Proposal Explorer

Add claims to see which ones the mechanisms address.

Built for an adversarial prover

Bounding unexplained information in outputs and Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

No new hardware needed

On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

Attack testing records published testing for this use. It does not by itself show independent review, a formal proof or that a deployed system is secure.

• Bounding unexplained information in outputs: Independent red-team
• Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Analysis
• On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters: Red-teamed

Open significant failures

6 failures in 3 mechanisms

• Prompt-controlled entropy inflation widens the covert channel in Bounding unexplained information in outputs

  Gumbel-based inference verification tolerates token choices that honest GPU nondeterminism could produce, and the size of that tolerated set grows with the model's output entropy. Kezins, an independent researcher, showed that an adversary who controls the prompt distribution can raise output entropy and roughly double the bits leaked per token. Across six models of 1 to 32 billion parameters, this cut the slowdown from 146–254 times under benign prompts to 60–118 times. Kezins argues that architectures built on the same unexplained-information bound inherit this attack surface, and recommends calibrating tolerances against local token entropy rather than benign traffic. ^{2 3}

  Known failure · Demonstrated attack · Significant · Open. On the record

  Related mechanism Operational use Deterministic and bit-exact inference: Bit-exact replay would remove the tolerance for numerical noise that sets the size of this channel. The record notes that it needs full hardware and software metadata. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. Add

• State attackers can likely defeat current secure enclosures in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

  The flexHEG authors write that "nation-state attackers can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures", and that the marginal cost of circumvention per device is hard to estimate. RAND similarly judges that anti-tamper measures "would not be insurmountable for a determined and well-resourced adversary", although they raise costs and can reveal tampering. ^{7 9}

  Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

• Firmware-only retrofits rely on Secure Boot, which fault injection can bypass in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

  Part II notes that the most common attack on Secure Boot replaces the firmware and applies a voltage glitch while the signature is being checked. It also notes that sophisticated actors may use microprobing or laser voltage probing to read key registers. ⁷

  Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

• FLOP accounting can be laundered through external data in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

  Results of earlier or parallel workloads could be hidden in the "external data" fed to a device, which would falsify the total FLOP count unless the inputs are explained or time delays are imposed. ⁷

  Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

• Adversarially disguised fine-tuning partly evades classification in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

  Across 20 evasion strategy families in five monitor-evader rounds, the classifier's accuracy against the most challenging disguised workloads held out from training was 43–87%. White-box LoRA fine-tuning was the only evasion family detected less than half the time. The evaluation covered single nodes, PyTorch-level evasion and NVIDIA hardware. ¹⁴

  Known failure · Demonstrated attack · Significant · Open. On the record

• Counters leak information about protected workloads in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

  Performance counters have been used as a side channel against TEEs, for example in CounterSEVeillance. NVIDIA disables performance counters in full confidential-computing mode, stating that they could provide an avenue for side-channel attacks. Richer counters for verification therefore pull against confidentiality. ^{15 16}

  Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

Scope limitations

• Information the declared computation explains is not bounded in Bounding unexplained information in outputs

  The bound limits unexplained bits only. Outputs that the declared computation fully explains can still carry valuable information: a compression study notes that an adversary with inference access can extract more proprietary information per bit than naive transmission allows. ^{1 4}

  Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

• Channels other than checked outputs are outside the bound in Bounding unexplained information in outputs

  The inference-verification scheme treats side channels as out of scope. A low-trust system design argues that suppressing physical covert bandwidth below kilobits per second is much more achievable than aiming for zero, and that a malicious device can leak one bit of information by deliberately outputting a wrong result. ^{2 5}

  Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

  Related mechanism Proposed Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities: Physical side channels need separate suppression, which is this mechanism's purpose. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. Add

• Many important rules cannot be checked on-chip in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

  Malicious intent "is not a technical property observable on-chip", and misuse depends on what is done with a computation's results. A guarantee processor cannot easily tell whether a network is the whole system or one expert in a mixture-of-experts system. Part III judges that a fully local ruleset "may not be entirely feasible" for the same reason. ^{6 8}

  Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

• Coverage stops at flexHEG-equipped chips in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

  Motivated actors will always be able to use some compute that is not flexHEG-equipped. Recalling existing consumer GPUs would likely be impractical, and reaching perfect coverage, or conclusively proving that no secret government data centres exist, would be "practically quite difficult". ^{6 8}

  Scope limitation · Open question. On the record

  Related mechanism Proposed Chip registries and manufacturing records: Accounts for which chips exist and who holds them. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. Add

  Related mechanism Proposed Remote detection of data centres: Looks for undeclared facilities that hold other chips. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. Add

• Software-read telemetry can be forged by the operator in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

  NVML-based classification assumes trustworthy telemetry. Without a tamper-resistant read path, an authenticated telemetry channel and secure boot of the monitoring software, an operator who controls the full software stack could forge counter values. Monfared et al. start from the same premise: current GPUs expose little trusted telemetry and can be modified or virtualized. ^{12 14}

  Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

  Related mechanism Proposed Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: A guarantee processor on the chip would give the tamper-resistant, authenticated telemetry path the flaw says is missing. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. In the proposal.

• Timing challenges do not identify the individual chip in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

  GEMM and VDF challenges can be answered by identical GPUs elsewhere, and floating-point fingerprints distinguish GPU models, not individual devices. GPU virtualization adds timing leakage that prevents attributing compute use. ¹²

  Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

Open questions

• The facility-level design is untested in Bounding unexplained information in outputs

  The compute-verification architecture is described with protocol details, potential attacks and prototyping plans, but no prototype results have been published. ¹

  Open question · Open question. On the record

• Supply-chain diversion and hidden backdoors in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

  Components could be diverted before a guarantee processor is added, and backdoors could be introduced during design or manufacturing. Open-source designs and physical scans of randomly selected chips are proposed as countermeasures. Part III proposes international oversight of production and extensive testing of a random sample of finished devices. ^{7 8}

  Open question · Open question. On the record

  Related mechanism Proposed Chip registries and manufacturing records: Records each chip's identity and owner from the fab onwards, which bears on diversion before a guarantee processor is fitted. It does not address hidden backdoors. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. Add

• No quantified error rates or formal thresholds for timing primitives in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

  Monfared et al. state that false-positive and false-negative rates are not quantified and leave hardware-specific formal thresholds to future work. ¹²

  Open question · Open question. On the record

Not yet demonstrated

Proposed Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

Need new chip designs

Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

Mechanisms on the map that are not in the proposal. Pointers, not recommendations. ?

• Operational use Deterministic and bit-exact inference Add
  • Bears on the open significant failure “Prompt-controlled entropy inflation widens the covert channel” in Bounding unexplained information in outputs. Bit-exact replay would remove the tolerance for numerical noise that sets the size of this channel. The record notes that it needs full hardware and software metadata.
  • Bounding unexplained information in outputs waits on it. Tolerance for numerical nondeterminism sets the size of the residual channel; bit-exact replay would remove it but needs full hardware and software metadata.
• Research demo Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization Add
  • Bounding unexplained information in outputs waits on it. The prover's compute must be isolated so that all traffic passes through the verifier's interlock; any unmonitored path voids the bound.
• Research demo Tamper evidence for verifier devices Add
  • Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors waits on it. State-level attackers who hold the hardware can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures.
• Proposed Chip registries and manufacturing records Add
  • Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors waits on it. Governing all relevant chips depends on knowing where they are, through chip registries and detection of undeclared facilities.
• Proposed Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities Add
  • Bounding unexplained information in outputs waits on it. Physical side channels need separate suppression, and one design treats a low residual bandwidth, rather than zero, as the realistic target.
• Operational use Sampled inference recomputation Add
  • Bounding unexplained information in outputs depends on it.
• Operational use TEE remote attestation for AI workloads Add
  • Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors depends on it.
  • On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters depends on it.
• Proposed Network taps and certifiers Add
  • Bounding unexplained information in outputs depends on it.

Missing prerequisites

• Operational use Sampled inference recomputation needed by Bounding unexplained information in outputs Add
• Research demo Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization needed by Bounding unexplained information in outputs Add
• Proposed Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities needed by Bounding unexplained information in outputs Add
• Proposed Network taps and certifiers needed by Bounding unexplained information in outputs Add
• Operational use TEE remote attestation for AI workloads needed by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors and On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters Add
• Proposed Chip registries and manufacturing records needed by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors Add

Shared foundations

• TEE remote attestation for AI workloads relied on by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors and On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

Blockers

14 blockers recorded

• Bounding unexplained information in outputs
  • The prover's compute must be isolated so that all traffic passes through the verifier's interlock; any unmonitored path voids the bound. Coverage & hidden compute. Waits on Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization ¹
  • Physical side channels need separate suppression, and one design treats a low residual bandwidth, rather than zero, as the realistic target. Coverage & hidden compute. Waits on Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities ^{2 5}
  • Tolerance for numerical nondeterminism sets the size of the residual channel; bit-exact replay would remove it but needs full hardware and software metadata. Protocol soundness. Waits on Deterministic and bit-exact inference ^{3 5}
  • Recomputation over confidential weights and inputs needs a protected setting: prover recomputation in a verifier-controlled enclosure, verifier recomputation in a prover-controlled enclosure, or zero-knowledge proofs. Privacy & leakage ¹
  • No prototype of the facility-level architecture exists to red-team. Adversarial validation ¹
• Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors
  • Integrated flexHEG needs substantial help from the accelerator manufacturer, and the authors estimate 3.7–7.9 years, from when the manufacturer starts work, for such hardware to displace other accelerators in frontier development. Access & governance ⁷
  • State-level attackers who hold the hardware can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures. Hardware trust. Waits on Tamper evidence for verifier devices ^{7 9}
  • Rival states would need to trust the design and manufacture of guarantee processors and enclosures, for example through open design, redundant processors from each side or oversight of production. Hardware trust ^{6 8}
  • Restricting future rule updates would need a formal language for rules, which the authors judge most likely infeasible for early flexHEG versions. Protocol soundness ⁶
  • Governing all relevant chips depends on knowing where they are, through chip registries and detection of undeclared facilities. Coverage & hidden compute. Waits on Chip registries and manufacturing records ⁸
• On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters
  • Shipping accelerators need a tamper-resistant, authenticated telemetry path. Hardware trust. Waits on Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors ^{13 14}
  • NVIDIA's full confidential-computing mode disables the hardware performance counters its profiling tools use, so telemetry that needs them conflicts with it. Privacy & leakage ^{15 16}
  • Continuous challenge puzzles cost power and throughput on production workloads. Performance & compatibility ¹²
  • Evaluation has not gone beyond single nodes, framework-level evasion and one vendor's hardware. Adversarial validation ¹⁴

From the family or selected implementation's record. ?

Model weights

Depends on the design for Bounding unexplained information in outputs and On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters.

Hidden by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors.

Inputs and outputs

Depends on the design for Bounding unexplained information in outputs and On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters.

Hidden by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors.

Training data

Depends on the design for On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters.

Hidden by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors.

Not involved: Bounding unexplained information in outputs.

Bounding unexplained information in outputs

None on the map

Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

None on the map

On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

None on the map

1. Verifying AI Compute by Bounding Unexplained Information Exfiltration, J. Petrie & Y. Mühlhäuser (2026). Original
2. Verifying LLM Inference to Detect Model Weight Exfiltration, R. Rinberg et al. (2025). Original
3. Adversarial Entropy Inflation Against Gumbel-Based Inference Verification, N. Kezins (2026). Original
4. Haiku to Opus in Just 10 bits: LLMs Unlock Large Compression Gains, R. Rinberg et al. (2026). Original
5. A System Overview for Near-Term, Low-Trust AI Compute Verification, N. Cankaya (2026). Original
6. Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees for AI Compute, J. Petrie et al. (2025). Original
7. Technical Options for Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees, J. Petrie & O. Aarne (2025). Original
8. International Security Applications of Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees, O. Aarne & J. Petrie (2025). Original
9. Hardware-Enabled Governance Mechanisms: Developing Technical Solutions to Exempt Items Otherwise Classified Under Export Control Classification Numbers 3A090 and 4A090, G. Kulp et al. (2024). Original
10. Secure, Governable Chips: Using On-Chip Mechanisms to Manage National Security Risks from AI & Advanced Computing, O. Aarne et al. (2024). Original
11. Hardware-Enabled Mechanisms for Verifying Responsible AI Development, A. O'Gara et al. (2025). Original
12. Timing and Memory Telemetry on GPUs for AI Governance, S. K. Monfared et al. (2026). Original
13. Guaranteeable Memory: An HBM-Based Chiplet for Verifiable AI Workloads, J. Petrie (2025). Original
14. Detecting Hidden ML Training With Zero-Overhead Telemetry, R. Rahman & S. Tajdari (2026). Original
15. On TEEs for Privacy-Preserving Monitoring in AI Governance, Gloria Z (2026). Original
16. NVIDIA Secure AI with Blackwell and Hopper GPUs (White Paper), NVIDIA (2025). Original