Chips are where they are declared to be

Sources

1. AA. Reuel et al. (2025). Open Problems in Technical AI Governance. Transactions on Machine Learning Research. Source recordSupports: export-controlled chips straightforward to smuggle; location and owner unknowable after export; data-processing laws; verifiable latencies to trusted servers; co-location · §5.2.1
2. BA. Scher & L. Thiergart (2025). Mechanisms to Verify International Agreements About AI Development. arXiv. Source recordSupports: location as a verification goal; time-based ping location attestation; private-key extraction enables spoofing; locate chips early and keep them monitored · Verifying the location of AI compute; on-chip mechanisms
3. BA. R. Wasil et al. (2024). Verification methods for international AI agreements. arXiv. Source recordSupports: chip location tracking via unique identifiers; evasion by hardware modification or location spoofing; limited to new chips; needs manufacturing agreements · Hardware-dependent methods; Table 1; Figure 4
4. BA. Scher et al. (2025). An International Agreement to Prevent the Premature Creation of Artificial Superintelligence. Machine Intelligence Research Institute. Source recordSupports: declaration of chip locations; monitored facilities; inspectors with ongoing physical access; chip use verification · §4; Articles V and VII (as summarised)
5. BY. Shavit (2023). What does it take to catch a Chinchilla? Verifying Rules on Large-Scale Neural Network Training via Compute Monitoring. arXiv. Source recordSupports: chip owner directory with serial numbers; physical inspection of sampled chips · §3; §5
6. BA. Brass & O. Aarne (2024). Location Verification for AI Chips. Institute for AI Policy and Strategy. Source recordSupports: H100 trusted execution environment could likely implement location attestation · Proposed Solution Requirements
7. BA. Brass (2025). Location Verification for AI Chips (issue brief). Institute for AI Policy and Strategy. Source recordSupports: rudimentary location-verification prototype on NVIDIA H100 chips (builder not named); single Singapore result within 300 miles; summarises Brass and Aarne's 2024 report · issue brief, pp. 1-2
8. BB. Avellar & E. Grunewald (2026). Near-Term Verification Methods for AI Chip Exports. Institute for AI Policy and Strategy. Source recordSupports: NVIDIA confirmed developing delay-based location verification with NVIDIA-run servers (citing Reuters, December 2025) · §1.6
9. BNVIDIA (2025). Opt-In NVIDIA Software Enables Data Center Fleet Management. NVIDIA Blog. Source recordSupports: NVIDIA's opt-in, customer-installed fleet-management service with read-only telemetry; NVIDIA's statement that its GPUs lack hardware tracking, kill switches and backdoors (provider self-description) · blog post
10. BSovereignty Certificates Working Group (2025). Sovereignty Certificates: draft specification, version 0.1.0. GitHub (Lucid-Computing/sovereignty-certificate-specification). Source recordSupports: draft specification for location (sovereignty) certificates · specification v0.1.0
11. BJ. Petrie et al. (2025). Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees for AI Compute. arXiv. Source recordSupports: flexHEG could enable automated verification of approximate chip location; designs should be retrofittable on existing chip and server designs · How FlexHEGs Could Address Risks (Malicious Use); Recommended Areas of Technical Research
12. BE. Grunewald & T. Fist (2025). Countering AI Chip Smuggling Has Become a National Security Priority. Center for a New American Security (working paper). Source recordSupports: authors' model-based range for AI chip smuggling into China in 2024; recommendation for software-based location verification · four lines of argument; recommendations 2 and 3
13. AU.S. Department of Justice (2025). U.S. Authorities Shut Down Major China-Linked AI Tech Smuggling Network. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs. Source recordSupports: December 2025 prosecution alleging GPU relabelling and misclassified exports · criminal complaint summary