Proposal Explorer

Add claims to see which ones the mechanisms address.

Not counted

Excluded by your filters: Network taps and certifiers, On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters and Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges

Attack testing records published testing for this use. It does not by itself show independent review, a formal proof or that a deployed system is secure.

• Network taps and certifiers: Analysis · excluded by filters
• On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters: Red-teamed · excluded by filters
• Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges: Analysis · excluded by filters

Excluded by your filters

• Network taps and certifiers Prover cooperation is required; the filter allows not required.
• On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters Prover cooperation is partial; the filter allows not required.
• Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges Prover cooperation is required; the filter allows not required.

Open significant failures

5 failures in 3 mechanisms

• Output nondeterminism leaves covert capacity in Network taps and certifiers

  Hashing cannot remove information hidden in the outputs themselves. The Secure Gateway Device paper estimates that about 0.1 bit per token remains even with seed-synchronized replay checks. For a 200k-GPU inference cluster at full load (2,000 tokens per GPU per second), that is about 40 Mbit/s of covert egress, enough to move a 1 TB model in under three days. The paper names this the core remaining challenge and points to deterministic replay or active scrubbing of hardware-induced entropy. An independent study found that an adversary who chooses the prompts roughly doubles the bits leaked per token under Gumbel-based inference verification; see Bounding unexplained information in outputs. ^{1 9}

  Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

  Related mechanism Operational use Deterministic and bit-exact inference: Deterministic replay is one of the two remedies the flaw's source names. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. Add

  Related mechanism Research demo Bounding unexplained information in outputs: Bounds the hidden information outputs can carry by measuring what the declared computation fails to predict. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. Add

• Residual side channels in simple passive setups in Network taps and certifiers

  Amodo's analysis of its own tapped prototype lists unvalidated header fields, timing of permitted traffic and variation in response formatting as residual channels, and concludes that the passive tap must be replaced by an active one. ⁵

  Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

• Adversarially disguised fine-tuning partly evades classification in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

  Across 20 evasion strategy families in five monitor-evader rounds, the classifier's accuracy against the most challenging disguised workloads held out from training was 43–87%. White-box LoRA fine-tuning was the only evasion family detected less than half the time. The evaluation covered single nodes, PyTorch-level evasion and NVIDIA hardware. ¹³

  Known failure · Demonstrated attack · Significant · Open. On the record

• Counters leak information about protected workloads in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

  Performance counters have been used as a side channel against TEEs, for example in CounterSEVeillance. NVIDIA disables performance counters in full confidential-computing mode, stating that they could provide an avenue for side-channel attacks. Richer counters for verification therefore pull against confidentiality. ^{14 15}

  Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

• Remote memory narrows the timing margin in Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges

  Data-centre remote memory access returns in about 1–2 µs, against about 70–200 ns for local DRAM. The MIRI overview says verification of memory saturation depends on ruling out remote access by latency or physical disconnection. It names pre-staging data into local memory as the remaining evasion and proposes an unpredictable, capacity-filling challenge to close it. ³

  Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

  Related mechanism Research demo Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization: Physical disconnection is proposed to exclude remote memory between the separated groups during a challenge. It depends on the isolation boundary being enforced. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. Add

Scope limitations

• Some links cannot be passively tapped in Network taps and certifiers

  Cankaya notes that copper-connected scale-up domains (for example NVL72 racks and TPU v7 cubes) are much harder to tap than fibre, and that optical budgets make passive taps impractical on 400GBASE-SR8 multimode links. Amodo found no taps advertised for 53 GBaud links as of May 2026. ^{2 10}

  Scope limitation · Open question. On the record

• Encrypted fabrics hide plaintext from both parties in Network taps and certifiers

  Cankaya notes that with TEE-protected sessions whose keys are ephemeral and managed inside the TEE, neither the operator nor the manufacturer can recover session keys after the session, so tapped traffic could not be opened for recomputation. For other encrypted fabrics, the operator can retain keys. ²

  Scope limitation · Open question. On the record

• Completeness rests on physical monitoring left out of scope in Network taps and certifiers

  The Secure Gateway Device paper assumes the facility is physically monitored, and states that the whole architecture depends on the device being the only communication channel. It names radio emanation, power-line signalling and thermal channels as covert channels beyond that scope. ¹

  Scope limitation · Open question. On the record

  Related mechanism Proposed Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities: Addresses the radio, power-line and thermal channels that network-level designs leave out. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. Add

• Software-read telemetry can be forged by the operator in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

  NVML-based classification assumes trustworthy telemetry. Without a tamper-resistant read path, an authenticated telemetry channel and secure boot of the monitoring software, an operator who controls the full software stack could forge counter values. Monfared et al. start from the same premise: current GPUs expose little trusted telemetry and can be modified or virtualized. ^{11 13}

  Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

  Related mechanism Proposed Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: A guarantee processor on the chip would give the tamper-resistant, authenticated telemetry path the flaw says is missing. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. Add

• Timing challenges do not identify the individual chip in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

  GEMM and VDF challenges can be answered by identical GPUs elsewhere, and floating-point fingerprints distinguish GPU models, not individual devices. GPU virtualization adds timing leakage that prevents attributing compute use. ¹¹

  Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

Open questions

• No quantified error rates or formal thresholds for timing primitives in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

  Monfared et al. state that false-positive and false-negative rates are not quantified and leave hardware-specific formal thresholds to future work. ¹¹

  Open question · Open question. On the record

• Error rates not quantified in Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges

  Monfared et al. show separable timing distributions. Their acceptance rule passes a GPU when its mean time per round stays at or below a chosen maximum, and an appendix outlines statistical tests for the proof-of-work puzzle. They leave hardware-specific threshold values to future work and report no false-positive or false-negative rates. ¹¹

  Open question · Open question. On the record

Not yet demonstrated

Proposed Network taps and certifiers

Mechanisms on the map that are not in the proposal. Pointers, not recommendations. ?

• Operational use Deterministic and bit-exact inference Add

  Excluded by filters: prover cooperation required

  • Bears on the open significant failure “Output nondeterminism leaves covert capacity” in Network taps and certifiers. Deterministic replay is one of the two remedies the flaw's source names.
  • Network taps and certifiers waits on it. Nondeterministic inference leaves covert capacity in outputs that hashing cannot remove.
• Research demo Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization Add

  Excluded by filters: prover cooperation required

  • Bears on the open significant failure “Remote memory narrows the timing margin” in Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges. Physical disconnection is proposed to exclude remote memory between the separated groups during a challenge. It depends on the isolation boundary being enforced.
  • Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges waits on it. Outside help, such as remote memory, must be excluded during challenges.
• Research demo Bounding unexplained information in outputs Add

  Excluded by filters: prover cooperation required

  • Bears on the open significant failure “Output nondeterminism leaves covert capacity” in Network taps and certifiers. Bounds the hidden information outputs can carry by measuring what the declared computation fails to predict.
• Research demo Tamper evidence for verifier devices Add

  Excluded by filters: prover cooperation partial

  • Network taps and certifiers waits on it. Taps and gateway devices need tamper-evident housing and physical monitoring so that traffic cannot bypass them.
• Proposed Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors Add

  Excluded by filters: prover cooperation required

  • On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters waits on it. Shipping accelerators need a tamper-resistant, authenticated telemetry path.
• Proposed Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities Add

  Excluded by filters: prover cooperation partial

  • Network taps and certifiers waits on it. Radio, power-line and thermal channels are not addressed by network-level designs.
• Operational use Sampled inference recomputation Add

  Excluded by filters: prover cooperation required

  • Network taps and certifiers depends on it.
• Operational use TEE remote attestation for AI workloads Add

  Excluded by filters: prover cooperation required

  • On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters depends on it.

Missing prerequisites

• Operational use Sampled inference recomputation needed by Network taps and certifiers Add
• Operational use Deterministic and bit-exact inference needed by Network taps and certifiers Add
• Research demo Tamper evidence for verifier devices needed by Network taps and certifiers Add
• Proposed Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities needed by Network taps and certifiers Add
• Operational use TEE remote attestation for AI workloads needed by On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters Add

Blockers

12 blockers recorded

• Network taps and certifiers
  • No complete verification tap has been demonstrated at production frontend link rates, and on the tested CPU no hash algorithm reached line rate with minimum-size frames. Performance & compatibility ^{10 23}
  • Nondeterministic inference leaves covert capacity in outputs that hashing cannot remove. Evidence binding. Waits on Deterministic and bit-exact inference ¹
  • Taps and gateway devices need tamper-evident housing and physical monitoring so that traffic cannot bypass them. Hardware trust. Waits on Tamper evidence for verifier devices ^{1 3}
  • Radio, power-line and thermal channels are not addressed by network-level designs. Coverage & hidden compute. Waits on Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities ¹
  • Red-teaming by specialists is called for but has not been reported. Adversarial validation ¹
• On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters
  • Shipping accelerators need a tamper-resistant, authenticated telemetry path. Hardware trust. Waits on Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors ^{12 13}
  • NVIDIA's full confidential-computing mode disables the hardware performance counters its profiling tools use, so telemetry that needs them conflicts with it. Privacy & leakage ^{14 15}
  • Continuous challenge puzzles cost power and throughput on production workloads. Performance & compatibility ¹¹
  • Evaluation has not gone beyond single nodes, framework-level evasion and one vendor's hardware. Adversarial validation ¹³
• Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges
  • No network-level memory challenge across data-centre servers has been demonstrated. Adversarial validation ³
  • Challenges that fill memory displace workloads; filling a pod's volatile memory takes tens of minutes and SSDs take hours. Performance & compatibility ^{3 11}
  • Outside help, such as remote memory, must be excluded during challenges. Coverage & hidden compute. Waits on Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization ³

From the family or selected implementation's record. ?

Model weights

Depends on the design for Network taps and certifiers and On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters.

Not involved: Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges.

Inputs and outputs

Depends on the design for Network taps and certifiers and On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters.

Not involved: Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges.

Training data

Depends on the design for Network taps and certifiers and On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters.

Not involved: Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges.

Network taps and certifiers

• Proposed AI 2040 inference-only verification stack Proposed architecture, AI Futures Project
• Proposed Low-trust AI compute verification system overview Proposed architecture, Machine Intelligence Research Institute
• Proposed SASH confidential network logger Research prototype, Singapore AI Safety Hub (SASH)

On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

None on the map

Timed challenge-response and memory-occupation challenges

• Proposed Data-centre memory challenging Proposed architecture, Machine Intelligence Research Institute
• Research demo GPU contention probes Research prototype
• Proposed Low-trust AI compute verification system overview Proposed architecture, Machine Intelligence Research Institute
• Research demo SAGE Research prototype
• Research demo VRAM-residency challenge Research prototype

1. Fingerprinting All AI Cluster I/O Without Mutually Trusted Processors, N. Cankaya et al. (2026). Original
2. The Fundamentals and Feasibility of Secure Network Taps for Verifying AI Datacenter Use, N. Cankaya (2026). Original
3. A System Overview for Near-Term, Low-Trust AI Compute Verification, N. Cankaya (2026). Original
4. Verification Plan, R. Dean (2026). Original
5. Fitting a Network TAP to our Inference Verification Prototype, Amodo Design (2026). Original
6. Amodo-Design/Inference-Recomputation-Prototype (GitHub repository), Amodo Design (2026). Original
7. inference-verification: Inference Verification Prototype, Singapore AI Safety Hub (SASH) (2026). Original
8. Internationalising AI Verification, Singapore AI Safety Hub (SASH) (2026). Original
9. Adversarial Entropy Inflation Against Gumbel-Based Inference Verification, N. Kezins (2026). Original
10. Network Tapping for AI Verification: A Technical Assessment, Amodo Design (2026). Original
11. Timing and Memory Telemetry on GPUs for AI Governance, S. K. Monfared et al. (2026). Original
12. Guaranteeable Memory: An HBM-Based Chiplet for Verifiable AI Workloads, J. Petrie (2025). Original
13. Detecting Hidden ML Training With Zero-Overhead Telemetry, R. Rahman & S. Tajdari (2026). Original
14. On TEEs for Privacy-Preserving Monitoring in AI Governance, Gloria Z (2026). Original
15. NVIDIA Secure AI with Blackwell and Hopper GPUs (White Paper), NVIDIA (2025). Original
16. SAGE: Software-based Attestation for GPU Execution, A. Ivanov et al. (2023). Original
17. SWATT: SoftWare-based ATTestation for Embedded Devices, A. Seshadri et al. (2004). Original
18. Proofs of Space, S. Dziembowski et al. (2015). Original
19. Secure Code Update for Embedded Devices via Proofs of Secure Erasure, D. Perito & G. Tsudik (2010). Original
20. Software-Based Memory Erasure with Relaxed Isolation Requirements, S. Bursuc et al. (2024). Original
21. On the Difficulty of Software-Based Attestation of Embedded Devices, C. Castelluccia et al. (2009). Original
22. Refutation of "On the Difficulty of Software-Based Attestation of Embedded Devices", A. Perrig & L. van Doorn (2010). Original
23. Network Traffic Hashing, Amodo Design (2026). Original