Mechanism · Model identity attestation
Technical detail
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- Modelwrap build (Tinfoil's description). The tool downloads a pinned model revision, normalizes its directory structure and builds an EROFS image. It computes a dm-verity root hash with veritysetup. The Merkle tree gives a 32-byte commitment to, for example, 140 GB of weights 1.
- Binding and enforcement. The root hash is passed on the kernel command line, which the enclave measurement covers. dm-verity then checks every block read against it and returns an error on any mismatch 1.
- Reported costs. Tinfoil reports a hash-tree overhead of about 0.8% of image size, and build times from 5 s for a 549 MB model to 13 min 25 s for a 554 GB model. Cold-cache loading takes about 80% longer, and inference is unaffected once the weights are in GPU memory 1.
- PAL*M inference attestation. PAL*M sets the Intel TDX REPORTDATA field to the concatenation of the operation, a challenge, and hashes of the inputs and outputs. It supports single-prompt and multi-turn inference attestations. Across three models of 3.8 to 8 billion parameters on an H100, PAL*M's added time was 3.8–11.4% of total run time for multi-turn sessions and 45.5–66.4% for single prompts, so a single attested prompt took 1.8 to 3 times as long as without PAL*M 2.
- Fixed-seed sampling likelihood. Rinberg et al. score the likelihood that each token was honestly sampled from the claimed model under a known seed, with estimators for inverse-probability-transform and Gumbel-max samplers. On a 30B mixture-of-experts model under benign prompt traffic, the check limits exfiltratable information to under 0.5% at a false-positive rate under 0.01%, a slowdown of more than 200 times for the adversary 4. An independent study found that an adversary who controls the prompts roughly doubles leakage per token, reducing the slowdown to 60–118 times 5.