Proposal Explorer

Add claims to see which ones the mechanisms address.

In production

• R3 Model identity attestation for showing users that a service runs the declared model weights

Built for an adversarial prover

Network taps and certifiers, Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors and Tamper evidence for verifier devices

No new hardware needed

Model identity attestation

Flaws since mitigated

• Launch-state attestation does not by itself cover weights loaded later in Model identity attestation ^{1 13}
• Verifier dictionary attacks on hashes in Network taps and certifiers ¹⁵

Published attempts to break a system, including those that found failures. Testing history does not show that open flaws are resolved.

• Model identity attestation: Independent red-team
• Network taps and certifiers: Analysis
• Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Analysis
• Tamper evidence for verifier devices: Analysis

Open critical flaws

• Underlying attestation can be forged or relayed in Model identity attestation

  Critical for the enclave route against an operator with physical access to affected hardware, or control of an unpatched SEV-SNP hypervisor. It does not apply to the recomputation route. PAL*M excludes physical attacks, and Tinfoil acknowledges this boundary.

  The enclave route inherits the platform-specific TEE attestation failures. Intel TDX forgery and H100 relay were demonstrated with physical access and host control. Battering RAM defeated AMD SEV-SNP attestation on DDR4 servers; RMPocalypse did so from malicious host software on platforms without AMD's fixes. These demonstrate failures of the trust roots, not of each model-commitment protocol. ^{2 4 8 10 11 12}

  Response: The TEE.fail authors report that physical interposer attacks are outside Intel's and AMD's threat models. AMD reports fixes for RMPocalypse.

  Demonstrated attack · Critical · Open · Inherited finding. On the record · Related finding in TEE remote attestation for AI workloads

  Related mechanism R1 Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: A tamper-protected enclosure around the chip is the proposed answer when the party that holds the hardware may attack it physically. A pointer, not evidence that this flaw is mitigated. In the proposal.

Open significant flaws

16 flaws in 4 mechanisms

• For private models, a user can confirm consistency but not content in Model identity attestation

  When weights are not published, users can check that the same root hash is served each time, but not what the model is. Pairing the hash with an attested evaluation, as in Attestable Audits, is one proposed remedy. ^{1 14}

  Open question · Significant · Open. On the record

• Recomputation depends on trusted logging and randomness, and its tolerance leaves a covert channel in Model identity attestation

  The recomputation variant assumes that every input, output and seed is logged correctly, and that the attacker can neither predict nor manipulate which messages are sampled for verification. Legitimate nondeterminism concentrates at a few token positions, and slow leaks within the tolerated slack remain possible. An independent study showed that an adversary who controls the prompts roughly doubles the bits leaked per token, reducing the exfiltration slowdown from 146–254 times under benign prompts to 60–118 times. The attack targets the exfiltration bound, not the check that outputs match the declared model. ^{3 9}

  Demonstrated attack · Significant · Open. On the record

  Related mechanism R1 Network taps and certifiers: Taps are proposed to copy and hash traffic on the monitored links, reducing reliance on the prover's own log. This still depends on the monitored boundary and trusted capture. A pointer, not evidence that this flaw is mitigated. In the proposal.

  Related mechanism R3 Deterministic and bit-exact inference: Bit-exact inference would remove the numerical tolerance that leaves this channel. A pointer, not evidence that this flaw is mitigated. Add

• Output nondeterminism leaves covert capacity in Network taps and certifiers

  Hashing cannot remove information hidden in the outputs themselves. The Secure Gateway Device paper estimates that about 0.1 bit per token remains even with seed-synchronized replay checks. For a 200k-GPU inference cluster at full load (2,000 tokens per GPU per second), that is about 40 Mbit/s of covert egress, enough to move a 1 TB model in under three days. The paper names this the core remaining challenge and points to deterministic replay or active scrubbing of hardware-induced entropy. An independent study found that an adversary who chooses the prompts roughly doubles the bits leaked per token under Gumbel-based inference verification; see Bounding unexplained information in outputs. ^{9 15}

  Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

  Related mechanism R3 Deterministic and bit-exact inference: Deterministic replay is one of the two remedies the flaw's source names. A pointer, not evidence that this flaw is mitigated. Add

  Related mechanism R2 Bounding unexplained information in outputs: Bounds the hidden information outputs can carry by measuring what the declared computation fails to predict. A pointer, not evidence that this flaw is mitigated. Add

• Some links cannot be passively tapped in Network taps and certifiers

  Cankaya notes that copper-connected scale-up domains (for example NVL72 racks and TPU v7 cubes) are much harder to tap than fibre, and that optical budgets make passive taps impractical on 400GBASE-SR8 multimode links. Amodo found no taps advertised for 53 GBaud links as of May 2026. ^{16 23}

  Open question · Significant · Open. On the record

• Encrypted fabrics hide plaintext from both parties in Network taps and certifiers

  Cankaya notes that with TEE-protected sessions whose keys are ephemeral and managed inside the TEE, neither the operator nor the manufacturer can recover session keys after the session, so tapped traffic could not be opened for recomputation. For other encrypted fabrics, the operator can retain keys. ¹⁶

  Open question · Significant · Open. On the record

• Residual side channels in simple passive setups in Network taps and certifiers

  Amodo's analysis of its own tapped prototype lists unvalidated header fields, timing of permitted traffic and variation in response formatting as residual channels, and concludes that the passive tap must be replaced by an active one. ¹⁹

  Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

• Completeness rests on physical monitoring left out of scope in Network taps and certifiers

  The Secure Gateway Device paper assumes the facility is physically monitored, and states that the whole architecture depends on the device being the only communication channel. It names radio emanation, power-line signalling and thermal channels as covert channels beyond that scope. ¹⁵

  Open question · Significant · Open. On the record

  Related mechanism R1 Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities: Addresses the radio, power-line and thermal channels that network-level designs leave out. A pointer, not evidence that this flaw is mitigated. Add

• State attackers can likely defeat current secure enclosures in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

  The flexHEG authors write that "nation-state attackers can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures", and that the marginal cost of circumvention per device is hard to estimate. RAND similarly judges that anti-tamper measures "would not be insurmountable for a determined and well-resourced adversary", although they raise costs and can reveal tampering. ^{25 27}

  Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

• Firmware-only retrofits rely on Secure Boot, which fault injection can bypass in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

  Part II notes that the most common attack on Secure Boot replaces the firmware and applies a voltage glitch while the signature is being checked. It also notes that sophisticated actors may use microprobing or laser voltage probing to read key registers. ²⁵

  Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

• Many important rules cannot be checked on-chip in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

  Malicious intent "is not a technical property observable on-chip", and misuse depends on what is done with a computation's results. A guarantee processor cannot easily tell whether a network is the whole system or one expert in a mixture-of-experts system. Part III judges that a fully local ruleset "may not be entirely feasible" for the same reason. ^{24 26}

  Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

• FLOP accounting can be laundered through external data in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

  Results of earlier or parallel workloads could be hidden in the "external data" fed to a device, which would falsify the total FLOP count unless the inputs are explained or time delays are imposed. ²⁵

  Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

• Supply-chain diversion and hidden backdoors in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

  Components could be diverted before a guarantee processor is added, and backdoors could be introduced during design or manufacturing. Open-source designs and physical scans of randomly selected chips are proposed as countermeasures. Part III proposes international oversight of production and extensive testing of a random sample of finished devices. ^{25 26}

  Open question · Significant · Open. On the record

  Related mechanism R1 Chip registries and manufacturing records: Records each chip's identity and owner from the fab onwards, which bears on diversion before a guarantee processor is fitted. It does not address hidden backdoors. A pointer, not evidence that this flaw is mitigated. Add

• Coverage stops at flexHEG-equipped chips in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

  Motivated actors will always be able to use some compute that is not flexHEG-equipped. Recalling existing consumer GPUs would likely be impractical, and reaching perfect coverage, or conclusively proving that no secret government data centres exist, would be "practically quite difficult". ^{24 26}

  Open question · Significant · Open. On the record

  Related mechanism R1 Chip registries and manufacturing records: Accounts for which chips exist and who holds them. A pointer, not evidence that this flaw is mitigated. Add

  Related mechanism R1 Remote detection of data centres: Looks for undeclared facilities that hold other chips. A pointer, not evidence that this flaw is mitigated. Add

• Seals are often defeated with simple methods in Tamper evidence for verifier devices

  Published defeats of general security seals. They warn about proposed verifier-device seals, but do not demonstrate defeat of an AI verification enclosure or sensor.

  In 1996 a Los Alamos vulnerability assessment defeated all 94 security seals it examined, with 132 defeats in total, using rapid, inexpensive, low-tech methods. It found that seal cost did not predict security. In 2001 Johnston reported that high-tech seals are often easier to defeat than low-tech ones. ^{36 37}

  Demonstrated attack · Significant · Open · Mechanism-class evidence. On the record

• Security depends on inspection protocols in Tamper evidence for verifier devices

  An inspection and protocol requirement drawn from safeguards and enclosure studies, not a reported break of a deployed AI verifier.

  Johnston argues that a seal is no better than the protocols for using it, and that inspectors are usually given little useful information on how to detect tampering. The Sandia survey notes that larger enclosures are hard to inspect fully and that sensor data must be authenticated. ^{35 37}

  Theoretical argument · Significant · Open · Mechanism-class evidence. On the record

• Attack classes outside published models in Tamper evidence for verifier devices

  The radio compensation result is emulated using measured channel data under a known-reference attacker model. It is not a physical bypass demonstration against an AI verifier enclosure.

  The authors of the batteryless cover say they cannot assess chemical-solvent attacks, which exceed their expertise, and deem cover removal impractical. Anti-Tamper Radio's reference can drift as the environment or measurement system ages; the authors suggest gradually renewing the reference. A 2025 follow-up by some of the same authors shows, by emulation on measured channel data, that an attacker who knows the reference channel and the needle's effect on it could inject a signal that cancels the change caused by a needle insertion. It proposes a reconfigurable intelligent surface that randomizes the channel as a countermeasure. ^{30 31 38}

  Open question · Significant · Open · Mechanism-class evidence. On the record

Not yet demonstrated

R1 Network taps and certifiers and R1 Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

Need new chip designs

Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

Mechanisms on the map that are not in the proposal. Pointers, not recommendations. ?

• R3 Deterministic and bit-exact inference Add
  • Bears on the open significant flaw “Recomputation depends on trusted logging and randomness, and its tolerance leaves a covert channel” in Model identity attestation. Bit-exact inference would remove the numerical tolerance that leaves this channel.
  • Bears on the open significant flaw “Output nondeterminism leaves covert capacity” in Network taps and certifiers. Deterministic replay is one of the two remedies the flaw's source names.
  • Model identity attestation waits on it. Numerical nondeterminism limits how tightly recomputation can pin down the model and sampling.
  • Network taps and certifiers waits on it. Nondeterministic inference leaves covert capacity in outputs that hashing cannot remove.
• R2 Bounding unexplained information in outputs Add
  • Bears on the open significant flaw “Output nondeterminism leaves covert capacity” in Network taps and certifiers. Bounds the hidden information outputs can carry by measuring what the declared computation fails to predict.
• R1 Chip registries and manufacturing records Add
  • Bears on the open significant flaw “Supply-chain diversion and hidden backdoors” in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors. Records each chip's identity and owner from the fab onwards, which bears on diversion before a guarantee processor is fitted. It does not address hidden backdoors.
  • Bears on the open significant flaw “Coverage stops at flexHEG-equipped chips” in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors. Accounts for which chips exist and who holds them.
  • Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors waits on it. Governing all relevant chips depends on knowing where they are, through chip registries and detection of undeclared facilities.
• R1 Remote detection of data centres Add
  • Bears on the open significant flaw “Coverage stops at flexHEG-equipped chips” in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors. Looks for undeclared facilities that hold other chips.
• R1 Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities Add
  • Bears on the open significant flaw “Completeness rests on physical monitoring left out of scope” in Network taps and certifiers. Addresses the radio, power-line and thermal channels that network-level designs leave out.
  • Network taps and certifiers waits on it. Radio, power-line and thermal channels are not addressed by network-level designs.
• R3 TEE remote attestation for AI workloads Add
  • Model identity attestation waits on it. Attestation that resists physical attackers, for the enclave variant.
  • Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors depends on it.
• R3 Sampled inference recomputation Add
  • Network taps and certifiers depends on it.

Missing prerequisites

• R3 Sampled inference recomputation needed by Network taps and certifiers Add
• R3 Deterministic and bit-exact inference needed by Network taps and certifiers Add
• R1 Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities needed by Network taps and certifiers Add
• R3 TEE remote attestation for AI workloads needed by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors Add
• R1 Chip registries and manufacturing records needed by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors Add

Shared foundations

• TEE remote attestation for AI workloads relied on by Model identity attestation and Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors
• Deterministic and bit-exact inference relied on by Model identity attestation and Network taps and certifiers
• Tamper evidence for verifier devices relied on by Network taps and certifiers and Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors. In the proposal

Blockers

17 blockers recorded

• Model identity attestation
  • Attestation that resists physical attackers, for the enclave variant. Hardware trust. Waits on TEE remote attestation for AI workloads ⁸
  • Numerical nondeterminism limits how tightly recomputation can pin down the model and sampling. Protocol soundness. Waits on Deterministic and bit-exact inference ³
  • The recomputation variant needs the verifier to hold the declared weights. Access & governance ³
• Network taps and certifiers
  • No complete verification tap has been demonstrated at production frontend link rates, and on the tested CPU no hash algorithm reached line rate with minimum-size frames. Performance & compatibility ^{23 39}
  • Nondeterministic inference leaves covert capacity in outputs that hashing cannot remove. Evidence binding. Waits on Deterministic and bit-exact inference ¹⁵
  • Taps and gateway devices need tamper-evident housing and physical monitoring so that traffic cannot bypass them. Hardware trust. Waits on Tamper evidence for verifier devices ^{15 17}
  • Radio, power-line and thermal channels are not addressed by network-level designs. Coverage & hidden compute. Waits on Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities ¹⁵
  • Red-teaming by specialists is called for but has not been reported. Adversarial validation ¹⁵
• Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors
  • Integrated flexHEG needs substantial help from the accelerator manufacturer, and the authors estimate 3.7–7.9 years, from when the manufacturer starts work, for such hardware to displace other accelerators in frontier development. Access & governance ²⁵
  • State-level attackers who hold the hardware can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures. Hardware trust. Waits on Tamper evidence for verifier devices ^{25 27}
  • Rival states would need to trust the design and manufacture of guarantee processors and enclosures, for example through open design, redundant processors from each side or oversight of production. Hardware trust ^{24 26}
  • Restricting future rule updates would need a formal language for rules, which the authors judge most likely infeasible for early flexHEG versions. Protocol soundness ²⁴
  • Governing all relevant chips depends on knowing where they are, through chip registries and detection of undeclared facilities. Coverage & hidden compute. Waits on Chip registries and manufacturing records ²⁶
• Tamper evidence for verifier devices
  • No tamper-evident enclosure has been designed for AI verifier hardware at retrofit scale. Hardware trust ¹⁷
  • Battery-backed designs add bulk, limit operating temperature (+10 °C to +35 °C for the IBM 4765) and complicate transport. Performance & compatibility ³¹
  • Active monitoring needs power, and visual inspection of large enclosures faces access limits. Access & governance ³⁵
  • No evaluation has been published in the AI verification setting. Adversarial validation ¹⁷

From the family or selected implementation's record. ?

Model weights

Depends on the design for Model identity attestation and Network taps and certifiers.

Hidden by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors.

Not involved: Tamper evidence for verifier devices.

Inputs and outputs

Depends on the design for Model identity attestation and Network taps and certifiers.

Hidden by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors.

Not involved: Tamper evidence for verifier devices.

Training data

Depends on the design for Network taps and certifiers.

Hidden by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors.

Not involved: Model identity attestation and Tamper evidence for verifier devices.

Model identity attestation

• R2 Attestable Audits Research prototype, University of Cambridge
• R2 PAL*M Research prototype, University of Waterloo
• R3 Tinfoil model identity (Modelwrap) Product, Tinfoil

Network taps and certifiers

• R1 AI 2040 inference-only verification stack Proposed architecture, AI Futures Project
• R1 Low-trust AI compute verification system overview Proposed architecture, Machine Intelligence Research Institute
• R1 SASH confidential network logger Research prototype, Singapore AI Safety Hub (SASH)

Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

None on the map

Tamper evidence for verifier devices

• R1 AI 2040 inference-only verification stack Proposed architecture, AI Futures Project

1. How Tinfoil Proves Exactly What Model Is Running, Tinfoil Team (2026). Original
2. PAL*M: Property Attestation for Large Generative Models, P. Chantasantitam et al. (2026). Original
3. Verifying LLM Inference to Detect Model Weight Exfiltration, R. Rinberg et al. (2025). Original
4. A primer on secure enclaves, Tinfoil (2026). Original
5. Backend infrastructure, Tinfoil (2026). Original
6. How verification works in Tinfoil, Tinfoil (2026). Original
7. modelwrap: Reproducible dm-verity read-only image of Huggingface models, Tinfoil (2026). Original
8. TEE.fail: Breaking Trusted Execution Environments via DDR5 Memory Bus Interposition, J. Chuang et al. (2026). Original
9. Adversarial Entropy Inflation Against Gumbel-Based Inference Verification, N. Kezins (2026). Original
10. Battering RAM: Low-Cost Interposer Attacks on Confidential Computing via Dynamic Memory Aliasing, J. De Meulemeester et al. (2026). Original
11. RMPocalypse: How a Catch-22 Breaks AMD SEV-SNP, B. Schlüter & S. Shinde (2025). Original
12. SEV-SNP RMP Initialization Vulnerability (AMD-SB-3020), AMD (2025). Original
13. On TEEs for Privacy-Preserving Monitoring in AI Governance, Gloria Z (2026). Original
14. Attestable Audits: Verifiable AI Safety Benchmarks Using Trusted Execution Environments, C. Schnabl et al. (2025). Original
15. Fingerprinting All AI Cluster I/O Without Mutually Trusted Processors, N. Cankaya et al. (2026). Original
16. The Fundamentals and Feasibility of Secure Network Taps for Verifying AI Datacenter Use, N. Cankaya (2026). Original
17. A System Overview for Near-Term, Low-Trust AI Compute Verification, N. Cankaya (2026). Original
18. Verification Plan, R. Dean (2026). Original
19. Fitting a Network TAP to our Inference Verification Prototype, Amodo Design (2026). Original
20. Amodo-Design/Inference-Recomputation-Prototype (GitHub repository), Amodo Design (2026). Original
21. inference-verification: Inference Verification Prototype, Singapore AI Safety Hub (SASH) (2026). Original
22. Internationalising AI Verification, Singapore AI Safety Hub (SASH) (2026). Original
23. Network Tapping for AI Verification: A Technical Assessment, Amodo Design (2026). Original
24. Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees for AI Compute, J. Petrie et al. (2025). Original
25. Technical Options for Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees, J. Petrie & O. Aarne (2025). Original
26. International Security Applications of Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees, O. Aarne & J. Petrie (2025). Original
27. Hardware-Enabled Governance Mechanisms: Developing Technical Solutions to Exempt Items Otherwise Classified Under Export Control Classification Numbers 3A090 and 4A090, G. Kulp et al. (2024). Original
28. Secure, Governable Chips: Using On-Chip Mechanisms to Manage National Security Risks from AI & Advanced Computing, O. Aarne et al. (2024). Original
29. Hardware-Enabled Mechanisms for Verifying Responsible AI Development, A. O'Gara et al. (2025). Original
30. Anti-Tamper Radio: System-Level Tamper Detection for Computing Systems, P. Staat et al. (2022). Original
31. Secure Physical Enclosures from Covers with Tamper-Resistance, V. Immler et al. (2019). Original
32. ImpedanceVerif: On-Chip Impedance Sensing for System-Level Tampering Detection, T. Mosavirik et al. (2023). Original
33. IBM 4765 Cryptographic Coprocessor Security Module: Security Policy, IBM Corporation (2012). Original
34. PHYSEC SEAL: Change detection for maximum safety, PHYSEC GmbH (2026). Original
35. Tamper-Indicating Enclosures, A Current Survey, H. A. Smartt & Z. N. Gastelum (2015). Original
36. Physical Security and Tamper-Indicating Devices, R. G. Johnston & A. R. E. Garcia (1996). Original
37. Tamper Detection for Safeguards and Treaty Monitoring: Fantasies, Realities, and Potentials, R. G. Johnston (2001). Original
38. Anti-Tamper Radio Meets Reconfigurable Intelligent Surface for System-Level Tamper Detection, M. S. Tabar et al. (2025). Original
39. Network Traffic Hashing, Amodo Design (2026). Original