Evidence & limits

R1Proposed for certifying the region where an attested workload ran at a given time

Evidence

Specification. The draft is version 0.1.0, dated 2025-10-21 ¹. The working group's site listed January 2026 as the target for a final version ². As of September 2026 the repository still holds draft 0.1.0 and no reference implementation ¹.
Worked example. Annex B illustrates a result with a 45 m radius and 0.92 confidence from seven anchor receipts. It is an example, not a measurement ¹. For comparison, Brass and Aarne report that delay-based methods locate devices to within about 10 km to 1,000 km, depending on the algorithm ⁶.
Lucid's statements. Lucid's homepage says that "every cluster can prove where it is, whose silicon ran, what executed, and how data moved" ³. Its developer documentation lists a "Data Sovereignty & Localization" auditor, described as "Ensuring data remains within approved geographic jurisdictions" ⁴. Neither explains how location is determined or reports results ³ ⁴.

As of September 2026 no test deployment or measured location results have been published ¹ ³ ⁴.

Trusted hardware. The threat model lets the attacker control the network and hold root on the host, including where the host is an untrusted cloud provider. It trusts the hardware root of trust and the TEE, and leaves sophisticated physical attacks as a residual risk ¹.
Key extraction. Tee and Happel argue that keys stored on the chip, on which ping-based protocols rely, may be extractable by adversaries with physical access ⁵.
General delay attacks. Adding delay, using faster network paths and compromising landmarks are known weaknesses of delay-based location verification ⁶. The specification relies on signed anchor directories, HSM-protected keys, diverse and independently operated anchors, and anchor peer monitoring against some of these ¹.