Proposal Explorer

Add claims to see which ones the mechanisms address.

Built for an adversarial prover

Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization, Whole-workload recomputation (reproducible packets) and Network taps and certifiers

Flaws since mitigated

• Verifier dictionary attacks on hashes in Network taps and certifiers ¹³

Published attempts to break a system, including those that found failures. Testing history does not show that open flaws are resolved.

• Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization: Analysis
• Network taps and certifiers: Analysis

Open significant flaws

12 flaws in 3 mechanisms

• Low-communication training reduces the bandwidth training needs in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization

  DiLoCo matched fully synchronous training on 8 workers while communicating 500 times less. Rahman writes that this family of methods theoretically allows large-scale training with less than 100 Mbps. Lucid includes these methods in its bounds, but notes that extreme activation compression, architectures with unusually small inter-layer widths, or modular paradigms could erode the margin. ^{2 6 7}

  Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

• Operator control of pod routing collapses the bound in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization

  Lucid's analysis finds that if the operator can freely assign pods to routers, it could dedicate a whole cell of 100 or more pods to one pipeline stage. The bound then falls to about 90–220x uncompressed and as low as about 25x with compression. The proposed mitigation, auditor-controlled random assignment that is periodically re-randomized, has not been implemented. ²

  Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

• Undeclared local storage raises per-pod capacity in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization

  More memory or storage per pod helps an adversary. Lucid requires per-pod storage to be declared, capped and physically inspected. ²

  Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

• Training within one pod is not covered in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization

  Lucid's bounds concern pre-training models larger than the pods are sized for. Training models that fit in one pod, fine-tuning and reinforcement-learning post-training within one pod are outside the modelled threat. ²

  Open question · Significant · Open. On the record

• Parallel scale-up switches are hard enforcement points in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization

  In GB200 topologies, GPUs reach GPUs in other nodes through NVSwitches without a NIC on the path. Amodo notes that limits are hard to enforce there because many switches work in parallel, so compromising one or two would bypass the limit. ⁵

  Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

• Spare compute is outside the scheme in Whole-workload recomputation (reproducible packets)

  The plan states that it does not verify that spare compute is not used for unapproved workloads, because this seems very challenging. Recomputation checks the correctness of declared work, not its completeness. ^{1 8}

  Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

  Related mechanism R1 Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting: Proposed as one input to accounting for spare capacity on declared hardware. A pointer, not evidence that this flaw is mitigated. Add

• Non-compliant work could be encoded inside compliant-looking packets in Whole-workload recomputation (reproducible packets)

  The plan notes that an AI company might try to encode a non-compliant workload inside a workload that looks compliant on the surface. ¹

  Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

• Output nondeterminism leaves covert capacity in Network taps and certifiers

  Hashing cannot remove information hidden in the outputs themselves. The Secure Gateway Device paper estimates that about 0.1 bit per token remains even with seed-synchronized replay checks. For a 200k-GPU inference cluster at full load (2,000 tokens per GPU per second), that is about 40 Mbit/s of covert egress, enough to move a 1 TB model in under three days. The paper names this the core remaining challenge and points to deterministic replay or active scrubbing of hardware-induced entropy. An independent study found that an adversary who chooses the prompts roughly doubles the bits leaked per token under Gumbel-based inference verification; see Bounding unexplained information in outputs. ^{13 19}

  Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

  Related mechanism R3 Deterministic and bit-exact inference: Deterministic replay is one of the two remedies the flaw's source names. A pointer, not evidence that this flaw is mitigated. Add

  Related mechanism R2 Bounding unexplained information in outputs: Bounds the hidden information outputs can carry by measuring what the declared computation fails to predict. A pointer, not evidence that this flaw is mitigated. Add

• Some links cannot be passively tapped in Network taps and certifiers

  Cankaya notes that copper-connected scale-up domains (for example NVL72 racks and TPU v7 cubes) are much harder to tap than fibre, and that optical budgets make passive taps impractical on 400GBASE-SR8 multimode links. Amodo found no taps advertised for 53 GBaud links as of May 2026. ^{14 20}

  Open question · Significant · Open. On the record

• Encrypted fabrics hide plaintext from both parties in Network taps and certifiers

  Cankaya notes that with TEE-protected sessions whose keys are ephemeral and managed inside the TEE, neither the operator nor the manufacturer can recover session keys after the session, so tapped traffic could not be opened for recomputation. For other encrypted fabrics, the operator can retain keys. ¹⁴

  Open question · Significant · Open. On the record

• Residual side channels in simple passive setups in Network taps and certifiers

  Amodo's analysis of its own tapped prototype lists unvalidated header fields, timing of permitted traffic and variation in response formatting as residual channels, and concludes that the passive tap must be replaced by an active one. ¹⁵

  Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

• Completeness rests on physical monitoring left out of scope in Network taps and certifiers

  The Secure Gateway Device paper assumes the facility is physically monitored, and states that the whole architecture depends on the device being the only communication channel. It names radio emanation, power-line signalling and thermal channels as covert channels beyond that scope. ¹³

  Open question · Significant · Open. On the record

  Related mechanism R1 Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities: Addresses the radio, power-line and thermal channels that network-level designs leave out. A pointer, not evidence that this flaw is mitigated. Add

Not yet demonstrated

R1 Whole-workload recomputation (reproducible packets) and R1 Network taps and certifiers

Mechanisms on the map that are not in the proposal. Pointers, not recommendations. ?

• R3 Deterministic and bit-exact inference Add
  • Bears on the open significant flaw “Output nondeterminism leaves covert capacity” in Network taps and certifiers. Deterministic replay is one of the two remedies the flaw's source names.
  • Whole-workload recomputation (reproducible packets) waits on it. Workloads are not reproducible by default, and achieving reproducibility may cost performance.
  • Network taps and certifiers waits on it. Nondeterministic inference leaves covert capacity in outputs that hashing cannot remove.
• R2 Bounding unexplained information in outputs Add
  • Bears on the open significant flaw “Output nondeterminism leaves covert capacity” in Network taps and certifiers. Bounds the hidden information outputs can carry by measuring what the declared computation fails to predict.
• R1 Proofs of useful work for capacity accounting Add
  • Bears on the open significant flaw “Spare compute is outside the scheme” in Whole-workload recomputation (reproducible packets). Proposed as one input to accounting for spare capacity on declared hardware.
• R1 Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities Add
  • Bears on the open significant flaw “Completeness rests on physical monitoring left out of scope” in Network taps and certifiers. Addresses the radio, power-line and thermal channels that network-level designs leave out.
  • Network taps and certifiers waits on it. Radio, power-line and thermal channels are not addressed by network-level designs.
• R2 Tamper evidence for verifier devices Add
  • Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization waits on it. Shaping devices and routing assignments must be trusted by both parties; Amodo has not yet fully analysed resilience to a compromised DPU.
  • Network taps and certifiers waits on it. Taps and gateway devices need tamper-evident housing and physical monitoring so that traffic cannot bypass them.
• R3 Sampled inference recomputation Add
  • Network taps and certifiers depends on it.

Missing prerequisites

• R2 Tamper evidence for verifier devices needed by Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization and Network taps and certifiers Add
• R3 Deterministic and bit-exact inference needed by Whole-workload recomputation (reproducible packets) and Network taps and certifiers Add
• R3 Sampled inference recomputation needed by Network taps and certifiers Add
• R1 Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities needed by Network taps and certifiers Add

Shared foundations

• Tamper evidence for verifier devices relied on by Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization and Network taps and certifiers
• Network taps and certifiers relied on by Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization and Whole-workload recomputation (reproducible packets). In the proposal
• Deterministic and bit-exact inference relied on by Whole-workload recomputation (reproducible packets) and Network taps and certifiers

Blockers

13 blockers recorded

• Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization
  • No cap that a verifier can check has been implemented or red-teamed. Adversarial validation ²
  • The verifier must know that all traffic leaving a pod crosses the capped, monitored links. Coverage & hidden compute. Waits on Network taps and certifiers ³
  • Shaping devices and routing assignments must be trusted by both parties; Amodo has not yet fully analysed resilience to a compromised DPU. Hardware trust. Waits on Tamper evidence for verifier devices ^{2 5}
  • Advances in low-communication training could shrink the margin that the cap enforces. Capacity bounds ^{2 6 7}
• Whole-workload recomputation (reproducible packets)
  • Workloads are not reproducible by default, and achieving reproducibility may cost performance. Performance & compatibility. Waits on Deterministic and bit-exact inference ¹
  • Network packets are not individually reproducible by default; making them so may need considerable software, firmware and hardware work. Amodo rates this 'not on track'. Performance & compatibility ¹⁰
  • All traffic must reach the recomputation server via network taps, and the server's integrity is critical. Hardware trust. Waits on Network taps and certifiers ^{1 10}
  • Recomputing training steps needs checkpoints: writing one at every step would cost more than 100% overhead, so Amodo's design needs a spare data-parallel replica that tracks the weights instead. Performance & compatibility ⁸
• Network taps and certifiers
  • No complete verification tap has been demonstrated at production frontend link rates, and on the tested CPU no hash algorithm reached line rate with minimum-size frames. Performance & compatibility ^{20 21}
  • Nondeterministic inference leaves covert capacity in outputs that hashing cannot remove. Evidence binding. Waits on Deterministic and bit-exact inference ¹³
  • Taps and gateway devices need tamper-evident housing and physical monitoring so that traffic cannot bypass them. Hardware trust. Waits on Tamper evidence for verifier devices ^{3 13}
  • Radio, power-line and thermal channels are not addressed by network-level designs. Coverage & hidden compute. Waits on Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities ¹³
  • Red-teaming by specialists is called for but has not been reported. Adversarial validation ¹³

From the family or selected implementation's record. ?

Model weights

Depends on the design for Whole-workload recomputation (reproducible packets) and Network taps and certifiers.

Not involved: Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization.

Inputs and outputs

Depends on the design for Whole-workload recomputation (reproducible packets) and Network taps and certifiers.

Not involved: Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization.

Training data

Depends on the design for Whole-workload recomputation (reproducible packets) and Network taps and certifiers.

Not involved: Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization.

Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization

• R1 AI 2040 inference-only verification stack Proposed architecture, AI Futures Project
• R1 RAND secure inference data center (SIDC) design Proposed architecture, RAND

Whole-workload recomputation (reproducible packets)

• R1 AI 2040 inference-only verification stack Proposed architecture, AI Futures Project

Network taps and certifiers

• R1 AI 2040 inference-only verification stack Proposed architecture, AI Futures Project
• R1 Low-trust AI compute verification system overview Proposed architecture, Machine Intelligence Research Institute
• R1 SASH confidential network logger Research prototype, Singapore AI Safety Hub (SASH)

1. Verification Plan, R. Dean (2026). Original
2. Traffic Shaping for Workload Classification, Lucid Computing (2026). Original
3. A System Overview for Near-Term, Low-Trust AI Compute Verification, N. Cankaya (2026). Original
4. De-risking Interconnect Limits for AI Verification, A. Scher et al. (2026). Original
5. The Tray as a Bandwidth Boundary, Amodo Design (2026). Original
6. DiLoCo: Distributed Low-Communication Training of Language Models, A. Douillard et al. (2024). Original
7. Does Distributed Training Undermine Compute Governance?, R. Rahman (2026). Original
8. Example Schemes for Verifying High-Stakes AI Agreements, Amodo Design (2026). Original
9. Scaling Recomputation Inference Verification, Amodo Design (2026). Original
10. AI 2040 Plan A — Verification SITREP, Amodo Design (2026). Original
11. Get Involved in Verification, AI Futures Project (2026). Original
12. Proof-of-Learning is Currently More Broken Than You Think, C. Fang et al. (2023). Original
13. Fingerprinting All AI Cluster I/O Without Mutually Trusted Processors, N. Cankaya et al. (2026). Original
14. The Fundamentals and Feasibility of Secure Network Taps for Verifying AI Datacenter Use, N. Cankaya (2026). Original
15. Fitting a Network TAP to our Inference Verification Prototype, Amodo Design (2026). Original
16. Amodo-Design/Inference-Recomputation-Prototype (GitHub repository), Amodo Design (2026). Original
17. inference-verification: Inference Verification Prototype, Singapore AI Safety Hub (SASH) (2026). Original
18. Internationalising AI Verification, Singapore AI Safety Hub (SASH) (2026). Original
19. Adversarial Entropy Inflation Against Gumbel-Based Inference Verification, N. Kezins (2026). Original
20. Network Tapping for AI Verification: A Technical Assessment, Amodo Design (2026). Original
21. Network Traffic Hashing, Amodo Design (2026). Original