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A verification proposal from the AI Verification Tech Map, from its records of 2026-10-09. https://trustbutveri.fyi/explorer/?mechanisms=M-0009,M-0016&chips=existing&cols=claims,tested

Claims

Mechanisms2

Filters:× 23 of 25 match

Applied filters: Chips: Existing chips only. Not set (Any): Prover, Verifier devices on site, Prover cooperation, Minimum development status, Attack testing, Keep hidden from the verifier.

Analysis

Applied filters: Chips: Existing chips only. Not set (Any): Prover, Verifier devices on site, Prover cooperation, Minimum development status, Attack testing, Keep hidden from the verifier.

MechanismDevelopmentSecurity evidenceOpen failuresAttack testing
Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors ⚠ excluded by your filters: needs new chips ProposedPublished security analysis3 significantAnalysis
Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges Research demoPublished security analysis1 significantAnalysis
  • Open failures: n critical n significant n minor
  • ⚠ Dimmed: excluded by your filters; point at ⚠ for the reason
Claim coverageNo claims yet

Add claims to see which ones the mechanisms address.

Properties1 built for an adversarial prover
Attack testing2 mechanisms with published testing

Attack testing records published testing for this use. It does not by itself show independent review, a formal proof or that a deployed system is secure.

Limits2 scope limitations · 2 open questions · 1 excluded by filters · 1 not yet demonstrated · 2 mechanisms with open significant failures
Excluded by your filters
Open significant failures
4 failures in 2 mechanisms
  • State attackers can likely defeat current secure enclosures in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

    The flexHEG authors write that "nation-state attackers can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures", and that the marginal cost of circumvention per device is hard to estimate. RAND similarly judges that anti-tamper measures "would not be insurmountable for a determined and well-resourced adversary", although they raise costs and can reveal tampering. 2 4

    Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

  • Firmware-only retrofits rely on Secure Boot, which fault injection can bypass in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

    Part II notes that the most common attack on Secure Boot replaces the firmware and applies a voltage glitch while the signature is being checked. It also notes that sophisticated actors may use microprobing or laser voltage probing to read key registers. 2

    Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

  • FLOP accounting can be laundered through external data in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

    Results of earlier or parallel workloads could be hidden in the "external data" fed to a device, which would falsify the total FLOP count unless the inputs are explained or time delays are imposed. 2

    Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

  • Remote memory narrows the timing margin in Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges

    Data-centre remote memory access returns in about 1–2 µs, against about 70–200 ns for local DRAM. The MIRI overview says verification of memory saturation depends on ruling out remote access by latency or physical disconnection. It names pre-staging data into local memory as the remaining evasion and proposes an unpredictable, capacity-filling challenge to close it. 7

    Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

    Related mechanism Research demo Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization: Physical disconnection is proposed to exclude remote memory between the separated groups during a challenge. It depends on the isolation boundary being enforced. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. Add

Scope limitations
  • Many important rules cannot be checked on-chip in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

    Malicious intent "is not a technical property observable on-chip", and misuse depends on what is done with a computation's results. A guarantee processor cannot easily tell whether a network is the whole system or one expert in a mixture-of-experts system. Part III judges that a fully local ruleset "may not be entirely feasible" for the same reason. 1 3

    Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

  • Coverage stops at flexHEG-equipped chips in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

    Motivated actors will always be able to use some compute that is not flexHEG-equipped. Recalling existing consumer GPUs would likely be impractical, and reaching perfect coverage, or conclusively proving that no secret government data centres exist, would be "practically quite difficult". 1 3

    Scope limitation · Open question. On the record

    Related mechanism Proposed Chip registries and manufacturing records: Accounts for which chips exist and who holds them. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. Add

    Related mechanism Proposed Remote detection of data centres: Looks for undeclared facilities that hold other chips. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. Add

Open questions
  • Supply-chain diversion and hidden backdoors in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

    Components could be diverted before a guarantee processor is added, and backdoors could be introduced during design or manufacturing. Open-source designs and physical scans of randomly selected chips are proposed as countermeasures. Part III proposes international oversight of production and extensive testing of a random sample of finished devices. 2 3

    Open question · Open question. On the record

    Related mechanism Proposed Chip registries and manufacturing records: Records each chip's identity and owner from the fab onwards, which bears on diversion before a guarantee processor is fitted. It does not address hidden backdoors. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. Add

  • Error rates not quantified in Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges

    Monfared et al. show separable timing distributions. Their acceptance rule passes a GPU when its mean time per round stays at or below a chosen maximum, and an appendix outlines statistical tests for the proof-of-work puzzle. They leave hardware-specific threshold values to future work and report no false-positive or false-negative rates. 9

    Open question · Open question. On the record

Possible additions1 for open failures · 4 for dependencies

Mechanisms on the map that are not in the proposal. Pointers, not recommendations.

    • Bears on the open significant failure “Remote memory narrows the timing margin” in Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges. Physical disconnection is proposed to exclude remote memory between the separated groups during a challenge. It depends on the isolation boundary being enforced.
    • Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges waits on it. Outside help, such as remote memory, must be excluded during challenges.
    • Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors waits on it. State-level attackers who hold the hardware can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures.
    • Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors waits on it. Governing all relevant chips depends on knowing where they are, through chip registries and detection of undeclared facilities.
    • Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors depends on it.
Dependencies2 missing prerequisites · 8 blockers
Missing prerequisites
Blockers
8 blockers recorded
  • Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors
    • Integrated flexHEG needs substantial help from the accelerator manufacturer, and the authors estimate 3.7–7.9 years, from when the manufacturer starts work, for such hardware to displace other accelerators in frontier development. Access & governance 2
    • State-level attackers who hold the hardware can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures. Hardware trust. Waits on Tamper evidence for verifier devices 2 4
    • Rival states would need to trust the design and manufacture of guarantee processors and enclosures, for example through open design, redundant processors from each side or oversight of production. Hardware trust 1 3
    • Restricting future rule updates would need a formal language for rules, which the authors judge most likely infeasible for early flexHEG versions. Protocol soundness 1
    • Governing all relevant chips depends on knowing where they are, through chip registries and detection of undeclared facilities. Coverage & hidden compute. Waits on Chip registries and manufacturing records 3
  • Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges
    • No network-level memory challenge across data-centre servers has been demonstrated. Adversarial validation 7
    • Challenges that fill memory displace workloads; filling a pod's volatile memory takes tens of minutes and SSDs take hours. Performance & compatibility 7 9
    • Outside help, such as remote memory, must be excluded during challenges. Coverage & hidden compute. Waits on Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization 7
What the verifier seesNo outright disclosure specified

From the family or selected implementation's record.

Exposure notes
Implementations5 systems
Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors
None on the map
Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges
Sources16 cited
  1. Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees for AI Compute, J. Petrie et al. (2025). Original
  2. Technical Options for Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees, J. Petrie & O. Aarne (2025). Original
  3. International Security Applications of Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees, O. Aarne & J. Petrie (2025). Original
  4. Hardware-Enabled Governance Mechanisms: Developing Technical Solutions to Exempt Items Otherwise Classified Under Export Control Classification Numbers 3A090 and 4A090, G. Kulp et al. (2024). Original
  5. Secure, Governable Chips: Using On-Chip Mechanisms to Manage National Security Risks from AI & Advanced Computing, O. Aarne et al. (2024). Original
  6. Hardware-Enabled Mechanisms for Verifying Responsible AI Development, A. O'Gara et al. (2025). Original
  7. A System Overview for Near-Term, Low-Trust AI Compute Verification, N. Cankaya (2026). Original
  8. Verification Plan, R. Dean (2026). Original
  9. Timing and Memory Telemetry on GPUs for AI Governance, S. K. Monfared et al. (2026). Original
  10. SAGE: Software-based Attestation for GPU Execution, A. Ivanov et al. (2023). Original
  11. SWATT: SoftWare-based ATTestation for Embedded Devices, A. Seshadri et al. (2004). Original
  12. Proofs of Space, S. Dziembowski et al. (2015). Original
  13. Secure Code Update for Embedded Devices via Proofs of Secure Erasure, D. Perito & G. Tsudik (2010). Original
  14. Software-Based Memory Erasure with Relaxed Isolation Requirements, S. Bursuc et al. (2024). Original
  15. On the Difficulty of Software-Based Attestation of Embedded Devices, C. Castelluccia et al. (2009). Original
  16. Refutation of "On the Difficulty of Software-Based Attestation of Embedded Devices", A. Perrig & L. van Doorn (2010). Original

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Filter mechanisms

Filters apply to mechanisms only. They describe the setting a proposal is for, and all are off by default. A mechanism that a filter rules out is flagged and does not count towards claim coverage. Selected implementations use their own record fields. A match means not excluded; conditional or unspecified exposure stays with a note. Passing a filter does not establish that the assumptions hold in a deployment.

23 of 25 mechanisms match · Clear all

Prover

How far can the party being checked be trusted?

The prover is the party being checked. Semi-trusted designs rely on part of its stack: usually the chip vendor's hardware root of trust, its firmware or counters, or its supply-chain records. Adversarial designs aim to hold even if it cheats wherever the checks allow, within their stated assumptions.

Keeps mechanisms whose threat model holds against at least this prover. Adversarial is the strongest assumption. Definitions

Verifier devices on site

May the verifier install its own hardware at the prover's sites?

Some mechanisms need a device the verifier owns or trusts at the prover's facility, such as a network tap, a bandwidth limiter or a sealed sensor. Choose Not allowed when the setting rules that out. Inspectors are not covered.

"Not allowed" removes mechanisms that need a retrofit device, such as a network tap or a sealed sensor. Definitions

Prover cooperation

How much must the prover take part?

Required: the prover takes part, for example by logging requests, producing proofs or opening records. Partial: some access, such as installing a device. Not required: works from outside, such as satellite imagery.

"Partial at most" removes mechanisms that need the prover's active participation. "Not required" keeps only those that work without it. Definitions

Chips

May the proposal depend on new chip designs?

New chip features take years to reach a deployed fleet and cover only chips made after they ship. Mechanisms that use shipping features, such as trusted execution environments or performance counters, stay.

"Existing chips only" removes mechanisms that need changes to future chip designs. Definitions

Minimum development status

Development status

A level describes the public evidence for a mechanism's stated use, not its cost or feasibility. R3 can still have open critical flaws.

Keeps mechanisms whose readiness level is at least this one. Definitions

Attack testing

How hard has each mechanism been attacked in public?

The strongest published attempt to break the mechanism for its verification use: a security analysis, red-teaming by its developers or collaborators, or a red team independent of them.

Keeps mechanisms whose strongest published attack testing is at least this. Definitions

Keep hidden from the verifier

What must the verifier never see? Choose any.

Model weights: the checked model's parameters. Inputs and outputs: the requests a deployed model serves and its responses. Training data: what a model was trained on. Each mechanism's exposure is the editors' reading of its record: shown, depends on the design (kept, with a note), hidden, not involved, or unspecified for a selected implementation. Code and configuration are not covered yet.

Removes mechanisms that show the asset to the verifier. Conditional or unspecified exposure stays with a note and needs checking against the privacy requirement.

Claims

A claim is something one party wants to verify about another party's AI hardware or software. Each claim's number shows how the proposal addresses it.

  • Addressed. A mechanism in the proposal is aimed at this claim and is not excluded by the filters.
  • Partly addressed. Only supporting mechanisms, or mechanisms aimed at it that the filters exclude.
  • Unaddressed. No mechanism in the proposal addresses this claim.

Addressed means a mechanism in the proposal is aimed at the claim and is not excluded by your filters. It does not mean the claim is verified: check its assessed use, development status, security evidence, assumptions and findings.

All claims

Mechanisms

A mechanism is a general technique for verifying claims. Its badge is its development status for its stated use. An optional implementation choice narrows its assumptions, assessed use and claim links to that record. Lines join it to the claims it addresses. Click a line for details.Under its name it lists the claims it is aimed at or supports.

  • Aimed at the claim: verifying it is a direct purpose of the mechanism.
  • Supports the claim: helps verify it without being aimed at it.
  • Faint: excluded by your filters, so it does not count towards claim coverage.

All mechanisms

Overview

One row per mechanism in the proposal. Every mark comes from that mechanism's record, as listed in the panels below; what the verifier sees is the editors' reading of the record's text. Failure counts are per mechanism. Summary counts name mechanisms with open failures, not a sum of attacks. Choosing an implementation narrows each row to that record's assessed use; family findings remain as context. Findings are grouped as known failures, scope limitations and open questions. Only known failures count as failures. Counts are an inventory of published findings, not a risk score.

What the verifier sees

For model weights, inputs and outputs, and training data. This is the editors' reading of each mechanism's record (its threat model, how it works and its limitations), not a field of the record. Shown: the verifier sees it. Depends: on the design or variant, or the verifier sees only samples. Hidden: the verifier sees only commitments, hashes, proofs or results. Not involved: the record does not handle it. Unspecified: the selected implementation has no asset-specific assessment here.

Possible additions

Mechanisms on the map, not in the proposal, that the records connect to an unaddressed or partly addressed claim, an open failure or a dependency. They are pointers, not recommendations: each brings its own readiness level and findings, and none is claimed to close a failure. Links from failures are the editors' reading of the two records.

Start from a published design

Choosing a design loads the mechanisms its record realises or depends on. If the proposal has no claims yet, it also loads the claims that record says the design addresses.

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