Proposal Explorer

Add claims to see which ones the mechanisms address.

Operational use

• Operational use Sampled inference recomputation for checking untrusted workers' activations against the declared model, prompt and precision

Built for an adversarial prover

Network taps and certifiers, Bounding unexplained information in outputs, Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges and Sampled inference recomputation

No new hardware needed

Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges and Sampled inference recomputation

Failures since mitigated

• Verifier dictionary attacks on hashes in Network taps and certifiers ¹

Attack testing records published testing for this use. It does not by itself show independent review, a formal proof or that a deployed system is secure.

• Network taps and certifiers: Analysis
• Bounding unexplained information in outputs: Independent red-team
• Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges: Analysis
• Sampled inference recomputation: Analysis

Open significant failures

6 failures in 4 mechanisms

• Output nondeterminism leaves covert capacity in Network taps and certifiers

  Hashing cannot remove information hidden in the outputs themselves. The Secure Gateway Device paper estimates that about 0.1 bit per token remains even with seed-synchronized replay checks. For a 200k-GPU inference cluster at full load (2,000 tokens per GPU per second), that is about 40 Mbit/s of covert egress, enough to move a 1 TB model in under three days. The paper names this the core remaining challenge and points to deterministic replay or active scrubbing of hardware-induced entropy. An independent study found that an adversary who chooses the prompts roughly doubles the bits leaked per token under Gumbel-based inference verification; see Bounding unexplained information in outputs. ^{1 9}

  Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

  Related mechanism Operational use Deterministic and bit-exact inference: Deterministic replay is one of the two remedies the flaw's source names. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. Add

  Related mechanism Research demo Bounding unexplained information in outputs: Bounds the hidden information outputs can carry by measuring what the declared computation fails to predict. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. In the proposal.

• Residual side channels in simple passive setups in Network taps and certifiers

  Amodo's analysis of its own tapped prototype lists unvalidated header fields, timing of permitted traffic and variation in response formatting as residual channels, and concludes that the passive tap must be replaced by an active one. ⁵

  Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

• Prompt-controlled entropy inflation widens the covert channel in Bounding unexplained information in outputs

  Gumbel-based inference verification tolerates token choices that honest GPU nondeterminism could produce, and the size of that tolerated set grows with the model's output entropy. Kezins, an independent researcher, showed that an adversary who controls the prompt distribution can raise output entropy and roughly double the bits leaked per token. Across six models of 1 to 32 billion parameters, this cut the slowdown from 146–254 times under benign prompts to 60–118 times. Kezins argues that architectures built on the same unexplained-information bound inherit this attack surface, and recommends calibrating tolerances against local token entropy rather than benign traffic. ^{9 12}

  Known failure · Demonstrated attack · Significant · Open. On the record

  Related mechanism Operational use Deterministic and bit-exact inference: Bit-exact replay would remove the tolerance for numerical noise that sets the size of this channel. The record notes that it needs full hardware and software metadata. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. Add

• Remote memory narrows the timing margin in Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges

  Data-centre remote memory access returns in about 1–2 µs, against about 70–200 ns for local DRAM. The MIRI overview says verification of memory saturation depends on ruling out remote access by latency or physical disconnection. It names pre-staging data into local memory as the remaining evasion and proposes an unpredictable, capacity-filling challenge to close it. ³

  Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

  Related mechanism Research demo Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization: Physical disconnection is proposed to exclude remote memory between the separated groups during a challenge. It depends on the isolation boundary being enforced. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. Add

• Tolerance for numerical noise leaves a covert channel in Sampled inference recomputation

  Schemes that accept approximate matches can put an upper bound on an adversary's covert bandwidth, but they cannot close the channel. The weight-exfiltration detector cut exfiltratable information to under 0.5%, not to zero, on a 30-billion-parameter mixture-of-experts model under benign prompt traffic. Its authors called the channel's size under adversarial prompts an open empirical question. An independent study showed that an adversary who controls the prompts roughly doubles the bits leaked per token. Across six models, that cut the slowdown from 146–254 times under benign prompts to 60–118 times. The attack widens the exfiltration bound. It does not target the check that outputs match the declared model. ^{9 12 31}

  Known failure · Demonstrated attack · Significant · Open. On the record

  Related mechanism Operational use Deterministic and bit-exact inference: Bit-exact inference would remove the numerical tolerance if exact replay can be deployed with the required weights and configuration. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. Add

• Some inference optimizations are not covered in Sampled inference recomputation

  TOPLOC's authors state that it cannot detect speculative decoding in which a cheaper model does the decoding. They did not test whether it distinguishes types of key-value (KV) cache compression. DiFR was evaluated only on sampling from a single model. Its authors sketch an extension to one speculative-decoding algorithm but do not test it. ^{22 23}

  Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

Scope limitations

• Some links cannot be passively tapped in Network taps and certifiers

  Cankaya notes that copper-connected scale-up domains (for example NVL72 racks and TPU v7 cubes) are much harder to tap than fibre, and that optical budgets make passive taps impractical on 400GBASE-SR8 multimode links. Amodo found no taps advertised for 53 GBaud links as of May 2026. ^{2 10}

  Scope limitation · Open question. On the record

• Encrypted fabrics hide plaintext from both parties in Network taps and certifiers

  Cankaya notes that with TEE-protected sessions whose keys are ephemeral and managed inside the TEE, neither the operator nor the manufacturer can recover session keys after the session, so tapped traffic could not be opened for recomputation. For other encrypted fabrics, the operator can retain keys. ²

  Scope limitation · Open question. On the record

• Completeness rests on physical monitoring left out of scope in Network taps and certifiers

  The Secure Gateway Device paper assumes the facility is physically monitored, and states that the whole architecture depends on the device being the only communication channel. It names radio emanation, power-line signalling and thermal channels as covert channels beyond that scope. ¹

  Scope limitation · Open question. On the record

  Related mechanism Proposed Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities: Addresses the radio, power-line and thermal channels that network-level designs leave out. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. Add

• Information the declared computation explains is not bounded in Bounding unexplained information in outputs

  The bound limits unexplained bits only. Outputs that the declared computation fully explains can still carry valuable information: a compression study notes that an adversary with inference access can extract more proprietary information per bit than naive transmission allows. ^{11 13}

  Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

• Channels other than checked outputs are outside the bound in Bounding unexplained information in outputs

  The inference-verification scheme treats side channels as out of scope. A low-trust system design argues that suppressing physical covert bandwidth below kilobits per second is much more achievable than aiming for zero, and that a malicious device can leak one bit of information by deliberately outputting a wrong result. ^{3 12}

  Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

  Related mechanism Proposed Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities: Physical side channels need separate suppression, which is this mechanism's purpose. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. Add

• Only recorded traffic is checked in Sampled inference recomputation

  Recomputation checks that recorded, declared workloads are correct. It cannot show that the record is complete. The published schemes do not cover hidden workloads run on the same compute, or substituted work. Rinberg et al. say their exfiltration-detection scheme cannot stand alone. ^{12 32}

  Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

  Related mechanism Proposed Network taps and certifiers: Taps copy and hash all traffic on the monitored links, which bears on whether the traffic record is complete. They do not show what else ran on the same chips. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. In the proposal.

Open questions

• The facility-level design is untested in Bounding unexplained information in outputs

  The compute-verification architecture is described with protocol details, potential attacks and prototyping plans, but no prototype results have been published. ¹¹

  Open question · Open question. On the record

• Error rates not quantified in Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges

  Monfared et al. show separable timing distributions. Their acceptance rule passes a GPU when its mean time per round stays at or below a chosen maximum, and an appendix outlines statistical tests for the proof-of-work puzzle. They leave hardware-specific threshold values to future work and report no false-positive or false-negative rates. ¹⁴

  Open question · Open question. On the record

Open minor failures

1 mechanism with minor failures

• Mixed hardware widens the honest baseline in Sampled inference recomputation

  When honest reference runs span different GPU types, the spread of benign scores grows. In DiFR's tests on Qwen3-30B-A3B, pooling A100 and H200 runs left Token-DiFR unable to separate the two smallest tested changes, a temperature of 1.1 instead of 1.0 and a simulated top-2 sampling bug, at the target false-positive rate, while cross-entropy separated them. Matched provider and verifier environments, or pooling that weights rare large deviations, restored detection. ²²

  Known failure · Open question · Minor · Open. On the record

Not yet demonstrated

Proposed Network taps and certifiers

Mechanisms on the map that are not in the proposal. Pointers, not recommendations. ?

• Operational use Deterministic and bit-exact inference Add
  • Bears on the open significant failure “Output nondeterminism leaves covert capacity” in Network taps and certifiers. Deterministic replay is one of the two remedies the flaw's source names.
  • Bears on the open significant failure “Prompt-controlled entropy inflation widens the covert channel” in Bounding unexplained information in outputs. Bit-exact replay would remove the tolerance for numerical noise that sets the size of this channel. The record notes that it needs full hardware and software metadata.
  • Bears on the open significant failure “Tolerance for numerical noise leaves a covert channel” in Sampled inference recomputation. Bit-exact inference would remove the numerical tolerance if exact replay can be deployed with the required weights and configuration.
  • Network taps and certifiers waits on it. Nondeterministic inference leaves covert capacity in outputs that hashing cannot remove.
  • Bounding unexplained information in outputs waits on it. Tolerance for numerical nondeterminism sets the size of the residual channel; bit-exact replay would remove it but needs full hardware and software metadata.
• Research demo Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization Add
  • Bears on the open significant failure “Remote memory narrows the timing margin” in Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges. Physical disconnection is proposed to exclude remote memory between the separated groups during a challenge. It depends on the isolation boundary being enforced.
  • Bounding unexplained information in outputs waits on it. The prover's compute must be isolated so that all traffic passes through the verifier's interlock; any unmonitored path voids the bound.
  • Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges waits on it. Outside help, such as remote memory, must be excluded during challenges.
• Research demo Tamper evidence for verifier devices Add
  • Network taps and certifiers waits on it. Taps and gateway devices need tamper-evident housing and physical monitoring so that traffic cannot bypass them.
• Proposed Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities Add
  • Network taps and certifiers waits on it. Radio, power-line and thermal channels are not addressed by network-level designs.
  • Bounding unexplained information in outputs waits on it. Physical side channels need separate suppression, and one design treats a low residual bandwidth, rather than zero, as the realistic target.

Missing prerequisites

• Operational use Deterministic and bit-exact inference needed by Network taps and certifiers Add
• Research demo Tamper evidence for verifier devices needed by Network taps and certifiers Add
• Proposed Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities needed by Network taps and certifiers and Bounding unexplained information in outputs Add
• Research demo Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization needed by Bounding unexplained information in outputs Add

Shared foundations

• Sampled inference recomputation relied on by Network taps and certifiers and Bounding unexplained information in outputs. In the proposal
• Deterministic and bit-exact inference relied on by Network taps and certifiers and Bounding unexplained information in outputs
• Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities relied on by Network taps and certifiers and Bounding unexplained information in outputs
• Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization relied on by Bounding unexplained information in outputs and Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges
• Network taps and certifiers relied on by Bounding unexplained information in outputs and Sampled inference recomputation. In the proposal

Blockers

18 blockers recorded

• Network taps and certifiers
  • No complete verification tap has been demonstrated at production frontend link rates, and on the tested CPU no hash algorithm reached line rate with minimum-size frames. Performance & compatibility ^{10 33}
  • Nondeterministic inference leaves covert capacity in outputs that hashing cannot remove. Evidence binding. Waits on Deterministic and bit-exact inference ¹
  • Taps and gateway devices need tamper-evident housing and physical monitoring so that traffic cannot bypass them. Hardware trust. Waits on Tamper evidence for verifier devices ^{1 3}
  • Radio, power-line and thermal channels are not addressed by network-level designs. Coverage & hidden compute. Waits on Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities ¹
  • Red-teaming by specialists is called for but has not been reported. Adversarial validation ¹
• Bounding unexplained information in outputs
  • The prover's compute must be isolated so that all traffic passes through the verifier's interlock; any unmonitored path voids the bound. Coverage & hidden compute. Waits on Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization ¹¹
  • Physical side channels need separate suppression, and one design treats a low residual bandwidth, rather than zero, as the realistic target. Coverage & hidden compute. Waits on Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities ^{3 12}
  • Tolerance for numerical nondeterminism sets the size of the residual channel; bit-exact replay would remove it but needs full hardware and software metadata. Protocol soundness. Waits on Deterministic and bit-exact inference ^{3 9}
  • Recomputation over confidential weights and inputs needs a protected setting: prover recomputation in a verifier-controlled enclosure, verifier recomputation in a prover-controlled enclosure, or zero-knowledge proofs. Privacy & leakage ¹¹
  • No prototype of the facility-level architecture exists to red-team. Adversarial validation ¹¹
• Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges
  • No network-level memory challenge across data-centre servers has been demonstrated. Adversarial validation ³
  • Challenges that fill memory displace workloads; filling a pod's volatile memory takes tens of minutes and SSDs take hours. Performance & compatibility ^{3 14}
  • Outside help, such as remote memory, must be excluded during challenges. Coverage & hidden compute. Waits on Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization ³
• Sampled inference recomputation
  • In tap-based retrofit designs, recording all inference traffic needs network taps and recomputation servers that can ingest it, in the worst case one recomputation-server network interface per inference front-end interface. Coverage & hidden compute. Waits on Network taps and certifiers ^{4 28}
  • In retrofit designs, the recomputation server must sit inside the prover's data centre, possibly under the prover's physical control, and still be protected from a compromised provider, which Amodo rates 'not on track'. Hardware trust ^{12 28}
  • No independent red-team of a recomputation consistency check has been published (the one independent attack study targets the weight-exfiltration bound), and Amodo rates recomputation red-teaming 'not started'. Adversarial validation ^{9 28}
  • Tolerance-based checks need calibration on trusted hardware and exact knowledge of the provider's sampling procedure, and in one prototype a sampling-implementation mismatch produced large spurious differences. Performance & compatibility ^{22 27}
  • The verifier needs the model weights, so checking a closed-weights model requires a trusted, confidential recomputation environment, which the retrofit designs place inside the prover's facility. Privacy & leakage ^{3 22 32}

From the family or selected implementation's record. ?

Model weights

Depends on the design for Network taps and certifiers, Bounding unexplained information in outputs and Sampled inference recomputation.

Not involved: Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges.

Inputs and outputs

Depends on the design for Network taps and certifiers, Bounding unexplained information in outputs and Sampled inference recomputation.

Not involved: Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges.

Training data

Depends on the design for Network taps and certifiers.

Not involved: Bounding unexplained information in outputs, Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges and Sampled inference recomputation.

Network taps and certifiers

• Proposed AI 2040 inference-only verification stack Proposed architecture, AI Futures Project
• Proposed Low-trust AI compute verification system overview Proposed architecture, Machine Intelligence Research Institute
• Proposed SASH confidential network logger Research prototype, Singapore AI Safety Hub (SASH)

Bounding unexplained information in outputs

None on the map

Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges

• Proposed Data-centre memory challenging Proposed architecture, Machine Intelligence Research Institute
• Research demo GPU contention probes Research prototype
• Proposed Low-trust AI compute verification system overview Proposed architecture, Machine Intelligence Research Institute
• Research demo SAGE Research prototype
• Research demo VRAM-residency challenge Research prototype

Sampled inference recomputation

• Proposed AI 2040 inference-only verification stack Proposed architecture, AI Futures Project
• Research demo DiFR (Divergence From Reference) Research prototype
• Proposed Low-trust AI compute verification system overview Proposed architecture, Machine Intelligence Research Institute
• Proposed SASH confidential network logger Research prototype, Singapore AI Safety Hub (SASH)
• Operational use TOPLOC Open-source project, Prime Intellect

1. Fingerprinting All AI Cluster I/O Without Mutually Trusted Processors, N. Cankaya et al. (2026). Original
2. The Fundamentals and Feasibility of Secure Network Taps for Verifying AI Datacenter Use, N. Cankaya (2026). Original
3. A System Overview for Near-Term, Low-Trust AI Compute Verification, N. Cankaya (2026). Original
4. Verification Plan, R. Dean (2026). Original
5. Fitting a Network TAP to our Inference Verification Prototype, Amodo Design (2026). Original
6. Amodo-Design/Inference-Recomputation-Prototype (GitHub repository), Amodo Design (2026). Original
7. inference-verification: Inference Verification Prototype, Singapore AI Safety Hub (SASH) (2026). Original
8. Internationalising AI Verification, Singapore AI Safety Hub (SASH) (2026). Original
9. Adversarial Entropy Inflation Against Gumbel-Based Inference Verification, N. Kezins (2026). Original
10. Network Tapping for AI Verification: A Technical Assessment, Amodo Design (2026). Original
11. Verifying AI Compute by Bounding Unexplained Information Exfiltration, J. Petrie & Y. Mühlhäuser (2026). Original
12. Verifying LLM Inference to Detect Model Weight Exfiltration, R. Rinberg et al. (2025). Original
13. Haiku to Opus in Just 10 bits: LLMs Unlock Large Compression Gains, R. Rinberg et al. (2026). Original
14. Timing and Memory Telemetry on GPUs for AI Governance, S. K. Monfared et al. (2026). Original
15. SAGE: Software-based Attestation for GPU Execution, A. Ivanov et al. (2023). Original
16. SWATT: SoftWare-based ATTestation for Embedded Devices, A. Seshadri et al. (2004). Original
17. Proofs of Space, S. Dziembowski et al. (2015). Original
18. Secure Code Update for Embedded Devices via Proofs of Secure Erasure, D. Perito & G. Tsudik (2010). Original
19. Software-Based Memory Erasure with Relaxed Isolation Requirements, S. Bursuc et al. (2024). Original
20. On the Difficulty of Software-Based Attestation of Embedded Devices, C. Castelluccia et al. (2009). Original
21. Refutation of "On the Difficulty of Software-Based Attestation of Embedded Devices", A. Perrig & L. van Doorn (2010). Original
22. DiFR: Inference Verification Despite Nondeterminism, A. Karvonen et al. (2025). Original
23. TOPLOC: A Locality Sensitive Hashing Scheme for Trustless Verifiable Inference, J. M. Ong et al. (2025). Original
24. PrimeIntellect-ai/toploc (GitHub repository), Prime Intellect (2025). Original
25. INTELLECT-2: A Reasoning Model Trained Through Globally Decentralized Reinforcement Learning, Prime Intellect Team et al. (2025). Original
26. adamkarvonen/difr (GitHub repository), A. Karvonen (2025). Original
27. Scaling Recomputation Inference Verification, Amodo Design (2026). Original
28. AI 2040 Plan A — Verification SITREP, Amodo Design (2026). Original
29. SYNTHETIC-2 Release: Four Million Collaboratively Generated Reasoning Traces, Prime Intellect (2025). Original
30. An Inference Verification Prototype — Stage 1, Amodo Design (2026). Original
31. Bit-Exact AI Inference Verification Without Performance Tradeoffs, N. Cankaya (2026). Original
32. Example Schemes for Verifying High-Stakes AI Agreements, Amodo Design (2026). Original
33. Network Traffic Hashing, Amodo Design (2026). Original