Proposal Explorer

Add claims to see which ones the mechanisms address.

Operational use

• Operational use Hardware-attested weight binding for hardware-attested weight binding showing users that a service runs its committed weights

Built for an adversarial prover

Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

No new hardware needed

Hardware-attested weight binding and Chip registries and manufacturing records

Failures since mitigated

• Launch-state attestation does not by itself cover weights loaded later in Hardware-attested weight binding ^{1 11}

Attack testing records published testing for this use. It does not by itself show independent review, a formal proof or that a deployed system is secure.

• Hardware-attested weight binding: Independent red-team
• Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Analysis
• Chip registries and manufacturing records: Analysis

Open critical failures

• Underlying attestation can be forged or relayed in Hardware-attested weight binding

  Critical for weight binding against an operator with physical access to affected hardware, or with control of the hypervisor on an AMD SEV-SNP platform without AMD's fixes. PAL*M excludes physical attacks, and Tinfoil acknowledges this boundary.

  The enclave route inherits the platform-specific TEE attestation failures. Intel TDX forgery and H100 relay were demonstrated with physical access and host control. Battering RAM defeated AMD SEV-SNP attestation on DDR4 servers; RMPocalypse did so from malicious host software on platforms without AMD's fixes. These demonstrate failures of the trust roots, not of each model-commitment protocol. ^{2 3 7 8 9 10}

  Response: The TEE.fail authors report that physical interposer attacks are outside Intel's and AMD's threat models. AMD reports fixes for RMPocalypse.

  Known failure · Demonstrated attack · Critical · Open · Inherited finding. On the record · Related finding in TEE remote attestation for AI workloads

  Related mechanism Proposed Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: A tamper-protected enclosure around the chip is the proposed answer when the party that holds the hardware may attack it physically. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. In the proposal.

Open significant failures

4 failures in 2 mechanisms

• State attackers can likely defeat current secure enclosures in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

  The flexHEG authors write that "nation-state attackers can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures", and that the marginal cost of circumvention per device is hard to estimate. RAND similarly judges that anti-tamper measures "would not be insurmountable for a determined and well-resourced adversary", although they raise costs and can reveal tampering. ^{14 16}

  Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

• Firmware-only retrofits rely on Secure Boot, which fault injection can bypass in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

  Part II notes that the most common attack on Secure Boot replaces the firmware and applies a voltage glitch while the signature is being checked. It also notes that sophisticated actors may use microprobing or laser voltage probing to read key registers. ¹⁴

  Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

• FLOP accounting can be laundered through external data in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

  Results of earlier or parallel workloads could be hidden in the "external data" fed to a device, which would falsify the total FLOP count unless the inputs are explained or time delays are imposed. ¹⁴

  Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

• Documents and serial numbers can be forged in Chip registries and manufacturing records

  Avellar and Grunewald note that export documents can be forged, that companies can hide information behind obscure corporate structures, and that it may be possible to forge serial numbers on chips and racks. They recommend cryptographic attestation of a powered-on chip as an extra check. ²⁰

  Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

Scope limitations

• For private models, a user can confirm consistency but not content in Hardware-attested weight binding

  When weights are not published, users can check that the same root hash is served each time, but not what the model is. Pairing the hash with an attested evaluation, as in Attestable Audits, is one proposed remedy. ^{1 12}

  Scope limitation · Open question. On the record

• Many important rules cannot be checked on-chip in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

  Malicious intent "is not a technical property observable on-chip", and misuse depends on what is done with a computation's results. A guarantee processor cannot easily tell whether a network is the whole system or one expert in a mixture-of-experts system. Part III judges that a fully local ruleset "may not be entirely feasible" for the same reason. ^{13 15}

  Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

• Coverage stops at flexHEG-equipped chips in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

  Motivated actors will always be able to use some compute that is not flexHEG-equipped. Recalling existing consumer GPUs would likely be impractical, and reaching perfect coverage, or conclusively proving that no secret government data centres exist, would be "practically quite difficult". ^{13 15}

  Scope limitation · Open question. On the record

  Related mechanism Proposed Chip registries and manufacturing records: Accounts for which chips exist and who holds them. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. In the proposal.

  Related mechanism Proposed Remote detection of data centres: Looks for undeclared facilities that hold other chips. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. Add

• Records cover only chips that were recorded in Chip registries and manufacturing records

  A registry or commitment accounts only for chips entered into it. Cankaya asks how a verifier would know it had found all chips, or how much "dark compute" remains, and notes that a fraudulent original record would mean unregistered chips had been made in advance. Halstead and Larsen propose reconstructing earlier production by auditing upstream suppliers. ^{21 23}

  Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

  Related mechanism Proposed Remote detection of data centres: Looks for large data centres that were never declared, which a registry cannot show. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. Add

• Insiders could alter records before they are fixed in Chip registries and manufacturing records

  Cankaya argues that insiders who can photograph process secrets could also tamper with production records. A commitment makes changes after publication detectable, but it cannot show that the records were accurate when committed. ²¹

  Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

Open questions

• Supply-chain diversion and hidden backdoors in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

  Components could be diverted before a guarantee processor is added, and backdoors could be introduced during design or manufacturing. Open-source designs and physical scans of randomly selected chips are proposed as countermeasures. Part III proposes international oversight of production and extensive testing of a random sample of finished devices. ^{14 15}

  Open question · Open question. On the record

  Related mechanism Proposed Chip registries and manufacturing records: Records each chip's identity and owner from the fab onwards, which bears on diversion before a guarantee processor is fitted. It does not address hidden backdoors. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. In the proposal.

Not yet demonstrated

Proposed Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors and Proposed Chip registries and manufacturing records

Need new chip designs

Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

Mechanisms on the map that are not in the proposal. Pointers, not recommendations. ?

• Operational use TEE remote attestation for AI workloads Add
  • Hardware-attested weight binding waits on it. Attestation that resists physical attackers, for the enclave variant.
  • Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors depends on it.
• Research demo Tamper evidence for verifier devices Add
  • Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors waits on it. State-level attackers who hold the hardware can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures.

Missing prerequisites

• Operational use TEE remote attestation for AI workloads needed by Hardware-attested weight binding and Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors Add

Shared foundations

• TEE remote attestation for AI workloads relied on by Hardware-attested weight binding and Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

Blockers

9 blockers recorded

• Hardware-attested weight binding
  • Attestation that resists physical attackers, for the enclave variant. Hardware trust. Waits on TEE remote attestation for AI workloads ⁷
• Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors
  • Integrated flexHEG needs substantial help from the accelerator manufacturer, and the authors estimate 3.7–7.9 years, from when the manufacturer starts work, for such hardware to displace other accelerators in frontier development. Access & governance ¹⁴
  • State-level attackers who hold the hardware can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures. Hardware trust. Waits on Tamper evidence for verifier devices ^{14 16}
  • Rival states would need to trust the design and manufacture of guarantee processors and enclosures, for example through open design, redundant processors from each side or oversight of production. Hardware trust ^{13 15}
  • Restricting future rule updates would need a formal language for rules, which the authors judge most likely infeasible for early flexHEG versions. Protocol soundness ¹³
  • Governing all relevant chips depends on knowing where they are, through chip registries and detection of undeclared facilities. Coverage & hidden compute. Waits on Chip registries and manufacturing records ¹⁵
• Chip registries and manufacturing records
  • No implementation of an AI chip registry has been publicly reported, and covering re-exports would need cooperation from re-exporters and foreign governments that may not be feasible everywhere. Access & governance ^{19 20}
  • Linking records to physical chips needs hard-to-spoof unique IDs and inspections. Hardware trust ^{19 20 21}
  • Chips produced before a registry starts must be reconstructed from supplier records. Coverage & hidden compute ^{21 23}

From the family or selected implementation's record. ?

Model weights

Hidden by Hardware-attested weight binding and Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors.

Not involved: Chip registries and manufacturing records.

Inputs and outputs

Hidden by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors.

Not involved: Chip registries and manufacturing records.

Unspecified for Hardware-attested weight binding. Check the implementation record.

Training data

Hidden by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors.

Not involved: Hardware-attested weight binding and Chip registries and manufacturing records.

Hardware-attested weight binding

• Research demo Attestable Audits Research prototype, University of Cambridge
• Research demo PAL*M Research prototype, University of Waterloo
• Operational use Tinfoil model identity (Modelwrap) Product, Tinfoil

Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

None on the map

Chip registries and manufacturing records

None on the map

1. How Tinfoil Proves Exactly What Model Is Running, Tinfoil Team (2026). Original
2. PAL*M: Property Attestation for Large Generative Models, P. Chantasantitam et al. (2026). Original
3. A primer on secure enclaves, Tinfoil (2026). Original
4. Backend infrastructure, Tinfoil (2026). Original
5. How verification works in Tinfoil, Tinfoil (2026). Original
6. modelwrap: Reproducible dm-verity read-only image of Huggingface models, Tinfoil (2026). Original
7. TEE.fail: Breaking Trusted Execution Environments via DDR5 Memory Bus Interposition, J. Chuang et al. (2026). Original
8. Battering RAM: Low-Cost Interposer Attacks on Confidential Computing via Dynamic Memory Aliasing, J. De Meulemeester et al. (2026). Original
9. RMPocalypse: How a Catch-22 Breaks AMD SEV-SNP, B. Schlüter & S. Shinde (2025). Original
10. SEV-SNP RMP Initialization Vulnerability (AMD-SB-3020), AMD (2025). Original
11. On TEEs for Privacy-Preserving Monitoring in AI Governance, Gloria Z (2026). Original
12. Attestable Audits: Verifiable AI Safety Benchmarks Using Trusted Execution Environments, C. Schnabl et al. (2025). Original
13. Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees for AI Compute, J. Petrie et al. (2025). Original
14. Technical Options for Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees, J. Petrie & O. Aarne (2025). Original
15. International Security Applications of Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees, O. Aarne & J. Petrie (2025). Original
16. Hardware-Enabled Governance Mechanisms: Developing Technical Solutions to Exempt Items Otherwise Classified Under Export Control Classification Numbers 3A090 and 4A090, G. Kulp et al. (2024). Original
17. Secure, Governable Chips: Using On-Chip Mechanisms to Manage National Security Risks from AI & Advanced Computing, O. Aarne et al. (2024). Original
18. Hardware-Enabled Mechanisms for Verifying Responsible AI Development, A. O'Gara et al. (2025). Original
19. Verifying International Agreements on AI: Six Layers of Verification for Rules on Large-Scale AI Development and Deployment, M. Baker et al. (2025). Original
20. Near-Term Verification Methods for AI Chip Exports, B. Avellar & E. Grunewald (2026). Original
21. TSMC most definitely has a golden record of all AI chips it made, N. Cankaya (2025). Original
22. Hardware-Level Governance of AI Compute: A Feasibility Taxonomy for Regulatory Compliance and Treaty Verification, S. Ansari (2026). Original
23. Covert AI Projects, B. Halstead & T. Larsen (2026). Original