres Add
  • Bears on the open significant flaw “Proves that work was done, not that no capacity remains” in Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting. Looks for data centres that were never declared, which a proof cannot discover.
  • Bears on the open significant flaw “Records cover only chips that were recorded” in Chip registries and manufacturing records. Looks for large data centres that were never declared, which a registry cannot show.
• R1 Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities Add
  • Bears on the open significant flaw “Channels other than checked outputs are outside the bound” in Bounding unexplained information in outputs. Physical side channels need separate suppression, which is this mechanism's purpose.
  • Bounding unexplained information in outputs waits on it. Physical side channels need separate suppression, and one design treats a low residual bandwidth, rather than zero, as the realistic target.
• R2 Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization Add
  • Bounding unexplained information in outputs waits on it. The prover's compute must be isolated so that all traffic passes through the verifier's interlock; any unmonitored path voids the bound.
• R3 Sampled inference recomputation Add
  • Bounding unexplained information in outputs depends on it.
• R1 Network taps and certifiers Add
  • Bounding unexplained information in outputs depends on it.

Missing prerequisites

• R3 Sampled inference recomputation needed by Bounding unexplained information in outputs Add
• R2 Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization needed by Bounding unexplained information in outputs Add
• R1 Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities needed by Bounding unexplained information in outputs Add
• R1 Network taps and certifiers needed by Bounding unexplained information in outputs Add

Blockers

11 blockers recorded

• Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting
  • Bounding spare capacity needs a credible estimate of the compute available to the actor, including third-party access. Capacity bounds ¹
  • Proofs of work cannot find facilities that were never declared. Coverage & hidden compute ¹
  • As of September 2026 no implementation, demonstration or independent evaluation of proofs of work for capacity bounding has been published. Adversarial validation
• Bounding unexplained information in outputs
  • The prover's compute must be isolated so that all traffic passes through the verifier's interlock; any unmonitored path voids the bound. Coverage & hidden compute. Waits on Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization ⁶
  • Physical side channels need separate suppression, and one design treats a low residual bandwidth, rather than zero, as the realistic target. Coverage & hidden compute. Waits on Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities ^{7 10}
  • Tolerance for numerical nondeterminism sets the size of the residual channel; bit-exact replay would remove it but needs full hardware and software metadata. Protocol soundness. Waits on Deterministic and bit-exact inference ^{8 10}
  • Recomputation over confidential weights and inputs needs a protected setting: prover recomputation in a verifier-controlled enclosure, verifier recomputation in a prover-controlled enclosure, or zero-knowledge proofs. Privacy & leakage ⁶
  • No prototype of the facility-level architecture exists to red-team. Adversarial validation ⁶
• Chip registries and manufacturing records
  • No AI chip registry operates, and covering re-exports would need cooperation from re-exporters and foreign governments that may not be feasible everywhere. Access & governance ^{11 12}
  • Linking records to physical chips needs hard-to-spoof unique IDs and inspections. Hardware trust ^{11 12 13}
  • Chips produced before a registry starts must be reconstructed from supplier records. Coverage & hidden compute ^{13 15}

From the family or selected implementation's record. ?

Model weights

Depends on the design for Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting and Bounding unexplained information in outputs.

Not involved: Chip registries and manufacturing records.

Inputs and outputs

Depends on the design for Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting and Bounding unexplained information in outputs.

Not involved: Chip registries and manufacturing records.

Training data

Not involved: Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting, Bounding unexplained information in outputs and Chip registries and manufacturing records.

Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting

• R3 Pearl proof-of-useful-work blockchain Open-source project, Pearl Research Labs

Bounding unexplained information in outputs

None on the map

Chip registries and manufacturing records

None on the map

1. Pacing AI Requires Proof, Attestable (2026). Original
2. Mechanisms to Verify International Agreements About AI Development, A. Scher & L. Thiergart (2025). Original
3. Proofs of Useful Work from Arbitrary Matrix Multiplication, I. Komargodski & O. Weinstein (2025). Original
4. Pearl Floating Point Scheme Specification, Pearl Research Team (2026). Original
5. pearl: Monorepo for the Pearl network, Pearl Research Labs (2026). Original
6. Verifying AI Compute by Bounding Unexplained Information Exfiltration, J. Petrie & Y. Mühlhäuser (2026). Original
7. Verifying LLM Inference to Detect Model Weight Exfiltration, R. Rinberg et al. (2025). Original
8. Adversarial Entropy Inflation Against Gumbel-Based Inference Verification, N. Kezins (2026). Original
9. Haiku to Opus in Just 10 bits: LLMs Unlock Large Compression Gains, R. Rinberg et al. (2026). Original
10. A System Overview for Near-Term, Low-Trust AI Compute Verification, N. Cankaya (2026). Original
11. Verifying International Agreements on AI: Six Layers of Verification for Rules on Large-Scale AI Development and Deployment, M. Baker et al. (2025). Original
12. Near-Term Verification Methods for AI Chip Exports, B. Avellar & E. Grunewald (2026). Original
13. TSMC most definitely has a golden record of all AI chips it made, N. Cankaya (2025). Original
14. Hardware-Level Governance of AI Compute: A Feasibility Taxonomy for Regulatory Compliance and Treaty Verification, S. Ansari (2026). Original
15. Covert AI Projects, B. Halstead & T. Larsen (2026). Original