Proposal Explorer

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Built for an adversarial prover

Remote detection of data centres and Tamper evidence for verifier devices

No new hardware needed

On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters and Remote detection of data centres

Attack testing records published testing for this use. It does not by itself show independent review, a formal proof or that a deployed system is secure.

• On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters: Red-teamed
• Remote detection of data centres: Analysis
• Tamper evidence for verifier devices: Analysis

Open significant failures

4 failures in 2 mechanisms

• Adversarially disguised fine-tuning partly evades classification in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

  Across 20 evasion strategy families in five monitor-evader rounds, the classifier's accuracy against the most challenging disguised workloads held out from training was 43–87%. White-box LoRA fine-tuning was the only evasion family detected less than half the time. The evaluation covered single nodes, PyTorch-level evasion and NVIDIA hardware. ³

  Known failure · Demonstrated attack · Significant · Open. On the record

• Counters leak information about protected workloads in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

  Performance counters have been used as a side channel against TEEs, for example in CounterSEVeillance. NVIDIA disables performance counters in full confidential-computing mode, stating that they could provide an avenue for side-channel attacks. Richer counters for verification therefore pull against confidentiality. ^{4 5}

  Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

• Seals are often defeated with simple methods in Tamper evidence for verifier devices

  Published defeats of general security seals. They warn about proposed verifier-device seals, but do not demonstrate defeat of an AI verification enclosure or sensor.

  In 1996 a Los Alamos vulnerability assessment defeated all 94 security seals it examined, with 132 defeats in total, using rapid, inexpensive, low-tech methods. It found that seal cost did not predict security. In 2001 Johnston reported that high-tech seals are often easier to defeat than low-tech ones. ^{18 19}

  Known failure · Demonstrated attack · Significant · Open · Mechanism-class evidence. On the record

• Attack classes outside published models in Tamper evidence for verifier devices

  The radio compensation result is emulated using measured channel data under a known-reference attacker model. It is not a physical bypass demonstration against an AI verifier enclosure.

  The authors of the batteryless cover say they cannot assess chemical-solvent attacks, which exceed their expertise, and deem cover removal impractical. Anti-Tamper Radio's reference can drift as the environment or measurement system ages; the authors suggest gradually renewing the reference. A 2025 follow-up by some of the same authors shows, by emulation on measured channel data, that an attacker who knows the reference channel and the needle's effect on it could inject a signal that cancels the change caused by a needle insertion. It proposes a reconfigurable intelligent surface that randomizes the channel as a countermeasure. ^{11 12 20}

  Known failure · Open question · Significant · Open · Mechanism-class evidence. On the record

Scope limitations

• Software-read telemetry can be forged by the operator in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

  NVML-based classification assumes trustworthy telemetry. Without a tamper-resistant read path, an authenticated telemetry channel and secure boot of the monitoring software, an operator who controls the full software stack could forge counter values. Monfared et al. start from the same premise: current GPUs expose little trusted telemetry and can be modified or virtualized. ^{1 3}

  Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

  Related mechanism Proposed Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: A guarantee processor on the chip would give the tamper-resistant, authenticated telemetry path the flaw says is missing. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. Add

• Timing challenges do not identify the individual chip in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

  GEMM and VDF challenges can be answered by identical GPUs elsewhere, and floating-point fingerprints distinguish GPU models, not individual devices. GPU virtualization adds timing leakage that prevents attributing compute use. ¹

  Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

• Facilities can be disguised or hidden in Remote detection of data centres

  Halstead and Larsen discuss two ways to hide a facility. One is to disguise it as a legitimate industrial site. The other is to build it underground, with cooling that avoids visible heat plumes. They note that the underground option requires bespoke engineering. ⁶

  Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

• Small sites may not be detectable in Remote detection of data centres

  Halstead and Larsen conclude that a sufficiently small covert project could not be ruled out with confidence. In their estimates, the chance of detection is lower for smaller sites. Krawec notes that small data centres in existing buildings may lack the distinctive features of large facilities. ^{6 8}

  Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

  Related mechanism Proposed Chip registries and manufacturing records: Accounts for chips from the fab onwards, which does not depend on a site being visible. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. Add

• Security depends on inspection protocols in Tamper evidence for verifier devices

  An inspection and protocol requirement drawn from safeguards and enclosure studies, not a reported break of a deployed AI verifier.

  Johnston argues that a seal is no better than the protocols for using it, and that inspectors are usually given little useful information on how to detect tampering. The Sandia survey notes that larger enclosures are hard to inspect fully and that sensor data must be authenticated. ^{16 19}

  Scope limitation · Theoretical argument · Mechanism-class evidence. On the record

Open questions

• No quantified error rates or formal thresholds for timing primitives in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

  Monfared et al. state that false-positive and false-negative rates are not quantified and leave hardware-specific formal thresholds to future work. ¹

  Open question · Open question. On the record

• Search for unknown sites is undemonstrated in Remote detection of data centres

  Krawec reports that telling data centres apart from other industrial facilities systematically is difficult. Automating detection would need large amounts of training imagery and a purpose-trained model. In Krawec's words, automated data-centre detection "remains primarily conceptual at present". ⁸

  Open question · Open question. On the record

Not yet demonstrated

Proposed Remote detection of data centres

Mechanisms on the map that are not in the proposal. Pointers, not recommendations. ?

• Proposed Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors Add
  • On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters waits on it. Shipping accelerators need a tamper-resistant, authenticated telemetry path.
• Operational use TEE remote attestation for AI workloads Add
  • On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters depends on it.

Missing prerequisites

• Operational use TEE remote attestation for AI workloads needed by On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters Add

Blockers

11 blockers recorded

• On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters
  • Shipping accelerators need a tamper-resistant, authenticated telemetry path. Hardware trust. Waits on Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors ^{2 3}
  • NVIDIA's full confidential-computing mode disables the hardware performance counters its profiling tools use, so telemetry that needs them conflicts with it. Privacy & leakage ^{4 5}
  • Continuous challenge puzzles cost power and throughput on production workloads. Performance & compatibility ¹
  • Evaluation has not gone beyond single nodes, framework-level evasion and one vendor's hardware. Adversarial validation ³
• Remote detection of data centres
  • Wide-area, automated detection of data centres is not yet practical and needs large training datasets. Coverage & hidden compute ⁸
  • No measured detection or false-alarm rates for finding undeclared facilities have been published. Adversarial validation ^{6 8}
  • Recent high-resolution imagery is costly, is limited by weather and needs trained analysts. Access & governance ⁸
• Tamper evidence for verifier devices
  • No tamper-evident enclosure has been designed for AI verifier hardware at retrofit scale. Hardware trust ¹⁷
  • Battery-backed designs add bulk, limit operating temperature (+10 °C to +35 °C for the IBM 4765) and complicate transport. Performance & compatibility ¹²
  • Active monitoring needs power, and visual inspection of large enclosures faces access limits. Access & governance ¹⁶
  • No evaluation has been published in the AI verification setting. Adversarial validation ¹⁷

From the family or selected implementation's record. ?

Model weights

Depends on the design for On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters.

Not involved: Remote detection of data centres and Tamper evidence for verifier devices.

Inputs and outputs

Depends on the design for On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters.

Not involved: Remote detection of data centres and Tamper evidence for verifier devices.

Training data

Depends on the design for On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters.

Not involved: Remote detection of data centres and Tamper evidence for verifier devices.

On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

None on the map

Remote detection of data centres

None on the map

Tamper evidence for verifier devices

• Proposed AI 2040 inference-only verification stack Proposed architecture, AI Futures Project

1. Timing and Memory Telemetry on GPUs for AI Governance, S. K. Monfared et al. (2026). Original
2. Guaranteeable Memory: An HBM-Based Chiplet for Verifiable AI Workloads, J. Petrie (2025). Original
3. Detecting Hidden ML Training With Zero-Overhead Telemetry, R. Rahman & S. Tajdari (2026). Original
4. On TEEs for Privacy-Preserving Monitoring in AI Governance, Gloria Z (2026). Original
5. NVIDIA Secure AI with Blackwell and Hopper GPUs (White Paper), NVIDIA (2025). Original
6. Covert AI Projects, B. Halstead & T. Larsen (2026). Original
7. Verifying International Agreements on AI: Six Layers of Verification for Rules on Large-Scale AI Development and Deployment, M. Baker et al. (2025). Original
8. Tracking Hyperscale AI Data Center Growth with Satellite Imagery, C. Krawec (2026). Original
9. Introducing the Frontier Data Centers Hub, Epoch AI (2025). Original
10. AI Data Centers Documentation – Methodology, Epoch AI (2026). Original
11. Anti-Tamper Radio: System-Level Tamper Detection for Computing Systems, P. Staat et al. (2022). Original
12. Secure Physical Enclosures from Covers with Tamper-Resistance, V. Immler et al. (2019). Original
13. ImpedanceVerif: On-Chip Impedance Sensing for System-Level Tampering Detection, T. Mosavirik et al. (2023). Original
14. IBM 4765 Cryptographic Coprocessor Security Module: Security Policy, IBM Corporation (2012). Original
15. PHYSEC SEAL: Change detection for maximum safety, PHYSEC GmbH (2026). Original
16. Tamper-Indicating Enclosures, A Current Survey, H. A. Smartt & Z. N. Gastelum (2015). Original
17. A System Overview for Near-Term, Low-Trust AI Compute Verification, N. Cankaya (2026). Original
18. Physical Security and Tamper-Indicating Devices, R. G. Johnston & A. R. E. Garcia (1996). Original
19. Tamper Detection for Safeguards and Treaty Monitoring: Fantasies, Realities, and Potentials, R. G. Johnston (2001). Original
20. Anti-Tamper Radio Meets Reconfigurable Intelligent Surface for System-Level Tamper Detection, M. S. Tabar et al. (2025). Original