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A verification proposal from the AI Verification Tech Map, from its records of 2026-10-09. https://trustbutveri.fyi/explorer/?mechanisms=M-0014,M-0010,M-0009&implementations=M-0014:I-0010

Claims

Mechanisms3

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Analysis

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  • Open failures: n critical n significant n minor
Claim coverageNo claims yet

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Properties1 built for an adversarial prover
Attack testing3 mechanisms with published testing

Attack testing records published testing for this use. It does not by itself show independent review, a formal proof or that a deployed system is secure.

Limits1 family with findings to check · 6 scope limitations · 2 open questions · 2 not yet demonstrated · 2 mechanisms with open significant failures
Family findings
  • Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization

    Context for RAND secure inference data center (SIDC) design. Findings from the mechanism family appear here as context. They apply to an implementation only when its own record lists them, under the conditions stated there.

    • Low-communication training reduces the bandwidth training needs in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization

      DiLoCo matched fully synchronous training on 8 workers while communicating 500 times less. Rahman writes that this family of methods theoretically allows large-scale training with less than 100 Mbps. Lucid includes these methods in its bounds, but notes that extreme activation compression, architectures with unusually small inter-layer widths, or modular paradigms could erode the margin. 2 3 4

      Open question · Theoretical argument. On the record

    • Operator control of pod routing collapses the bound in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization

      Lucid's analysis finds that if the operator can freely assign pods to routers, it could dedicate a whole cell of 100 or more pods to one pipeline stage. The bound then falls to about 90–220x uncompressed and as low as about 25x with compression. The proposed mitigation, auditor-controlled random assignment that is periodically re-randomized, has not been implemented. 4

      Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

    • Undeclared local storage raises per-pod capacity in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization

      More memory or storage per pod helps an adversary. Lucid requires per-pod storage to be declared, capped and physically inspected. 4

      Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

    • Training within one pod is not covered in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization

      Lucid's bounds concern pre-training models larger than the pods are sized for. Training models that fit in one pod, fine-tuning and reinforcement-learning post-training within one pod are outside the modelled threat. 4

      Scope limitation · Open question. On the record

    • Parallel scale-up switches are hard enforcement points in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization

      In GB200 topologies, GPUs reach GPUs in other nodes through NVSwitches without a NIC on the path. Amodo notes that limits are hard to enforce there because many switches work in parallel, so compromising one or two would bypass the limit. 5

      Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

Open significant failures
5 failures in 2 mechanisms
  • Adversarially disguised fine-tuning partly evades classification in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

    Across 20 evasion strategy families in five monitor-evader rounds, the classifier's accuracy against the most challenging disguised workloads held out from training was 43–87%. White-box LoRA fine-tuning was the only evasion family detected less than half the time. The evaluation covered single nodes, PyTorch-level evasion and NVIDIA hardware. 8

    Known failure · Demonstrated attack · Significant · Open. On the record

  • Counters leak information about protected workloads in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

    Performance counters have been used as a side channel against TEEs, for example in CounterSEVeillance. NVIDIA disables performance counters in full confidential-computing mode, stating that they could provide an avenue for side-channel attacks. Richer counters for verification therefore pull against confidentiality. 9 10

    Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

  • State attackers can likely defeat current secure enclosures in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

    The flexHEG authors write that "nation-state attackers can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures", and that the marginal cost of circumvention per device is hard to estimate. RAND similarly judges that anti-tamper measures "would not be insurmountable for a determined and well-resourced adversary", although they raise costs and can reveal tampering. 12 14

    Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

  • Firmware-only retrofits rely on Secure Boot, which fault injection can bypass in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

    Part II notes that the most common attack on Secure Boot replaces the firmware and applies a voltage glitch while the signature is being checked. It also notes that sophisticated actors may use microprobing or laser voltage probing to read key registers. 12

    Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

  • FLOP accounting can be laundered through external data in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

    Results of earlier or parallel workloads could be hidden in the "external data" fed to a device, which would falsify the total FLOP count unless the inputs are explained or time delays are imposed. 12

    Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

Scope limitations
  • Everything rests on the trusted setup in RAND secure inference data center (SIDC) design

    Reference measurements for model weights and reference data are established in a trusted setup phase. The report states that the system cannot detect compromise that happened before ingestion if the trusted setup itself is compromised. 1

    Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

  • Security weakens over long operation in RAND secure inference data center (SIDC) design

    The authors claim that the facility can withstand attacks at the OC5 level for a five-year operational period. They expect its ability to withstand long OC5 campaigns to become less robust the longer the facility remains in operation. 1

    Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

  • Software-read telemetry can be forged by the operator in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

    NVML-based classification assumes trustworthy telemetry. Without a tamper-resistant read path, an authenticated telemetry channel and secure boot of the monitoring software, an operator who controls the full software stack could forge counter values. Monfared et al. start from the same premise: current GPUs expose little trusted telemetry and can be modified or virtualized. 6 8

    Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

    Related mechanism Proposed Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: A guarantee processor on the chip would give the tamper-resistant, authenticated telemetry path the flaw says is missing. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. In the proposal.

  • Timing challenges do not identify the individual chip in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

    GEMM and VDF challenges can be answered by identical GPUs elsewhere, and floating-point fingerprints distinguish GPU models, not individual devices. GPU virtualization adds timing leakage that prevents attributing compute use. 6

    Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

  • Many important rules cannot be checked on-chip in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

    Malicious intent "is not a technical property observable on-chip", and misuse depends on what is done with a computation's results. A guarantee processor cannot easily tell whether a network is the whole system or one expert in a mixture-of-experts system. Part III judges that a fully local ruleset "may not be entirely feasible" for the same reason. 11 13

    Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

  • Coverage stops at flexHEG-equipped chips in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

    Motivated actors will always be able to use some compute that is not flexHEG-equipped. Recalling existing consumer GPUs would likely be impractical, and reaching perfect coverage, or conclusively proving that no secret government data centres exist, would be "practically quite difficult". 11 13

    Scope limitation · Open question. On the record

    Related mechanism Proposed Chip registries and manufacturing records: Accounts for which chips exist and who holds them. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. Add

    Related mechanism Proposed Remote detection of data centres: Looks for undeclared facilities that hold other chips. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. Add

Open questions
  • No quantified error rates or formal thresholds for timing primitives in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

    Monfared et al. state that false-positive and false-negative rates are not quantified and leave hardware-specific formal thresholds to future work. 6

    Open question · Open question. On the record

  • Supply-chain diversion and hidden backdoors in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

    Components could be diverted before a guarantee processor is added, and backdoors could be introduced during design or manufacturing. Open-source designs and physical scans of randomly selected chips are proposed as countermeasures. Part III proposes international oversight of production and extensive testing of a random sample of finished devices. 12 13

    Open question · Open question. On the record

    Related mechanism Proposed Chip registries and manufacturing records: Records each chip's identity and owner from the fab onwards, which bears on diversion before a guarantee processor is fitted. It does not address hidden backdoors. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. Add

Possible additions3 for dependencies

Mechanisms on the map that are not in the proposal. Pointers, not recommendations.

Dependencies2 missing prerequisites · 1 shared foundation · 13 blockers
Missing prerequisites
Shared foundations
Blockers
13 blockers recorded
  • Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization
    • No prototype exists; RAND recommends prototyping key security features and integration now. Adversarial validation 1
    • The report describes internal integrity checks, audit logging and accreditation, but no way for a party outside the operator to verify the facility's properties. Access & governance 1
    • Human review of every prompt and response makes each request take three to five minutes, with the review steps as the rate-limiting factor. Performance & compatibility 1
    • Detailed design information is withheld from the public report and is to be evaluated privately with stakeholders, which limits independent public scrutiny. Access & governance 1
  • On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters
    • Shipping accelerators need a tamper-resistant, authenticated telemetry path. Hardware trust. Waits on Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors 7 8
    • NVIDIA's full confidential-computing mode disables the hardware performance counters its profiling tools use, so telemetry that needs them conflicts with it. Privacy & leakage 9 10
    • Continuous challenge puzzles cost power and throughput on production workloads. Performance & compatibility 6
    • Evaluation has not gone beyond single nodes, framework-level evasion and one vendor's hardware. Adversarial validation 8
  • Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors
    • Integrated flexHEG needs substantial help from the accelerator manufacturer, and the authors estimate 3.7–7.9 years, from when the manufacturer starts work, for such hardware to displace other accelerators in frontier development. Access & governance 12
    • State-level attackers who hold the hardware can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures. Hardware trust. Waits on Tamper evidence for verifier devices 12 14
    • Rival states would need to trust the design and manufacture of guarantee processors and enclosures, for example through open design, redundant processors from each side or oversight of production. Hardware trust 11 13
    • Restricting future rule updates would need a formal language for rules, which the authors judge most likely infeasible for early flexHEG versions. Protocol soundness 11
    • Governing all relevant chips depends on knowing where they are, through chip registries and detection of undeclared facilities. Coverage & hidden compute. Waits on Chip registries and manufacturing records 13
What the verifier sees1 unspecified · 1 depend on design

From the family or selected implementation's record.

Exposure notes
Implementations2 systems
Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization
On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters
None on the map
Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors
None on the map
Sources16 cited
  1. Highly Secure Inference Data Centers: A Vertically Integrated Strategy for Security Engineering, S. F. Comer et al. (2026). Original
  2. DiLoCo: Distributed Low-Communication Training of Language Models, A. Douillard et al. (2024). Original
  3. Does Distributed Training Undermine Compute Governance?, R. Rahman (2026). Original
  4. Traffic Shaping for Workload Classification, Lucid Computing (2026). Original
  5. The Tray as a Bandwidth Boundary, Amodo Design (2026). Original
  6. Timing and Memory Telemetry on GPUs for AI Governance, S. K. Monfared et al. (2026). Original
  7. Guaranteeable Memory: An HBM-Based Chiplet for Verifiable AI Workloads, J. Petrie (2025). Original
  8. Detecting Hidden ML Training With Zero-Overhead Telemetry, R. Rahman & S. Tajdari (2026). Original
  9. On TEEs for Privacy-Preserving Monitoring in AI Governance, Gloria Z (2026). Original
  10. NVIDIA Secure AI with Blackwell and Hopper GPUs (White Paper), NVIDIA (2025). Original
  11. Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees for AI Compute, J. Petrie et al. (2025). Original
  12. Technical Options for Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees, J. Petrie & O. Aarne (2025). Original
  13. International Security Applications of Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees, O. Aarne & J. Petrie (2025). Original
  14. Hardware-Enabled Governance Mechanisms: Developing Technical Solutions to Exempt Items Otherwise Classified Under Export Control Classification Numbers 3A090 and 4A090, G. Kulp et al. (2024). Original
  15. Secure, Governable Chips: Using On-Chip Mechanisms to Manage National Security Risks from AI & Advanced Computing, O. Aarne et al. (2024). Original
  16. Hardware-Enabled Mechanisms for Verifying Responsible AI Development, A. O'Gara et al. (2025). Original

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Filter mechanisms

Filters apply to mechanisms only. They describe the setting a proposal is for, and all are off by default. A mechanism that a filter rules out is flagged and does not count towards claim coverage. Selected implementations use their own record fields. A match means not excluded; conditional or unspecified exposure stays with a note. Passing a filter does not establish that the assumptions hold in a deployment.

All 25 mechanisms match.

Prover

How far can the party being checked be trusted?

The prover is the party being checked. Semi-trusted designs rely on part of its stack: usually the chip vendor's hardware root of trust, its firmware or counters, or its supply-chain records. Adversarial designs aim to hold even if it cheats wherever the checks allow, within their stated assumptions.

Keeps mechanisms whose threat model holds against at least this prover. Adversarial is the strongest assumption. Definitions

Verifier devices on site

May the verifier install its own hardware at the prover's sites?

Some mechanisms need a device the verifier owns or trusts at the prover's facility, such as a network tap, a bandwidth limiter or a sealed sensor. Choose Not allowed when the setting rules that out. Inspectors are not covered.

"Not allowed" removes mechanisms that need a retrofit device, such as a network tap or a sealed sensor. Definitions

Prover cooperation

How much must the prover take part?

Required: the prover takes part, for example by logging requests, producing proofs or opening records. Partial: some access, such as installing a device. Not required: works from outside, such as satellite imagery.

"Partial at most" removes mechanisms that need the prover's active participation. "Not required" keeps only those that work without it. Definitions

Chips

May the proposal depend on new chip designs?

New chip features take years to reach a deployed fleet and cover only chips made after they ship. Mechanisms that use shipping features, such as trusted execution environments or performance counters, stay.

"Existing chips only" removes mechanisms that need changes to future chip designs. Definitions

Minimum development status

Development status

A level describes the public evidence for a mechanism's stated use, not its cost or feasibility. R3 can still have open critical flaws.

Keeps mechanisms whose readiness level is at least this one. Definitions

Attack testing

How hard has each mechanism been attacked in public?

The strongest published attempt to break the mechanism for its verification use: a security analysis, red-teaming by its developers or collaborators, or a red team independent of them.

Keeps mechanisms whose strongest published attack testing is at least this. Definitions

Keep hidden from the verifier

What must the verifier never see? Choose any.

Model weights: the checked model's parameters. Inputs and outputs: the requests a deployed model serves and its responses. Training data: what a model was trained on. Each mechanism's exposure is the editors' reading of its record: shown, depends on the design (kept, with a note), hidden, not involved, or unspecified for a selected implementation. Code and configuration are not covered yet.

Removes mechanisms that show the asset to the verifier. Conditional or unspecified exposure stays with a note and needs checking against the privacy requirement.

Claims

A claim is something one party wants to verify about another party's AI hardware or software. Each claim's number shows how the proposal addresses it.

  • Addressed. A mechanism in the proposal is aimed at this claim and is not excluded by the filters.
  • Partly addressed. Only supporting mechanisms, or mechanisms aimed at it that the filters exclude.
  • Unaddressed. No mechanism in the proposal addresses this claim.

Addressed means a mechanism in the proposal is aimed at the claim and is not excluded by your filters. It does not mean the claim is verified: check its assessed use, development status, security evidence, assumptions and findings.

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Mechanisms

A mechanism is a general technique for verifying claims. Its badge is its development status for its stated use. An optional implementation choice narrows its assumptions, assessed use and claim links to that record. Lines join it to the claims it addresses. Click a line for details.Under its name it lists the claims it is aimed at or supports.

  • Aimed at the claim: verifying it is a direct purpose of the mechanism.
  • Supports the claim: helps verify it without being aimed at it.
  • Faint: excluded by your filters, so it does not count towards claim coverage.

All mechanisms

Overview

One row per mechanism in the proposal. Every mark comes from that mechanism's record, as listed in the panels below; what the verifier sees is the editors' reading of the record's text. Failure counts are per mechanism. Summary counts name mechanisms with open failures, not a sum of attacks. Choosing an implementation narrows each row to that record's assessed use; family findings remain as context. Findings are grouped as known failures, scope limitations and open questions. Only known failures count as failures. Counts are an inventory of published findings, not a risk score.

What the verifier sees

For model weights, inputs and outputs, and training data. This is the editors' reading of each mechanism's record (its threat model, how it works and its limitations), not a field of the record. Shown: the verifier sees it. Depends: on the design or variant, or the verifier sees only samples. Hidden: the verifier sees only commitments, hashes, proofs or results. Not involved: the record does not handle it. Unspecified: the selected implementation has no asset-specific assessment here.

Possible additions

Mechanisms on the map, not in the proposal, that the records connect to an unaddressed or partly addressed claim, an open failure or a dependency. They are pointers, not recommendations: each brings its own readiness level and findings, and none is claimed to close a failure. Links from failures are the editors' reading of the two records.

Start from a published design

Choosing a design loads the mechanisms its record realises or depends on. If the proposal has no claims yet, it also loads the claims that record says the design addresses.

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